

# Municipalities Elections and the Participation of Youth and Women

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## Abstract

Young people under 30 years of age represent about one third of the population, while the percentage is close to half among women, but empirical evidence indicates that the representation and participation rates of these two groups are low. Comparative data indicate that there is a sharp decline in the participation of youth and women in the municipal elections in 2017 compared to the elections in 2012; that there are several reasons behind this decline, including the high rates of consensus lists, in addition to the low percentage of party lists, and the low participation rates in voting.

The study contributes to clarify the impact of many independent variables not addressed in previous studies on the participation of youth and women because of the specificity of these factors in the Palestinian case, such as lists of consensus or circles that were not nominated as they are still under direct political and administrative control by the Israeli Occupation; hence all these factors are unique to the Palestinian situation, which gives this research study a great theoretical significance.

**Key Words:** *Youth participation. Municipality election Palestine 2017. Consensus list. Voting, occupation.*

## Introduction

The Council of Ministers issued on January 31, 2017 a decision requesting all local municipalities to hold elections in all locations on May 13, 2017. About 700 thousand voters who are 18 years old and registered on the voters list where they have been residents for at least six months, elected 3,849 members of local government councils in West Bank.

The local councils held the elections according to the proportional system in the West Bank only because of the split, and 326 local councils out of 391 participated in these elections. Later on, the Council of Ministers issued another decision to hold supplementary local elections on July 29, 2017, in which 32 local councils participated. This study seeks to examine the impact of the electoral system on the participation of both youth and women in Palestine, who are considered marginalized.

## Political environment:

There are two main factors that influence the process of local elections in Palestine. The first is linked to the political split between Fatah and Hamas since 2007, which led to the division of Gaza under Hamas' rule and the West Bank under Fatah's rule. The second factor is the Israeli occupation, which led the Palestinians to lose hope in having peace. In light of this vision, Israel has built an isolation wall, between the Palestinian and Israeli areas, following the second intifada. It is designed to capture more than 65% of the water resources in the Palestinian territories. When the wall is completed, it is expected that the percentage of Palestinian land being

swallowed up within the Israeli territory will reach 9.4% (B'Tselem, 2011, p. 46). On another-note, since 1993, Israel has doubled the number of settlers in the territories of the Palestinian National Authority to more than half a million settlers, in violation of the International Law and mutual agreements between the Israeli and Palestinian sides. Finally, the occupation policies have burdened the Palestinians, weakened their local economies and contributed to the spread of high levels of poverty and unemployment. In this context, the economic loss of the Palestinian economy is estimated directly and indirectly as a result of the continued Israeli occupation to the Palestinian territories to be \$ 6897 billion, which is equivalent to 93.3% of the GDP of the Palestinian economy in 2010 (Ministry of National Economy, and the ARIJ Institute, 2011, p. 1-2).

According to previous analysis, the level of democracy in Palestine has decreased between 2006 and 2012. Palestine changed from a “flawed democracy” in 2006 to a “hybrid regime” in 2012 (Olof Palme International Center ‘n.d ). According to Freedom House, (2018) Palestine converted to a no-free region after the split.

President Abaas issued on January 9, 2017, a decree by law amending the Local Elections Law by which the Elections Court was formed to adjudicate elections’ appeals instead of the Court of First Instance. In addition, the Palestinian cabinet in the West bank called for a new local election in January 2017 (Central elections commission, 2017, p. 13). Thus, the Palestinian Authority's cabinet chose in May 2017 the elections to be held in the West Bank and postponed the elections indefinitely in Gaza Strip. The Municipalities’ elections are conducted under Law (5) of the 1996 Election Law for Local Councils (with amendments passed in 2004, 2005 and 2012) (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2017).

Elections have been called for 391 councils: 116 municipal councils and 275 village councils. However, polling was held only in 145 councils. In 181 councils, only a single electoral list was registered so the seats were awarded without polling. In 65 councils, no list was registered, which meant that the mandate of the current council was extended until the next round of local elections (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2017).

