A Critical Review on Political Economy of Rohingya Influx in Bangladesh

Akkas Ahamed*, Mohammad Alam Chowdhury**, Md. Sayedur Rahman***

*Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Chittagong, Chittagong, Bangladesh.
**Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Chittagong, Chittagong, Bangladesh.
***Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Begum Rokeya University, Rangpur-5400, Bangladesh & Masters Student, Master's Programme in Socioeconomic and Political Development of Modern Asia, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russian Federation.

Abstract-

The Rohingya refugees are the most persecuted ethnic and religious minority in the world. They are suffering for long time. Many observers think that the Rohingyas are treated badly on ground of their religious identity. And they have been oppressed by the Myanmar's Buddhist military junta for their distinct religious and ethnic identity. But, this study tries to find out the other motives behind the incident that not only religious and ethnic identity are held responsible for the Rohingya influx in Bangladesh; but also there are other reasons such as politics and economic interests of the Myanmar's government. The government intends to attract foreign investments in the Rakhaine state. They need the land by evacuating the Rohingya people. Thus, they have compelled the Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh. To make this happen they occurred crimes, human rights violations and genocide. To carry out this study, a series of focus group discussions was done. Besides, we have talked to the both documented and undocumented refugees settled at Ukhia and Teknaf refugee camps. We have also exchanged views with the local people who are suffering tremendously at the Rohingya influx. The secondary data and interrelated information about the study was collected from Ukhia and Teknaf statistical office, the office of the United Nations High Commissions for Refugees (UNHCR) and the library of the University of Chittagong.

Index Terms- Rohingya Refugees, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Political Economy, UNHCR, Human Rights, Genocide, Military Junta.

I. INTRODUCTION

Rohingya influx is one of the important national, regional and global issues in recent time. Many of us make statement on the difficulty supported their scanty knowledge about the difficulty. Only some has some idea of the political-economy of Rohingya influx from Myanmar's Rakhine (Arakan) state to the southeastern part (Cox's Bazar district) of Bangladesh. What politico-economic features of Rakhine state and Myanmar normally pushed the Rohingyas to depart their paternal homeland and choose for sub-human life of refugees in Bangladesh? That's the question which has been described in this research. For many years, the Myanmar inner circle had declined to just accept the Rohingya, a separate Muslim ethnic group living in western Burma/Myanmar, mutually of the country's several ethnic groups. Thus, Rohingya people have suffered human rights violations and a greater part of them are denied of citizenship rights. In 1978, a Myanmar army campaign of killing, rape, destruction of mosques, and non-secular persecution drove 167,000 Rohingyas across Burma's porous border with Bangladesh **(Omi, 2010).** Under intense international pressure, the Myanmar government eventually allowed many of the Rohingyas to return to Myanmar. But during 1991-1992, again a brand new wave of Burmese repression forced over 250,000 Rohingyas to escape into Bangladesh. Among them 22000 approximately were also sent back to Myanmar under an agreement. A massive wave of Rohingyas came within the last half of 2017. In keeping with UNHCR, 2018, the quantity of Rohingyas in Teknaf and Ukhia, sub- districts of Cox's Bazar district of Bangladesh, about .9 million. This study is meant to analyze the politics and economics of the Rohingya influx in Bangladesh.

II. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The Bangladesh Government has been very liberal towards Rohingya refugees over the last few decades. However, the government's support and resource capacities are placed under massive strain, with new challenges linked to security, pollution, deforestation, and clashes between local population and refugees.

The medium to longer-term challenge is to find the ways and means to assist the Rohingya to return to Myanmar. This paper contributes to the academic literature on politico-economic causes of influx in Bangladesh. The Rohignya issue has become a regional and global issue; as an example it's posing security threats to not only Bangladesh but also to the South-east Asia, China and Australia. If the Rohingya issue isn't dealt with utmost sincerity and priority basis, it'll pose not only security threats but also socio-economic and political threats to several countries of this region. Myanmar's political stability has significant implications on both South and South-East Asia. Thus doing research on the politics and economics of Rohingya influx in Bangladesh is crucial. We all know that protection of business interests relies on the regime stability and political environment. This research will provide policy recommendation to defend business interests of South Asia, South-East Asia, and North East Asia and to some extent Asia Pacific countries. Besides, the study will provide with necessary recommendations to protect socio-political, security and environment, and human rights of both Bangladesh and Myanmar.

