Military Role in the Nigerian Constitution: An Exposé of law and Security Impact on Development

Ayodele A. Otaiku

Abstract: Nigeria’s 195 million population security situation currently is enormous and the growing insecurity requires the imperative to investigate and identify its sources and causes with the guide of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 constitutional provision of the law and the statutory role of the military and national security agencies. In Nigeria, the law has ceased to act as a deterrent since corruption and insecurity have largely been compromised. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) database used for content analysis and benchmark for comparative studies of the impacts of insecurity and other externalities to Nigeria economy. The root causes of insecurity in Nigeria are: insurgency, poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, injustice, corruption, porous borders and small arms proliferation nationwide. The menace of insecurity calls for a new approach founded on creditable intelligence gathering. There is the need to modernize the security agencies through capacity building in advanced training, intelligence sharing, advanced technology, logistics, motivation and change of orientation. Despite the decrease in deaths from terrorism, Nigeria still experienced a high rate of violent deaths from Fulani herdsmen and terrorist Boko Haram terrorist with hybrid war strategy in north east of Nigeria. The economic impact of terrorism as percentage of Nigeria Gross Domestic Product, (GDP) N67.9 trillion (2016) is 4.5% by GTI (2016) and with 9.314 score third globally. Climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’ to Nigeria food security with the consequence of increase forced migration, raise tensions and trigger conflict and root cause of Fulani herdsmen conflicts nationwide. The military institution should re-think cause, impacts and mitigation strategies of conflicts management in Nigeria with the perspectives of global best practices.

Keywords: Military, Law, Security, National security, Development, Nigeria Constitution, Global Peace Index (GPI), Global Terrorism Index (GTI), Food security, Insurgency and climate change.

1.0 Background

In Nigeria, the constitution unequivocally spelt out as a fundamental objective and directive principle of state policy that “the security and welfare of the people (of Nigeria) shall be the primary purpose of government” (Section 14 (2) (b) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. Nigeria in recent times has witnessed an unprecedented level of insecurity. No wonder national security has become an issue for government, prompting huge allocation of the national budget to security. The military which is a critical element of national defence alongside other security agencies would have to ensure that the territorial integrity of the nation and indeed, internal security of the nation is assured. The concept of law transcends social, political, economic and environmental dimension of human existence. Law, according to Robertson, in his Crimes Against Humanity: “is a system of rules and guidelines, usually enforced through a set of institutions ...and a social mediator of relations between people”. He argues further that, sociology of law is a field of study that examines the interaction of Law with society and overlaps with jurisprudence, economic analysis of Law and more specialised area of Law like criminology. The development and enforcement of Law, and the need for the establishment of the Police and Military institutions informed the ancient royal courts and modern states to emphasise the need for the projection of state power.

This has been attested to by both ancient and 20th century strategists like Nicollo Machiavelli, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Henry Kissinger. The theory and philosophy of Law which underscores the need for equity and fairness and democratic principles was vividly captured by Aristotle when he declared that, “The rule of Law is better than the rule of any individual.” This remains instructive even today for a peaceful, just and a cohesive society. Security generally, can be explained in the classical and traditional sense as remarked by a retired Brig Gen, J.O. Olorunfemi, a one-time commandant of Nigerian Army Education who states that,” The cold-war era conceptualization of national security, perceived it in terms of the amassment of military armaments and personnel”. This, he believes would be myopic as modern challenges have redefined security. Sun Tzu, a Chinese military strategist, differs from this perception when he states that, “To win one hundred victories in one hundred Battles is not the acme of skill. (But) to subdue an enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”. The concept of national security in recent times now includes: social, economic, cultural, technological and political consideration. Hence, Robert McNamara, a
one-time US Secretary of Defence asserted that: ‘‘Any society that seeks to achieve adequate military security against the background of acute food shortages, population explosions, low level of productivity and per capital income, low technological development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities, and chronic problem of unemployment, has a false sense of security’’.

The focus and scope of the discourse in this paper is the role of Nigeria constitution for the military and the resultant effects on national development. Conceptual discourse of law and order, security and state. The theoretical analyses of the Nigeria constitution role of the military as it relate to scope of national security, public policy, security challenges and impacts on national development and ranking of Nigeria in Global Terrorism Index (GTI), 2016, Global Peace (GPI) 2016, Global Multidimensional Poverty (2016) and Human development 2016 indexes as an integral denominator of outcomes of defence functions of the military in Nigeria 1999 constitution and consequences of security vulnerabilities.


The Concept of Security
Security is defined as something that can be diligently measured, monitored and improved upon by means of reason and scientific inquiry 5. Again, security attains a normative quality: it seems to be a good thing we ought to diligently strive to acquire. From the foregoing perspective, the broad definition of security is thought to be encountered in the absence or at least unlikeliness of threat to certain objects 6. Given the foregoing scenario, “national security can be dangerously ambiguous concept if it is used without specifications that facilitate analysing the rationality of security policy. It is important to define security as a policy objective and proceed to defining policies for pursuing the objectives”7. The definition of security has changed with the end of the ideological war between the United States and the Soviet Union. This struggle necessitated the move to defend national sovereignty in terms of territory, people and the system of government8. Security is defined as protective conditions which statesmen either try to acquire or pressure in order to guard the various components of their policies from either external or internal threats 9.

For Bello (2014), the modern understanding of security extends beyond the physical protection of territory through military intervention, to the provision of better quality of life and promotion of sustainable development. In this light, security can be described to include providing higher standards of living through health, economic, human, physical, environmental, food security 10.

Asobie (2017) is of the opinion that security has connections with low probability of attacks to the state’s acquired values Nigeria does not rely on itself for military protection. This is because Nigeria does not produce arms and ammunition, and depends on other countries for that. Nigeria has high probability of damage to their acquired values; therefore, Nigeria is not secured, security should not be defined in isolation of human security. Human security has to do with wellbeing, good health and other indexes of development (Asobie, 2017).

Security could be perceived in terms of economic and political as well as military objectives. In fact, lasting security should be founded on effective system of international order. Security is a process as much as a condition, and one in which the participants are individuals and public opinion11. Rothschild opined that global security must be expanded from its traditional focus on the security of states to the security of people and the planet12. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994 placed more emphasis on human security than nuclear security. Human security is defined as safety from hunger, disease, repression, and protection from sudden as well as hurtful disruptions. The idea of common security was proffered in the 1992 Report of the Palme Commission

Security
Security is a state of being safe and the absence of fear, anxiety, danger, poverty and oppression. It is the preservation of core values and the absence of threats to these values ( Alli, 2010:73). Imobighe (1990:224) opines that security is the freedom from threats to a nation’s capability to defend and develop itself, promote its values and lawful interest. For Zabadi (2005:3), security is a state in which people or things are not exposed to danger of physical or moral aggression, accident, theft or decline.


