

Nature of Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment (SARA) Based Response Strategies in the Management of Youth Radicalization in Nairobi County, Kenya

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Abstract: Globally, the debate around religious extremism and radicalization has re-emerged as a topical issue, notwithstanding the reality that a complete metamorphosis of the process of radicalization always matures to heinous acts of terrorism. Terrorism poses grave threats to national, regional as well as global peace and security. In spite of this, there have been lapses in the management of radicalization in Kenya. Existing literature globally has demonstrated that POP initiatives are effective in reducing gang violence, robberies and drug trafficking among other forms of crime. Similarly, relevant studies have acknowledged its application in policing without comprehensively linking it to the management of youth radicalization. The study interrogated the nature SARA based response strategies in the management of youth radicalization in Kenya. The findings revealed an outstanding variation in the nature of SARA based response strategies in Nairobi County as initially developed for use in policing.

Index Terms: Analysis, Assessment, Kenya, Management, Problem Oriented Policing, Scanning, Radicalization, Terrorism

1.0 Introduction

Over the last decade, Al-Qaeda was the focal point of youth radicalization. But in the last six years, since the carnage of the Arab Spring, the Islamic State (ISIS) has taken center stage on global youth radicalism and extremism. The explosion of ISIS has been attributed to political instability in Iraq and Syria which has provided optimum breeding ground for their activities (Gerges, 2016). On the continental front, *Boko Haram* of Nigeria epitomizes a radical group that is supra-secretive and hyper-reactive and hell bent on atrocious killings of Nigerian Christians. In response, the government of Nigeria continues to react through military actions to demolish the uprising (Aseulime & David, 2015). Such response strategies have perpetually failed to address the underlying issues of radicalization in Nigeria.

On the regional front, anarchy in Somalia resulted to the dawn of Al-shabaab militants in the Horn of Africa. With lack of a stable government in Somalia, the international community has made a number of attempts to intervene in Somalia. The latest being African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which the Al-shabaab has responded to by conducting retaliatory attacks in neighboring countries and Kenya in particular (Bruton *et al.*, 2010). The instability in Somalia is impacting on the security of Kenya (Mwilu, 2015). Kenya is now a hotbed of youth radicalization and

terrorism. According to Rabasa (2009), huge unemployed youthful populations, a relatively cheap and accessible internet, good infrastructure, technological advancement and a highly corrupt system of government among other factors have made the infiltration of youth radicalization relatively easy. Since 2011, Nairobi has experienced at least 10 terrorist attacks. In these attacks, around 120 deaths and 550 injuries have been registered. However, it is the response approaches towards Youth radicalization in Nairobi that have been largely ineffective due to their over reliance on traditional policing approaches. These approaches include arrest, incarceration, investigation, charging and imprisonment depending on the notions of guilty or innocent (Ridley, 2014).

SARA problem solving model has informed the choice of application of effective response strategies in the management of different criminal activities and vices-homicide, prostitution, weapon violations, drug activity and intoxication, underage drinking, shoplifting, assaults, residential and commercial robberies and loitering among others (Maguire *et al.*, 2010). However, the persistent growth of radicalization as well as terror related activities in the global realm, and Nairobi County-Kenya in particular implies that the response strategies put in place have not been as effective as envisaged (Miller and Hess, 2008). In addition, the SARA model was attributed to a general increase in security in Nairobi County without linking it to

the management of youth radicalization (Chumba, 2013). This paper sought to examine the nature of SARA based response strategies in the management of youth radicalization in Nairobi.

2.0 Theoretical Framework

The study was premised on the Social Identity theory by Henri Tajfel and the Conflict theory by Karl Marx. According to Tajfel (1979), social identity through membership of a group gives individuals a sense of belonging. Membership to social movements are important sources of pride and self esteem and increases our self image by holding prejudice against members of the out group. In a nutshell, there are three mental processes that take place in evaluating others as “us versus them” or the in-group versus the out group”. These processes are: Social Categorization, Social Identification and Social Comparison. Social identity theory holds that the in-group will discriminate against the out-group in a bid to enhance their self-image. The central tenet of social identity theory is that group members of an in-group will seek to find demeaning aspects of an out-group, thus enhancing their self-image. This theory is key in explaining how youths in Kenya identify themselves with the ideologies of social movements in the form radical and terrorist groups. However, a part from social identity, the theory fails to account for the underlying reasons why social movements advocate for change in the society through the use of unorthodox means as is in the case of this study- terrorist attacks.

