ROLE OF AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN PROMOTING PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOMALIA

Mohamed Abdinoor Omar[1]

Mount Kenya University

Dr. Joseph Ndalilah[2]

Mount Kenya University

Dr Wyliffe Karani[3]

Mount Kenya University

ABSTRACT

AMISOM was founded by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 8960) to maintain peace and stability, as well as resolve conflict by rebuilding the state of Somalia. Despite the role AMISOM has played in stabilizing Somalia since its inception, Somalia is described as an extremely fragile state but with relative calm as the root cause of the problem is yet to be resolved. The aim of this study was to examine the Role of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in promoting peace and stability in Somalia. The research was guided by four objectives; Promoting reconciliation and dialogue in Somalia, to Identify the role of AMISOM in building the capacity of the local police force, to examine the role of AMISOM in humanitarian assistance, and assess the role of AMISOM in disarmamentexercises. The research was guided by the Rational Choice Theory of Peacekeeping. This study employed descriptive research design. The study was conducted in Mogadishu the capital city of Somalia. The sites have been selected bearing in mind that the main operational base of AMISOM is in Mogadishu The target population of the study was 240 consisting AMISOM, Somali National Army Forces (SNAF), Somali Police Forces (SPF), Somali Federal Government (FGS), and Somali Civil Society Organizations (SCOs). The sample size was 150 drawn from the above actors in Mogadishu and it was driven using the Slovenes formulae. Data collection was conducted using structured questionnaires and analyzed quantitatively using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20. Further from the findings, regarding statements on troop contributing countries and police contributions it was found to have influence on operations of peacekeeping missions; most of the respondents agreed that troop and police contributing countries influence AMISOM's mandate as shown by 65.5%, AMISOM troops and police have helped maintain peace in Somalia as shown by 67.3% and that AMISOM's troops and police are vital for humanitarianoperations as illustrated by 76.1%. The study findings

indicated that respondents agreed thata reasonable degree of order is guaranteed for AMISOM's operations as shown by a factor loading of (0.779), the SRSG has the ability to lead the peace keeping operations of factor loading of (0.773), the selection of special representative to the UN secretary general (SRSG)follows the approved procedure of factor Further the respondents agreed that peace keeping efforts are equal of factor loading of (0.672), AMISOM is able to deliver social rehabilitation and construction of factor loading of (0.666), AMISOM is able to initiate a reconciliation process of loading of (0.585), AMISOM roles and functions are integrated as shown by a factor loading of (0.567) and that the special representative to the African Union chairperson (SRCC) has the ability to make the mandate goals achievable on the ground as shown by a factor loading of (0.550). Among the conclusions, Operations of Peacekeeping Missions was the dependent variable in this study. The study results lead to a conclusion that operations of peacekeeping missions is influenced by troop and police contributing countries, politics and bureaucracy and resources and logistical support. It is also concluded that AMISOM mandategoals are achievable and that AMISOM is able to deliver social rehabilitation and construction. The study recommends that AMISOM management should do more to highlightits achievements in Somalia, to demonstrate its value to current and potential future donors. The UN and AU should continue to develop and consistently revisit realistic timelines for AMISOM's exit, considering the challenges of building strong institutions in Somalia. This requires reconciling the tension in the AMISOM exit strategy between timelines and conditions, with a more realistic view about the specifics of each. This will make sure that thepeacekeeping operation goals and objectives are achieved and make the operation more successful.