National security

This view is associated with the survival of the state and the preservation of its citizens. In other words, the state has the responsibility of the use of force and power for the safety of its territory and its people. Furthermore, there is the crucial need to define national security. Held and McGrew (1998) give a traditional meaning of national security. He describes national security as “the acquisition, deployment and use of military force to achieve national goals”. Romm (1993) describes it as the lack of danger or risk to held standards, values and ideals and the absence of fear that such values will be attacked now or in the future. Thus, national security is the preservation of the values a nation holds as relates to the defence of its territory from human as well as non-human threats and guides in the pursuit of it national interest in the international system.

State

The term state is derived from the Italian word “lo stato”, a term coined by Niccolo Machiavelli to depict the social order that oversees and rules over a political entity or a country. According to Ekanem (2001:55) the “state is a permanent specialized organization of men armed with rules and means of coercion for maintaining order over a population in a defined territory over which this organization exercises power.” For Max Weber, ‘the state is an essential political union that has a centralized government that maintains a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a certain territory’ (Shaw, 2003). Evident in these definitions are the characteristics of the state such as territorial authority, sovereignty, government, population, independence, the right to relate with other states and very importantly, the monopoly of use of instruments of force.

National security

National security refers to the absence of threats to core values and the prevention of public disorders. Security could be seen at two levels, namely; the state and individual. Individual security has to do with core values such as job security, social security, and security against national disaster whereas at the state level, security connotes the safeguard of the territorial integrity of the state against internal and external aggressors (Atoyebi, 2003). Thamos (2008) noted that national security is to feel safe, which safety should stand guaranteed by the political dispense in such a way that wars may be less likely and the normal conditions among states may prevail. National security also envisages preparations for all sorts of defence which may appear as preparedness for war. Nweze (2004) conceptualized national security as the preservation, protection and the guarantee of the safety of life, property, wealth of the citizenry and measures to guard against threats to national sovereignty. It equally implies freedom from danger to life and property and people to pursue legitimate interest within the society (Bassey, 2004).

2.0 Nigeria 1999 Constitution Review* – Military Role


Part II. Powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*

Section 5*. (4) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section:-
(a) the President shall not declare a state of war between the Federation and another country except with the sanction of a resolution of both Houses of the National Assembly, sitting in a joint session; and
(b) except with the prior approval of the Senate, no member of the armed forces of the Federation shall be deployed on combat duty outside Nigeria.
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, the President, in consultation with the National Defence Council, may deploy members of the armed forces of the Federation on a limited combat duty outside Nigeria if he is satisfied that the national security is under imminent threat or danger: Provided that the President shall, within seven days of actual combat engagement, seek the consent of the Senate and the Senate shall thereafter give or refuse the said consent within 14 days.

* Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Constitution was written during the 29 years of military role in Nigeria

Section 11*. (1) The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part therefore with respect to the maintenance and securing of public safety and public order and providing, maintaining and securing of such supplies and service as may be designed by the National Assembly as essential supplies and services.
(3) During any period when the Federation is at war the National Assembly may make such laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part therefore with respect to matters not included in the Exclusive Legislative List as may appear to it to be necessary or expedient for the defence of the Federation.

Chapter II – Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy*

Section 14*. (1) The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a State based on the principles of democracy and social justice.
(2) It is hereby, accordingly, declared that:
(a) sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government through this Constitution derives all its powers and authority;
(b) the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government: and
(c) the participation by the people in their government shall be ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

**Section 16** *(1)* provides as follows: “The state shall, within the context of the ideals and objectives for which provisions are made in this Constitution:

(a) harness the resources of the nation and promote national prosperity and an efficient, a dynamic and self-reliant economy;
(b) control the national economy in such manner as to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity;
(c) that suitable and adequate shelter, suitable and adequate food, reasonable national minimum living wage, old age care and pensions, and unemployment, sick benefits and welfare of the disabled are provided for all citizens.”

**Section 17** *(1)* provides thus: “The State social order is founded on ideals of Freedom, Equality and Justice.

(2) In furtherance of the social order:

(a) every citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law, (b) the sanctity of the human person shall be recognized and human dignity shall be maintained and enhanced;
(c) governmental actions shall be humane;”

(3) The State shall direct its policy towards ensuring that:

(a) all citizens, without discrimination on any group whatsoever, have the opportunity for securing adequate means of livelihood as well as adequate opportunity to secure suitable employment.

**Section 18** *(1)* provides thus “Government shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels”.

**Section 19** “The foreign policy objectives shall be:

(a) promotion and protection of national interest
(b) respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication.

**Section 20** provides thus: “The state shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water, air and land, forest and wild life of Nigeria.

* Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Constitution

**Chapter III Citizenship**

**Section 30** *(1)* The President may deprive a person, other than a person who is a citizen of Nigeria by birth or by registration, of his citizenship, if he is satisfied that such a person has, within a period of seven years after becoming naturalised, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than three years.

(2) The President shall deprive a person, other than a person who is citizen of Nigeria by birth, of his citizenship, if he is satisfied from the records of proceedings of a court of law or other tribunal or after due inquiry in accordance with regulations made by him, that -

(b) the person has, during any war in which Nigeria was engaged, unlawfully traded with the enemy or been engaged in or associated with any business that was in the opinion of the president carried on in such a manner as to assist the enemy of Nigeria in that war, or unlawfully communicated with such enemy to the detriment of or with intent to cause damage to the interest of Nigeria.

**Section 37**. The privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications is hereby guaranteed and protected.

**Section 45**. (1) Nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of this Constitution shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society

(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom or other persons

(3) In this section, a " period of emergency" means any period during which there is in force a Proclamation of a state of emergency declared by the President in exercise of the powers conferred on him under section 305 of this Constitution.

**Chapter VI B - Establishment of Certain Federal Executive Bodies**

**Section 153**. (1) There shall be established for the Federation the following bodies, namely:

(k) National Security Council; (g) National Defence Council;

**Section 154**. (1) Except in the case of ex-officio members or where other provisions are made in this Constitution, the Chairman and members of any of the bodies so established shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, be appointed by the President and the appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Senate.
(2) In exercising his powers to appoint a person as Chairman or member of the Council of State or the National Defence Council or the National Security Council, the President shall not be required to obtain the confirmation of the Senate.

Part III Supplemental C - Armed Forces of the Federation*

Section 217*. (1) There shall be armed forces for the Federation which shall consist of an army, a navy, an Air Force and such other branches of the armed forces of the Federation as may be established by an Act of the National Assembly.

(2) The Federation shall, subject to an Act of the National Assembly made in that behalf, equip and maintain the armed forces as may be considered adequate and effective for the purpose of -

(a) defending Nigeria from external aggression;
(b) maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air;
(c) suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and
(d) performance such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

(3) The composition of the officer corps another ranks of the armed forces of the Federation shall reflect the federal character of Nigeria.

* Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Constitution

Section 218*. (1) The powers of the President as the Commissioner-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation shall include power to determine the operational use of the armed forces of the Federation.

(2) The powers conferred on the President by subsection (1) of this section shall include power to appoint the Chief of Defence staff, the Chief of Army Staff, the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of Air Staff and heads of any other branches of the armed forces of the Federation as may be established by an Act of the National Assembly.

(3) The President may, by directions in writing and subject to such conditions as he think fit, delegate to any member of the armed forces of the Federation his powers relating to the operational use of the Armed Forces of the Federation.

(4) The National Assembly shall have power to make laws for the regulation of -

(a) the powers exercisable by the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation; and
(b) the appointment, promotion and disciplinary control of members of the armed forces of the Federation.

Section 219*. The National Assembly shall:

(a) in giving effect to the functions specified in section 217 of this Constitution; and
(b) with respect to the powers exercisable by the President under section 218 of this Constitution, by an Act, established a body which shall comprise such members as the National Assembly may determine, and which shall have power to ensure that the composition of the armed forces of the Federation shall reflect the federal character of Nigeria in the manner prescribed in the section 217 of this Constitution.

Section 220*. (1) The Federation shall establish and maintain adequate facilities for carrying into effect any Act of the National Assembly providing for compulsory military training or military service for citizens of Nigeria.

(2) Until an Act of the National Assembly is made in that behalf the President may maintain adequate facilities in any secondary or post-secondary educational institution in Nigeria for giving military training in any such institution which desires to have the training.

Third Schedule  G - National Defence Council*

Section 16*. The National Defence Council shall comprise the following members – (a) the President who shall be the Chairman;
(b) the Vice-President who shall be the Deputy Chairman;
(c) the Minister of the Government of the Federation responsible for defence;
(d) the Chief of Defence Staff; (e) the Chief of Army Staff;
(f) the Chief of Naval Staff; (g) the Chief of Air Staff; and
(h) such other members as the President may appoint.

Section 17*. The Council shall have power to advise the President on matters relating to the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria.

(k) - National Security Council.

Section 25*. The National Security Council shall comprise the following members – (a) the President who shall be the Chairman;
(b) the Vice-President who shall be the Deputy Chairman;
(c) the Chief of Defence Staff;
(d) the Minister of the Government of the Federation charged with the responsibility for internal affairs;
(e) the Minister of the Government of the Federation charged responsibility for defence;
* Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Constitution

(f) the Minister of the Government of the Federation charged with the responsibility for foreign affairs;
(g) the National Security Adviser;
(h) the Inspector-General of Police; and
(i) such other persons as the President may in his discretion appoint.

3.0 Meaning and Scope of National Security

Right to self-defence by a nation is an International Law recognised right of nations. This recognition was reflected in Article 51
UN Charter. It was also referred to by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Case Concerning the Military and
Paramilitary Activities. The term national security is one devoid of definition, but one with serious and far reaching implication.
National security as explained earlier lacks specific definition, but has been described as the concern of government about
the stability and safety of a state. Another author also describes it as the measures taken by a state to ensure its survival and
safety. It was also defined as the ability of a state (Nigeria) to pursue her national interest and protect / maintain her core
values. There is a remarkable difference between what the concept of national security is in contemporary and
traditional/earlier days. The traditional understanding of security as the above discussion shows is limited to the physical
or direct protection of the lives and properties of citizens, both at home or abroad, or those of individuals living within a
state by protecting the sovereignty of the state (mostly or particularly through military action).

The modern understanding of security however extends beyond the physical protection of a territory through military
intervention, to the provision of better quality of life and promotion of sustainable development. In this light, security can be
described to include providing higher standard of living through health, economic, human, physical and environmental
and food security among others. The main essence of national security is the protection of the national interest /value of a state
and upholding what the state believes to be valuable to it and its people. Some issues of national value can be found in the grand
norm of a country i.e. its Constitution, from actions of government or other state policies that are manifest from its relationship
and interaction with other states.

Challenges to National Security

Governments in many cases had been and are still facing some challenges to their quest for national security. Some of those
challenges are in the area of response to threats to life and property this includes balancing human right and making the state more
secure and safe. Another challenge is the resources (both human and material) a state has to devote to specified measures
designed to improve the standard of living of the people, and other measures created to enhance the welfare of the people. This is
a challenge especially for developing countries that have little or in some instances no resources to devote to such projects, or
who have other competing important projects to attend to. Challenges also come in the form of the desire of state to want to do
things their own way by exercising their international law recognised sovereignty, and the need for them to balance such
desire with their international obligations and responsibilities.

16. A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy,
http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191639.pdf?CID=PDF
&PLA=furl&CRE =nationalsecuritystrategy (last visited 28/03/2011).

This has become has become a challenge more so with increase in interaction between states, and the globalisation taking place. It is
worthy to mention that as the scope of national security evolves, so also do the threats increase, and their dimension
become vast. Consequently the challenges to national security become dynamic. This evolving scope of and threats to national
security makes it increasingly difficult to give a precise estimate of the cost of implementing and sustaining a national security
measure in some instances. The limitless nature of threats makes it impossible to anticipate all necessary measure needed to
respond to threats to national security by states.

The Role of Public Policy in National Security in Nigeria

Public policy is used by the State to make policies of a public nature design to affect the entire state, as opposed to such policies
that are group or individual specific. For a policy to be described as public, it must be designed to protect and promote the core
and common values shared by the people of the state. Such core or common values shared by all can be described as reflective of
national interest. These values as noted earlier could be found in the country’s Constitution, From the discussion about the
meaning and scope of national security, it becomes clear that protecting the lives and property of citizens as well as improving
their welfare and standard of living is at the heart of government’s responsibility. This makes national security a part of, if not the
most important element of national interest, and the provision of same is the main essence of government. The importance attached to national security as an element of national interest and essence of government is not lost to Nigeria. Section 14 (2) (a) of the Constitution of The Federal Republic of Nigeria see Literature Review of Nigeria Constitution above. This discussion is not oblivious of the different views and arguments that say Nigeria does not have a clearly defined national interest. This is in line with the fact that some authors believe that the generally acceptable view is national interest is a manifestation of the core values, objectives and philosophy underlying the actions of the leaders. This view also believes that the ground norm provides the true basis for the collective action, preference, predictions and sentiments of leaders. The above Constitutional provision, particularly Section 14 (2) (b) clearly shows that Nigeria as a country has some core values that need to be promoted and protected. This also shows that Nigeria as a country has national interest. What had been happening in the past however is the successive leadership of the country gave it different interpretation, and attached different level of priority to those values?

