

China Military Base in Paracel Island and Impact Towards Vietnam Security

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ABSTRACT

The rise of China as a new superpower has resulted in an increased presence of Chinese power in the South China Sea. Even China's action of building military installations in the Paracel Islands has had an impact toward Vietnam. This action has prompted Vietnam as a major actor in the region has taken a diverse approach to address the issue. The objective of this study is to identify the factors that contributed to China building military installations in the Paracel Islands, to study the impact on Vietnam Security and further analyse the approach used by the Vietnamese Government in addressing the impact of this China State action. The theory used in this study is realism and the concept is the Power Transition Theory, national interest, balance of power and power struggle. This study uses a qualitative method in which data are collected from secondary data collected in library research. These include books, articles, newspapers and online resources that provide useful discussions. The results of the study found that China's main motive was to protect the country and their economic interests. There is no clear evidence to suggest that China tried to colonize or become a colonial state. On the other hand, Vietnam as a sovereign country also strives to protect their national interests because China's actions have indeed had a huge impact on them in terms of national sovereignty, economy, social, and security of their country. Thus, with some of the approaches taken by Vietnam such as managing maritime security, using soft diplomacy by adopting a more diplomatic foreign policy and developing a naval force capable of giving Vietnam hope of maintaining influence and at the same time will restrain China. Meanwhile, the United States has seen this situation as an excuse to increase their cooperation with Vietnam, as it worries China's growing power will be the cause of their declining influence in the region.

Keywords: *China, Military base, Paracel Island, South China Sea, Vietnam*

Background

The "semi-enclosed South China Sea" (SCS) covers an area of about "1.4 million square miles" (Akram, 2022). It begins from the "Strait of Taiwan in the north to the Singapore and Straits of Malacca in the south" and is surrounded by countries such as "China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Philippines and also Taiwan". Its extent is about "550 to 650 nautical miles (nm)", its "length more than 1200 nm". Numerous and hundreds of islands, shoals, reefs, rocks, and other features located in the SCS also measure a land part is almost six square miles (Li, 2016). The Scarborough Shoal and Pratas Islands, which are quite underwater for the whole year, and also Macclesfield Bank, which is soaked in water all year, are the other land arrangements in the SCS that are also in an irreconcilable situation (Khan & Ullah, 2018).

The SCS covers about 648,000 nautical square miles of the area and is the broadest sea bed among other's world 6 sea beds (Hong, 2010). SCS have a natural resource which very popular and was considered a risky area because of the numerous overlapping claims made by the respective nations. One of the claimant nations is China which claimed 80 percent of the SCS and includes the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands (Womack, 2011). It was supported by Rowan (2005) in his book "*The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute*" saying that the SCS connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans, forming a basic

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ocean path that connected Asia, Europe and Africa. SCS became the second most widely used universal transportation path because more than 90 percent of global transnational exchange is sought after through delivery, and 45 percent of that load was taken via the waters of the SCS.

It has long been assumed that the current scenario in the SCS poses a threat to regional stability. One of the complications is disputes between countries like “China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan” regarding their “overlapping claims” to Spratly Island and Paracel Island (Chang, 1991). All of these claims are for the reason of the advantage that the state can gain from the resources in the area and also because of their interest to control Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) in SCS which have a lot of advantages in the world economy and trade. The dispute that was “involved in the SCS between Vietnam and China” concerning Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, and also the maritime boundary. Tensions and political issues between China and Vietnam recently had been cooled. In March and April 2018, China increased their military activity in SCS by conducting naval manoeuvres and exercises. However, at the same time, China kept on building its military installation and manufacturing outposts on artificial islands and also it built in disputed waters (Vicedo, 2020).




Figure 1.1 Overall View of the South China Sea (SCS)

Source: Modified from Japan's Ministry of Defense, (2019)
<https://www.mod.go.jp/en/dact/secenv/pdf/chdactbe210906.pdf>

Figure 1.1 displays the map of SCS, stating the overlapping claim among the “Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)” and China's claim over the territorial rights of Spratly and Paracel Island. The SCS disputes between several sovereign states like “China, Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei” are included island and maritime claims because of their interest over the raw material, rich fishing grounds, and hegemony in the SCS, although it is far and beyond their 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Macaraig & Fenton, 2021). China's efforts to grow its economic and political influence, as well as its territorial expansion, in the SCS began at a time when China was seeking to expand not just its “economic and political” influence, but also its territory. The development and modernisation of “China's military” have been straight support to this effort. The “Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy” (PLAN) is “developing blue-water capabilities” that will allow China to project power or domination throughout the area and beyond (Macias, 2018).