According to the Conflict Theory, conflicts arise when resources, status, and power are not evenly distributed between groups in society and that these conflicts become the engine for social change. Marx theorized that this system, premised on the existence of a influential minority class (the *bourgeoisie*) and an oppressed majority class (the *proletariat*), created class conflict because the interests of the two were at odds, and resources were unjustly distributed among them. Within this imbalanced system, social order was maintained through ideological coercion. Marx reasoned that as the socio-economic conditions worsened for the *proletariat*, they would develop a class consciousness that revealed their exploitation at the hands of the wealthy capitalist class of bourgeoisie, and then they would revolt, demanding changes in the social structures. Similarly, youth radicalization in Kenya is as a result of high youth unemployment, social and economic marginalization with development only impacting on a few rich individuals in the society. Class consciousness is what makes these youths to join social movements and consequently conduct a number of terrorist attacks in a bid to alter changes in the status quo. The independent variable in this study is the SARA problem solving model which can be used to address the underlying socio-economic determinants of youth radicalization in Kenya.

3.0 Methodology

The study adopted a descriptive research design. The study population comprised 93 police officers, 256 community members, 10 youths, 2 chiefs, 4 assistant chiefs and 25

heads of *Nyumba Kumi*. The key informants included 4 intelligence officers, 3 security experts and 3 Officers in Charge of Stations. Members of the community and police officers were selected using simple random sampling techniques. Purposive and snowball sampling was used to select the key informants. Questionnaires were used to collect primary data from community members, police officers, chiefs and heads of *Nyumba Kumi*. Interview schedules were used to collect data from Officers in Charge of Stations, intelligence officers and security experts. Additionally, one focus group discussions comprising of ten youths was used for the study. Secondary data were collected from online sources, official security reports, books and journals. Quantitative data were analyzed descriptively by computing measures of central tendency, frequency counts and percentages. Qualitative data were analyzed thematically and presented through narratives and verbatim quotations. The output of data analysis was presented in charts, graphs and tables and discussions were made based on the research findings.

4.0 Study Findings

4.1 Models of Crime Prevention in the Management of Youth Radicalization

In the quest to understand the nature of SARA based response strategies, the study sought to establish the current police based strategies used in Nairobi County in the management of youth radicalization. Understanding the current response strategies enables law enforcement agencies as well as stakeholders to either improve on or retain the current approaches. Data on the current police based response strategies were collected, analyzed and presented in Figure 4.1.




Figure 4.1: Police Based Response Models to Youth Radicalization in Nairobi County, Kenya

Source: Author, 2017

The findings of the study indicated that 82.5% (330) of the community respondents revealed that intelligence led

policing was the most used response model to manage youth radicalization, 48.6% (194) of the community respondents indicated that the *Nyumba kumi* initiative was an effective model, 67% (268) of the community respondents indicated that sensitizing the youth on the dangers of youth radicalization was a good response model, 37% (148) indicated that the creation of a special department that exclusively deals with terrorism related activities was a good model and less than 20% (80) of the community respondents indicated that community policing was an effective response strategy towards the management of youth radicalization in Nairobi County. An interview with a security expert confirmed the results of the questionnaires by giving the following account of events:

Proper intelligence gathering is attributable to the reduced cases of terrorism in the city. Therefore, proper intelligence structures are necessary in the fight against youth radicalization...they have averted many attacks (Field Data, 2017).

Proper intelligence has enabled the police to avert a number of terrorist attacks. Intelligence led policing (ILP) is a key policing approach that is semi-proactive and semi-reactive in nature. ILP does not eliminate or minimize the causes of crime, but averts the intended effects of a crime to both the police and the community as is the case of the current study. ILP in Nairobi County since its inception has led to lower crime rates, reduced policing costs and kept police officers safe. In practice, the model better prepares police officers in the field (Kenya Police, 2014). The aim of ILP therefore is not to replace but to enhance the traditional policing approaches.