Recent global trends and the need to compete globally have brought about the need for government to review and refocus on the country’s core values and national interest. This was brought about by the need to create a conducive environment for competition for scarce resources, need to become more developed as well as the need to protect the citizens and individuals living in the country. Section 14(2) (c) of the Constitution did not only create an enabling environment for public policy to be part and parcel of national security, it also made it possible for Nigerians to participate in making, monitoring and reviewing national security policies. An instance of a way they can participate in making national security policies is by participating in public hearing. A very good instance of the role of public policy in national security in Nigeria is the Bill for and Act to Provide for Measures to Combat Terrorism and for other Related Matters (HB322). The Bill was an executive one proposed to apply throughout the country with a view to combating terrorism by putting certain measures in place. The Bill took into consideration our international obligations, which is in line with our foreign policy objectives and national interest.

There was an interactive session held on the 13th October 2010, as well as a call for submission of memoranda. This reflect a public policy process by first identifying that terrorism is a problem, there is a need for the government to do something about it, the government looked at the measures it had on ground and decided it was not enough to combat terrorism; it proposed a better way of combating it taking several issues such as rights, interests and logistics into consideration; and it also gave members of the general public an opportunity to contribute to the policy making via the session and call for memoranda a. The above shows how vital public policy process is to tackling national security issues. Public policy creates a framework for making effective national security policies that will take into consideration views and concerns of stakeholders that will be affected by the legislation if eventually passed. It take the national interest of the country such as Section 14 (2) (b)*, and international human rights issues into account, irrespective of the difficulty associated with balancing the governments obligations and the rights of the people that will be affected by the measures.

4.0 Environment as an Element of National Security

Beginning from the 1970s, however, the debate gradually started within the academic community that the concept of “national security” must shift from the narrow traditional concept of “organized violence” or “war system” i.e. the pursuit by a state of security from violence organized by another state or states. By 1996, national security was seen as an appropriate and aggressive blend of political resilience and maturity, human resources, economic structure and capacity, technological competence, industrial base and availability of natural resources and finally the military might. It was further viewed as the capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes is necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity and well-being. General Maxwell Taylor, a nation’s valuables in the broad sense will include current assets and national interest, as well as the sources of strength upon which her future as a nation depends. Some valuables are tangible and earthy; others are spiritual or intellectual. They range widely from political assets such as the Bill of Rights, a country’s political institutions and international friendships, to many economic assets which radiate worldwide from a highly productive domestic economy supported by rich natural resources.

With particular reference to Nigeria, the concept of national security is mentioned in section 5 (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, which empowers the President in consultation* with the National Defence Council, to deploy members of the armed forces of the Federation on a limited combat duty outside Nigeria if

20. Ibid. See also Otuongan.
* Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Constitution
** Nigeria National Assembly
he is satisfied that the national security is under imminent threat or danger. Premised on this, it has been contended that the national security goal of Nigeria has the state and military power as its primary focus.26

The above position, however, becomes incongruous when considered together with section 14 (2) (b) of Chapter II of the Constitution* which declares that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government” 27. In similar vein, resource problems28 and environmentally threatening outcomes of warfare 28 are issues that can seriously undermine the security of a nation. The United Nations has identified environmental degradation as one of six clustered threats with which the world must be concerned now and in the decades ahead. One of the first countries to make the clear connection between environment and national security was the United States when in 1990 Al Gore, then a Senator, placed environmental degradation on the national security agenda with his statement that environmental neglect threatens not only the quality of life but life itself. 29 In that same year, Al Gore initiated the strategic environmental research and development program together with Senator Sam Nunn with the aim of redirecting military resources toward developing and analysing the data needed for alerting the US public to possible security threats.30

In this regard, there is a National Security Agency (NSA)* whose goals and objectives are articulated through such bodies of the Nigerian Ministry of Defence as the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), Directorate of Naval Intelligence Agency (DNIA) and the Directorate of Air force Intelligence (DAI). Other relevant agencies of government are the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), State Security Services (SSS), Nigeria Police (NP), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Nigeria Customs Services (NCS) and National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). Environmental degradation did not come unto the front burner as a major issue in Nigeria until 1988 following the dumping of toxic waste on a site in Koko, a small port town in the southern part of Nigeria.31 This led to the setting-up of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency in 1988. What is of significance in the above is that while Nigeria may not have formally identified its environmental challenges as an issue of national security, a country like the United States is already looking at these issues via its own national security strategy document to conceptualize its relationship with Nigeria32 in furtherance of its foreign aid, diplomatic and national security policies.

Environmental crisis engender conditions which render conflict and insecurity all the more likely. They can serve to determine the source of conflict, shape the nature of conflict and act as multipliers that aggravate the core causes of conflict. Invariably, not only can environmental problems contribute to conflict, they can also stimulate the growing use of force to repress disaffection among those who suffer the consequences of environmental degradation. Where environmental deficiencies are not tackled and curbed, they will degenerate in the not too distant future to undermine political, social and economic stability. The connection between the consequences of environmental decline and a nation’s security should be accentuated in amendments of Nigeria constitution.33

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27 Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Constitution;
28 Saddam Hussein’s burning of oil wells in the Gulf War;
31 Sherri Wassermann Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for environmental security, ‘The Environment and National Security’, Speech to the National Defence University, August 8, 1996,
33 The United States and Nigeria launched a new Bi-national Commission in April, 2010. The goal of this Agreement is to help forge a greater partnership in improving governance and transparency in Nigeria. It has a focus on the Niger Delta and also looks

to increase Nigeria’s food security and agricultural development.
* Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Constitution

5.0  Nigeria Conflicts Source

Imobighe (2003) identified threats to internal security in Nigeria to include: religious/political intolerance, management of resources, subversion and sabotage, espionage, smuggling, alien influx, armed robbery, mutiny/coup d’etat, civil unrest, revolutionary insurgency. Some common descriptors of insecurity according to Achumba et al (2013) include: want of safety, danger, hazard, uncertainty, want of safety, doubt, inadequately guarded or protected, lack of stability, troubled, lack of protection and being unsafe. Beland (2005) defined insecurity as a state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection i.e. lack or inadequate freedom from danger. These definitions reflect physical insecurity which is the most visible form of insecurity, and it feeds into many other forms of insecurity such as economic security and social security. It is however depressing that Nigeria is yet to develop a credible security policy in the face of serious, threatening, internal security challenges (Ekoko and Vogt, 1990).

Nweze (2004) identified sources of security threats in Nigeria to include: militarism, and military experiences, ethnic/religious pluralism, unemployment, poverty and failure of governance, socio-economic inequalities and demographic factors, small arms and ammunition trafficking, migration and indigene question in Nigeria’s socio-economic status in Africa and the illegal alien issues, globalization, porous security heritage and external influence. It is necessary to distinguish between different causes as each may require different remedy. Like in other countries, the sources of insecurity in Nigeria can be traced to a number of factors. Beyond the external-internal dichotomy, sources of insecurity can equally be classified as either remote or proximate and immediate. In Nigeria, the challenge is not so much about external sources but rather that of internal sources.