China's navy nowadays consists of 241 primary combatant warships, “including 60 submarines”, and the “Department of Defense” announced prior to this year that the PLAN is “considering building multiple aircraft carriers by 2020”. The PLAN is also moving quickly to modernise its “submarine fleet and surface combatants” as part of its attempts to enhance its capacity to project power from its coast. This trend poses a serious threat to “Asia's current geostrategic equilibrium”. A wide number of unsettled conflicts in the SCS involve island groups that are claimed by “China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan and Malaysia as well as Brunei”. Paracel is a tiny group of islands “located in the south of China's Hainan Island” was claimed by China and Vietnam (International Crisis Group, 2021).

The second largest group of islands in SCS is the Paracel Islands which “are claimed” by “Vietnam, China, and also Taiwan” and consist of around 45 isles, reefs, rocks, and other common structures. Paracel is located “north of the Spratly Islands”, east of “Vietnam drift, and west of the Philippines”. The most developed is Woody Island which is part of the Paracel Islands, the city name Sasha City has established by China in 2012. There is a framework, an ocean port, a small military aeroplane terminal, a facility, and a mail station (Li, 2016). Vietnam and China are claimed Paracel Island. All of these issues have a significant impact on third-country governments in the region, making it critical to highlight that the country like the United States (US) which have the national power and international capability to balance of power carried by China in the situation. It is important to “maintain a geostrategic balance in the region” that ensures justice for all Asian states while also safeguarding the voices of all countries seeking a peaceful resolution to their differences. Maintaining this balance requires cooperation from all countries in the region (Goh, 2007).

According to “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)” which was claimed by the Vietnam and Philippines, a state may only obtain natural resources from the maritime zones surrounding its land or island territory. It is debatable whether China has historical rights to the SCS territory. The claim would require China to provide evidence of continuous fishing activities within the EEZ of the other state. Even the impossible appears to prove the historical right to extract oil in another country's EEZ. In response to Chinese expansionism, Vietnam passed legislation declaring sovereignty over the islands in 2012. Sasha city which is hosted by Navy garrisons and 159 artificially implemented inhabitants have been established on Paracel Island as a response to China. China banned summer fishing in the SCS in May 2009, and the marine fleet was sent there to enforce the new regulation.

Security is equally vital for the trade route, as well as access to economic rights. However, all of the state actors resolved “that interests” in uncontrolled “trade” typically “converge and that there was little” or no danger that the conflicts would jeopardise the trade routes. A few observers may have doubts about this, assuming that the “disputing countries” recently engaged in minor “military action over the islands”, sometimes resulting in casualties and leading to loss of life (Glaser, 2012). It is clear that China as a player in SCS is driven by its self-interest. The SCS became a serious issue in the Asia-Pacific area in the second decade of the twenty-first century as a result of China's two major acts of aggression against Vietnam, beginning with the annexation of the “Paracel archipelago in 1974 and a portion of the Spratly archipelago in 1988”. China's declaration of sovereignty over the SCS disputed over the island like Paracels and Spratlys is historically unsure, as China has yet to give a clear and sufficient justification. Moreover, when China combined with Tibet in 1950, it was deemed to be China's “core interest” (Raditio, 2018). Thus, the situation where China try to merge the two islands, Paracel and Spratly in 1988 by using force can be compared with the incident in China and Tibet. Mostly, the dispute in SCS is China's current plan of their “core interest” to develop their strategic ambitions in order to get hegemon title in Asia by using Paracel and Spratly (Linh et al., 2018). In 2014, China has pursued a further aggressive policy for their military part in the dispute of Pacific maritime. It did this by relocating the HD-981 oil drilling rig to the Paracel Islands and establishing an EEZ around the areas that Vietnam had already claimed as its sovereign territory. China also expand and enhance its military presence in SCS in 2017 by starting to “fire long-range surface-to-air missiles” at Spratly Islands (Macias, 2018). To support this, Linh et al., (2018) found that the main SCS rivalry and conflict about taking the Paracel and Spratly Island would restrict China and Vietnam as the holder. China will succeed in SCS with their main objective by “merging Paracel and Spratly Islands” into their mainland which will be called the “Chinese Inland Sea”.

Literature Review

In order to advance a comprehensive exposition of the China Military Base in Paracel Island and the impact toward Vietnam Security, this research presents historical and all about knowledge of Paracel Island, China and also Vietnam. Literature review is divided into three themes related to the topic and the research is articulating the factors and issues regarding the topic.

a. The Paracel Island.