Cordner (2012) adds that this approach allows security analysts to classify crime data. This makes it easy for police officers and investigators to work with an intelligence product that is finished rather than over reliance on basic crime information. Concisely, raw data is given to an analyst who takes the data and makes sense of it and then provides clear and succinct information for something usable by the police officers on the ground (Cordner, 2012). Similarly, Pickering *et al.*, (2007) study on Counter Terrorism policing reveals that ILP frees up police officers to do what they do best. It gives officers adequate time to perform real police work which simply increases police presence in a "would be" crime hotspot and reduces crime in an area. Lower crime rate translates to a safer environment for both the police and the community. More police hours on the beat means the job is being done without relying so heavily on overtime, lowering labor cost. Less overtime can also equate less exhausted officers, improving both quality of life and safety for those involved.

The findings of the study revealed that 82% of the respondents indicated that ILP is an effective way of addressing youth radicalization in Nairobi County because it leads to arrest of offenders. However, the study is premised on the principle that arrest and prosecution of offenders does

not solve problems facing the community and the police. Goldstein (2015) views that arrest and prosecution alone does not address crimes which is the premise of this study disagrees with Pickering *et al.*, (2007) views which advocate for the means rather than the ends of policing.

An interview with a security expert revealed that:

The *Nyumba kumi* initiative was effective when it was nascent, possibly this is because of the numerous attacks and public awareness campaigns then. However, city residents and Kenyans at large being who they are, the initiative is already facing an impending threat of collapsing. A majority of *Nairobians* do not even know who their neighbor is; leave alone their *Nyumba kumi* elders (Field Data, 2017).

The response clearly shows that the initiative was at some point effective but is currently faced by numerous challenges. In April 2005, the Government of Kenya launched the community policing initiative. However, the implementation of the initiative has been faced with an avalanche of challenges such as lack of trust between the police and the community, fear of victimization and general hostility between the police and the members of the community (Masese & Mwenzwa, 2012). To this end, the *Nyumba Kumi* initiative was launched in 2013 in order to cut on some of the challenges that community policing faced.

Despite the challenges that the newly launched *Nyumba Kumi* initiative faced, it managed to reduce fear of crime and social disorder. In addition, it established an active partnership between government policing agencies and the community which is a salient feature in POP. Increased partnership between the community and the government agencies has had a domino effect on enhancing democratic openness in policing, transparency as well as accountability (Kenya Police, 2014). These are core principles in the practice of POP (Miller, 2017). However, the current study also notes that, of the five most preferred police-based response strategies, none really manages the underlying causes of radicalization. SARA based response strategies requires comprehending the causes of youth radicalization and developing appropriate response strategies to mitigate, limit and or eliminate the threats of the problem.

4.2 Incidences of Reports on Youth Radicalization in Nairobi County

The first and most basic tenet of the nature of SARA based response strategies is the identification of a recurrent problem that affects both the police and the community (Goldstein, 2015). Data collected and analyzed indicated that the police identified youth radicalization as a problem occasionally at 46.4% (185), 38.1% (152) of the police respondents indicated that youth radicalization was often identified as a problem in Nairobi County. In addition,

11.9% (48) of the police respondents indicated that youth radicalization was rarely identified as a problem. Only 2.4% (10) and 1.2% (6) of the police respondents indicated that youth radicalization was identified very often and rarely as a recurrent problem in Nairobi County.




Figure 4.2: Incidences of reports on youth radicalization in Nairobi County, Kenya

Source: Author, 2017

An interview with an OCS revealed that:

Our intelligence officers tip the station on possible radicalization activities at least twice weekly. In my view, with such consistency, I would say that in Eastleigh Police Post, we deal with the problem on an occasional basis (Field Data, 2017).

The response clearly indicates that, reports on youth radicalization at least twice weekly is not as high as any other across the country. The findings are in agreement with Farah (2011) indicating that Eastleigh has the highest population density of the Somalis and migrant Somalis in Kenya thus making it susceptible to youth radicalization. In addition, a report on *Organized Criminal Gangs in Kenya*, by the National Crime Research Center (2012), identified Eastleigh not only as the local headquarter but also as a focal point of operation for the Al-shabaab militia. This could be used to justify why youth radicalization is “occasionally” identified as a recurrent problem in Nairobi County.