Remote (root) factors sources of insecurity in Nigeria

1. Lack of institutional capacity

There is apparently a breakdown of institutional infrastructure. The foundations of institutional framework in Nigeria according to Achumba et al (2013) are very shaky and have resulted in the deterioration of state governance and democratic accountability, thereby paralyzing existing set of constraints including the formal and legitimate rules nested in the hierarchy of social order. Igbuzor (2011), the state of insecurity in Nigeria is a function of government failure. Section 18 (1) provides thus “Government shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels”34. This is manifested by the inability of government to deliver public services and provide the basic needs of the masses. Lack of basic necessities in Nigeria has created a pool of frustrated people who are easily ignited by any event to become violent. It is argued that Nigeria has the wherewithal to provide for her people, but corruption of public office holders has made this impossible. Nigeria according to Hazen and Horner (2007) is a ‘paradox of plenty’, a very rich country with very poor people. With this kind of situation, insecurity of lives and properties is bound to arise/occur.

2. Ethno-religious conflicts

Among the various ethnic groups and religious in Nigeria have arisen distrust and lack of confidence. According to Hazen and Horner (2007), Salawu (2010) and Igbuzor (2010), ethno-religious conflict is a major source of insecurity in Nigeria. Frequent and persistent ethnic conflicts and religious clashes between the two dominant religions (Islam and Christianity) present the country with a major security challenge. In every part of Nigeria, there exists ethno-religious conflict which according to Ibrahim and Igbuzor (2002) have arisen as a result of new and particularistic forms of political consciousness and identity often associated with ethno-religious identities. Adagba et al (2012) noted, claim over scarce resources, power, land, chieftaincy, local government council, control of markets and sharia among other trivial issues have resulted in large scale killings and violence among groups in Nigeria.

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3. Weak security systems

The inadequate equipment for the security arm of government both in weaponry and training. This is in addition to poor attitudinal disposition of security personnel. In most cases, security personnel lack the expertise and equipment to handle such situations in a way to prevent them from occurring. Even when this exists, some personnel get influenced by ethnic, religious or communal sentiment and are usually swallowed by their personal interest to serve their people, rather than the nation. People as a result become saboteurs of government effort by supporting and fuelling insecurity through either lacking vital security information or aiding and abetting criminals to acquire weapons or to escape the long arm of the law (Section 14 (1) (b) of Nigeria 1999 constitution review above) 35.

4. Loss of socio-cultural and communal value system

The traditional value system of the Nigerian society like most other African societies according to Clifford (2009) is characterized by such enduring features as collectivism, loyalty to authority and community, truthfulness, honesty, hard work, tolerance, love for others, mutual harmony, and co-existence and identification of individual with one another. Other distinctive features of the Nigerian traditional society are abhorrence for theft, incest and high values for life. Stealing was considered
extremely disgraceful and lives were highly valued. All these values which made society secured and safe have all gradually been discarded or lost. New obnoxious values have succeeded the lost ones. We are often acquainted with ‘modernity and civilization’. Most traditional Nigerian endearing values and morals have been traded off for western values which portend a dangerous precedent.

Immediate and proximate factors sources of insecurity in Nigeria

1. Porous borders
One major immediate factor which has aggravated insecurity in Nigeria is the porous frontiers of the country, where individuals are largely untracked. The porosity of the Nigerian borders has serious security implications for the country. Given the porosity of our borders as well as weak security system, weapons and small arms get into Nigeria easily from other countries. Small arms and light weapons proliferation and the availability of these weapons have enabled militant groups and criminal gangs to have easy access to arms (Hazen and Horner, 2007). According to Edeko (2011), Nigeria is estimated to host over 70 percent of about 8 million illegal weapons in West Africa. Due to the porosity of Nigerian borders, unwarranted influx of migrants from neighbouring African countries such as Republic of Chad, Niger and Benin has become possible. These migrants who are mostly young men according to Adeola and Oluyemi (2012) are some of the perpetrators of crimes in Nigeria.

2. Unemployment/poverty
As a result of high level of unemployment and poverty among Nigerians, particularly the youths, they are adversely attracted to violent crime. Adagba et al (2012), Nwagboso (2012) noted that the failure of successive administrations in Nigeria to address challenges of unemployment and poverty inequitable distribution of wealth among ethnic nationalities are the major causes of insecurity in Nigeria (see Section 16 (1) (b) (c) of Nigeria 1999 constitution review above.

3. Terrorism
Today, terrorism is the most fundamental source of insecurity in Nigeria and its primary source is located in religious fanaticism and intolerance, particularly in Moslem dominated states of Nigeria. Terrorism which is a global phenomenon was defined by Sampson and Onuoha (2011) as the premeditated use of threat or violence by an individual or group to cause fear, destruction or death, especially against unarmed targets, property or infrastructure in a state, intended to compel those in authority to respond to the demands and expectations of the individual or group behind such violent “acts” like Boko Haram, which takes into account the legitimate political, social and economic grievances of the northern population. According to Oluokun (2014), Nigeria has lost up to 1,500 lives in the north since 2009 since the insurgency of Boko Haram.

Terrorism can be managed based on the Chapter II- Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy Section 14. (1)(b) of Nigeria 1999 constitution. The sources of insecurity in Nigeria have been summarized by Kufour (2012) as located in four factors, namely: political conflicts, unbalanced development that involves horizontal inequalities, religious/ethnic distrust and leadership failure but the constitution of Nigeria has provision in the Third Schedule G, National Defence Council Section 17 (k) to address the challenges.

6.0 Impact of insecurity on Development
Gbenga and Augoye, (2011) insecurity was as a result of malignant environment dominated by man’s insensitivity to man. Shadare (2011), insecurity in Nigeria has affected Air transport negatively. It scars away passengers and is like draining blood from a man, it drains the resources that could have been used to improve safety, including finance and time. It induces multiple levels of security checks at the airports with the attendant stress on the traveling public. Otto (2008) has shown that insecurity took a great toll on oil production in Nigeria between 1999 and 2008. Nigeria was producing at about 10% of its potentials of 3.4 million barrels of crude oil per day in 2007. Apart from the fall in output and the increase in unit cost of production, many firms in different industries relocated away from the Niger Delta and the country completely. Example, include Michelin, Dunlop, among several others. Gbenga and Augoye (2011) argued that an insecure environment impinges directly on development; it disenfranchises communities, contributes to poverty, distorts economies, creates instability and stunts political development.