The Spratly and Other South China Sea Islands Disputes (1999) by Chung, C. P., seeks to summarize the Spratlys, Paracels, and other low-lying coral reefs, atolls, and shoals in the SCS that the author is sure that the region's political shift and economic challenges would exacerbate the problem. Additionally, he noted that its seabed may be rich in hydrocarbons as a result of its location astride strategic marine waterways. Chien continued by stating that as economic and political interdependence grows, their leaders will become more interested in cooperation and more domestic groups will arise in support of peace and cooperation. He also underscored ASEAN's limited achievements in convincing China to accept some form of multilateralism in the SCS dispute. This article offers valuable information about ASEAN's development and accomplishments in dealing with China and the disputed islands; however, Chien did not conduct a thorough examination of the progress made by each claimant, as not all claimants handle the issue in the same way.

Tonneson (2000) "*The layered state of Vietnam. State Capacity in East Asia*" deliver that "China and North Vietnam" agreed during Vietnam War to defer the overlapping issue in order for South Vietnam to be defeated. SCS Challenges include "border raids in the Gulf of Tonkin, Parcel, and the Spratly Islands". In the 1950s, China patrolled half of "the Paracels", while South Vietnam controlled the other half. North Vietnam agreed to Chinese requests on Paracels in 1958. Previously, China had handed up White Dragon Island Tail to North Vietnam. Relation between China and South Vietnam has been heightened after the discovery of offshore oil reserves in Tonkin Bay.

According to this, Nguyen, (2012) mention in his paper "*Vietnam's Position on the Sovereignty over the Paracels & the Spratlys: Its Maritime Claim*" that Vietnam and China (considered disputing parties because of their shared views on these two islands) currently claim the whole island of Parcel and Spratly, whereas a portion of the Spratly Island is claimed by Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines. A lot of articles explain the claimant parts and give a resolution for the issue. The geographic location of the SCS, the dispute over sovereignty over "the Paracels and Spratly Islands", as well as SCS waters, the competition for control of natural resources in this region, the ambiguity of the UNCLOS 1982 regarding the status of islands, and national sentiments have all been put forth as possible explanations for the complexity of the SCS.

Beina Xu (2014) in "*South China Sea Tensions*" delivered that the rich "natural resources, fisheries, trade routes, and military bases" abound throughout the SCS. The "largest and most contentious locations" include the "Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal" and also Pratas Island. China uses the 9 Dash Line to determine their claim to SCS territories. This is because they can be represented as fair attempts to safeguard "marine resources and fisheries" and are an effective proxy for sovereignty claims. One of the most serious hurdles to a "resolution is China's insistence" on conducting much of its diplomacy bilaterally. "ASEAN's six-point" declaration issued in July made no mention of specific incidents, instead expressing an agreement to establish and implement a regional "Code of Conduct" (CoC).

Kurlantzick (2015) in "*A China-Vietnam Military Clash*" concentrates on the military conflict between China-Vietnam. This conflict begin in 2011 when both this country sought to claim the status in SCSs, Parcel and Spratly Island. Beginning with the three probable scenarios, he highlighted many warning signs of the bilateral relationship's rising tension. This clash has a greater impact on US interests, particularly the maritime crisis. Additionally, the author discusses risk reduction measures such as prevention and mitigation.

However, Zhang (2015) in "*Deng Xiaoping's Long War: The Military Conflict Between China and Vietnam*" deliver that Vietnam's perspective of "China as a potential national security threat" has changed as a result of this military war. In 1991, the Soviet Union's retreat from South East Asia led to the restoration of relations between "China and Vietnam". Despite this, a few concerns, particularly those involving the "Paracel and Spratly Islands", continue to strain relations between these two nations. 25 of the islands and reefs in the archipelago are currently occupied and under the jurisdiction of Vietnam, while China asserts possession of the remaining ones. The two nations have strained relations and are recognised for having legitimate claims to the islands. As a result, Vietnam and China don't think that using force to resolve their regional conflict is a viable option. Regardless of the problems, both nations seek peace and collaboration on a bilateral level to advance the country's focus on the two nations since 1991. As a result, both of the 28 nations will make every effort to prevent any armed conflicts from endangering the situation.

Thus, Asif Khan (2018) delivered in the "*The South China Sea Under Dispute of Sea*" that the SCS has aided as the attention of a political conflict involving six Asian countries. Many of have resulted in violence, while others have been handled via diplomacy and negotiation. It has been a long time since the "Paracel and Spratly Islands" were regarded valuable, and as a result, the claimants today have shown little interest in them.