4.3 Sources of Police Information on Youth Radicalization in Nairobi County

The sources of information inform on the reliability of policing models. Various sources of information are more reliable as opposed to single or limited sources of information (Goldstein, 2015). To this end, therefore, data were collected, analyzed and presented in Figure 4.3 the results indicated that the sources of police information were mainly of three types: the police investigative reports which are recorded in a book commonly referred to as the Occurrence Book (OB); reports from the members of the

public and the community and a hybrid from both the investigative reports from the police and the members of the public.




Figure 4.3: Sources of Police Information on Youth Radicalization in Nairobi County, Kenya

Source: Author, 2017

The results reveal that 46% (184) of the community respondents indicated that both the police and members of the public were sources of most of the information on youth radicalization, 24% (96) of the community respondents indicated that the police relied on the usage of the OB as a source of information on youth radicalization. 30% (120) of the community respondents indicated that the community and members of the public constituted the sources of information on youth radicalization in Nairobi County. The results are in agreement with Eck and Spelman (1987) on the nature of SARA based response strategies whose first step involves determining whether a problem really exists and whether the problem prompts further action by police.

An interview transcript by an intelligence officer revealed that:

Occasionally, we rely on what members of the public give us and what the intelligence officers on the ground give us. It is a collective responsibility that we cannot win without the involvement of the community, especially when collecting information on any act of crime (Field Data, 2017).

The response indicates that the police predominantly rely on a hybrid of information that combines what the public give and what the intelligence officers gather before proceeding to the next phase of SARA based response strategies in Nairobi County.

An FGD with youth respondents however gave mixed responses on scanning of information on youth radicalization in Nairobi County. The youths’ experiences were captured as follows;

Youth one:

I have volunteered to give the police information on youth radicalization since I joined Eastleighwood, before that I would not. Eastleighwood changed my perception in the fight against violent extremism (Field Data, 2017).

Youth two:

The police have never approached me to give them such information and I personally would have never volunteered to give them information on youth radicalization despite being in possession of crucial information, I would not set up a fellow youth to go rot in jail (Field Data, 2017).

Youth three:

I cannot, I won't and I will never. Youths have suffered in the hands of the police and I can never give them such information about my fellow youths (Field Data, 2017).

Youth four:

If I would be paid to give information to the police, I would. But again, these youths are into radicalization because they are hopeless and have no one to look up to. Let the police and the government of the day do their work. The government of the day in particular should deliver on the promises of the youths (Field Data, 2017).

The FGD excerpts reveal strained relationships between youths and the police who are the key subjects of the current study. The findings disagree with Clare *et al.*, (2010) study that emphasizes the need for cordial police-community relationships to ensure the full realization of POP and consequently the SARA model. In addition, the findings of this study concur with Rogers (2010) on his analysis of a decade on the problem oriented approach in England. He argues that the source in part echoes the level of engagement between the police officers, the community members and partners in the identification of policing priorities for response purposes. According to Rogers (2010), the police sources of information accounted for a 48% of the sources information across the three stations, members of the public accounted for 23% of the information whereas other agencies accounted for 29% of the sources of information. Similarly, Maguire *et al.*, (2015) in their analysis of 753 POP cases in Colorado Springs USA established that police information accounted for the highest prevalence (68%) of problem identification in their study

area. Members of the public accounted for 17% of the sources of information whereas 15% of the sources of information were unaccounted for. The results of this study on sources of police information concur with those of Maguire *et al.*, (2015).

4.4 Police Action/Reaction to the Information Scanned on Youth Radicalization

The study sought to identify what police action or reaction followed the information collected from the various sources of information. Data collected and analyzed on the same is presented in Figure 4.4 where 51% (204) of the community respondents indicated that the police conducted investigations after collecting information on youth radicalization, 33% (132) of the community respondents indicated that the police conduct impromptu raids to arrest the suspects of youth radicalization and only 16% (64) of the community respondents indicated that the police used "other" approaches which mainly cited routine patrols in the crime location as a reaction towards the information collected.