In Nigeria, apart from the millions of people who had been killed in course of one security breach or another, sources of livelihood were destroyed, families got disintegrated and social infrastructure were disrupted. The Nigerian government took steps to increase its counter-Boko Haram efforts. Nigeria continued to work with other Boko Haram-affected neighbours in the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) that facilitated collaboration and coordination on counter-Boko Haram efforts. Despite gains made by the MNJTF, much of its reported progress was merely duplication of failed efforts carried over from the end of the last dry/fighting season. The Nigerian military was unable to hold and re-build civilian structures and institutions in those areas it had cleared. Most of the remaining students abducted by BH in Chibok remained in captivity, although one girl was found in Borno, and the Government of Nigeria successfully negotiated the release of 21 of the kidnapping victims (Country Reports on Terrorism, 2016)

Terrorist activity in Nigeria accounted for the displacement of nearly two million persons in the states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe. The Nigerian government continued to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons to their home communities, although sometimes without providing adequate security and before appropriate conditions were in
place for safe, informed, voluntary returns. There was no evidence in 2016 of the implementation of a coordinated plan to restore civilian security in recaptured territories. In partnership with international donors, the Nigerian government set up several institutions to coordinate the reconstruction of areas destroyed by the conflict in the northeast (Country Reports on Terrorism, 2016). An Interdisciplinary Assistance Team (IDAT) comprising personnel from the Department of State, the Department of Defence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Agency for International Development continued to work from the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, closely coordinating efforts with the Nigerian military at the Defence Intelligence Agency. Daily military-to-military engagement at the Joint Combined Fusion Cell and the Joint Coordination Planning Committee led to a more detailed understanding of Nigerian military operations and established relationships with mid- and senior-level officers (Country Reports on Terrorism, 2016).

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6.1 Nigeria - The Global Terrorism Index (GTI)
The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2016 is a comprehensive study analysing the impact of terrorism for 163 countries, covering 99.7 per cent of the world’s population. The GTI therefore defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation”*. This definition recognises that terrorism is not only the physical act of an attack, but also the psychological impact it has on a society for many years after. Nigeria (GTI 2016, score 9.314) experienced a 34 per cent decline in the number of deaths from terrorism in 2015 (Figure 1). This was largely due to a decline in the number of attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria. A coalition of the Nigerian military and forces from neighbouring countries Cameroon, Chad and Niger forced Boko Haram out of areas in northeast Nigeria in 2015, driving the 33 per cent decline in deaths. In 2015, Boko Haram killed 4,095 people in terrorist attacks in Nigeria, down from 6,136 deaths in 2014 (Figure 2). However, there was an increase in attacks by Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, which resulted in 1,382 deaths, a 163 per cent increase from the previous year. Despite the decrease in deaths from terrorism, Nigeria still experienced a high rate of violent deaths. In addition to terrorism victims, there were at least 4,422 battle-related deaths from the conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian Government in 2015, down from 8,233 in 2014.

Source: GTI, 2016*

Figure 1. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI), 2016 data on Nigeria

http://dx.doi.org/10.29322/IJSRP.8.11.2018.p8388
Boko Haram has been one of the deadliest terrorist groups in history. Even though the first recorded terrorist death by Boko Haram was only in 2009, the group has the second highest death toll out of all terrorist groups since 2000 (Figure 3). Only the Taliban has killed more people than Boko Haram. Nearly 90 per cent of the 15,600 deaths by Boko Haram since 2009 have been in Nigeria. On average, Boko Haram killed 11 people per attack in Nigeria. Four out of five deaths from terrorism in Nigeria are civilians. This is one of the highest targeting of civilians anywhere in the world (Figure 2); by contrast civilians are targeted in half of all attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Whilst the majority of fatalities were caused by armed assaults with firearms and knives, there has been an increase in the use of bombings and explosions, a tactic Boko Haram has been increasingly using after receiving explosives training from al-Shabaab. In 2013, Boko Haram conducted 35 bombings which killed 107 people. In 2015 there were 156 bombings that killed 1,638. Nearly two thirds of the bombings in 2015 were suicide bombings, which on average killed ten people per attack. The majority of attacks in Nigeria were in the north-eastern states and particularly Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State where Boko Haram is based. Attacks by Fulani ethnic militants-groups of semi-nomadic, ethnic-based pastoralists engaged in conflict with farming communities—were recorded in the Middle Belt (Figures 1 and 3).

![Graph showing deaths from terrorism, 2000-2015](http://dx.doi.org/10.29322/IJSRP.8.11.2018.p8388)

Source: GTI, 2016

Figure 2. Deaths from terrorism, 2000 - 2015 GTI, 2016, Nigeria third globally.
There were 630 fewer deaths by militia in 2015, a decrease of 50 per cent since the previous year (Figure 4). Terrorism is highly concentrated, with 57 per cent of all deaths since 2000 occurring in four countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan. Half of the roughly 50,500 deaths in Iraq have occurred between 2012 and 2015. The other three countries most impacted by terrorism according to the GTI; Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan, each had between nine and 13 per cent of the total deaths (Figure 4).

Table 1 The Ten worst affected countries by economic impact of terrorism as percentage of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>% OF GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GTI, 2016

The economic impact of terrorism is relatively small compared to other forms of violence, accounting for approximately one per cent of the cost of violence at the global level in 2015. The total economic impact of violence reached $13.6 trillion in 2015 (PPP) or 13.3 per cent of global GDP. The economic resources devoted to peacekeeping and peace building represent two per cent of the economic impact of armed conflict and terrorism. The ten most affected countries relative to the size of their economy are all conflict-affected states in the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia regions. Iraq is the country with the greatest economic impact of terrorism, amounting to 17 per cent of its national GDP. The economic impact of terrorism as percentage of GDP is highest in countries where conflict is on-going with Nigeria 4.5% of GDP (Table 1)
Targets
Figure 5 highlights the fact that private citizens are the group targeted the most. There were roughly 2,800 fewer private citizens killed in 2015 than in 2014, amounting to a 19 per cent reduction. This is mainly because of the reduced level of activity of Boko Haram in Nigeria. However, the number of deaths was still high at 12,576. While there was an overall decline in attacks on civilians, there was an increase in attacks on the military and government. Military targets are the third largest category of deaths, after private citizens and police. Deaths of military personnel increased by 54 per cent, up from 2,520 people in 2014 to 3,885 in 2015. This increase in military attacks is largely attributable to the Taliban. Three quarters of attacks on military targets in 2015 were suicide attacks, while over half of the deaths were caused by bombings and explosions. The classification of military attacks as terrorism can be blurred but there are certain instances where attacks on military targets are clearly regarded as terrorism, particularly when it is an act of violence outside the precepts of international humanitarian law. An attack on a military hospital or a military checkpoint would be an example of this. The GTI scores the impact of terrorism based on the number of terrorist incidents in the past five years, fatalities from these attacks, injuries and damage to property.

These five countries have been at the top of the index for the last three years. However, there have been substantial improvements in Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan. Except for Pakistan, in each of these countries there is a prominent group which is responsible for the majority of deaths. These same groups make up the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Boko Haram and the Taliban were responsible for 55 per cent of all the deaths from terrorism in 2015.