Mustaza et al, (2021) stated in their article "*ASEAN, China and the South China Sea territorial disputes: analysis of conflict management strategies*" concerning the SCS is considered as "the mother of all territorial disputes". China, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and the Philippines claim either some parts or the whole of the Spratly islands. Paracels have been claimed under the control of the Vietnamese Nguyen Dynasty in the 18th century based on the collecting of items from shipwrecks. ASEAN carefully steers China's position in remarks by citing the SCS or China itself, either directly or indirectly. ASEAN defence ministers have also agreed that ADMM-Plus will be able to accomplish its objectives in terms of member trust and capacity growth.

It is envisaged that the policy will put a stop to China's hostile behaviour toward other SCS claimant nations to encourage any peaceful, cooperative resolution to the issue and also increase defence transparency. ASEAN's strategy is to offset China's assertiveness by developing "defence transparency" and supporting "peaceful and cooperative" conflict resolution. Because China discards all "efforts to internationalise" the problem and the "involvement of third parties", its participation is a sign that it is "willing to settle the disputes" amicably. ASEAN, China, Philippines, and Vietnam agreed to uphold "freedom of navigation

within and above the SCS," as well as peaceful dispute resolution "without resorting to the threat or use of force". For Example, China ousted South Vietnamese navy forces in 1974 in order to seize control over Crescent Group which is part of the Paracels and fought Vietnam troops on Johnson Reef in 1988. Because of China's aggression in the SCS disputes, smaller ASEAN claimants have sought tighter ties with the US.

b. China.

Ba (2003) in "*China and Asean: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-century Asia*" is looking back over the last three decades at China's victories over Vietnam disputes. The major objective was to work toward normalising relations between China and Vietnam, as well as to strengthen ties with Southeast Asia (SEA). As the world has witnessed in the instance of Vietnam, a study was conducted on the security perceptions of the SinoASEAN relationship. Furthermore, it discusses how each ASEAN member country is ensuring its security in light of China's engagement. In Vietnam, there hasn't been much research into border wars. A few writers contributed to "The Third Indochina War", which focused on the struggle between "China, Vietnam, and Cambodia" from 1972 to 1979, despite the fact from the book "*The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79 (1st ed.)*" that was edited by "Westad and Quinn-Judge" in 2006. Obtaining sources from "Russian and Chinese archives" in the early 1990s reveals the causes of "Vietnamese-Cambodia and Sino-Vietnamese" hostility. It highlights both the links between policies and policy assumptions in the numerous featured countries, as well as the dynamics, whether national, regional, or worldwide, that drove these disagreements to confrontation. The authors also examine the foreign policies of the ASEAN nations, which seek to further sever ties with the US while promoting a normal relationship based on a different philosophy—namely, to improve ties with Vietnam.

Percival (2007) in his book "*The Dragon Looks South*" focuses closely on it as a thorough treatise that analyses all aspects of China's relations with all SEA nations over the preceding five years. The author also differentiates between "China's goals in the mainland" and "maritime" SEA, discusses all of the major external players in SEA, not just China and the US, and argues that various IRs schools of assumed may or may not be applicable to Chinese-SEA relations. While security is prioritised, the author does not ignore economics. Percival includes material from interviews with a wide range of figures from a wide range of countries, demonstrating that he is not overly reliant on secondary reading. His facts and reasoning totally disprove the misconception that China is a threat to its neighbours, both economically and militarily. Of course, Taiwan is an exception to this rule. Percival makes a persuasive case that there is no inherent competition in the region between the US and China. This book examines the function and relative significance of each element of China's all-encompassing SEA strategy, including the "political, economic, and soft power aspects" of China's complex relationships with individual nations and the region as a whole. The book also explains and prioritises current American interests in SEA, which is a crucial first step toward assessing the implications of China's emerging presence in SEA for the US.

"*Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea*" by Dutton (2011) see "China's SCS policies are based on three key goals: regional integration, resource management, and security enhancement". Regional integration is critical for China's economic progress in order for it to accomplish its 'peaceful rise.' Resource control aims to improve its long-term resource security by ensuring control over the majority of SCS resources, while also strengthening security in the SCS by creating a maritime security buffer zone that protects its crucial eastern coastal territory. Dutton contends that China's attitude toward its sovereignty claim in the SCS is very strong and that any strategic miscalculation by any party will have serious consequences, which China has established the means to deal with. However, other difficulties, such as economic interdependence, were overlooked. It is inaccurate to portray China's policy as always offensive, as there are other elements that China must address in order to pursue its larger goals.