Figure 4.4: Police Action/Reaction to Information Obtained on Youth Radicalization in Nairobi County, Kenya

Source: Author, 2017

An interview with an OCS confirmed the results from the questionnaires:

The police force is a law enforcement agency of the government and is guided by law and standard operating procedures once they receive information on possible criminal activities. Once information has been obtained, the police usually conduct investigations to ascertain the authenticity of the information (Field Data, 2017).

The response is in tandem with the police responses that indicated that 51% (204) of the police officers conducted investigations to verify the information received from the various sources before warranting further action. Mwazige (2012) in his study on legal responses to terrorism in Kenya established that the police officers strictly adhere to the existing pieces of legislation to fully realize their mandate.

Section 31 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012, states that: “a police officer may arrest a person where he has reasonable grounds to believe that such person has committed or is committing an offence under this Act.” The powers of arrest that are vested in police officers under this clause are subject to legal oversight. Police officers in Kenya are required to base all arrests on reasonable grounds, and the suspect is to be either taken to court or released within 24 hours as provided by the Constitution. Any continued custody has to be authorized by the courts of law. The officer need not have a particular offence in mind in order to arrest an individual; it’s entirely based on his perception and whatever he considers a terrorist act at that moment. The current study disagrees with Mwazige (2012) because the SARA model is not means but is end oriented (Eck & Spelman, 1987).

Conducting investigations is what SARA based response strategies refer to as analysis. Analysis, according to Goldstein (2015) is the phase that succeeds scanning. This phase challenges police officers to analyze the causes of problems behind a series of crime incidences. Once the underlying conditions of a crime are known through the conduct of thorough investigations, police officers ought to develop and implement appropriate response strategies (Eck & Spelman, 1987). However, what constitutes analysis in the conventional model greatly differs from what constitutes analysis within the framework of traditional policing in Nairobi County where investigations are solely focused on places and times where particular offenses are likely to take place and then identifying the offenders who are most likely to be responsible for the crimes with the view of arresting them for further legal action.

Customarily, police departments have a tendency to view problem solving as being the implementation of enforcement tactics such as arrests or high visibility patrols. On average, Rogers (2010) established that law enforcement tactics were used by police officers to deal with problems with a prevalence of 55%, the police only embraced problem solving methods 35% of the times while it was unclear what techniques the police used 10% of the time to solve problems facing them and the community. The results of the current study are in agreement with Rogers (2010) that the police implementation of SARA based response strategies are heavily centered on law enforcement techniques which at best do not eliminate or reduce the underlying causes of criminal problems. However, the results of the current study as well as those of Rogers (2010) fail to demonstrate the correct usage of the SARA model. The elimination or drastic reduction of crime and disorder problems is the goal of SARA based response strategies.

4.5 Determination of Response Strategy to Youth Radicalization

The study sought to establish whether the response strategies used in the management of youth radicalization were developed in relation to the crime incident being handled or whether the response strategies were already pre-determined. Data were collected, analyzed and the results presented in Figure 4.5. The results indicated that only 37%

(34) of police respondents were in agreement that there was a mode of operation in the determination of the response strategies. A majority, 67% (59) of the respondents indicated that there was no specific criterion to determine effective response strategies.

As revealed by a key informant to this study:

Once the problem has been identified and information collected, what do you expect us to do? We are law enforcers and once we have all these information, we arrest suspects. Sometimes, once our “intel” furnishes us with information, we basically arrest suspects and let them stay in police custody as investigations proceed (Field Data, 2017).




Figure 4.5: Criterion to Determine Response Strategy to Youth Radicalization in Nairobi County, Kenya

Source: Author, 2017

From the results, it is clear that there is no specific criterion to determine effective response strategies. The study findings deviate from Cordner and Biebel (2005) study which sought to establish from the police officers the methods they used to develop response strategies. By far, the most common method used was personal experience (62%), brainstorming (26%), and the only other method used more than 10% was holding informal discussions with fellow police officers. However, the current study notes that the response strategies are pre-determined perhaps as provided by the existing pieces of legislation which do not support POP and once the information obtained has been analyzed or what is traditionally referred to as investigations, arrest of offenders is the best alternative. Determination of response strategies ought to be a shared function of the police, members of the community as well as other stakeholders who are affected by a particular crime problem in an area (Goldstein, 2015). This however, is not demonstrated by the findings of this study as well as findings by Cordner and Biebel (2005).