Key Terms: African Union Mission in Somalia, African Standby Force, Continental Early Warning System, National Security Service, Peace Support Operations

Background to the Study

According Mahmood (2011), AMISOM was founded by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 8960) (2007) to maintain peace and stability, as well as resolve conflict by rebuilding the state of Somalia. Despite the role AMISOM has played in stabilizing Somalia since its inception, Somalia is described as an extremely fragile state but with relative calm as the root cause of the problem is yet to be resolved. In global prospect Acharya (2010), observed that democratization has been an important conflict factor especially in East Asia. Although this has not been supported by empirical evidence, Scholarswho criticize the democratization factor do not consider other factors that mitigate and put to check the consequences of destabilization while ignoring the factors about it that bring about long-lasting peace. These factors may not necessarily be liberal forces such as regional integration, economic interdependence. Although these matter less, there are certain dynamics that are associated with democratization while relating it to the peace causative factors including the rebuilding of economies, nationalistic democratic pride, involving the civil society among others will potentially lessen conflicts within the state. Such factors that mitigate conflicts may not necessarily conform to the tenets of democratic principles and the larger democratization theory. Critics of the democratization theory have also overlooked these factors. After the identification process the study further demonstrated the East African

Experience that democratization actually led to more conflict than peace. Conversely, democratization creates cooperative peace with higher prospects.

According to the African prospect Sindaka (2016), Burundi and Rwanda, located in East- Central Africa, are two countries that have a lot in common. The similarity is that the two countries have both experienced violent and devastating civil wars emanating from escalationof tension between their main ethnic groups, the Tutsi and the Hutu. In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the Arusha agreement that ended the conflict in Burundi, the two countries initiated a series of processes aimed at establishing persistent peace since August 2000. Similarly, Humenberger (2018), Studied conflict in the Central Africa Republic and notes that has been on for years, despite the constant engagement of theinternational community and various concluded peace agreements. Therefore, the study empathizes that, there are misunderstandings of the situation reflected in the failure ofnumerous international peacebuilding efforts. The study mentions that more than twelve peace agreements have been signed between conflicting parties in the last ten years, but most of them were only partially implemented, stagnating national reconciliation. New waves of sectarian violence erupted subsequently in the years 2014, 2016, 2017, and 2018, and community conflicts in the Central Africa Republic are still a current feature.

In addition, Dusenbury (2013), examined societies that had just come out of conflict and violence and were by then in moving to transition from protracted violence. In these nations emergency relief were the single stabilizing factor in the long swaths of violence sometimes extending to several decades of systematic violence are now intended to transition from solutions that are long term and are aimed at rebuilding the state. The evolution of post conflict has been made more complex by the reintroduction of some of the destabilizing factors such as reintroduction of refugees who are returning as well the Internally displaced persons. Using Somalia as a case study, this study analyzed both short and longer term tradeoffs as well as the implications of the partial and full repatriations strategies for reconstruction and stabilization of societies in the post conflict era as it currently is in Somalia.

Since January 26, 1991, The Somalia Nation has been in conflict. The conflict was originally instigated by a coalition of armed opposition based clans and other groupings who overthrew the Nations long standing military ruler Major Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre. The clan groupings started to compete for influence to fill the power vacuum left by the toppled government. There was also an aborted attempt by the United Nations to send a peacekeeping mission to Somalia in the mid 1990's, then a period of decentralization of power followed. This was characterized by a return to religious and customary law in a number of regions. Most importantly there were established regional governments that were autonomousespecially in the northern region of Somalia. In Southern Somalia, some armed factions such the United Somali Congress under warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed who served as the 4th President of the Republic of Somalia between January 1991 to January 1997 sought the control of the capital Mogadishu. (Menkhaus, 2003)

While using the conflict transformation Theory (Davies 2015) assesses the Contribution of AMISOM to transformation of conflict in Somalia by making an assessment of various transformative activities and elements that usually address the root causes

of the conflict. Through the use of arguments based on theory helped in the determination of the extent to which AMISOM contributed to transforming of the Conflict in Somalia. AMISOM has been the leader in the process of transformation. This being the case it is vital that AMISOM does an analysis of its own role, the successes it has had, have a reflection on the gaps thereof, and use it to redesign the approaches they have been using. Various studies have including (Hamid 2018, Stan 2017, Asum 2018,) have stated that AMISOM has brought relative stability in Somalia and that in the capital Mogadishu people engage in their business on a normal basis.

Statement of the Problem

Since its inception, AMISOM has encountered a number of problems. This has made the United Nations Security Council extend AMISOM, s mandate severally to bring back stability in Somalia. Although substantial peace in Somalia has been achieved, it has been for the elite government officials and not as much for the contemporary Somali Citizen despite the force being in Somalia for a cumulative 10 years and above. The work also studied the role of AMISOM in promoting peace and stability in collaboration with clan chiefs, local administrations, supporting the community led initiatives, and the appropriate and effective way for reconciliation that can bring back complete stability in Somalia. Moreover, the armedmilitia groups (Al-Shabab and Daesh) have gained momentum against the Somali National Army Forces (SNAF) and AMISOM. Peace support operations have barely achieved their mandates and as a result, durable peace remains elusive in most parts of the country. In this context the study has sought to evaluate the effectiveness of AMISOM's Role and influence towards contributing to peace building efforts in Somalia.

Study Design and Methodology

This study employed descriptive research design and the reason for choosing this design is to describe between variables (to examine the role of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in promoting peace and stability in Somalia).

. A design was used to structure the research, to show how all of the major parts of the research project work together to try to address the central research questions.

This study adopted a quantitative research design. A quantitative research involves the generation of data in quantitative form, which can be subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis in a formal and rigid fashion. The aim of this study was to examine the role of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in promoting peace and stability in Somalia. Thus, a quantitative design helped in the generation of data, which subjected it to rigorous quantitative analysis.

This study identified civil societies in Somalia including: women groups, youth, elders, education centers, sports, minority groups and human rights organizations as case study; research design to describe the nature of the pattern, the research intends to follow. The study was conducted in Mogadishu the capital city of Somalia. The sites have been selected bearing in mind that the main operational base of AMISOM is in Mogadishu. The coverage is intended to provide broad perspective and a triangulation that illustrated various factors that influence the operational capacity of AMISOM to bring about cohesion andpeace.

The total population of the study was 240 people drawn from higher administration bodies of AMISOM, SNAF, FGS, and the

civil society organizations (CBOs) in Mogadishu.

This research employed questionnaire as instruments for the research, the researcher used questionnaires as the major data collection instrument, the researcher has chosen this method because it is the most valid and reliable research method. The instrument of questionnaire was divided into three sections such as profile of respondents, the objectives of the role of civil society on peacebuilding process in Mogadishu, Somalia

Secondary data was collected from documents and progress reports from Oxfam, Concern worldwide and Kenya Social protection secretariat. Secondary data also included sourcesfrom the university library such as books and academic journals.

The researcher first obtaineda research introduction letter from Mount Kenya University. Having obtained the research permit the researcher went ahead and collected data personally. Collecting the data personallyenabled the researcher to explain broadly to the respondents the reason for the study.

Secondary data was sourced from books, government reports and journals. Other published reports on conflict resolution, conflict settlement sustain able peace building andtransformation leadership were also reviewed to make basis of the study.
Upon obtaining an introduction letter from Mount Kenya University, the researcher personally delivered the questionnaires to the respondents to ensure maximum monitoring and response. The researcher briefly explained t h e questionnaires to the respondents to allow them fully understand how to fill the questionnaire.

Frequencies and percentages distribution were used to analyze data on the profile of the respondents. Means and standard deviations examined the role of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in promoting peace and stability in Somalia. Statistical package for social science (SPSS version 20) were used to tabulate and cross tabulate the data. Thereafter, the researcher made an interpretation of the frequency tables and accordingly make a summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Research findings

Out of the 150 administered questionnaires only 128 filled questionnaires were returned giving a response rate of 85% which is within what Cooper and Schindler (2011) prescribed significant response rate for statistical analysis which they established at a minimum value of 50%. Through the analysis of the above objectives and tasks of the AMISOM, it appears that the mission was not given an explicit mandate to protect civilians. It was allowed only to use force in self-defense, to protect their equipment, installations and other assigned personnel. Accordingly, the AU did not mandate the AMISOM as a peace enforcement mission which has the right for instance to force factions to the peace table. AMISOM was considered only as a peacekeeping operation due to its dependence upon the local consent of Somali factions and the ambiguity of the mandate regarding whether it had the legal right to protect civilians from attack. However, the AMISOM military policy changed from 2010 onwards which

affected the outcomes. The AU was not able to apply the norm of the right of intervention on the ground despite the fact that crimes against humanity were real, witnessed and recorded in Somalia. It is also evident that there has been a gap between the mandate of the AMISOM and the resources available for implementation. Certainly, since the initial stages of the deployment, the AMISOM suffered from an acute lack of resources and basic logistics.

In terms of clarity of the mandate, it seems that a significant number of tasks caused mandate overload and affected the mission's effectiveness. The multiplicity of objectives in the shadow of limited resources and a small number of troops did affect the clarity and feasibilityof AMISOM's mandate. Indeed, it is hard to envisage the success of a mission such as the AMISOM, with manpower of only 7,650 soldiers, in a territory as vast as Somalia. Fulfilling AMISOM's tasks as delineated in its mandate requires more resources in terms of peacekeepers and full availability and access to the needed supplies and equipment (interview with senior AMISOM official, 2021). The shortcomings highlighted above indicate some deficiencies in AMISOM's mandate, which prevented the proper management of the conflict and had a negative impact on the mission's effectiveness regarding finding solutions to the unfolding conflict, particularly in its first four years.

The AU is not only consistently struggling to organize the requisite military personnel but also to obtain a range of military assets needed for its peace operation in Somalia. According to an interview with a senior Amisom senior official (interview, 14/08/2021):

"the AMISOM was not appropriately equipped well after the deployment of its troops. The mission indeed suffered from lacking of important equipment such as helicopters (utility and attack), armored personnel carriers, communications and intelligence equipment and night vision goggles".

Conclusions

Operations of Peacekeeping Missions was the dependent variable in this study. The study results lead to a conclusion that operations of peacekeeping missions is influenced by troop and police contributing countries, politics and bureaucracy and resources and logistical support. It is also concluded that AMISOM mandate goals are achievable and that AMISOM is able to deliver social rehabilitation and construction.

The study concludes there was a positive and significant relationship between troop contributing countries and police contributions and operations of peacekeeping missions. This implied that the less the troop contributing countries and police contributions the more operations of peacekeeping missions are delayed. It was also concluded that Troop and policecontributing countries influence AMISOM's mandate where they have helped maintain peacein Somalia.

Recommendations

The study recommends that AMISOM management should do more to highlight its achievements in Somalia, to demonstrate its value to current and potential future donors. The UN and AU should continue to develop and consistently revisit realistic

timelines for AMISOM's exit, considering the challenges of building strong institutions in Somalia. This requires reconciling the tension in the AMISOM exit strategy between timelines and conditions, with a more realistic view about the specifics of each. This will make sure that thepeacekeeping operation goals and objectives are achieved and make the operation more successful.

The AMISOM management should spearhead training for the Somali Government Army (SNA) on international humanitarian law and human rights. This will make sure that SNA are aware of the humanitarian law which regulates the conduct of forces in armed conflict and seeks to protect the rights of civilians who are not participating in hostilities. This will make sure that there is reduced collateral damage during the operations.

The study also recommends that both troops present in Somalia should avoid sudden withdrawal without informing local governments or devising plans to ensure towns do not fall into the hands of Al-Shabaab. Regardless of whether these troops are part of AMISOM oroperating on a bilateral basis, it is necessary to coordinate movements in the face of a common enemy. The development of the Somali security sector is key to any AMISOM withdrawal. Efforts need to focus on shifting its character away from a clan-based entity that suffers from disjointed training and irregular payments. Specific actions that could be useful include; ensuring coordination in training and providing external support for troop payments while the Somali government builds up a more robust and sustainable revenue base. This willmake the operations successful.

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