According to Ba (2011) in "*Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the Waters?*" looks at the SCS problem is a complex dispute that no longer deals with land but rather with larger marine rights, resources, and, increasingly, the role of China as a rising force in East Asia in comparison to the US as the status quo power. The author believes that mismanagement of the SCS will have substantial, if not unacceptable, consequences for all claims. The author feels that the dispute can be averted because there is an opportunity for potential compromise; consequently, the involvement of existing organizations such as "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)", summits, and the 2011 "ASEAN-China 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties" in the SCS (DoC) Agreement is critical in countering the claimants' emotive and aggressive reactions. The author discovered that the SCS issue arose more frequently between 1988 and 1995, and less frequently between 1995 and 2009 when ChinaASEAN relations improved significantly. Alice's research includes helpful information on conflict tendencies as well as China's stance throughout the dispute.

Womack (2011) in "*The Spratlys: From Dangerous Ground to Apple of Discord* (2011)" explains the tension in the Spratlys, which ties to China's uncertain growth and unease of its SEA neighbours at the potential of becoming China's backyard. According to the author, the US entered the dispute due to American 'national interest' in the region. According to him, China is incapable of

challenging America's standing as a superpower. As a result, China's good neighbour strategy has resulted in dramatically better relationships around its entire perimeter during the last two decades. Throughout 2010, the tensions are a perfect indication of China's shift in vision, forcing other claimants, such as the Philippines, to seek a better relationship with the US. Wommack emphasised that the only realistic strategy for resolving the dispute is the peaceful cooperation indicated in the ASEAN-China 2002 DoC. His viewpoint is correct in the sense that it is related to Alice's claim that the period from 1995 to 2009 (after the 2002 DoC) saw significant progress in China-ASEAN relations.

According to Keck (2014) in "*China's "Nine-Dash Line" is Dangerous*" stated that since 2012, a lot of installations have been built by China on its claimed islands and has carried out periodic naval patrols in the waterways surrounding its bases. Other claimant countries see these actions as a silent but offensive dispute. The US is also opposing China's ambitions, owing to its belief in free navigation and its opinion that China's actions are provocative, unfriendly, and producing instability in the region. China's claim to the SCS stems from the country's long history of naval supremacy in the region. China established the 9 Dash Line in 1947 to designate the borders of its claim, spanning the majority of the SCS, to legitimize its involvement in the waters. This action has heightened the race for territories claimed by other nations.

This is supported by Linh et al. (2018) in "*Vietnam's Different Negotiations With China Over Two Islands Dispute : Parcel And Spratly*" mentioned that In 1974, China invaded and occupied the Parcel Islands, which were formerly controlled by South Vietnam. After that, the island is occupying by China without permission. China also constructed a city called "Sansha City" in July 2012 with their headquarters on Woody Island which belongs to Vietnam in the Paracels, and the city is served as the city's headquarters.

Furthermore, Burgess (2020) in "*Confronting China's Maritime Expansion in the South China Sea*" study found that China has established its "sovereignty over" the majority of the SCS via the so-called 9 Dash Line for more than a decade. The growing power has been invading "territory within the 200 nm" EEZs of "Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia"; intimidating force against US "military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)" activities in China's EEZ; and protesting US FON and flight operations near "People's Liberation Army (PLA)" bases located well outside China's EEZ. Beijing has interfered by deploying China's formidable "coast guard, armed fishing fleet, and militias", all of which are supported by an even more fearsome PLAN.

c. Vietnam.

Amer (1999) in "*Sino-Vietnamese Relations: Past, Present and Future in Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition*" that in the "post-World War II" era, "Hanoi and Beijing" had a good "relationship in the 1950s and 1960s". However, when the Vietnamese unite and fight for their freedom against US and France, the relationship between the two countries got worst in the late 1970s as a consequence of resistance generated by the "Sino-Soviet" divide. Hanoi take sides with Moscow, which make friction in their relations with Beijing. Both these countries fight in the war over Vietnam's assault on Cambodia in 1979, and their relationship remained tense throughout the 1980s. Normal relations were restored between Hanoi and Beijing in 1991.

In Gao and Jia (2013) article "*The Nine-Dash Line in The South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications*", says that later on, Vietnam became more forceful and had taken control of twenty-nine of the Spratly Islands in 2004. Vietnam reaffirmed its position and stated its commitment to the peaceful discussion in accordance with "international law in general", and, in particular, the UNCLOS and the 2002 DoC in the SCS. Vietnam responded to both the Philippines and China on its ownership of disputed islands in 2011, claiming adequate past evidence and a legal framework to assert its sovereignty over the claimed islands. Despite the fact that it began claiming the islands after unification in 1975, Vietnam has failed to provide any plausible explanation evidence. Vietnam is enforcing its rights while opposing other claims, particularly China's 9 Dash Line, as the analysis suggests. Vietnam, like many SEA countries, aspires to elevate its claimant status in accordance with international law and history, while continually challenging the activities and claims of others, most notably China.