4.6 Police Based Response Strategies to Youth Radicalization in Nairobi County

The study sought to find out the police based response strategies to youth radicalization in Nairobi. Data were

collected, analyzed and presented in Figure 4.6.




Figure 4.6: Police Based Response Strategies to Youth Radicalization in Nairobi County, Kenya

Source: Author, 2017

The findings reveal that 32% (29) of the respondents indicated that conducting regular and routine patrols as the most used police based response strategy to the management of youth radicalization. Use of community spies and informers stood at 20.2% (18), raiding suspects’ hideouts at 14.3% (13), intelligence gathering at 17.9% (16) and spiv and infiltration at 15.5% (14). An interview with an intelligence officer revealed that:

Spiv and infiltration is simply disguising one of our own and letting them be part of the community either in Eastleigh, Pumwani or Majengo with the aim of getting first-hand information from the ground. Despite the challenge it faces as a result of corruption just like all other response approaches, it has averted so many would be terror attacks (Field Data, 2017).

The result of the interview indicated that despite the challenge infiltration faces as a result of corruption, it has been effective in getting offenders behind bars. Knowledge of the aforementioned response strategies is a crucial element in the SARA based response strategies because the response strategies inform the success and limitations of the current response approaches. The findings of this study are in tandem with Cordner and Biebel (2005) in San Diego, US that asked officers to describe their actual responses to POP projects. The most commonly used approach was targeted enforcement by uniformed patrol officers (46%). Two traditional responses of a directed or saturation patrol (21%), targeted investigations (18%) and three community based responses such as altering physical environment (27%),

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collaborating with other agencies (24%) and conveying information (23%). Overall, the findings revealed that officers tend to rely on their own favorite response approaches over and over again- in this study, arrest and prosecution of offenders is the most common strategy. This explanation exhibits a lack of creativity and has not been given much attention. However, it seems to firmly fit on the notion that human beings are creatures of habit. Probably, this is an oversight in POP and deserves better attention in future studies as well as for the enrichment of the POP process.

4.7 Assessment of SARA Based Response Strategies in Nairobi County

Assessment or what is generally referred to as monitoring and evaluation is a key practice in all management and administrative procedures. This is because, it is only through assessments that organizations are able to tell whether progress is being made, failure is being realized or the management practices have stagnated. To this end, therefore, the study sought to establish whether the police force had assessment mechanisms of SARA based response strategies in place in Nairobi County. Data on the same were collected, analyzed and presented in Figure 4.7.




Figure 4.7 Whether there is Assessment of SARA Based Response Strategies in Nairobi County, Kenya

Source: Author, 2017

The results revealed that 71% (66) of the respondents indicated that there were no assessment mechanisms whereas only 29% (27) acknowledged the presence of such mechanisms. An interview an OCS on assessment mechanisms reveals:

Most of our tasks end with arrest of offenders. Once the case is handed over to the courts of law, then it moves from our jurisdiction. We rarely follow up on what the courts do- they are an independent arm of government, you know.... (Field Data, 2017).

From the results, it is clear that the police rarely do

assessment of their response strategies or that the assessment mechanisms are nonexistent. A complete metamorphosis of SARA based response strategies entails scanning, analysis, response and assessment (Eck & Spelman, 1987). However, the results of the study clearly indicate that SARA based response strategies usually end at the response stage. An explanation that is given for this is that, the police play a crucial role in law enforcement only as their main response avenue. Interpretation of the existing law is usually left for the courts of law and the offenders will be declared guilty or innocent based on the interpretation of the existing laws at this stage.

Rogers (2010) study findings in San Diego, US are in agreement that assessment was rarely done following POP projects. According to the cited study, in as much as the SARA efforts were successful 85% of the time, there were outstanding gaps in the assessment phase. The study does not demonstrate clear evidence as to how rigorous assessment was employed. For instance, in some areas they state that the measurement most frequently employed were changes in the numbers of incidents, and assessments of success were otherwise ‘informal’, such as the statement ‘things are quieter now’. In the context of this study, reduced terrorist attacks does not imply reduced radicalization. This is particularly disappointing concerning the fact that the assessment phase is critical in the ‘feedback’ or experiential model that SARA adopts, and that this phase of the process has long been identified as being one of the fundamental weaknesses within the model itself.