### **The study problem**

Youth under the age of 29 represent about one-third of the population, while the proportion of women is close to half. Empirical evidence indicates that the representation and participation rates of these two groups are low. Comparative data indicates that there is a sharp decline in the participation of youth and women in the municipal elections during 2017 compared to 2012. In the 2017 elections, women and youth won the following percentage of seats: 21.1% and 37% respectively, compared to 21.5% and 50% respectively in the 2012 elections. Jaffal (2017) points out that there are several reasons behind this decline, which include the increase in the consensus lists to reach 199 lists, in addition to the decline of party lists which only reached 35% of the total lists. Jaffal also demonstrates that this decline is attributed to the decrease in participation rates of the votes to about 53.4%. Another study by Odah (2016) indicates additional reasons that contributed to this decrease in the political participation of youth, which included the spread of poverty and unemployment amongst youth, and the political division and occupation. The Youth Survey (2016) showed a sharp decline in the participation rates of youth and women in political parties demonstrated by the low percentages of 1.4% and 0.3% respectively. On another note, the study by Odah (2017) and Mathewson (2014) indicates a negative relationship between exercising democracy and the occupation in Palestine. In this context, the elections that take place in Area C are directly subject to the Israeli repressive measures of arrest, threat and/or disruption, which affects the participation of youth and women in the elections in these areas. This study raises an important issue that revolves around an important central question, namely, the impact of the use of the proportional electoral system on the low participation rates of youth and women in the municipal elections of 2017 whether by voting or representation.

### **Literature review**

The electoral systems convert the number of votes obtained for each party/candidate according to the preferences of the voters to a number of seats in the parliament, which is divided according to the electoral formula of the proportional representation systems (PR),

the majority/pluralism systems, the mixed system, the convertible sound system, and the alternative sound system of the electoral formulas (Blais and Massicotte, 1996). According to Reynolds (1996, p.194-196), there are a number of advantages offered by the proportional systems, such as a fair representation for all different social groups, including women and youth. However, in some cases as what is explained in the contagion theory, which suggests that traditional parties will feel pressured to nominate more women or youth if one of their political rivals; starts to promote the representation of women or youth. It is important to distinguish between macrocontagion and microcontagion. In their article, Matland & Studlar (1996) argue that microcontagion is more likely to occur in party list proportional representation systems than in single-member district systems.

In the local elections in Nigeria, Olutayo & Adebayo (2017) point to the active participation of women in electoral politics, mainly as voters and support staff. Despite this participation, women are not rewarded with positions of political power in political parties. Therefore, the authors recommend that political parties and legislative gender quotas should be adopted to immediately enhance the attempt of women at becoming political actors.

Matland (2005) finds that there is no guarantee that the (PR) system will lead to an immediate increase in women's representation or women's participation. However, research indicates that it is just a step in the right direction to increase women's or youth's political participation. Previous studies indicate that not any (PR) system will work well to guarantee sufficient youth and women's representation. On the contrary, the author stresses that some types of PR systems are favored compared to others systems.

Jaffal (2017) indicates several important aspects that characterize these elections such as the low percentage of voting in the elections, the increase in the number of local municipalities that could not form any electoral lists, the increase in the consensus lists, and last but not least, the weak relation between the proportional electoral system and the low voting rates in the elections. The author highlights various reasons to explain this, these include the political division, the weakness of the institutionalized party, the polarization within Fatah movement, in addition to the strength of tribal affiliation. In contrast, Mansour (2015) argues that the (PR) system has contributed to the rise of the percentage in the consensus lists.

Previous Studies differed in determining the trends of cohesion and sustainability of Foreign Imposed Democracies (FID). Whitehead (1996) finds a positive relationship between the occupation and the sustainability of (FID). Enterline and Greig (2010) and Downs and Monten (2013) link between the environmental factors such as the economy and ethnic division, negative past experiences, negative culture, proximity, leadership and institutions, and the sustainability of (FID). Mathewson (2013) finds that the sustainability of (FID) is linked to the existence of external threats and the occupation margin value. In contrast, the results of the study by Meernik (1996) and De Mesquita and Downs (2006) do not match the results of previous researches that show a positive relationship between the occupation and the sustainability of democracies imposed from abroad.

In this context, the theory of electoral systems assumes that the proportional electoral system (PR) is more suitable for increasing the participation of women and youth in the elections. However, it is shown that the Palestinian municipal elections of 2017 that followed the (PR) system were accompanied by a clear reduction in youth and women's participation. The study proposes the (FID) theory to explain the decline in youth and women's participation, in which the Israeli occupation in general, and its increased control on areas (C) in particular, led to reducing the electoral participation of women and youth to a large extent that cannot offset the positive and stimulating effects of the use of the (PR) system.

### **The main objectives of the study**

1. To determine the implications of the participation rates of women and youth in terms of registration, voting, nomination and representation in the municipal elections of 2017 compared to the previous municipal elections.

2. To examine the relationship between the participation of youth and women in the municipal elections of 2017 in the lists of the consensus, the bodies that did not run any list, the place of residence (rural, city), the party lists, and the Israeli occupation.

### **Description of the study:**

The study proposes a different framework to study the impact of the electoral systems on the electoral participation of women and youth. While most of the literature discussing the electoral systems assume that there is a positive relationship between the propositional electoral systems (PR) and the political participation of marginalized groups in the elections, including women and youth, this study borrows from the literature of Foreign Imposed democracy (FID) an important result which is the existence of a negative relationship between the occupation and the sustainability of democracy. Additionally, the study argues that the negative impact of the occupation on the indicators of democracy including the participation in the electoral process varies depending on areas that are under direct control of the occupation. Moreover, the proposed framework depends on the combination of several variables in the theory of (FID), namely the nature of military control of the occupation, the degree of urbanization in these areas, and the number and nature of the competing lists under the proportional electoral system. Hence, the study argues that the Israeli occupation has played a negative role in weakening the participation of youth and women in the Palestinian municipal elections, and that the negative role was much greater than the positive impact of the (PR) on the participation of women and youth in the local elections in 2017.

### **The importance of the study**

- 1- The participation of women and young people in the Palestinian municipal elections is increasingly reduced; as was clearly indicated by the results of the local elections in 2017. One of the explanations suggested by the study is the existence of a large number of local bodies under direct military control of the Israeli occupation (Area C) (275 local bodies from 391). The study also suggests to get rid of the occupation, which will contribute to enhancing the participation of youth and women in the Palestinian territories and thus promoting the sustainability of democracy.
- 2- The study contributes to clarifying the effect of many independent variables, which were not studied before, on the participation of youth and women. One reason as to why such variables were not studied is explained by the lists of constituencies that did not present any list or district since they are under the direct political and administrative control of the occupation. All of the reasons mentioned earlier are unique to the case of Palestine, which makes the research of great importance at the theoretical level.
- 3- Based on what was mentioned earlier, the results of this study will contribute to bridging the debate over the feasibility of changing the electoral system in the municipal elections in Palestine, and examining whether another electoral system can be designed to increase the participation of women and youth taking into consideration the characteristics of the Palestinian society such as occupation, division, family, and the weakness of the political parties.

### **The methodology of the study:**

The study uses quantitative and qualitative methods to answer the study questions. Through the quantitative approach, and to be able to examine the first objective, the study uses the numerical data of the results of the municipal elections prepared by the Central Election Commission and works on providing a statistical comparison between the participation rates of women and youth in various municipal elections for the years 2004-2005, the 2012 elections, and the 2017 elections. Additionally, the study explains these results and clarifies their implications. Quantitative and qualitative analysis is also used to examine the second objective of this study. The statistical data from the 2017 municipal elections prepared by the Central Elections Commission will be used; the study sample is the whole study population, which is 461 municipal elections. The results are then analyzed where youth and women's participation are the dependent variable, and the independent variables are the lists of compatibility, the bodies in which no list was drawn, the place of residence (rural, city), the party lists, and the Israeli occupation and area C. The analysis will be done using the SPSS program. Finally, the study will conduct two focus groups, each involving 12 participants from different sectors of youth and women, in order to explain the relationship between the dependent factor and the independent factors, and to describe it correctly and in line with the quantitative results.

**Percentage of youth in the lists of registrants:**

The Central Election Commission records show that the percentage of males registered in the election records is two percentage points higher than that of females (51% males, 49% females), On the other hand, the records show that the percentage of females in the electoral register among the younger generation exceeds males (19% females, 18% males). See Table 1.

Table (1): Numbers and percentages of youth in the electoral registers

Total no. of voters	No. of males	% of males	No. of females	% of females	Total no. of youth aged 18-30	% of youth aged 18-30	No. of registered males aged 18-30	% of males aged 18-30	No. of registered females aged 18-30	% of females aged 18-30
805482	410164	51%	395318	49%	295596	37%	146267	18%	149329	19%

**Percentage of youth in the lists of voters:**

Voter records show that the proportions of male voters of all age groups converged with those of young male voters. The same applies for females, see Table 2.

Table (2): Percentage of youth in the lists of voters

		Percent of youth aged 25-30		
Percent of males	Percent of females	%	Percent of males	Percent of females
57.23%	42.77%	35.53%	57.25%	42.75%

Elections of the local authorities have rarely been repeated in this way, as voters from all categories converged with those of young people, but what is striking is the low turnout of women in comparison to men of all ages, where the difference between them was about 14%, which is rather large.

**Percentage of young candidates in all lists of sponsorship/endorsement and competition (325 bodies)**

No more than 1015 (17%) of the youth candidates were able to reach their local councils, either by endorsement or competition, including 12% of males and 5% of females. This does not reflect their size in the electoral register, but much less. See the table below.

Table (3): Percentage of young candidates in all lists

Total	Males	Females	Total 25-30	% youth	Males	% male youth	Females	% female youth
6094	4486	1608	1015	17%	737	12%	278	5%

**Percentage of youth winners**

Table (4): Percentage of youth winners

Total	Males	Females	Total 25-30	% youth winners	Males	% male youth winners	Females	% female youth winners
3235	2550	685	312	10%	221	71%	91	29%

The results show that there are significant differences between males (71%) and females (29%) of youth winners. The proportion of young women winning is greater than that established by law.

**Description of the registered sample**

Table (5): Description of the registered sample

No. of registered female youth	No. of registered male youth	No. of registered females	No. of registered males	Total no. of registered sample	Total no. of registered youth	
1029.8552	1008.7379	2726.3310	2828.7172	5555.0483	2038.5931	Mean
48.00	59.00	128.00	153.00	281.00	115.00	Lower limit
14000.00	13092.00	36321.00	39261.00	74893.00	27092.00	Upper limit

Voter records show that the number of registered females is higher than that of males at both the general and youth levels.

**Correlation between registrations and regions**

Table (6): Correlation between registered numbers and regions by urbanity and authority areas

		Total no. of registered individuals	Total no. of registered youth	Area (C)	Urban areas
Total no. of registered individuals	Pearson Correlation	1	.997	-.063	-.352
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.449	.000
	N	145	145	145	145
Total no. of registered youth	Pearson Correlation	1.000	.997	-.063	-.349
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.455	.000
	N	145	145	145	145
Area (C)	Pearson Correlation	-.063	-.070	1	.118
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.449	.400		.159
	N	145	145	145	145
Urban areas	Pearson Correlation	-.352	-.356	.118	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.159	
	N	145	145	145	145

**Total registered individuals according to the areas of the National Authority**

Table (7): Correlation between registered numbers and regions by urbanity and authority areas

Areas		Cases					
		True		Error		Total	
		No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Total no. of registered individuals	Areas (A/B)	141	100.0%	0	.0%	141	100.0%
	Area (C)	4	100.0%	0	.0%	4	100.0%
Total no. of registered youth	Areas (A/B)	141	100.0%	0	.0%	141	100.0%
	Area (C)	4	100.0%	0	.0%	4	100.0%

The elections were held in 145 local councils, including 141 local councils in Areas (A/B) under the Palestinian Authority in terms of security and administration, and 4 were held in Area (C) which is under the authority of the Israeli Occupation.

**Total registration depending on urbanity:**

Table (8): Total registration depending on urbanity

Area by Urbanity		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
		No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Total no. of registered individuals	Municipalities	86	100.0%	0	.0%	86	100.0%
	Rural Councils	59	100.0%	0	.0%	59	100.0%
Total no. of registered youth	Municipalities	86	100.0%	0	.0%	86	100.0%
	Rural Councils	59	100.0%	0	.0%	59	100.0%

Elections were held in 145 local councils including 86 municipalities out of 114 municipalities and 59 village councils out of 211 village councils. These figures show that about 60% of municipalities witnessed competition among voters, and the rest was by consensus, while only 28% of village councils saw competition among candidates.

**Number of registered individuals and urban areas (t-test)**

Table (9): Number of registered individuals and urban areas (t-test)

Area by Urbanity		Statistic	Bootstrap <sup>a</sup>				
			Bias	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval		
					Lower	Upper	
Total no. of registered individuals	Municipalities	N	86				
		Mean	8337.4070	-61.6467	1211.2638	6144.3170	10793.7572
		Std. Deviation	11668.04617	-628.04425	3053.25250	4838.75415	16615.89458
		Std. Error Mean	1258.19778				
	Rural Councils	N	59				
		Mean	1499.4068	-1.9450	85.8045	1321.4936	1664.5834
		Std. Deviation	642.39471	-8.44037	53.90313	532.85499	737.16647
		Std. Error Mean	83.63267				

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

t-test:

t-test for Equality of Means				
		T	df	Statistical significance
Total electoral	Equal variances assumed	4.492	143	.000
	Equal variances not assumed	5.423	85.750	.000

There is a statistical value of 0.000. This shows that there is a statistical relationship between the number of registrars and urban areas. When comparing the average between the two areas, we found that the average number of voters in the municipalities is 8337, which is higher than the average number of voters in the village councils of 1499. This means that the number of registrants is higher in the municipalities.

**Relationship between young candidates with competition (Elected Lists/Endorsement Lists)**

**Table (10):** Relationship of young candidates and competition

Means of competition		N	Mean	Std. deviation	Mean of std. deviation
Total no. of youth candidates aged 25-30	Elected	144	3.50	4.112	.343
	Consensus	177	2.81	3.949	.297

t-test:

t-test for Equality of Means		
Total no. of youth candidates aged 25-30	Equal variances assumed	.129
	Equal variances not assumed	.131

The above tables show that the average number of young candidates in the elected lists, which is 3.50, is greater than the average number of young candidates in the consensus lists, which is 2.81. This indicates an increase in the proportion of young candidates in the competition lists. However, the relationship is not statistically significant because the t-test had a significance result of 0.129, which is higher than 0.05.

**The Relationship between young candidates with the region under Palestinian Control**

**Table (11):** Relationship of young candidates per the region

Areas under Palestinian authority		N	Mean	Std. deviation	Mean of std. deviation
Total no. of youth candidates aged 25-30	Areas (A/B)	288	3.18	3.975	.234
	Area (C)	33	2.58	4.521	.787

Independent samples test:

t-test for Equality of Means		
Total no. of youth candidates aged 25-30		Statistical significance
	Equal variances assumed	.412
	Equal variances not assumed	.463

The above tables show that the average number of young candidates in Areas (A/B) is 3.18, which is higher than the average number of young candidates in Area (C), which is 2.58. This indicates an increase in the percentage of young candidates in Areas (A/B), but this is not statistically significant because the t-test had a significance of 0.412 which is higher than 0.05.

**The relationship between young candidates with urban areas**

**Table (12):** Relationship of young candidates with the urban areas

Urban Area		N	Mean	Std. deviation	Mean of std. deviation
Total no. of youth candidates aged 25-30	Municipalities	110	3.65	4.388	.418
	Rural Councils	211	2.84	3.813	.263

Independent samples test:



t-test for Equality of Means		
Total no. of youth candidates aged 25-30		Statistical significance
	Equal variances assumed	.087
	Equal variances not assumed	.102

The above tables show that the average number of young candidates in the municipalities, which is 3.65, is greater than the average number of young candidates in the municipal councils, which is 2.84. This indicates an increase in the proportion of young candidates in the municipalities, however, the relationship is not statistically significant because the t-test result had a significance of 0.087 which is higher than 0.05.

**The relationship between the number of youth winners with the manner of competition**

Table (13): Relationship of the number of youth winners with the manner of competition

Manner of competition		N	Mean	Std. deviation	Mean of std. deviation
Total no. of youth winners	Elected	144	1.02	1.125	.094
	Consensus	177	.89	1.150	.086

Independent samples test:

t-test for Equality of Means		
Total no. of youth winners		Sig. (2-tailed)
	Equal variances assumed	.317
	Equal variances not assumed	.316

The above tables show that the average number of young winners in the elected lists, which is 1.02, is greater than the average number of young winners in the consensus lists, which is 0.89. This indicates an increase in the percentage of young winners in the competition lists, but the relationship is not statistically significant because the t-test value of 0.317 is higher than 0.05.

**Relationship between the number of young winners in the regions under Palestinian control**

Table (14): Relationship between the number of young winners in the regions under Palestinian control

Area		N	Mean	Std. deviation	Mean of std. deviation
Total no. of youth winners	Areas (A/B)	288	.92	1.097	.065
	Areas (C)	33	1.21	1.453	.253

Independent samples test:

t-test for Equality of Means		
Total no. of youth winners		Statistical significance
	Equal variances assumed	.163
	Equal variances not assumed	.271

The above tables show that the average number of young winners in Areas (A/B), which is 0.92, is less than the average number of young winners in Area (C), which is 1.21. This indicates an increase in the percentage of young winners in Area (C). This, however, is not statistically significant because the t-test value with a significance of 1.63 is higher than 0.05.

**The relationship between young winners with urban areas**

**Table (15):** Relationship of young winners with urban areas

Area		N	Mean	Std. deviation	Mean of std. deviation
Total no. of youth winners	Municipalities	110	1.14	1.185	.113
	Rural Councils	211	.85	1.105	.076

Independent samples test:

t-test for Equality of Means		
Total no. of youth winners		Statistical significance
	Equal variances assumed	.034
	Equal variances not assumed	.039

The above tables show that the average number of young winners in the municipalities, which is 1.14, is greater than that in the village councils, which is 0.85. This indicates a high percentage of young winners in municipalities. This result is statistically significant because the t-test has a significance value of .034 which is less than 0.05.

**The relationship between young candidates with the size of the unit**

**Table (16):** Relationship of young candidates with the size of the unit

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.304a	.092	.089	3.827

a. Predictors: (Constant), unit size.

ANOVA <sup>b</sup>						
	Model	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	480.682	1	480.682	32.826	.000 <sup>a</sup>
	Residual	4729.761	323	14.643		
	Total	5210.443	324			

a. Predictors: (Constant), unit size.

b. Dependent Variable: total no. of youth aged 25-30.

The above tables indicate that there is a weak direct correlation between the number of young candidates and the size of the unit, where R Square value was 0.92, with a statistical significance of .000.

**The relationship between young winners and the size of the unit**

**Table (17):** Relationship of young candidates with the size of the unit

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.142a	.020	.017	1.129

a. Predictors: (Constant), unit size.

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	1.990	.405		4.911	.000
	Size of unit	-.104	.040	-.142	-2.573	.011

a. Dependent Variable: total no. of youth winners

The above tables show that there is a weak direct correlation between the number of young winners and the size of the circle whereby R Square value reached 0.020 with a statistical significance of .000.

**Relationship between the number of female winners in the areas under Palestinian control**

Table (18): Relationship between the number of female winners in the areas under Palestinian control

Area		N	Mean	Std. deviation	Mean of std. deviation
Total no. of female winners	Areas (A/B)	289	.25	.479	.028
	Area (C)	33	.52	.667	.116

Independent samples test:

t-test for Equality of Means		
Total no. of youth female winners		Statistical significance
	Equal variances assumed	.004
	Equal variances not assumed	.032

The above tables show that the average number of young women winners in Areas (A/B), which is 0.25, is lower than that in Area (C), which is 0.52. This indicates an increase in the percentage of young women winners in Area (C) with a statistically significant relationship of 0.04.

**Relationship between the number of young female winners and urban areas**

Table (19): Relationship between the number of young female winners and urban areas

Urban Area		N	Mean	Std. deviation	Mean of std. deviation
Total no. of female winners	Municipalities	110	.26	.482	.046
	Rural Councils	212	.28	.520	.036

Independent samples test:

t-test for Equality of Means		
Total no. of youth female winners		Sig. (2-tailed)
	Equal variances assumed	.745
	Equal variances not assumed	.739

The average number of young female winners in municipalities, which is 0.26, is slightly lower than the average number of young female winners in village councils, which is 0.28. This indicates an increase in the percentage of young female winners in village councils. However, the relationship between the two variables is not statistically significant because the t-test value of 0.745 is less than 0.05.

**The relationship between the number of young female winners with the manner of competition**

Table (20): Relationship between the number of young female winners with the manner of competition

Manner of competition		N	Mean	Std. deviation	Mean of std. deviation
Total no. of female winners	Elected	144	.21	.424	.035
	Consensus	178	.33	.560	.042

Independent samples test:

t-test for Equality of Means		
Total no. of youth female winners		Sig. (2-tailed)
	Equal variances assumed	.030
	Equal variances not assumed	.026

The above tables indicate that the average number of young female winners in the elected lists, which is 0.21, is slightly lower than that in the consensus lists, which is 0.33. This indicates the high percentage of young female winners in the consensus lists. Nonetheless, the relationship between the two variables is not statistically significant because the t-test value of .030 is less than 0.05.

**The relation between the percentage of young voters with the youth winning**

Table (21): Relation of the percentage of young voters

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.183a	.034	72.0	4.640

a. Predictors: (Constant), total no. of winning youth

ANOVA <sup>b</sup>						
	Model	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	106.406	1	106.406	4.942	.028 <sup>a</sup>
	Residual	3057.392	142	21.531		
	Total	3163.797	143			

a. Predictors: (Constant), total no. of winning youth

b. Dependent Variable: percent of voting youth aged 18-30

The above tables show that there is a weak relationship between the percentage of youth voting and the number of young winners, whereby the value of R Square was 0.34 and within a statistical significance level of 0.028.

**Summary of results:**

The study reached the following main conclusions:

- 1- The number of young candidates is increasing in the elected lists compared to the consensual lists. These numbers are also increasing in Areas (A/B) of the Palestinian National Authority and are decreasing in Area (C). The number of young candidates is also increasing in the municipalities and decreasing in the village councils.
- 2- The number of winners of youth is increasing in the elected lists compared to the consensus ones and in the municipalities. In contrast, the number of winners is also increasing in Area (C) and is decreasing in Areas (A/B), contrary to the expected, although the number of young candidates in Areas (A/B) is on average higher than the number of young candidates in Area (C).
- 3- The number of young female winners is increasing in the consensual lists compared to the elected lists, and in village councils compared to the municipalities. The number of young women winners is also higher in Area (C).
- 4- The larger the number of units (i.e. the larger number of seats), the more young candidates there are, and the more youth winners.
- 5- The larger the number of units (i.e. the larger number of seats), the more youth winners.
- 6- The number of young winners increases as the percentage of voting youth increases.

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