Brothers (2014) in "*The Enemy of My Enemy: The Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 and the Evolution of the Sino-American Covert Relationship*" discuss in detail the "history of alliances" that involving "Vietnam and China", which includes "US and Russia". How the alliance's relationships are intertwined with one occurrence after another and how they affect the others as they progress. There have been studies of the complicated relationship between the states, which has resulted in the states' relationship with one another deteriorating. He stated that there had been extensive conversations on the root of the disagreement, which had resulted in three key reasons, but he did not mention that the alliances had shifted towards one another.

On top of that, the study made by Koda (2014) in "*Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute*", mentioned that another cause of friction between the two countries is Vietnam's efforts to stop China from unlawfully searching for oil and gas in its waters. Shortly after mutual normalisation, the "China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)" signed an agreement with "Crestone Energy Corporation" in May 1992 to conduct exploration in

“Vietnam's Tu Chinh (Wan'an Bei in Chinese)” basin. Furthermore, Hiep (2014) in “*Vietnam's South China Sea disputes with China: The economic determinants*” stated that bilateral tensions have erupted as a result of the CNOOC's offer to international bidders of blocks in “Vietnam's EEZ” in the SCS. For example, in June 2012, China invited international bids on nine such blocks. Due to Vietnam's harsh criticism and China's uncertain legal base, oil multinationals have shown little interest in the offer. That is why, in several cases in the past, China has made the decision to explore the Vietnamese seas on its own.

“*Backgrounder: Major events in China-Vietnam ties*” by Huaxia (2015) analysed the progression of Vietnam-China relations from November 1991 to the current in terms of normalised relations between the two countries. It highlights how, despite historical concerns and power disparities between the two countries, relations have improved over the last seven years. Regardless, the author sees four factors influencing their connection, all of which are tied to their mutual land and sea limits being extraordinary. All assessments indicate that the two governments have the political will to tackle two of the four difficulties by the year 2000. They are the outskirts of the Tonkin (Bac To) Gulf and the land. In the near and medium term, he rational, ties will continue to develop on a level.

Conceptual Framework

Realism is a theory that is used to examine the concept of this research paper about China's military base on Paracel Island dan impact toward Vietnam Security. Given that both realism and concept “Power Transition Theory” (PTT) are famous methods to the “study of international politics”, a brief description here may suffice. Realism's early stages may be drawn all the way back to theorists such as Machiavelli and Hobbes. More recent versions of realism have emphasised the International System (IS) structure (anarchy), the use of the units (identity), and the distribution of capacities in place of classical realism's emphasis on human nature and the animus. Waltz famously stated that his theory just required two criteria to function: “that the order is anarchic and that it is populated by units pursuing survival.” Waltz believed that if these conditions were met, “balance-of-power politics” would be overcome. PTT was proposed by A. F. K. Organski and it has subsequently been expanded upon by Organski, Kugler, J. and a number of other academics. Its central claims are that the IS is typically hierarchical, with a “dominant power” at the top that “creates and sustains the international order”; that new powers emerge on a regular basis as a result of uneven growth rates; and that “the risk of war” is greatest when a dissatisfied “rising power” reaches par with, or level surpasses, the deteriorating “dominant power”. Both (balance-of-power) “realism and PTT” are focused on war and peace in the IS, emphasise the role of the “state as the primary actor”, and emphasise the function of power. PTT is frequently seen as a subset or branch of realism as a result of these connections. Some academics even combine the two methodologies in a fictitious 'realist PTT.' There are two key differences that I would like to discuss below, despite the obvious fact that PTT's perspective on international politics and power distribution is more longitudinal (looking at a development over time), whereas judgments. The power transition paradigm sees politics as a hierarchy of states with various degrees of cooperation and rivalry, in contrast to realism's emphasis on anarchy. realism's perspective is more cross-sectional (looking at a specific point in time), and the ontological disagreement over whether the IS generally resembles anarchy (realism) or hierarchy (PTT). the explanations of various terms I think that taking these differences seriously leads to policy suggestions that are vastly different depending on the viewpoint employed (Rauch, 2018).

Assuming that, since realism has long dominated International Relations (IR) theory, it only seems sensible to start by outlining how realism views anarchy. While survival is a central idea in realist theory, and governments pass and enforce laws to protect individuals, reducing the likelihood of conflict or civil war, the same cannot be said of “international politics”. Thus, one essential premise of the realism method to anarchy is that anarchy dictates standards; anarchy is defined in this sense as a lack of centralised authority to enforce laws and protect nations. Waltz, K. a realist, blames the existence of state violence on the absence of a “global government.” The lack of a higher authority than nation-states is thought to result in an anarchical, self-help international system; this anarchical, self-help IS has been characterised as “a ruthless arena where states hunt for opportunities to exploit one another.” This impression is linked to the conviction that IRs “would stay perilous as a result of their failure to emerge from anarchy.” These findings imply that realists are gloomy about the international system.