Source: GTI, 2016

Figure 5. Trend in deaths by Target Type, 2000 -2015

The discrepancy between the countries with the most deaths and those with the most attacks shows that terrorism has different levels of lethality around the world. Lethality can be measured by the average. Niger had the highest lethality rate in 2015, with an average of 19.7 people killed per attack, resulting in a total of 649 deaths. The second highest rate was in Chad, with 9.4 people killed per attack. Boko Haram, which is responsible for the attacks in Niger and Chad, has caused the second highest rate of deaths per attack in 2015, with an average of 11.2. Al-Nusrah Front had the highest rate of lethality, at 11.8 (Figure 4).

6.2 Nigeria Global Peace Index, 2016

i. 149 ranking with GPI score of 2.87 for Nigeria Global Peace Index 2016
ii. Violence Containment Rank by % GDP 46
iii. Violence Containment as a % GDP 11%
iv. Per Capital Violence Containment cost (2014 PPP) 588
v. Total Costs of Violence Containment 2014 PPP $104,378 M

Terrorism
The single greatest indicator change occurred on terrorism impact, which deteriorated by more than 20 per cent on average, followed by refugees and internal displaced people (IDPs) and internal conflict deaths. There were also smaller deteriorations for the intensity of internal conflict, violent demonstrations and perceptions of criminality indicators. No indicator improved by more
than 15 per cent, with only external conflicts fought and UN peacekeeping funding improving by more than ten per cent. The majority of terrorist activity is highly concentrated in five countries: Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. Between them these countries accounted for 78 per cent of deaths from terrorism in 2014.

However, there are signs that terrorism is becoming more common across the globe, with almost every region having an increase in its terrorism impact score from 2008 to 2016. The number of countries with over 500 deaths from terrorism increased from five to 11 between 2013 and 2014. At the other end of the scale, the number of countries which recorded no terrorist incidents at all decreased from 49 in 2008, to 37 in 2016 out of 163 countries. Although there are many hundreds of active terrorist groups in the world, most are responsible for only a few deaths or no deaths at all. The responsibility for the majority of deaths comes from just a few large terrorist groups, with Boko Haram and ISIL being responsible for over 50 per cent of deaths by known actors. In Nigeria, Boko Haram became the deadliest terrorist organisation in the world in 2014, seriously threatening the country’s internal stability. On top of terrorism, in 2014 Nigeria had 18,000 deaths from internal conflict, Figure 6.

Armed Services Personnel and Military Expenditure

Figure 6. Countries with the most internal conflict deaths, 2016 excluding Syria

Source: GTI, 2016

Figure 7. Change in average military expenditure % GDP by government type, 2008 -2016

Source: GTI, 2016
The fall in the armed service personnel rate was not strongly correlated with a fall in military expenditure, with many countries increasing weapons expenditure outlay while also reducing the total number of troops, reflecting a longer term shift away from larger standing armies to more technology and capital intensive weapons systems. Figure 7 highlights the change in average military expenditure by government type from 2008 to 2016. The average level of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP declined in both full democracies and flawed democracies. However, there was considerably more variation in the trend in authoritarian regimes and hybrid regimes, which both experienced steep declines from 2010 to 2012, followed by a steady increase in military expenditure for the past four years. The largest increase over the full time period occurred in Afghanistan, where military expenditure rose from 1.66 per cent of GDP to 15.75 per cent in less than a decade. Libya, Oman, Algeria and Syria also had large increases.

**On-going Domestic and International Conflict**

![Graph showing total armed conflicts by type, 1946-2014](source: GTI, 2016)

The trend away from external and towards internal conflicts can be seen in Figure 8, which shows a more detailed account of armed conflicts, which are defined as a conflict that caused more than 25 battle deaths in any one year from 1946 to 2014. The decline in the number of interstate and extra systematic is clear, as is the rise of internal conflicts. Overall, the total number of active serious armed conflicts has declined from a peak of 51 conflicts in 1991 to 40 in 2014, although this is the highest number of active conflicts since 1999. In addition, there has been a clear rise in the number of internationalised internal conflicts, which were just three per cent of total conflicts in 1991, but constituted 32.5 per cent of total conflicts in 2014. The number of attempted genocides and politicides has also been declining since the end of the Second World War. A politicide is defined here as the mass murder of civilians for their support of a political movement. Figure 9 shows a count of the number of genocides and politicides per year from 1956 to 2014, classified according to the magnitude of deaths that occurred.

### 6.3 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2017

The 2017 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) provides a headline estimation of poverty and its composition for 103 countries across the world. The global MPI measures the nature and intensity of poverty, based on the profile of overlapping deprivations each poor person experiences. It aggregates these into meaningful indexes that can be used to inform targeting and resource allocation and to design policies that tackle the interlinked dimensions of poverty together (Alkire and Robles, 2017). The MPI and its indicators are disaggregated by 988 subnational regions in 78 countries. The poorest regions are in Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Nigeria, Uganda and Afghanistan. Inside Afghanistan poverty rates vary from 25% in Kabul to 95% in Urozgan.

The MPI reflects acute multidimensional poverty in developing countries. Figure 7 on the next page shows the percentage of the population who are MPI poor, which is the height of the beige bar, and the percentage that are living in destitution, which is the height of the red subcomponent. At a glance, we can see that destitution rates ranges from 0% to 71.4% of the population. What else do we see? In some countries and regions, destitution is still ‘the norm’ because it affects half of more of the population.

Source: Alkire and Robles (2017).

Six countries have more than 50% of their population living in destitution – and together they are home to 100 million poor people. Drilling down, in 117 subnational regions, 50-92% of the population are destitute (161 million). These high destitution regions are mainly located in Sub-Saharan Africa. Looking at the high rates of destitution we might presume that destitution is largely an African story. But it is not. Of the 706 million people who are destitute, 362 million live in South Asia and 282 million in Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, 26 million live in the Arab States, another 26 million live in East Asia, and over 8 million live...
in Latin America, plus nearly 300,000 in Europe and Central Asia. India has over 295 million destitute people, more than the total number if destitute people in all of Sub-Saharan Africa (Alkire and Robles, 2017).