III.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In this paper we will focus on seeking answers to the following questions:
1. What happened to the Rohingyas in Myanmar and what made them to flee to Bangladesh?
2. What are the major politico-economic reasons for the Rohingya influx in Bangladesh?
3. Is there any link between the kind of Political System and Economic Model practiced in Myanmar?
4. What are the political aspects of Myanmar that forced the Rohingya Muslims to flee to Bangladesh, a Muslim majority neighboring country?
5. What are the economic imperatives for the Myanmar regime to force the Rohingyas to evacuate their lands and homesteads?

IV.   HYPOTHESES

A learned guess on the relationship between two or more variables is named hypothesis. This study is principally concerned about the vulnerability of the Rohingya people because of political and economic situations created by Myanmar government, their army, and to some extent, a bit of Buddhist. The hypothesis for this research will therefore, target the event model that needs acquisition of land and other natural resources in Rakhine state which led the Myanmar military rulers to be aggressive against the Rohingyas. This will be one amongst main religious activities of the explanations for such a mass influx in Bangladesh. Religious difference and hatred to Rohingya Muslims is another political factor that forced the Rohingyas to escape to Bangladesh. Besides, Rohingyas were empty their citizenship rights by the Burmese government. The military maltreated Rohingya people due to their religious beliefs and ethnic identity. So, the Myanmar's government wanted to induce remove them. Myanmar's nationalism features a heavy influence of Buddhist religious component which cannot accommodate the Muslim Rohingyas for historical and spiritual reasons. To pursue this study, these two variables, (political and economic causes), of Rohingya influx to Bangladesh are studied. The Rohingyas should be evicted to amass land. Thus, economic model of land for the state of Myanmar and industrialization to draw in foreign investment are studied.

V.   MATERIALS AND METHODS

The study has started with preparing community profiles to find out details of the community people. But the centerpiece of our methodology was collection of information from key informants through a survey. Initially primary information from key informants was collected on the politico-economic causes of Rohingya influx in Bangladesh. We have drawn community maps and involved in focus group interviews. Refugees living outside the camps from different locations were selected randomly for interview. Secondary data and interrelated information about the study was collected from the Upazilla statistical office of Ukhia and Teknaf, the UNHCR office and also the libraries of the University of Chittagong. Local newspapers, magazines and other reliable sources on Rohingya refugee issue were studied.

VI.   LITERATURE REVIEW

Myanmar considers the Rohingya as illegitimate migrants in Northwestern a part of Rakhine State (NRS) and, as such, they're not granted basic citizenship rights **(Azad &Jasmin, 2013, p. 26).** There's an oversized body of literature on the history and development of issues involving the Rohingya **(Ahmed 2010; Alam 2012; Brooten 2015; Deppermann 2013; Haque 2016).** On 25 August 2017, activists of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked 30 police security posts, provoking a violent reaction from the protection forces. In line with Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), a global medical humanitarian aid organization, at least 6,700 Rohingyas and 730 Rohingya children under age of 5 were brutally killed during the violence **(MSF 2017).** Amnesty International estimated that Myanmar defense forces and police forces raped and sexually ill-treated Rohingya women and girls. In line with the

human rights organization, a minimum of 288 villages located within the northern part of Arakan were partially or totally demolished by fire in late August 2017 **(Amnesty International, 2018).** Over 655,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh during the months after 25 August 2017. Before August, an estimated 307,500 Rohingya refugees were already living in refugee camps. Reports show that the Myanmar military committed serious human rights violations, crimes against humanity, genocide, and group action **(Martin, Margesson& Vaughn 2017, pp. 1-2).**

VII.   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK/ POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ROHINGYA INFLUX IN BANGLADESH

In academic research, conceptualizing the subject establishes a justification for the research **(Radhakrishna, Yoder & Ewing, 2007).** A conceptual framework, defined as a group of interrelated concepts and concepts forms the idea of interpretations and conclusions **(Berman, 2013, p. 2).** It helps develop the goal of the study, advance thesis questions, choose appropriate approaches, and recognize probable limits of the research **(Lederman & Lederman 2015, p. 597; Le Compte and Goetz, 1993).** Creswell **(2013)** argues that the literature review provides a concrete foundation for developing frameworks for research.

The international organization Conventions of 1951 and its Protocol of 1967 define a refugee as a person who is forced to escape their native country across a global border because of oppression, social disturbance, or war. Affected states and also the UNHCR decide an individual's refugee status through an administrative process **(George 2009, p. 34).** Often, refugees effectively become stateless people, because they can't return their homeland for horror of reprisals or ongoing persecution. Historian Joseph Reese Strayer argues: "A man can lead a rationally full life without a family, a permanent local residence or a spiritual attachment, but if he's stateless he's nothing. He has no rights, no security and small opportunity"**(The Lancet, 2016, p. 217). Vas Dev (2002, p. 3)** states that a society is any independent nation which by proactive choice or through incapability to act accepts asylum seekers and permits them to reside on their land on short or long-term basis. In line with the Administration for Refugee and Return Affairs-Ethiopia (ARRA), host communities is welcoming of refugees and sleep in relative harmony, upholding the rights of refugees and sharing natural assets **(ARRA 2011, p. 34).** However, in some situation the host people exhibits an unhelpful response because of discontent with the impact of refugees on the local economy, social and political life, and security and safety **(Vas Dev 2002, p. 4).**

An individual may commit to shift to a different country for various reasons and under different situations. Migration occurs on ground of financial factors, and for socio-cultural, environmental and political reasons **(Parkins 2011, p. 12).** Often, people are forced to migrate because of religious and ethnic conflict, war, and poverty **(Grinvald 2010, p. 17).** The term refugee and migrant are sometimes used interchangeably; however, the two terms have different meanings. The UNHCR **(2018)** states that: the definition of refugee is one that has been enforced to escape his or her motherland thanks to harassment, war, or violence. A refugee features a justifiable fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political ideology or membership during a particular social/political group. Presumably, they can't return home or are terrified to try to so. An individual who moves from one country to a different trying to find improved opportunities, as an example service or living conditions, is defined as a migrant **(Sengupta, 2015).**

The Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, specifies in Article 14(1) that: "everybody has the lawful right to appear for and to require pleasure in other countries asylum from persecution" **(UN n.d., p.1).** This can be the elemental right that defends people from persecution. The convention of 1951 and also the Protocol of 1967 include the essential definition of a refugee, their status within the host country and also the state's responsibility in alliance with the UNHCR **(Jastram&Achiron 2001).** As per Article 33 (1) of the Convention of 1951, a contracting country cannot decline entry of a refugee or force their return to areas where life or independence is endangered thanks to nationality, religion, race, or membership of any specific group. As a member of the UN, Bangladesh is obliged to support these international laws and meet its obligations toward Rohingya refugees **(Mohammed 2011; UNHCR 1992).** From a humanitarian viewpoint, Bangladesh provided for the Rohingya's basic needs in accordance with international refugee law after allowing refugees to enter and reside in.

VIII.   POLITICAL CAUSES OF ROHINGYA INFLUX IN BANGLADESH

The Rohingya clash is an ongoing conflict within the northern division of Myanmar's Rakhine State characterized, by sectarian hostility,between the Rohingya Muslim and Rakhine Buddhist communities; an armed attack on Rohingya minority people by Myanmar's military, and rebel attacks by Rohingya separatists in Buthidaung, Maungdaw, and Rathedaung Townships, which border

with Bangladesh. The conflict arises mainly on grounds of the religious and cultural differences between the Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslim minority. During World war II in Burma (Myanmar), Rohingya Muslims, who were allied with the British Empire and promised a separate Muslim state reciprocally, fought against local Rakhine Buddhists, who were sympathetic of the Japanese occupying forces. Following independence in 1948, the newly created union government of the mostly Buddhist Burma deprived the Rohingyas of their citizenship rights subjugating them to wide range of systematic discrimination within the country. This has broadly been compared to serious human rights violations **(BBC News. 9 October, 2016).**

By several international academics, analysts, and political figures including Desmond Tutu, a famous South African anti-apartheid activist **(Far Eastern Economic Review, 2017).** From 1947 to 1961, Rohingya mujahideen fought Burmese military in an attempt to own the predominantly Rohingya geographical area around the Mayu peninsula in northern Arakan (Rahkine State) to realize autonomy or independence in order that it may well be united by Pakistan's East Bengal (now Bangladesh) **(Yegar, 1972).** During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Mujahideen lost an outsized amount of their forces and support, resulting the bulk of them surrendering to the Burmese military **(Pho KanKaung, May 1992).** Within the 1970s the Rohingya pro-independence movements emerged from remnants of the Mujahideen, and also the combat/fight culminated with the Burmese administration beginning a large armed operation named Operation Dragon King (Naga Min) in 1978 to drive out the Rohingyas, the so-called "foreigners". Within the 1990s, the well-armed Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) emerged because the main Rohingya rebel groups came to the Burmese authorities alongside the Bangladesh–Myanmar border. The Burmese government responded militarily with Operation Clean and delightful Nation, but did not disable the RSO. In October 2016, Burmese border posts along the Bangladesh–Myanmar borders were attacked by an extra radical group, Harakah al-Yaqin, leading to the deaths of a minimum of 40 combatants **(Radio Free Asia, 2017).** It absolutely was the initial key resurgence of the clash since 2001. Combating erupted again in November 2016, bringing the 2016 toll to 134, and for a second time on 25 August 2017, when the Arakan Rohingya NGO (formerly Harakah al-Yaqin) launched coordinated attacks on 24 police posts and a military base that left 71 dead. A subsequent military crackdown by Myanmar provoked the Office of the U.N. diplomat for Human Rights (UNHCHR) to examine the difficulty. The UNHCR released a report on 11 October 2017 detailing the Burmese military's "systematic process" of driving many thousands of Rohingyas from Myanmar "through frequent acts of humiliation and aggression" **(Cumming-Bruce, Nick, 18 September, 2018).**

The Rohingyas uphold that they're indigenous to western Myanmar with an inheritance of over a millennium with influence from the Arabs, Mughals and Portuguese. The Rohingys argue that they're descended from natives in pre-colonial Arakan. In history, the region was a sovereign Kingdom between Southeast Asia and also the Indian subcontinent **(Ghosh, Partha S. 23 May, 2016).** The position of the Myanmar government, on the opposite hand, is that the Rohingyas don't seem to be a state "indigenous race", but are illegal immigrants from bordering Bangladesh. It argues that the Muslims of pre-colonial times are now called Kameins which the Rohingya contemplate their history, civilization and culture with the history of all Muslims in Arakan to require ahead its separatist agenda. Additionally, Myanmar's government doesn't allow the term "Rohingya" and prefers to sit down with the community as "Bengalis" during a derogatory manner. Rohingya advocacy groups, like the Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO), impose their right to "self-determination within Myanmar **(Leider, Jacques, 2013).**

IX.   ECONOMIC CAUSES OF ROHINGYA INFLUX IN BANGLADESH

According to Binoda Mishra, head of the Centre for Studies in Diplomacy and Development (CSIRD) in India, "China supports Myanmar to stay its influence built over three decades of giant development aid and supply of military hardware, India supports Myanmar to play catch-up and make influence partially by development financing and to a specific extent by playing on civilizational linkages supported the common Buddhist legacy. And both India and China connect the Burmese military the maximum amount because the country is vital to India's "look East' policy and China's Belt and Road Initiative. China is Myanmar's northern neighbor and friend **(Nations, AP at the United, 24 October 2018)".** China has been investing within the Kyauk Phyu port which could supply a pipeline from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan. As a part of its "One Belt, One Road" program, China has made heavy investments in Rakhine state, including development of China's cost-effective critical first-ever seaport on the ocean within the predominantly-Rohingya coastal region of Rohingya community of Maungdaw, providing a much-shorter route to the ocean for land-locked Central and Western China **(The Guardian, September 2018).** China also has taken plans to open up Rakhine state which is commercially important in other ways. With China's economic involvement in Rakhine state requiring collaboration with the Myanmar military forces and government, China helped Myanmar by using its veto power within the U.N. SC to guard Myanmar

from any strong U.N. action over the Rohingya issue. Instead, China has stated that the answer to the Rohingya problem is ensuring more development in Rakhine state **(Guardian, September 2018).** On Revolutionary Organization 17 November 2017, China declared that it might send government minister Wang Yi to Myanmar and Bangladesh with a proposal to hold Beijing's control over the area and mediate the issue of Rohingya refugee catastrophe **(The independent, 11 November 2017)**. India like China has also secured Myanmar's military government over the crisis. But India has become modest in its support to Myanmar **(Guardian, September 2018).** In accordance with, South China Morning Post, India invested in the Rakhine's Kaladan project to connect Northeast India to the Bay of Bengal. Because of the entry of over half 1,000,000 refugees, both Bangladesh and India fear of what they call the "jihadi nexus" **(South China Morning Post, 2018).** The Indian Ministry of External Affairs stated: "We stand by Myanmar government within the hour of its emergency, we strongly denounce the terrorist attacked on 24–25 August and condole the death of policemen and militia, we'll support Myanmar in its battle against terrorism" **(The South China Morning Post,August, 2018).** This was occurred on a daily basis following an ARSA attack on 30 police and armed guard posts. Myanmar claims that this attack "triggered" it's cruel counter-retaliation that has driven quite half 1,000,000 Rohingyas into Bangladesh. Major General Gaganjit Singh, former Deputy Chief of India's Defense intelligence service, asked:"What if ARSA terrorists perform an attack on Indian ship on the Kaladan river or try revenge on parts of the Yunnan-Kyauk Phyu oil-gas pipeline because the (pro-independence group United Liberation Front of Assam, ULFA) want to endanger the Indian state of Assam? Such scenarios can't be discounted" **(The South China Morning Post, 2018).**

According to Human Rights Council (2019), Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), both are owned and influenced by senior military leaders of Myanmar. Among them are Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Vice Senior General Soe Win, both of whom the Mission earlier said should be investigated and prosecuted for genocide, human rights violations, crimes against humanity and war crimes. MEHL and MEC own a minimum of 120 businesses involved in everything from construction works to pharmaceuticals, manufacturing, insurance, tourism, banking and insurance. Both the businesses, together with a minimum of 26 of their subsidiaries, hold licenses for jade and ruby mining businesses in Kachin and Shan states. Violations of international human rights and humanitarian law including forced labor and sexual aggression, are perpetrated by the Tatmadaw in northern Myanmar in reference to their business activities **(Human Rights Council, 2019).**"Given the scope of Myanmar military/Tatmadaw connection in jade and ruby mining in northern Myanmar, businesses and customers should conduct sharp with due diligence to make sure that they're not purchasing, selling, trading or otherwise using jewelry produced or sold by enterprises owned or inclined by the Tatmadaw," said Mission Expert Radhika Coomaraswamy **(Human Rights Council, 2019).** The 111-page report of Human Rights Council, released in Geneva, contains five annexes that the list of military businesses and foreign and domestic businesses that provide to or like the Tatmadaw and its operations **(Human Rights Council, 2019).** The statement details how 45 business companies and organizations in Myanmar contributed over 10 million dollars to the military forces within the weeks following the start of the 2017 clearance operations in Rakhine State. So-called "crony companies" with close relations to the Tatmadaw later financed development related projects in Rakhine State that further served the military's "purpose of re-engineering the world in a very way that deletes the evidence of Rohingya belongings to Myanmar **(Human Rights Council, 2019).**The report named two companies, KBZ Group and Max Myanmar, which helped financially in constructing a wall fence along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border "knowing that it'd contribute to the distress and anguish related to the effect of preventing the displaced Rohingya population from returning to their homes and land. The report found that a minimum of 15 foreign firms have venture business with the Military/Tatmadaw, while 44 others have some kind of business ties with Tatmadaw's financial conglomerate. These foreign business companies risk causative to, or being connected to, violations of the international human rights and humanitarian law. At least, they're playing a role in supporting the military's financial ability. All companies doing business in or buying goods from Myanmar; and should conduct heightened due diligence to make sure that they're not benefiting the Tatmadaw **(Human Rights Council, 2019).**The revenue that these military businesses generate contribute to tremendous political and economic powers for the Tatmadaw's autonomy from elected civilian people and also provides economic support for the Tatmadaw's operations with their big range of international human rights and humanitarian law violations," said Mission Expert Christopher Sidot **(Human Rights Council, 2019).** Mission Chair Marzuki Darusman said:" Removing the Tatmadaw from Myanmar's economic and business activities entails two parallel approaches. Additionally to separating the Tatmadaw financially, we've to support economic ties with non-Tatmadaw companies and businesses in Myanmar. This may promote the stable liberalization and development of Myanmar's economy to a good extent, including its natural resource sectors, but in a vary way that ensures accountability, equity and transparency for its population **(Human Rights Council, 2019).**

According to the **(Myanmar Times, August 2019),** foreign investors are still keenly fascinated by Rakhine State in spite of overseas sanctions and international pressure applied in spite of political instability and insurgency. And now the state has enhanced access to electricity, circumstances are looking better for businesses to come back into the state or expand. Projects linked to China's Belt and Road initiative remain a point of interest, with the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which comprises a marine port, parcel and housing, being a main attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the state **(The Myanmar Times, August 2019).** The economic park will maintain businesses involved in aquaculture, livestock and garment industries while the deep-sea port and its conveniences will connect Myanmar with a regional network of economies including China, India and ASEAN countries. Plans to develop the SEZ were first declared in September 2013 and a consortium led by Beijing-based CITIC Group Corporation Ltd that incorporated Thailand's Charoen Pokphand Group Co Ltd was awarded the project in 2015. Though, it absolutely was not until November last year that a framework accord was signed between the Myanmar governments and CITIC, which also saw the first price-tag of US$7.5 billion reduced to US$1.3 billion. The Rakhine state chief minister U NyiPu said that among the projects within the SEZ, Myanmar Bright Prospect International Logistics Co Ltd has proposed to line up prawn farming, support of a jetty project on Made Island and build a five-star hotel on Ramree Island. There have also been some proposals submitted **(The Myanmar Times, August 2019).** Additionally, there are some requests to carry out surveys and permission to amass land," he said, adding that the authorities welcome all investors because the state's growth will create more job opportunities **(The Myanmar Times, August 2019).** Thanks to the massive FDI involved, the proposals have all been filed to the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC), which has the ability to approve the projects. Rakhine's state minister for development U Win Myint, told the Myanmar Times that the hotel and jetty projects were supporting projects for the deep sea port project. The five-star hotel project features a predictable cost of US$38 million while the jetty has an estimated cost of over US$100 million. The state money of Sittwe has also be converted into a point of interest for investors, with Coast KTMG Development Co Ltd proposal to create a US$38 billion, 7000-acre project called New Sittwe Myanmar City 2030 having been registered to the MIC **(The Myanmar Times, August 2019).** A Chinese–backed Limited Co. . has also submitted a proposal to construct coastal road through the Ponnagyun business zone. U Win Myint said that for assured projects just like the New Sittwe Myanmar City 2030 project, variety of issues about land ownership will must be solved initially before the project can run. They need to settle the land disputes first. Then, they have to pass the MIC because the investment amount is big. He said, "We will do all we are able to do at the national authorities' level to assist accelerate the projects" **(The Myanmar Times, August 2019).** U Than Sin Lwin, director general at the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration, further assured that business which are involved within the offshore oil and gas industry are always welcome to invest in Rakhine state. Rakhine is, of course, rich in oil and gas reserves and lots of the other natural resources also. A small amount of disturbances won't have a problem in Rakhine state, plenty of opportunities are available in Rakhine if the authorities can run efficiently," he said which incorporates seven townships. The violence is contained in Maungdaw **(The Myanmar Times, August 2019).**

X.   CONCLUSION

Cookson **(2017a)** argues that if the Rohingya refugees cannot to go back to Myanmar in the next one to two years or perhaps forever, then the refugee presence will be perpetual and weigh heavily on the socio-economic structure and overall situation of Bangladesh. Therefore, it can be seen from the literature that the long-term Rohingya presence in Bangladesh for several decades will have serious negative impact on natural resources and environment, as well as upon the lives of local people and the sustainability of the whole region **(Omeokachi 2013, p. 46; Rahman 2010, p. 237).** Existence of Rohingya peoples is one of the major drivers of deforestation in and around the Cox's Bazar Forest Division. However, repatriation could be a solution for Rohingya refugees, but that issue completely depends on the Governments of both the countries of Bangladesh and Myanmar. Kabir, **(2010)** suggested several measures to resolve cross border disputes with Myanmar including Rohingya problem. Negotiation and international arbitration can be used by Bangladesh for resolving disputes. However, while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been engaged in providing support to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh with other numerous International Organizations they can take positive initiatives to resolve the issue with Myanmar. This is particularly true for Rohingya refugees as accelerating drivers of deforestation in Bangladesh. The conclusion is that we may have to blame the Rohingya refugees for deforestation or other environmental degradation, but- at the same time we have to adopt for a sound forest management as well as social welfare and equity. Local elites together with the political leaders have ample opportunities to interfere in such initiatives.

REFERENCES

[1] Alam, F (2012). 'Rohingya Refugee in Bangladesh: Humanitarian Assistance, Internal Disturbances and The Role of External Factors', in N Uddin (ed.), *To Host or To Hurt: Counter-Narratives on Rohingya Issue in Bangladesh*, Institute of Culture and Development Research (ICDR), Dhaka.

[2] Anon. (2002). *Persecuted Muslims Fear Deportation to Military Burma.* FORUM-ASIA

[3] Press Release, Bangkok, (3December, 2002).

[4] BBC News. (9 October 2016).

[5] Berman, J (2013). 'Utility of a conceptual framework within doctoral study: A   researcher's reflections', *Issues in Educational Research*, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 1-18.

[6] Betts, A (2009). 'Development Assistance and Refugees, towards a North-South Grand Bargain?', Forced Migration Policy Briefing 2, *Refugee Studies Centre,* University of Oxford, United Kingdom.

[7] Brooten, L (2015). 'Blind Spots in Human Rights Coverage: Framing Violence Against the Rohingya in Myanmar/ Burma', *Popular communication*, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 132-144.

[8] Cookson, F (2017a). 'Impact of the Rohingya crisis on Bangladesh (Part -I)', *The Independent*, 9 October, viewed 10 April 2018, *<http://www.theindependentbd.com/post/117945>*.

[9] Cookson, F (2017b) 'Impact of the Rohingya Crisis on Bangladesh (Part II)', *The Independent,* 10 October, viewed 11 April 2018, <http://www.theindependentbd.com/post/118117>. 734.

[10] Creswell, JW, Hanson, WE, Clark Plano, VL, & Morales, A (2007). 'Qualitative research designs: Selection and implementation', *The Counseling Psychologist,* vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 236-264.

[11] Cumming-Bruce, Nick (18 September 2018). "Myanmar's 'Gravest Crimes' Against Rohingya Demand Action, U.N. Says". *New York Times*. Archived from the original (19 September 2018).Retrieved 19 September 2018.

[12] Fair, C &Oldmixon, S (2015) 'Think Again: Islamism and Militancy in Bangladesh', *The National Interest*, 13 August, viewed 3 March 2018, *<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/think-again-islamism-militancy-bangladesh-13567>*.

[13] Far Eastern Economic Review, (2017).

[14] FORUM-ASIA, (1 April 2002). Paper delivered at the Médecins Sans Frontières Conference: 10 Years for the Rohingya Refugees: Past, Present and Future., Dhaka,   *available at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/MSF-Lewa-2002.htm.*

[15] Gain, P. (1998). Forest and Forest People of Bangladesh, In: Gain, P. (ed.) Bangladesh: Land Forest and Forest people.*Society for Environment and Humen Development* (SEHD), Dhaka, Bangladeh.pp 29-50.

[16] Ghosh, Partha S. (23 May 2016). *Migrants, Refugees and the Stateless in South Asia*.SAGE Publications.p. 161.

[17] Haque, MM (2016). 'Protracted displaced and concern for security: The case of Rohingya', Proceedings of the 4th International conference on Magsaysay Awardees, Good Governance and Transformative leadership in Asia*, College of Politics and Governance (*COPAG), Mahasarakham University, Thailand, viewed 12 May 2018, *<http://www.copag.msu.ac.th/conference4/files/PDF/19.2.Md.%20Mahbubul%20Haque*

[18] Houghton, R. A. (1994). Land-Use Change and Tropical Forests. Bioscience May, 44: 305-31%20860-867.pdf>.

[19] Human Rights Council, 2019.

[20] Idris, I (2017). 'Drivers of Extremism, Violent Extremism and Terrorism (EVET) in Bangladesh', *K4D Helpdesk Report 139*, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK.

[21] Imran, HFA &Mian, MN (2014) 'The Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh: A vulnerable group in Law and policy', *Journal of Studies in Social Sciences*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 226-253.

[22] International Crisis Group (ICG) (2018). 'The long haul ahead for Myanmar's Rohingya refugee crisis', *Asia report N 296*, Belgium, viewed 19 May 2018, *<https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/296-the-long-haul-ahead-for-myanmar.pdf>*.

[23] Leider, Jacques (2013*). Rohingya The name.The movement.The quest for identity (PDF).Yangoon: Myanmar Publishing House. pp. 163–177.*

[24] Jastram, KM &Achiron, MM (2001). *Refugee Protection: A Guide to International Refugee Law,* United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), viewed 20 April 2018, *<http://www.unhcr.org/3d4aba564.pdf>*.

[25] Kabir.B.M.M. (2010). Bangladesh and its Borders: a preliminary study of cross border Issues.*Journal of International Relations,* 8: 104-131.

[26] LeCompte, MD & Goetz, JP (1993). *Ethnography and Qualitative Design in Educational Research*, 2nd Edn., Emerald Publishing, UK.

[27] Lederman, NG & Lederman, JS (2015). 'What is a theoretical Framework?A practical answer', *Journal of science Teacher Education*, vol. 26, no. 7, pp. 593-597.

[28] Lewa, C. 2003. Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are facing a new drive of involuntary repatriation. *Report of Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development* (FORUM-ASIA) Bangkok, Thailand.

[29] Lewa, C. (2002). The exodus has not stopped: Why Rohingyas continue to leave Myanmar.

[30] Mahmud, T (2017). 'Refugees outnumber Ukhiya, Teknaf locals', *The Dhaka Tribune*, 23 October, viewed 8 May 2018, *<https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/10/23/rohingya-influx-refugees-outnumber-ukhiya-teknaf-locals/>*.

[31] Martin, MF, Margesson, R & Vaughn, B (2017). *The Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh and Burma*, Congressional Research Service*,* viewed 26 March 2018, *<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45016.pdf>*.

[32] Medecins Sans Frontieres (2017). *MSF surveys estimate that at least 6,700 Rohingya were killed during the attacks in Myanmar*, press release, 12 December, viewed 8 June 2018, *<https://www.msf.org/myanmarbangladesh-msf-surveys-estimate-least-6700-rohingya-were-killed-during-attacks-myanmar>*.

[33] Mohammad, N (2011). 'International refugee law standards: Rohingya refugee problems in Bangladesh', *ISIL Y.B. International Human & Refugee Law*, vol. 11, pp. 401-

[34] Omi, S. H. (2010). Stateless Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh, In: Moving Walls 17. Group photography exhibition.Pp 12-13. Open Society Institute, New York, pp 12-13.

[35] Pho KanKaung (May 1992). *The Danger of Rohingya*.MyetKhinThit Magazine No. 25. pp. 87–103.

[36] Parkins, NC (2011). Push and Pull Factors of Migration, *The University of the West Indies,* Mona*,* viewed 1 June 20018, *<https://sites.bemidjistate.edu/arpejournal/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/11/v8n2-parkins.pdf>. 418.*

[37] Parsons, J. A. (1994). Cultural Geography at Work.In Re-Reading Cultural Geography. K. E. Foote, P. J. Hugill, K. Mathewson and J. M. Smith, eds. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, pp. 281-288.

[38] Radio Free Asia. Archivedfrom the original (17 October 2016).Retrieved 16 October2016.

[39] Radhakrishna, E, Yoder, P & Ewing, JC (2007). 'Strategies for Linking Theoretical Framework and Research Types'*,* Proceedings of the 2007 AAAE Research Conference*,* Volume 34.

[40] Rahman, U (2010). 'The Rohingya refugee: A security dilemma for Bangladesh', *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 233-239.

[41] Sattar, M (2017). 'Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to be relocated to remote island', *The New York Times*, 31 January, viewed 1 June 2018, *<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/world/asia/rohingya-refugees-bangladesh.html>*.

[42] Sengupta, S (2015). 'Migrant or Refugee? There is a Difference, with Legal Implications', *The New York Times,* 27 August,

viewed 6 June 2018, *<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/world/migrants-refugees-europe-syria.html>.*

[43] *South China Morning Post, (*2018).

[44] *The Guardian,* (September 2018). The Wayback Machine

[45] The Independent, (11 November 2017).

[46] The Myanmar Times, (August, 2019).

[47] Yegar, Moshe (1972). *Muslims of Burma*. pp. 98–101.

AUTHORS

First Author- Akkas Ahamed, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Chittagong, Chittagong, Bangladesh, E-mail: akkas_cu@yahoo.com

Second Author- Mohammad   Alam Chowdhury, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Chittagong, Bangladesh, E-mail: malamcu@yahoo.com

Third Author- Md. Sayedur Rahman, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Begum Rokeya University, Rangpur, Bangladesh, E-mail: sayedur34@brur.ac.bd
&
Masters Student, Master's Programme in Socioeconomic and Political Development of Modern Asia, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russian Federation,
E-mail: sayedur34@gmail.com

Correspondence Author - Md. Sayedur Rahman, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Begum Rokeya University, Rangpur-5400, Bangladesh, E-mail: sayedur34@gmail.com