To summarise, all realists seem to believe that states are the only significant “actors in international politics”, that anarchy reigns as a result of the absence of a “central authority to regulate or govern nation-states”, and that “conflict and war” are a continuous danger as each state seeks to guarantee its own survival at the expense of others. A “security dilemma” occurs when “government activities to safeguard their own security imperil the security of other states.” As a result, realism contends that anarchy in the international system limits the settlement of the security quandary, culminating in conflict. Realist thinkers assert that it is impossible to eradicate anarchy because no nation would ever feel secure enough to cede sovereignty to a higher power under some form of global governance (Dornan, 2011).

States operate in an anarchic environment, which means that there is no clear expectation that anyone or anything will do anything in response – because there is no clear expectation that anyone or anything will do something in response. Thucydides and Machiavelli's history is a big influence in his writing. Perhaps more than any other theory of international relations, realism best fits the way statecraft practitioners view international politics. Detractors of realists believe that by opposing them, they will contribute to the perpetuation of the aggressive and hostile reality they represent. According to realists, leaders are faced with an

unlimited number of restrictions and few opportunities for collaboration. Confronting the facts of one's situation is a cause of caution rather than despair for a realist. When the Cold War ended, world politics shifted dramatically, ushering in a new period marked by low animosity between nations and enormous possibilities for cooperation. The realism toolkit failed to account for and continues to fail to account for, events such as the Soviet Union's demise. This is because the thinking that underpins realism is state centred. Numerous critics of realism focus on one of its key foreign policy approach: the 'balance of power.' Rather than political or cultural commonalities, the desire to recruit fair-weather allies, or 'enemies of my adversary,' controls the balance of power between nations. This may explain why the US and Soviet Union allied during World War II (1939–1945): they perceived a comparable threat from a developing Germany and sought to counter it. To support the theory above, there are a lot of variables were analysed and studied.

Analysis

Growing concerns exist that tensions over China's active involvement in the SCS could lead to a military conflict and upset the balance of power in the area. If there is no system in place to reduce or defuse events in the area, it may be deemed a total loss. Therefore, it is essential to lessen the motivation for China's construction of a military facility on Paracel Island and to consider the impact on the security of Vietnam. China's strong engagement was motivated by a desire to defend its economic interests, maintain security for their waterway trade or SLOC and to show the world that they are the superpower in the region at the same time to balance US power in the SCS. To do that, China has continued to modernize their military and expand their military in the sea. The modernization of the PLAN fleet towards the blue-water navy and control over the 9 Dash Line will guarantee the security and safety of Chinese traders in the SCS. As a result, the PLAN's operation in the SCS has as one of its goals the protection of China's economic interests, the security of the SLOC, and the improvement of China's reputation. It is to maintain China's need for natural resources such as coal, gas, oil and also fishing activity. They need to maintain their continuity of national development. This is the factor that has been identified as why China remain an active presence in SCS and built a military base in the Paracel Island.

China's claim the 9 Dash Line and overlapped with Vietnam's territory and give this put Vietnam into a difficult situation while wanting to recover their lost territory and at the same time having to face China's assertiveness in the sea which intervene in Vietnam's activity in the sea. Both nations involve in maintaining their economic activity and the wealth of seabed and natural resources in SCS also Paracel Island gave difficulty for Vietnam to develop in the oil and gas industry. Not to forget when China built the military base on Paracel Island which near Vietnam makes the fishing activity for Vietnam is in a not good position. Because of this, Vietnam has increased their military activity and this naval tension affects not only the two nations but also every country in the region as a neighbour. Vietnam has seen China's intention by establishing its military base to continue its OBOR initiative. Thus, Vietnam has reacted by military activity in the SCS and a modernisation effort is being carried out to ensure that the military can prevent any unwarranted conflict.

Vietnam approaches managing their maritime security dispute by using legal action such as UNCLOS, ARF meetings and Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). At the same time, Vietnam uses ASEAN as their platform to mitigate this issue. Vietnam also uses Soft Diplomacy as their approach such as Defense Diplomacy such as a vast network with China and following other country claimants such as the Philippines that legal platform to deny China's overlapping claim. Internationalization of the SCS Issue by cooperation with big power is also one of Vietnam's approaches to denying China assertiveness in the SCS. A lot of cooperation with the US has been conducted by the Vietnam government and at the same time, Vietnam engage with Russia by procuring military assets from Russia such as submarines and others. By that time, Vietnam was also prepared for coercive action by military modernization and military activity in the SCS. This can be seen with the military exercises in SCS and the increase of the Vietnam military expenditure over the year.