6.4 Human Development Index (HD)
Human Development Index (HDI) a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development - a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. Nigeria, ranked 152 among the 188 UN member states as a low human development 252 of 185 countries. According to the HDI 2016 report released by the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, in Abuja, Nigeria retained its 2015 status with a computation of 0.527 score which was two points above 2014 computation of 0.525 score and where Central Africa Republic ranked 188. The HDI, a composite statistics of life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators, is used to rank countries into four tiers of human development. The country is followed closely by Cameroon in number 153 and Zimbabwe in 154 positions. The new report places Nigeria below neighbouring Ghana and Zambia positioned at 139, Gabon, 109, and Equatorial Guinea, 135. The reports, however, showed a positive outlook for the country as Nigeria’s HDI increased from 0.466 to 0.527, a 13.1 per cent increase in the last 10 years under review between 2005 and 2015. The represents a three-point increase over what the nation had between 2005 and 2014, when Nigeria HDI’s value increased from 0.467 to 0.514, an increase of 10.1 per cent and does this data encapsulate the Nigeria 1999 constitutional role of Chapter II – Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy Section 18 (1) and Section 19 (a).37

6.5 The Impact of Security Expenditure on Nigeria Economic Growth
Insecurity is a risk factor which investors the world all over consider when investing. For investors, insecurity in any country is considered as a warning sign to take their investible funds to another country where there is adequate security. Foreign direct investments are required to stimulate the Nigeria emerging economy. However, the more the warning signals persist, the more fearful the investors become about investing in the Nigeria economy. In fact, panic withdrawal or disinvestment may result from insecurity in Nigeria (Fefa and Irefin, 2014). The resultant loss of lives, rising budgetary spending for security and destruction of valuable government facilities portend devastating consequences for sustainable economic growth and development in the country (Adebakin and Rami, 2012). The relationship between security expenditure and economic growth has continued to generate series of debates among policy makers, academicians, financial analysts, governments, researchers, economists as well as scholars. Government performs two functions, protection (security) and provision of certain public goods. Protection function consists of the creation of rule of law and enforcement of property rights, while provision of public goods includes: constructions of roads, water supply, building of schools and hospitals and others. See chapter II section 14 (b) of Nigeria constitution37. The consequence help minimize risks of criminality; enhance protection of life and property, and also protection of the nation from both internal and external aggression (Nurudeen and Abdullahi, 2008). More notably, security expenditures can increase internal and external security by funding the production of an optimal level of military production (See chapter II Section 16 (c) and 19). A more secure environment would attract domestic and foreign investments, thus improve the standard of living.

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Moreover, technology transfers from the inflow of foreign capital can speed up economic growth in the process (Ali and Mustapha, 2014; Halicioglu, 2004; Tiwari and Shahtab, 2011; Anwar, Rafique and Joiyia, 2012). Scholars argues that security expenditure can retard economic growth by way of crowding out investment Edeme et al, (2013); Tekeogbu, (2008). The work of Myo (2013) found that military expenditure has no clear impact on economic growth using sample of eighteen (18) Asian countries, hence the relationship is not clear. Therefore, the inconsistency in the theoretical and empirical evidence on the relationship between security spending and economic growth are attributed to individual country specific effects and the techniques employed. Most studies on the security-growth relationship utilized time series data like Tekeogbu (2008); Abraham, (2011); Gaiya, (2011); El-Husseini, Al-Sayed and El-Sayed (2013), sample variations and differences in the model specifications and time periods usually lead to diversity on result and of interpretations. Furthermore, since different parts of the world do not share the same natural environments and socio-economic structures, the impacts of security spending across countries cannot be easily generalized. These facts provide a justification for case studies on specific countries by using time-series data.

The nature and pattern of internal security is partly associated with the nature and pattern of defence expenditure; as total defence expenditure (TDE) raises, so also the total internal security expenditure (TISE). In Figure 11, the total Nigeria internal security expenditure (TISE), since 1961 has also not statistically significant until 1999 with the emergence of democratic system of government when the value stood at ₦20,433.00 billion and the continues to increase with slight fluctuations until 2014 when it reached a value of ₦674, 295.471 billion, this is as a result of the persistent increase in internal insecurity challenges over the entire period under study. Threat to national security is the singular factor that is responsible for the astronomical increase in the nation’s expenditure on security. Sabitu (2015) reported that Federal government has continued to appropriate huge funds for security (i.e. defence and internal security) in the national budget; a trend that has denied capital projects in the education, health, agriculture, construction sectors etc that needed attention. For example in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 fiscal years, the total security expenditures in the approved budgets billion (b) were ₦246b, ₦352b, ₦506b, ₦607b, ₦828b,
₦866b, ₦1.020 trillion, 1.006 trillion and ₦1.014 trillion respectively (CBN, 2011 and Federal Government Budgets, 2006 - 2014).

The threat to Nigeria’s internal security is real, as the international community has declared Nigeria a failing state in several circles as well as in policy papers at different security conference communiqués. For instance, the Fund for Peace (FFP) in its 2012 report ranked Nigeria as one of the top 10 failed states in Africa and 14th in the world because of growing wave of insecurity and endemic violence (Tella, 2012). The evidence from Figure 11 reveals that for more than four (4) decades, the total defence expenditures were greater than internal security expenditure since 1961-2003. This is as a result of the fact that internal insecurity is not more pronounced during the period than now that there has been the participation of Nigeria in peace keepings in different countries like Liberia, Somalia etc. However, in recent time the data from Figure 11 reveals that internal security expenditure constitutes a large chunk of budgetary allocation for security expenditure which is greater than defence expenditure. Sabitu (2015) reported since 2004, the internal security stood at N95143.3b while defence expenditure stood at N76057.3b, in subsequent years, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, the internal security expenditure and defence expenditure were N114,601.9 billion, N1451.20.0 billion, N206,560.9 billion, N314,800.1billion, N384,452.6 billion, N564,052.1 billion, N618,677.0 billion ,N660,995.0 billion N657,844.1billion, N674,295.5 billion and N111,869.0 billion ,N101,451.9 billion ,N145,926.9 billion ,N191,575.2 billion , N223,021.9 billion ,N264,206.6 billion , N248,037.1 billion , N359,735.5 billion , N348,908.1 billion , N340,332.3 billion respectively. Furthermore, this is as a result of the fact that Nigeria was facing security challenges especially internal insecurity such as ethno-religious crisis, kidnapping, armed-robbery, Niger Delta Militant activities and most recently Boko-Haram and Niger Delta insurgencies.

Boko-Haram insurgencies and Niger-Delta militancy have raised government spending on security in Nigeria which in turn and also affected economic growth negatively. When there is high economic activity, government invest more on security than on the period of low economic activity in Nigeria; therefore, the investment on security sector retard economic growth. Finally, the study concluded that total security expenditure is capable of explaining at least 40% of the fluctuation of economic activities in Nigeria. This report is in-line that economic impact of terrorism as percentage of Nigeria GDP is 4.5% (GPI, 2016).

Source : Sabitu, Abubakar, 2015 ABU, Zaria, Nigeria website: kubanni.abu.edu.ng:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/8743/1/THE%20IMPACT%20OF

Figure 11. Total Internal Security Expenditure in Nigeria (1961-2012)

7.0 Consequences of non-execution of the constitution

Most Nigeria’s 36 States remained unable to develop their internal resources due to constitutional hurdles that limit their powers to explore natural resources (solid and liquid minerals); a pervasive appetite for easy oil rent, as well as poor visionary approaches and a literal term-based mind set to governance. