

# Assessing the Interface between Military Diplomatic Tools and Military Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

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**Abstract-** Military diplomacy is increasingly emerging as an approach in the management of intra state conflicts globally. Far more common and controversial is the issue of combat troops to help end fighting in an intractable conflict. The Horn of Africa represents a classic example of a region that has witnessed many conflicts attracting several international, regional and even individual state initiatives to ameliorate the situation. The Somalia and Sudan crises provide typical examples in which such efforts have been witnessed yet they also provide a case study of successful military diplomacy by African states in states engaged in protracted intra-state conflicts. This study was conceived to assess the interface between military diplomacy tools and military intervention in intrastate conflicts in the Horn of Africa. This study was juxtaposed in just war theory. The study was carried out among peace groups and individuals who had participated in peace processes in the Horn of Africa. Personnel who have had a role in the Horn of Africa peace processes at African Union (AU), Inter - Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East Africa Standby Force (EASF), United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), United Nations Africa (Union) Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and African (Union) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) were key informants. The study used purposive sampling and snowballing to determine the sample size. Data was collected using interview schedules and questionnaires which were analyzed using Concurrent Nested (Embedded) Design. Secondary data was gathered and reviewed from Journals, books and published proceedings that corroborated the primary data. Drawing a nexus between soft power and hard power in diplomatic efforts, this study makes a contribution to peace and conflict studies based on the interface between the two instruments of power: military and diplomacy. There is an interface between military diplomatic tools and military intervention in conflicts. The study found out that arms transfer was the most common diplomatic program used by the military, in contrast weapons shipments increase the duration and hostility levels and make the termination of civil conflicts less likely. These efforts are complemented by compensatory interventions including peacekeeping military, humanitarian agencies and NGOs functions which provide the necessary assistance, not only towards the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme, but also enhancing local and national capacities through active engagement, consultation and

participation in the planning and implementation of the programme. It is recommended that the 'carpenter's tool box' model be adopted in which every item in the tool box has a specific role to play in conflict management and, therefore, it is the complementarity of the efforts between the military, police, civilian components and entirety of society that will lead to conflict management in the Horn of Africa.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Military intervention in conflict theatres has been focused on the condign strategies to the detriment of soft power tools including compensatory and conditioning power tools. These are tools derived from the analysis of the exercise of power as advanced by John Kenneth Galbraith and whose relevance can be juxtaposed in the use of military diplomatic tools. According to Galbraith (1989) there are three military diplomacy power tools. The first is condign power which refers to winning submission by making the alternative to submission sufficiently painful. The second is compensatory which involves use of rewards or payments sufficiently advantageous or agreeable so that one foregoes pursuit of one's own preferences to seek the reward instead. Finally, Conditioning power is exercised by changing belief through persuasion, education or social commitment to what seems natural, proper or right.

The linkage, therefore, between military practice and diplomacy can be traced back to centuries past. From the earliest recorded days of warfare, military theorists and practitioners, revealed the relationships of these elements and the need to coordinate them to realize maximum efficiency. If this coordination could be well knit in the Horn of Africa then the management of intra state conflicts in the region could be realized. Historically, militaries have been associated with the use of force to achieve the desired political objectives. Despite of this, there have been numerous instances where military diplomacy has been used for peace so as to further the country's international relations. In his writings on Offensive Strategy, Sun Tzu asserts that for to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill (Sun Tzu, 1968). What the military thinker meant was that attaining several victories, whatever the number, in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence but subjugating the enemy

army without fighting or firing a single round is the true pinnacle of excellence or victory.

The emphasis Sun Tzu places on the use of skill as opposed to force is apparent from the foregoing. Further, he writes about managing the battle environment in order to influence future outcomes, which he sees as the essence of military diplomacy (Sun Tzu, 1968). It would be interesting to unravel the way military skill has been used in the resolution of intrastate conflicts in the Horn of Africa thus interfacing military diplomatic tools with military intervention in intrastate conflict management.

Johnson and Hall (2005) note some positive attitudes with regard to diplomacy among the English School scholars, where it assumes the role of an institution structuring relations among politics (not states) and even elicits the highest level of abstraction in a dualism of mediation of universalism and particularism. Alongside this positive trait, they also cite diplomatic repertoire especially with regard to the aspects of communication and representation which can be described as the hallmark of diplomacy; that is, to moderate and manage the clash of conflicting interests as efficiently as possible.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The conflicts in the Horn of Africa have witnessed a lot of international attention with growing number of military bases. In fact, this is akin to militarization of the entire Horn of Africa. In this context, third party involvement in the form of facilitative mediation, problem solving workshops, training in conflict resolution and post conflict rehabilitation, are the tools available for international actors. These initiatives require a non-partisan third party role in the conflicts and are designed to deal with trust and perception related matters that cripple relationships (McDonald, 2004).

Military diplomacy as a concept has gained relevance considering that diplomacy has experienced a significant transformation particularly in the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Military diplomacy performs several functions including a strong commitment to economic investment in the future of disparate regions to enhance partnerships within those regions. It equally helps to generate sustained diplomatic efforts, with military diplomacy taking the centre stage in a region held hostage by conflict (Healy, 2008). Specific reference has been made to the erosion of the barrier of sovereignty which has cushioned states against interference in their internal affairs by other states and non-state actors (Migue, 2014). It is contextualized not only within the realm of defense diplomacy, but also within the wider framework of a country's diplomacy as exemplified in the foreign policy. It can also be considered as one of the tools of a country's diplomatic practice in furtherance of its foreign policy objectives.

The linkage, therefore, between military practice and diplomacy can be traced back to centuries past. From the earliest recorded days of warfare, military theorists and practitioners, revealed the relationships of these elements and the need to coordinate them to realize maximum efficiency. If this coordination could be well knit in the Horn of Africa then the management of intra state conflicts in the region could be realized. Reputed theorists and practitioners include; Sun Tzu, Fredrick the Great, Carl Von Clausewitz, and Alfred Thayer Mayer (Williard, 2008).

Philips (1985) notes the vital relationship between military activities and diplomatic activities as integrated tools in a nation's pool of power. While he practiced formal diplomacy extensively, he emphasized the importance of public and military diplomacy. Further, he underscored the need to appreciate the environment within which his generals operated in by making visits to study the country where you are going to act, roads are examined, and the mayors of the village, the butchers, and farmers are talked to. Clausewitz (1968), like Sun Tzu, emphasized the ability of a great commander achieving an end state through varied means of influence. At one level he talks of the soldier statesman whom he sees as the cornerstone of modern military diplomacy. The role of a soldier is first that of a fighter and also that of a statesman who deals with issues of policy. He, therefore, draws the important linkage of military activities to those of policy. He advocates the need to synchronize military capabilities with other tools of policy implementation for the desired effects (Clausewitz, 1968). This study examined whether such military activities have been harmonized with those of policy in an attempt to manage intrastate conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

The multi-faceted nature of security threats has challenged the strategic posture of states. New emerging security interests have therefore opened a wide array of concerns that include and not limited to: food security, population control and even issues of environment. In this rapidly changing environment, there are security implications for diplomacy that are complex and evolving. Security can therefore be viewed as the pursuit of policies through diplomatic and military means to confront such external threats as; regime maintenance, the attainment of a reasonable level of economic sustenance, ethnic cohesion, trans-boundary sources of instability and access to natural resources. At another level, the UN financial crisis and global politics has diminished the linkages between diplomacy (military) and peacekeeping. This has resulted in hampered peacekeeping operations, some of which have been withdrawn or have not received desired expanded support at critical moments. Examples are given in Somalia and Bosnia. At the regional level, African states have found it difficult to establish viable security arrangements. This was particularly evident during the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) era whose preoccupation was mainly in the political and economic arena. The case of the African Union (AU) has not significantly changed the status of regional security arrangements in spite of the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

A study by Bademosi (2012) investigated the ethical dilemmas of Kenyan military intervention in Somalia. The case study targeted international governmental organizations, state security departments and NGOs relying on interviews and document analysis. Bademosi employed the just war theory as a vehicle to analyze the morality of the Kenyan intervention in Somalia. The study found out that the role of non-state actors in Somalia is significant because the government has been more or less absent in the last several decades. It concluded that engaging more moderate Muslims and including them in their intervention can offer a long-term strategy to countering terrorism in Somalia (Bademosi, 2012). The study recommended the need for Kenya to capitalize on various forms of nontraditional diplomacy efforts for example non-traditional diplomatic tools like faith-based diplomacy to engage stakeholders, towards Somalia. Military

diplomacy is also another non-traditional diplomatic tool to find relevance in the Horn of Africa.

In the theory of Sea Power, Mohani (2012), demonstrates the means of achieving a variety of goals be they, informational, diplomatic, military and economic through what he calls maritime military diplomacy. The use of maritime power has also been referred to as Gunboat Diplomacy. The author, therefore, saw the maintenance of a naval fleet as a prerequisite to the advancement of economic interests by means of sheer presence. Gunboat diplomacy has therefore been described as the application of sea based power resources in the furtherance of national interests. This application can be either in the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign state. The concept of gunboat diplomacy traces its origin to the period of colonialism at the height of European imperialism. The European powers used demonstration of superior maritime military power to intimidate states into offering them concessions. Indeed, the sight of a warship or fleet elicited the desired response (Mohani, 2012). Although some maritime strategists associate gunboat diplomacy with yesteryears of colonialism, it has significance in the contemporary age. For example, the employment of the KDF's maritime military resources (Kenya Navy) both within Kenya's Coastal waters and that of Somalia, demonstrated military diplomacy and whether this portended any condign or compensatory power in influencing intra state conflict management in the Horn of Africa was the focus of this study.

### III. THE JUST WAR THEORY

In an attempt to understand the interface between diplomacy and military intervention in intrastate conflict management in the Horn of Africa, the study was guided by the just war theory as propagated by among others, St. Augustine, Michael Walzer and Bellamy. Just war theory offers rules to guide decision-makers on the appropriateness of their conduct during the resort to war, conduct during war, the termination phase of the conflict and the post war settlement and reconstruction. Its over-all aim is to try and ensure that wars are begun only for a very narrow set of truly defensible reasons, that when wars break out, they are fought in a responsibly controlled and targeted manner, and that the parties to the dispute bring their war to an end in a speedy and responsible fashion that respects the requirements of justice. These guide military intervention.

The main argument behind the just war theory is the ethical arguments about the resort to and conduct of war. According to St. Augustine, waging war and extending influence over other territories may seem justified to wicked men, but to good men it is seen only as a necessary evil. However, according to Dyson (1998), although war is bad, it is necessary if it prevents a greater harm. According to Walzer (1977), just war theory broken into its two main categories tries to dictate the justification for going to war (*jus ad bellum*) and once engaged, the conduct of the combatants involved (*jus in bello*) (Walzer 1977). The interesting question is then; When is war morally acceptable (*jus ad bellum*)? And how can morality be observed by combatants (*jus in bello*)? *Jus in bello* refers to justice in war, or right conduct in the midst of battle. Responsibility for state adherence to *jus in bello* norms falls primarily on the shoulders of those military commanders, officers and soldiers who formulate and execute the war policy of

a particular state which involves a lot of military diplomacy in their interaction.

Bellamy (2012) argues that natural law is grounded in moral reasoning. It holds that proper behavior is governed by precepts that can be known by reason and are binding on all rational beings. Chief among these precepts is that natural rights accrue to people simply by virtue of their being human (Bell and Coicoud). Natural law recognizes the right and, according to some thinkers, the duty of sovereigns to use force to uphold the good of the human community, particularly in cases where unjust injury is inflicted on innocents. This is very valid in application of military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa particularly the use of condign power and military interventions. Just war theory is probably the most influential perspective on the ethics of war and peace. The tradition has thus been doubly influential, dominating both moral and legal discourse surrounding war. It sets the tone, and the parameters, for the great debate surrounding the concept of military diplomacy.

### IV. METHODOLOGY

The study area is the Horn of Africa (HOA); The HOA is a large extension of land that protrudes from the eastern edge of the continent of Africa lying between the Indian Ocean to the East and the Gulf of Aden to the North jutting for hundreds of kilometers into the Arabian Sea including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda which are members of (IGAD).

The Horn of Africa is a location of strategic importance globally since it is a gateway from and to the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arab Gulf and the Indian Ocean. It is also the continent's gateway to Asia and Middle East with deep historical ties to India and China who present themselves as powerhouses in trade and investment deals. The peace, security and stability of the region therefore is paramount not only to Africa as a continent but also to the Arab countries and the West (Fahmy, 2006).

This study employed a mixed methods design covering the target regions including Kenya (Nairobi), Somalia (Mogadishu and Kismayu), Sudan (Khartoum), South Sudan (Juba) and Ethiopia (Addis Ababa). The total sample size for the study was 270. The specific respondents for study included; state actors (Foreign Affairs, Horn of Africa Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), Ministry of Defense, Kenya, Sudan and Somalia Embassies, Non state actors (Media houses, Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Civil society) and religious institutions. The researcher considered them relevant for study because they had experience with the central phenomenon of military diplomacy and intra state conflict management. The study used both probability and nonprobability sampling techniques; and utilized simple random sampling technique and purposive sampling to determine the settings and the participants. The data was collected using questionnaires, interview guides and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) guides. Secondary data was sourced from reading literature in secondary sources.

V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS.

The field study endeavoured to elicit responses from key informants who had versed knowledge in conflict management and had either practiced or participated in the Somalia and/or Sudan conflict(s) to explain the nexus between military and non-military tools. This was nested with 270 questionnaires distributed across the areas of study. This is also supported by documentary analysis. One key informant interviewed in Nairobi on 18 June 2018 likened the nexus between the use of military and non-military tools in conflict management to a carpenter’s tool box: In conflict the tools you choose can be likened to a carpenter’s tool box where the choice of a tool to be used depends on the task ahead, you cannot choose a hacksaw to deal with a nail instead you use a hammer and so forth....

From the foregoing, as a foreign policy action, diplomacy entails the process through which a given state employs political, social and economic means at its disposal across recognized boundaries aimed at affecting the political authorities of the target. Therefore the concept of the ‘Carpenters Tool Box’ in conflict management is in agreement with reviewed literature of Mohani (2012) that while diplomacy is the first line of defence among states, military is the last one and involves the use of force especially what this study has discussed extensively as condign power. Therefore there is vital relationship between military activities and diplomatic activities as integrated tools in a nation’s pool of power, which is well postulated in the just war theory which requires the use of military power as a last resort. The integrated use of a nation’s pool of power is demonstrated in scholarly works of people like Sun Tzu (1968) who wrote that to fight and win a thousand wars is not the acme of skill but to subdue the enemy is the acme of skill.

Militarized diplomacy as a foreign policy action in the Horn of Africa has been a salient national security feature, regionally, sub-regionally and internationally in lieu of the escalation of intrastate conflict, often in a protracted nature, in the region. In this regard, the desired end of military diplomacy is to shore up or replace existing structures, assist embattled civilian populations and/or to shore up structures thought to be in danger of collapse. The interface starts from the structuring of the Peace Support Operations with the best example being the interface within the

AMISOM structure as alluded to by one military officer interviewed in Mogadishu on 14 December 2018:

When you talk about AMISOM as a peace support operation, it is not about the military alone but there are other components like the police and civilians whose role is very clear as stipulated in the mandate...

From documentary analysis of AMISOM Standing Operating Procedures (AMISOM SOP, 2007), it suffices to note that in combined civilian and military AU Peace Missions, the overall political direction and control of the activities of the mission and consultations with other organizations and agencies in the field is normally exercised and coordinated by an AU Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Somalia (SRCC) as such all Heads of major components (Military, Police and Civilian) report to the SRCC. In this arrangement the Head of Mission is provided with legal and political advisors, with a civilian administrative staff as necessary (AMISOM SOP, 2007). The UNAMID and UNMIS setups each have the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN Security Council. The two missions have similar configurations of military, police and civilian components, for example, while the military components focus would be military operations and civil military coordination, the police would bolster up internal security and address human rights issues.

It is therefore clear that there is a clear interface between non- military tools and military tools whose application, the choice of whose just like in the carpenter’s tool box, entirely depends on demand of the mission for example, as earlier intimated while the military component’s focus is on military operations and civil military coordination the police would bolster internal security and address human rights issues.

VI. PROGRAMMES USED BY THE MILITARY

The study sought to elicit from the respondents the programs used by the military in intrastate conflict management in the Horn of Africa. The respondents mentioned arms transfer, exchange programmes for military staff and finally Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes as indicated in Table 2.

**Table 2: Programmes used by the Military**

Ser	Programme	Responses out of 270	Percentage
1.	Arms Transfer	139	51.4
2.	Exchange Programmes	48	17.8
3.	DDR	30	8
4.	Intervention (PSOs)	63	23.5

Source: Field Data, 2019

Some of the most known military popular programmes used in intra-state conflict management as provided by the respondents included, arms transfer was mentioned 139 times (51.4 %), Peace

Support Operations 63 times (23.5%), Exchange Programmes for military Staff was mentioned 28 times (17.8%) and DDR 30 times (8%). These findings are in tandem with Kinsella (1998), who

agrees that there are a number of programmes used by the military in intra state conflict. These percentages based on the responses were weighted in this cluster to a total of 100%. The results indicate the level of impact each of the programmes had according to the respondents in intra state conflict management. For example DDR programmes are very elaborate but their impact is still minimal because there are small arms and light weapons in the hands of so many locals in Somalia and Sudan.

The findings show that 51.4% of the respondents felt that arms transfer was the most common diplomatic program used by the military. Yet Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration ranked very low at 8%. One military officer interviewed in Mogadishu on 14 December 2018 provided an explanation:

In the entire Sudan and Somalia, DDR programmes appear not effective because there are so many weapons in the hands of civilians because they feel they would be insecure if they released their weapons...

It emerged from the respondents that the issue of arms and motivation to disarm and demobilize has been used by combatants as a means to cajole the respective governments for compensation. They turn it into a compensatory power tool to trade with the governments as if they are selling the weapons for money.

Some of the militarized conflict resolution programmes that were most commonly mentioned included Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DDRR) and arms transfer were mostly employed through condign military tools. This is in contrast to peace support operations and exchange programs for military staff which mostly use compensatory and conditioning tools. This sentiments are shared by Adekanye (1997) who has reviewed demilitarization and reconstruction processes in post-conflict societies in Somalia (UNOSOM & United Nations International Task Force - UNITAF), Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, the former Yugoslavia (United Nations Protection Force - UNPROFOR), Cambodia (UNTAC) and Mozambique (ONUMOZ), in his reviews he argues that managing arms is only one aspect of a peace process yet this remains a challenge in the use of military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa.

## VII. ARMS TRANSFER

According to the findings arms transfer scoring 51.4% is a relatively effective programme in intra state conflict management in agreement with Kinsella (1998) who postulates that, as a transfer of military capability, weapons shipments increase the tendency of the recipient to strike a conflictual posture in its foreign policy, while arms transfer dependence restrains that tendency. With regards to this issue an opinion was brought up by one of the respondents who was interviewed in Juba in October 2018:

...you cannot be comfortable with guns in the hands of almost the entire population....it's like domiciling a snake, you will never sleep easy...

Yet guns are a common feature in both Somalia and Sudan. In the two conflict areas, despite the finding that arms transfer is the most effective, are still awash with small arms and light weapons. One respondent interviewed in Mogadishu on 15 December 2018 explained that because of the availability they are so cheap. He said:

...while in my village (name withheld), a rifle is exchanged for 30 cattle worth equivalent of 200 US dollars each, in Somalia a rifle can be bought for 50 US Dollars.


This then requires a mop up exercise which would require military diplomacy through serious and elaborate DDR programmes yet from the findings it is very clear that the effectiveness of DDR programmes in the Horn of Africa conflict countries is still ranked very low at 8% compared to the other programmes.

Kinsella (1998) further argues that an arms recipient faces the possibility that weapons shipments will be truncated during periods of regional crisis and hostility. The same is true in regard to when a state is dependent on one or a few major suppliers for the bulk of its imported weaponry as it serves to have the costs associated with supply restrictions increased. This encourages restraint on the part of states which would have otherwise been emboldened by arms acquisitions. For some states, Kinsella (1998) argues, there is evidence that arms shipments encourages more conflictual foreign policies; but there is also evidence that this propensity was tempered by the degree of arms transfer dependence (Kinsella, 1998). This collaborates UNSC Resolution 2472 emphasizing the ban on sale of charcoal in Somalia and placing the reinforcement of this mandate on AMISOM. On this an AMISOM official remarked:

Indeed the issue of charcoal and the Somali conflict goes beyond meet the eyes... charcoal fuels the conflict because it is well known that charcoal leaves the Port city of Kismayu in small boats and is offloaded in turns onto waiting ships in the deep seas...sometimes it is in exchange of arms.

This is a clear indication that as much as arms transfer fuels conflicts to others it is an economic source and this explains why the Horn of Africa conflict zones are still awash with weapons despite international efforts through embargoes and even deliberate military interventions in the conflict zones.

It was evident that the three significant military diplomacy power tools were; condign power, compensatory power and conditioning power. It was therefore of interest to place the military programmes within the context of the military diplomacy power tools which occasioned responses as indicated in Figure 3.



**Figure 3: Military Programmes in Military Diplomacy Power Tools**  
**Source: Field Data, 2018**

### 1. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes

According to Knight and Ozerdem (2004), the process of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration (DDRR) of former combatants plays a critical role in transitions from war to peace. The success or failure of this endeavor, Knight and Ozerdem (2004) further argue, directly affects the long-term peace building prospects for any post conflict society. The two scholars explore the closely interwoven relationship between peace building and the DDRR process in order to present an assessment of various disarmament, demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes planned or implemented in a number of countries over the last two decades (Knight & Ozerdem, 2004).

Knight and Ozerdem (2004) question whether there is a need for a more comprehensive consideration of disarmament by acknowledging and responding to its social, economic and political implications. In this regard, the two scholars see disarmament in terms of a social contract is proposed as an alternative to the current military-centred approach (Knight & Ozerdem, 2004).

Post-conflict peace-building in many areas have been undermined by the high level of armaments that continues to create instability, even after negotiated peace agreements. Programmes to reduce the levels of these destabilizing arms followed by long-term arrangements to demobilize and reintegrate combatants into civil society through economically viable alternative lifestyles accompanied by post-conflict reconstruction and development therefore promise a more permanent end-state of peace and stability.

According to regional Economic Communities, regional countries, NGOs, civil society organizations and the international community have a very important role in DDR activities, particularly in the reconciliation and peace-building process, as well as mobilizing or providing financial and logistical support. Given the diversity of actors involved in various stages and aspects

of DDR, planning is to be done in an integrated multidisciplinary manner.

The peacekeeping military and humanitarian agencies and NGOs functions are therefore complimentary in providing the necessary assistance, not only towards the DDR programme, but also enhancing local and national capacities through active engagement, consultation and participation in the planning and implementation of the programmes. The entirety of these processes is what underscores the concept of military diplomacy particularly considering the interface between diplomatic tools and military tools. A respondent at the AU PSC interviewed in Addis Ababa on 15 January 2019 remarked:

The relationship between diplomatic and military tools in a Peace Support Environment is that one of one emanating from the other... the civilian needs the military for protection and the military need the civilian to play the administrative and political process

The DDR functions are principally the responsibility of the civil authority, normally, with the support of civil society organizations and the international community, within the framework of post-conflict peace-building measures but having a military face, arms control requires a military engagement. The combined active participation in the planning and implementation of the programmes provides for the inevitable aid packages that relate directly to the immediate bread and butter needs, as well as shelter, tools, transportation, education and vocational training, of the ex-combatants. This takes cognizance of the just war theory stipulating the manner in which ex-combatants including Prisoners of War (POWs) should be treated in conflict.

To add synergy, the vocational training projects for provision of employment and socioeconomic livelihoods and for poverty alleviation should integrate demobilized combatants and the civilian population, including returning refugees and Internally Displaced Persons - IDPs to facilitate national reconciliation, reunification and rehabilitation. (AMISOM SOP, 2007)

### 2. Demilitarization


Demilitarization is a prerequisite for the successful establishment of a safe area, buffer zone or DMZ, but not necessarily for a TSZ. Asked to explain what entails demilitarization, an Officer interviewed in Juba on 15 October 2018 explained that Demilitarization includes; disarming of all combatants who are non-AU or non-UN personnel to include weapons, ammunition and communication equipment. This also extends to infrastructure where it involves dissolving any military structure or organization in the area, handing in of all military or military type uniforms and clothing and withdrawal of any military force from one senior respondent this can be: ...outside the area to a distance at least farther than the range of most small arms (at least 1.5kms), or if agreed, beyond conventional artillery range (2.530kms).

According to the AMISOM Standard Operating Procedure document obtained at AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu, thorough demilitarization can be achieved only if the party that is to demilitarize is satisfied that one of the two following conditions are met; units of elements of the peacekeeping mission protecting the area has the mandate, the means and the will physically to

protect the area and/or the terms of disarmament allow the disarming party to ream and mobilize with sufficient speed to counter a hostile force (AMISOM SOP, 2007). The respondent further explained that if one of these conditions is not met, it must be expected that the party that is to disarm will in all likelihood go underground with a substantial part of its war fighting capability, and this has remained a disturbing challenge to conflict management in the Horn of Africa.

#### VIII. MILITARY INTERVENTION AS A TOOL

According to Crocker (1996), states generally decide on how to entrench military diplomacy in their foreign policy. From the findings of this study the motivation for military intervention is three-fold namely, the intervening nation's own capabilities and connection to the conflict (what corresponds to this studies responses on a scale of 100% about national interests accounting for (162) 60%); secondly, the status and ripeness of the conflict for resolution (accounting for a distant (27)10%); thirdly, the characters of the parties and their decision-making systems (54) 20% and others accounting for (10) 10% as depicted in Figure 4.



**Figure 4: Intervention as a Tool**  
**Source: Field Data, 2018**

It is true that the respondents responses on other factors are in line with what Crocker (1996) also advocates for a closer attention on a fourth factor which he says is overly glossed over but should on the contrary be given increased attention; intervening states should compare the cost of intervention to the cost of doing nothing (Crocker, 1996).

#### IX. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AS AN INTERVENTION TOOL

Data from the key respondents indicated that one key military tool that is manifest in conflict management in the Horn of Africa is the use of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) as an intervention tool. In the wake of the advent of viable regional integration schemes, it would be important to delve into the role of regionalized military diplomatic forays in instances where a country intervenes directly through regional and sub-regional

bodies such as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), like was the case in Somalia.

Although the doctrines of sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states are fundamental principles of the international arena, intervention by states in foreign armed conflicts occurs frequently. Many foreign armed conflicts have prompted diplomatic, economic or military interventions by foreign powers.

Asked to mention types of conflicts that have attracted foreign military intervention, respondents mentioned two types. The first group includes neutral which are generally multilateral interventions and which are described as collective conflict resolution efforts organized by the international community to end the civil war and to bring peace and stability to the region. The overriding motive of neutral multilateral interventions under the auspices of the international community, such as the United Nations peacekeeping forces, is to restore peace in the target country. The second one is a unilateral intervention like the case of Kenya military intervention in Somalia citing self defence against threats to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. A key respondent interviewed in Nairobi on 18 November cited the Somalia conflict as a good example where military diplomacy and diplomatic tools have played a significant interface with the international community showing commitment, albeit, at different levels almost reluctantly because of the prevailing circumstances: A good example of the regionalized military diplomacy is the international response to the Somali civil war.

Marangio (2012) argues that international actions towards the Somali crisis have all tried to address four main issues bedeviling the failed state of Somalia, namely; internal conflict, piracy off the expansive Horn of Africa's coast, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, and, development. The author opines that efforts expended towards tackling these issues have varied over time in terms of actors and actions, and have privileged security conditions first and then addressed piracy and Islamic fundamentalism as they arose (Marangio, 2012).

However, Marangio (2012) doesn't delve into the non-humanitarian aspect of interventionism thus; the push for domestic politics, the quest for the consolidation and protection of foreign markets as well as the creation of new ones, quest for hegemonic powers among other ulterior motives masked under the guise of humanitarianism in a given neutral interventionist policy. This explains why one key respondent interviewed in Mogadishu on 15 December 2018 said:

...while there is a keen interest in fighting terrorism in the Horn of Africa, one wonders why the international community has remained reluctant in supporting Kenya's request of listing Al Shabaab as a terrorist group under United Nations Security Council - UNSCR 2026 like they did with the Taliban over the sale and use of opium.

From the foregoing, it is clear that terrorism if understood from the political economy of the concept has far reaching ramifications. The end state has a business and economic connotation of a political market place as well said by De Waal (2015) because even aid agencies believe listing Al Shabaab as such will deny them access to victims of Al Shabaab terrorism.

### **Other Tools other than Military**

The study sought to know the programs used that are non-military in intrastate conflict management. The respondents listed; support to civic activities, intervention through parliament, diplomacy meetings, disarmament and amnesty, engaging opinion leaders and humanitarian Aid. Asked to mention other tools other than the military, respondents, name the following including; people to people and leader to leader's reconciliation, support and strengthening cultural exchanges, establishing an IGAD coordinating mechanism, tackling political economies of violence and war, addressing gender and age related issues, promoting good governance and addressing the problem and promoting religious cooperation.

#### **1. Civil Military Cooperation**

Militaries are trained to handle diverse goals, mixed practices and assorted actors in a Peace Support Operational environment like South Sudan, Darfur and Somalia. A deduction was made from the findings of the study that the military peace keeper is a soldier-relief worker, soldier media expert, soldier-doctor, and soldier-chaplain always necessitates a beginning point that is military in nature. This builds a strong nexus between military diplomacy and military intervention.

This collaborates one of the findings according to Ligawa (2018) that in organizational hybridity, civil-military cooperation enjoys the centre stage in military diplomacy. This study found out that this provides a cocktail of activities that links structures to actual performance. CIMIC activities are a military creation dominated by military considerations, mostly headed by military heads to achieve military objectives. CIMIC is a perfect link between military and civilians. A CIMIC officer who worked in South Sudan and Darfur was interviewed in Nairobi in January 2018 and said:

CIMIC activities are the gateway to local populations, NGOs or civilian officials through its activities you win the hearts and minds of the populations for conflict management to prevail... According to the informant, CIMIC officers are charged with various tasks including; Planning and Coordinating between elements of the Peace Support Operations, running joint Operations centered on human rights, political and civil affairs and joint assessment with partners. One important element of CIMIC activities is Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).

A Colonel charged with Quick Impact Projects (QIPS) in AMISOM interviewed in Mogadishu on 16 December 2018 cautioned on the effects of poor coordination of humanitarian operations geared towards conflict management saying: Uncoordinated humanitarian operations cause friction, impose extra demands on military resources and may affect the Peace Support plan of the mission.

Therefore a sound Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) plan and cordial peace support co-operation between military operations and the operations of UN agencies, Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), are therefore vital to the success of multidisciplinary and multidimensional PSO. From documentary analysis, it is only through CIMIC activities that a cocktail of activities are achieved through a cocktail of structures. For example for medical campaigns to yield the desired results, local administration need to be reached. The military will provide medical experts and security while the international partners will provide financial and

material support. This interface between military and other tools requires clear coordination. The idea of coordination is clarified in the AMISOM Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) which clearly and strictly considers; transitional assistance, supervision, administration, protection, response, control and coordination.

#### **a. Transitional Assistance**

Transitional assistance refers to all forms of military assistance to a civil authority or community rendered as part of a wider diplomatic, humanitarian and economic strategy to support a return to peace and stability. The need for this assistance is predicated on the widespread destruction of conflicts on infrastructure and institutions. AMISOM has in its mandate a Transitional Assistance clause to help stabilize the institutions by providing a secure and enabling environment as it hand over security of the country to the Somali Security Forces.

The degree of destruction or disruption will dictate the scope of transitional assistance that could range from direct help to interim administrations, local authorities and civil communities to the complete establishment and running of the transitional government as in Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor. In Somalia, successful elections in Federal Member States (FMSs) is critical for the central government elections under Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Transitional Assistance is a post-conflict activity that could be enhanced if accompanied by parallel reconstruction and peace-building efforts. Military transitional assistance tasks could be categorized according to findings of this study as supervision, administration, protection, response, control and coordination. This is what this study proposes as the SAPRECOCO of transitional assistance towards conflict management. Similarly, the functions fits well in the functions provided under compensatory power that helps to win the hearts and minds of the population in order for conflict management to take pace.

#### **b. Supervision**

Military transitional assistance through supervision would include the transition of authority to the local administration, restructuring and retraining of security forces, which would include their recruitment and finally relocation and rehabilitation of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). In the transitional phase towards the recognition of South Sudan as an independent state a lot of supervisory military diplomacy was exercised to ensure secure environment in the region. This process of transitional assistance is still ongoing.

#### **c. Administration**

It was observed from key informants that in Somalia and Sudan, apart from the traditional military roles, the military during the transition period also engages in liaison and establishment of an interim government and help in the provision of Public services and utilities including water supply, wells and bore holes, electricity, transport, communications, health and hygiene. These functions are performed under the name of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). With such economic and social services the military provides sound environment for the government to function.

#### **d. Protection.**

The military during the transition period is also expected to perform protection function. This includes Protection of human rights; thus women, children, elderly and protection of people with

disabilities. Similarly included in this function is Safeguarding of individuals, communities and installations. This is clearly embedded in the mandates of AMISOM and UNAMID. These are clear tenets of military diplomacy where condign power is less used in effecting this function.

#### **e. Response**

At all levels of the Peace Support Operations the force or mission commanders must maintain reserves and contingencies to be able to respond to and influence fresh situation. Some of these situations are known with clear information sharing, which is made possible from good relations with the local community through constant interaction, which is a function of Military Diplomacy.

#### **f. Control**

To maintain the co-operation and consent of the local authority and community, commanders apply prohibitions and restrictions fairly and proportionately when enforcing collective control measures. Control and dominance of areas is not only achieved through application of condign power but also utilization of military diplomacy as a function that endears the military to the populations by winning hearts and mind and trust of the communities they intend to liberate.

#### **g. Co-ordination**

All major activities must be coordinated with other co-operating organizations and agencies. This coordination brings on board various aspects through what scholars like Swistek (2012) refers to as Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS).

### **2. Complementarity of the Soldier Military Diplomat**

The complementarity of the military in conflict management in the Horn of Africa is clearly exhibited in the role that this study as classified as the Soldier Relief Worker, Soldier Engineer, Soldier Doctor, Soldier Media Expert contributes to conflict management in the Horn of Africa. These roles clearly demonstrate the significant interface between military diplomacy tools and military intervention in intrastate conflict management.

#### **The Soldier-Relief worker**

The work of a soldier is also explicit in humanitarian intervention through relief work. Humanitarian intervention in a foreign conflict may take two shapes; non-militarized humanitarian intervention and militarized humanitarian intervention. Even though the modern international system is founded on the premise that sovereign states have a right to nonintervention as well as to be free from unwanted external involvement in their internal affairs, controversy has emerged on the extent to which the world can watch as atrocities are visited upon a people inside a sovereign state. A key respondent interviewed in Mogadishu on 15 December 2018 said:

We entered Somalia under the banner of Pan Africanism...you cannot sit back as your neighbour's house is burning... Somalia was burning and the effect was great on the entire region...

From the findings Somalia had reached a humanitarian crisis and needed something to be done. The situation in Somalia is collaborated by Seybolt that proponents of humanitarian interventionism mainly decry the loss of human life (Seybolt, 2008).

In practice, according to AMISOM SOP (2007), the scale of humanitarian problems and the demands for security and protection of humanitarian resources will always elicit a lot of military diplomacy. Military relief operations, where the capacity exists and is mandated, should provide according to a CIMIC Officer interviewed in Juba on 16 October 2018:

Emergency relief for the sustainment and protection of the means to safeguard life, delivery of aid/relief supplies, prevention of human rights violations, quick-impact reconstruction assistance, long-term reconstruction assistance and assistance to local authorities.

All these require serious diplomatic engagement with the belligerents. To get the projects initiated and done requires a lot of coordination and engagement with donors yet the activities are key to help win hearts and minds and trust of the population for conflict management to take place. Engagement of the military in such is what this study likened to the Soldier - Relief worker.

### **The Soldier-Law Enforcer**

Normally, law enforcement will be the responsibility of the Military Police, local and the civil authorities. However, military operations contribute to the overall level and quality of law and order. When this deteriorates, military enforcement action and support to the police may be necessary to restore and maintain the peace.

Besides all legal matters are handled by a Legal officer who also deals with government agencies on legal matters pertaining customs, insurance, claims, jurisdictional problems. S/he assists the Chief Administrative officer on the legal aspects of commercial dealings and advises the Provost Marshal in any peace support operations environment on legal matters. Asked the balance between law and military undertakings, a legal officer who worked with IGAD and interviewed in Juba said:

I work in a multiagency setup where national interests and institutional biases have a big influence on relations but being a lawyer in uniform has helped me to be diplomatic in dealing with people...so we get along well.

The above finding indicates the significant role a legal expert plays as s/he puts on two hats; one as a legal person and the other as a military person who has national interests to pursue yet s/he has to balance with those of the other multiagency teams s/he represents in a peace support environment. This is a delicate balance that requires military diplomacy.

### **The Soldier Media Expert**


The role of the media in providing timely information in the theatre of war plays a crucial role in intra state conflict management because most of the issues in warfare are brought to the fore by media. To do their jobs, journalists employ both the camera and the computer, and, with the help of portable satellite dishes and video phones, stream or broadcast their reports from hotel roofs and hilltops, as they cover the movement of troops and the rocketing of villages often, (unintentionally, one assumes) revealing sensitive information to the enemy.

Once upon a time, such information was the stuff of military intelligence acquired with considerable effort and risk; now it has become the stuff of everyday journalism. A media officer who served in AMISOM as a spokesperson said:


The camera and the computer have become weapons of war. For any journalist in uniform worth his or her salt, this should spark a respectful moment of reflection.

In the Horn of Africa media timely reporting enabled military media experts to bring the ugly reality of conflict to both belligerents (and others around the world), serving as a powerful influence on public opinion and governmental attitudes and actions. This study collects one media expert analysis provided on the analysis of media trends of reporting by AMISOM accessed in Mogadishu; Asked what they do with the very elaborate analysis, a respondent interviewed in Mogadishu on 14 July 2019 said:

We use what we have analyzed to understand the patterns and perceptions of the population on activities of the mission...you know media has a big influence on people...



**Figure 5: Analysis of Media in News in November 2018**  
 Source: AMISOM Archives, 2019



**Figure 6: AMISOM in the News November 2018**  
 Source: AMISOM Archives, 2019

Due to the academic interest of what is happening in Somalia, opinion pieces tend to cover the slow process of building the capacity of Somali security agencies. In an interview with the Military Spokesperson conducted in Mogadishu on 16 December 2018, it was interesting to note that his function requires a lot of diplomacy:

The office of Force Spokesperson will always work in close consultation with the Mission Headquarters (MHQ) Public

Information Unit (PIU)...and this extended to the local Somali media houses.

The informant explained that his office is designed to provide information through all mass communication means to AMISOM audiences by responding to media inquiries, issue statements, conduct briefings and interviews, arrange for access to operational units and distribute information including imagery all

as a means to develop relations with the purveyors and the consumer of news. This is done through outreach programmes: ...these are activities aimed at fostering strategic relations with the key external stakeholders, who have an interest in AMISOM military issues and activities, such as think-tanks, academia, military related associations, and other non-news media entities. The issue of military diplomacy expositied in public diplomacy is one of the areas in intrastate conflict management that seeks the attention and also the various states and agencies engaged in conflict management in the Horn of Africa. Activities in the theatre are carefully tailored to meet the demands of the conflict zone without compromising the operations. For example an attack on peacekeepers is reported with a lot of caution not to destabilize the victims' families. The media office therefore plays a critical role to shape public opinion and help win hearts and minds for conflict management to take shape.

### **The Soldier-Doctor**

The role of the medical practitioners in a conflict zone goes beyond just the conventional treatment of patients from conventional diseases like malaria, Typhoid and injuries but also manage conflict related ailments and even those caused by gunshots. While doing this, it is not restricted to avoid perpetrators of conflicts but would serve as a very important asset to the conflict if they were handled diplomatically. A doctor who served in both AMISOM and UNMIS, interviewed in Kismayo on 13 October 2018 said:

As AMISOM medical team we engage in various activities that just go beyond treatment but assist the mission to win hearts and minds of the locals in order to pacify them. This enables the process of peace building to take place...I call it the power of the syringe...

### **The Soldier-Chaplain**

The military are usually associated with the 3Ws, thus War, Women and Wine. This is a perception that is carried along in the conflict zones. Similarly parties to the conflict are equally associated with lots of vices including rape, killing and extortion. This study however found out that instead of religion being used for spiritual nourishment during peacetime it is sine-qua-non weapon of conflict management used by the military in the Horn of Africa, as one Commanding Officer interviewed in Kismayu on 14 October 2018 would say:

In my battalion, I have a full complement of the chaplaincy in uniform; I have a priest with his catechists, I have an Imaam and a protestant Pastor. All these underwent military training. They have two weapons; the Bible/Quran and the gun/rifle.

The role of the chaplaincy is to spiritually nourish the soldiers as they partake the role of conflict management. They also pacify the locals by not only preaching to them but also assist by construction of mosques and churches:

The church we attend here was constructed through our voluntary contributions. Each soldier volunteered five hundred Kenya shillings every month. We have also supported the construction of a primary school.

This activities by the chaplaincy are used to pacify the communities in order for the peace building process to take place. Interestingly, while this tenet of military diplomacy was prevalent

among the BDNF and KDF troops, it was noted that this is not a norm among the Uganda Peoples Defense Forces who do not value religion within the military cycles. One respondent interviewed in Mogadishu confirmed:

Since 1986, we do not encourage religion in the military barracks because religion is used to divide soldiers along religious lines like ethnicity does...

The above sentiments agree with Elsenhans (1996) views that while politics is the ultimate cause, ethnicity and religion are factors of mass mobilization that are given prominence by the disgruntled political elites fighting against what the author calls state classes. This study therefore depicts religion as a tool which some militaries in the study area like Burundi National Defence Forces and Kenya Defence Forces have appropriately used to galvanize hearts and minds for conflict management processes to be initiated.

### **Soldier-Engineer**

Asked to explain the role of an engineer officer in the operation, a Kenya Engineer Officer who had served in both Somalia and south Sudan said the mission of engineers is to provide mobility, survivability and general engineering support to PSO missions. Engineers undertake defensive and survival works within the Areas of Responsibility. Engineer staff will identify utility repair requirements and priorities, in conjunction with local authorities, with whom they will also negotiate, and organize military support for the repair missions, as well as advise, assist and support units with regard to utility repair matters with their AORs. All items, including sub-munitions, mines, bombs, booby traps, suspect items and abandoned attractive equipment, are assumed to be a hazard to the smooth operations of the mission.

## **X. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Based on the findings, there is a lot of interface between diplomatic tools and military intervention in the Horn of Africa. The study found out that arms transfer was the most common diplomatic program used by the military, in contrast weapons shipments increase the duration and hostility levels and make the termination of civil conflicts less likely. These efforts are complemented by compensatory interventions including peacekeeping military, humanitarian agencies and NGOs functions which provide the necessary assistance, not only towards the DDR programme, but also enhancing local and national capacities through active engagement, consultation and participation in the planning and implementation of the programme.

It is recommended that the 'carpenter's tool box' model be adopted in which every item in the tool box has a specific role to play in conflict management and, therefore, it is the complementarity of the efforts between the military, police, civilian components and entirety of society that will lead to conflict management in the Horn of Africa. It is apparent from the foregoing, therefore, that through military diplomacy one may be able to discern a country's national security interests and threats vis-a-vis its relations with other countries. One is also able to identify a military's organizational ethos, philosophies, culture, strengths and weaknesses for the sake of conflict management in the Horn of Africa. Military diplomacy will remain important in framing and enabling the evolution of the world, but unless

practitioners get better at the civilian side of things it is difficult to understand how the security challenges in the Horn of Africa can be effectively managed.

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