It appeared that China's motivation is to defend its country and national interests. The realist theory, which states that the state will seek to increase its power and influence to maintain its influence, can be related to this. China's action over SCS can be seen through their overlapping claim using the 9 Dash Line. However, there is no concrete proof that China is attempting to colonise or is turning into a colonial power. On other hand, Vietnam is also attempting to defend their national interests and national sovereignty because China built a military base on Paracel Island as it "has been operating" in the region for a period. Hence, altering its "foreign policy and developing capable military" forces will give Vietnam confidence to maintain its interest and simultaneously would counterbalance China. As China's power grows, the US has viewed this situation as a reason to deepen its ties with Vietnam since it raises concerns that its influence in the region will decline as a result.

As we can see there is lots of International Organization such as ASEAN that exist in the Asian region which can give an advantage to settling the dispute in the SCS. This is the platform that should be maintained by Vietnam to balance China's power in the region. Activities and events such as discussions, whether official or informal, should be intensified between ASEAN and China. However,

the difficulty is that China wants to resolve the matter bilaterally. This is a significant impediment to obtaining a unified ASEAN perspective on the subject. As a result, Vietnam and ASEAN should reassure China that ASEAN is a coalition whose purpose is to establish regional stability and peace. Each ASEAN member state should get one. Vietnam should constantly remind ASEAN claimant nations that China's military expansion is a natural and justifiable result of its expanding economy. Aside from dialogues between state leaders, Vietnam should promote more regular expert discussions on conflict and marine management. Outside bodies may have a role here. Think tanks, scholars, attorneys, and foundations might serve as a "virtual International Court of Justice" to practice the arguments that states would make in a true hearing. Experts, whether neutral or partisan, might compile the information already made public by governments and others and seek further materials. This 'Track Two Tribunal' might ask governments to provide evidence but continue whether or not they comply. Vietnam should advocate for a united ASEAN posture on this subject, especially against China, whose strength rivals that of the US. Small and middling powers have a secondary, subservient role in the international arena; if they have any impact, it is via the formation of coalitions of like-minded governments to achieve similar aims. This topic should be emphasized to avoid divisions within ASEAN.

Conclusion

The facts have been faced by the Vietnam government because of China's claims which involve overlapping claims with Vietnam. Vietnam has to face the impact of China's claim that not only involves international claims but is accompanied by several actions such as violating action on the waters of a sovereign country such as Vietnam. It has been learned that the actions of the state of China claiming some areas in the SCS and claims based on the 9 Dash Line have interrupted the sovereignty of Vietnam. Activities such as the construction of artificial islands, building up a military installation on the islands as a forward base and military activities by China are believed to protect their economic importance give an impact on Vietnam's economy as well. Vietnam has to protect the sovereignty of their country although it is believed China's actions to strengthen the OBOR initiative by using waterways in the SCS also led to their actions to build military installations in the Spratly Islands and Paracel islands as forward operational bases to protect their interests in the SCS. This impact has caused Vietnam to strengthen their military forces to face the actions of China. Vietnam has also learned from their past mistakes and their experience of having a war with China over the land dispute and several islands including the Paracel Islands. At the same time, this action is as China's rising as a major power in the Asian region. The results of the analysis also found that the action of China is due to the importance of marine products and seabed found in the SCS which will be used as a resource for China to meet the "needs of the people" in their country.

Vietnam was so overwhelmed by the Chinese maritime route that it became the main route of economic activity or China's SLOC that which led to military actions such as the expulsion of Chinese maritime enforcement agencies and the cessation of oil exploration activities. This impact has indeed greatly affected the development of the Vietnamese army especially in maintaining sovereignty in the SCS. Other factors such as the economy, fishing activities and oil and gas exploration activities also have a major impact on Vietnam. Therefore, the research found that Vietnam has taken courses of action and lessons from history in which Vietnam also strengthened the activities and capabilities of their country through military upgrades and development. Apart from that, strengthening the military is a way for Vietnam to balance powers like China and at the same time face other great powers like the US and others. In fact, there have been several incidents, which show that Vietnam has shown their aggressive attitude by expelling fishing activities, oil and gas exploration by China in the islands near Vietnam. This is also supported by the increase in military assets and maritime activity was also implemented by Vietnam to cope with the current situation. Thus, it can be concluded that the actions of the State of China to build military installations on several "Spratly Islands and moreover the Paracel Islands" have had a tremendous impact on the State of Vietnam politically, economically and militarily. This effect will also lead to adverse developments if this matter is not curbed or controlled in the future.

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