Similarly, the results of the current study are in disagreement with Cordner and Biebel (2005) which established through the interview items that though cursory in nature, assessment was done in POP projects. The results of the cited study revealed that personal observation (51%), analysis of radio calls (14%) and speaking to residents and businesses (13%) were the most common assessment approaches used. The second assessment question was that officers were asked to characterize the results of their POP efforts, 83% of the officers indicated that the problem was significantly reduced, only 3% of the interviewees indicated that they had accomplished no impact on the targeted problem (Cordner & Biebel, 2005).

4.8 Community Involvement in Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment in Nairobi County

SARA based response strategy is a core philosophy in community policing (Miller, 2017). This implies that at the heart of the SARA problem solving model is the utility of the community members across all the four phased process. Data on community involvement in SARAsame were collected, analyzed and the results presented in Figure 4.8.




Figure 4.8: Community usage on SARA based response strategies in Nairobi County, Kenya

Source: Author, 2017.

The results revealed that on scanning, 50% (200) of the respondents indicated that they were ‘often’ involved, 40.5% (162) respondents indicated that they were ‘occasionally’ involved in analysis, 48.8% (195) of respondents indicated that they were ‘occasionally involved in response while a majority of 61.9% (247) of respondents indicated that they were rarely used involved in assessment. Police community collaboration is a salient feature of the SARA based response strategy. This implies that failure of the police to involve the community across all the four stages could lead to undesired results and hinder the effectiveness of the strategy.

Youth experiences on community engagement by the police in the fight against youth radicalization are captured as follows:

Youth one:

In the fight against youth radicalization, I am not aware of any police- youth neighborhood programs. I am a fence sitter when it comes to engaging police officers in my area or any other area in Nairobi County. I neither trust nor fear them (Field Data, 2017).

Youth two:

There is no convergence between the youths and the police officers here. We have no common projects with the officers on the ground. However, on three occasions, I have been approached by them to provide information in ongoing criminal activities in my area and I did not comply in all those situations (Field Data, 2017).

Youth three:

Generally, the youth police relationship in my area (Majengo) is pathetic. Most youths in my hood are jobless and are often profiled as “suspects” by the Kenya Police. It is that bad (Field Data, 2017).

The results from the FGD excerpts compound the fact that the police youth relationship is neither cold nor hot. Such a scenario implies that fear and lack of trust exists between the two groups. Good police youth relationship is a starting point to effective involvement since the issue at hand predominantly involves the youths. A lot has to be effected to establish optimum working conditions for the two very essential elements of the SARA based response strategies in Nairobi County.

Literature on the effectiveness of community involvement in the SARA model is hard to come by. This study therefore establishes that the SARA model assumes and acquires its’ involvement of the community from the basic concept of community policing. As a concept, community policing has a number of definitions, however, most scholars content that in practice, it requires the police and citizens to join together as partners in a venture to identify and deal with various issues (Espejo, 2014). In a nutshell, it promotes organizational strategies that support the usage of partnerships as well as problem solving techniques in a manner that is proactive in nature to address conditions that give rise to crime and social disorder as well as the fear of crime. This basic definition is inadequate to explain the usage of community in SARA problem solving process in the management of crime and disorder problems. The study concludes that community usage in the SARA model is unaccounted for by various scholars (Goldstein (1990): Eck & Spelman (1987)).

Similarly, community partnerships- a key philosophy of community policing attempts to explain community involvement without directly linking it to the SARA model. Community partnerships ought to be between the law enforcement agency and the individuals as well as the organizations they serve to develop solutions to the problems facing them as well as to increase public trust in police. Recognizing that the police alone rarely public safety problems, Miller (2017) encourages interactive partnerships with relevant stakeholders, often diverse. Miller (2017) argues that such partnerships can be used to realize two interrelated goals. First, developing solutions through collective problem solving and improving public trust. This study puts emphasis on the first goal of collective problem solving. According to Miller (2017), members of the public should play a role in prioritizing and addressing public safety. Partners include other government agencies, community members, service providers, private businesses and the media who assist in publicizing community problems as well as the available solutions. Additionally, the media can have a significant impact on public perceptions of the police, crime problems, and fear of crime. To this end, the study concludes that community involvement in the

SARA problem solving model is an area that needs further academic research.

4.9 Police Awareness of Nature of SARA Based Response Strategies

The study sought to establish police awareness on the usage and nature of SARA based response strategies in Nairobi County. Data were collected, analyzed and presented in Figure 4.9.




Figure 4.9 Police Awareness of SARA Based Response Strategies in Nairobi County, Kenya

Source: Author, 2017

The results in Figure 4.9 reveal that 81% (75) of the police officers indicated that they were aware of SARA based response strategies in the management of youth radicalization in Nairobi County, 14% (13) of the respondents indicated that they were not aware of the nature of SARA based response strategies while only 5% (6) indicated that they were not sure of the nature of SARA based response strategies. However, an FGD with the youths on SARA based response strategies revealed that the community members were not familiar with nature or had never even heard about the model. The youths’ responses in an FGD revealed the following differing experiences:

Youth one:

I am not aware of the SARA strategies or any new techniques of crime prevention in my area. I am only aware of community policing.... (Field Data, 2017).

Youth two:

SARA? I do not know any such policing approaches used in my area (Field Data, 2017).

Youth three:

SARA? What is it? How does it work and for what purposes is it used for?(Field Data, 2017).

Youth four:

No- I have never heard of SARA based approaches (Field Data, 2017).

This assertion is in tandem with the criticism that is put forth by Greene (2007) that, SARA problem solving model does not formally incorporate the community members. As such, it echoes a model that is predominantly a police function. If so however, the risk is that only problems that the police consider as important considered important by the will be attended to, only police data will be used to analyze the problems, only police led responses will be employed, and assessment will proclaim victory or defeat exclusively on the basis of police criteria. Because of these concerns, when problem solving is included within community policing, it is usually termed shared problem solving, in order to put emphasis on the importance of community involvement in each step of the SARA process.

The findings however, disagree with Katz and Web (2012) study on policing gangs in America which established that the unit officers were barely familiar with formalized problem solving in the Phoenix police department or with the SARA problem solving model. Some of the officers interviewed were asked to describe the SARA model but simply admitted that they knew nothing about the formal problem solving or SARA. A few indicated that problem solving occurred at higher levels such as the chief's level, while others knew of problem solving efforts carried out at precinct/district level. SARA problem solving model ought to be a model that is equally known to both the police as well as the community members for it to yield maximum results.

Conclusion

Problem oriented policing (whose main model of operation is the SARA problem solving model) is an effective strategy in the management of youth radicalization and other crime problems facing the society. The results inform us that whereas it is an effective strategy in the developed countries, it is still in early stages of implementation in Nairobi County. This study concludes that the police and the community are aware of the basic issues that accompany youth radicalization in Nairobi County. However, these are rarely taken into account in the implementation of SARA based response strategies. These basics include the respondents' knowledge on the drivers, indicators, consequences of youth radicalization in Nairobi County as well as the current response strategies. The study also concludes that SARA based response strategies are not consistent with the conventional model as they are law enforcement centric as opposed to problem solving oriented. Therefore, the nature of SARA based response strategies in the management of youth radicalization in Nairobi County are overly compromised thereby minimizing its intended benefits.

Recommendations

The study recommends that, the national government through the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government should put up an appropriate problem oriented policing mechanism to work towards the common interest of public safety and security. There is need for implementing a more holistic approach to building awareness of the SARA problem solving model to both the

police departments and the community members. The establishment of community policing forums at every station in Nairobi County and beyond would be key in improving awareness of the SARA based response strategies. The Kenya Police should therefore develop a set of courses on public awareness programs on the management of violent extremism for both the police and the members of the public. The study also recommends that the police training colleges should fully incorporate the aspect of problem oriented policing in the syllabus used in colleges. Training the officers in colleges ensures that the culture of problem solving is inculcated at the most basic level of training. In addition, the government should aid police departments on job training on problem oriented policing through regular seminars which will go a long way in encouraging a culture of problem solving among the police officers.

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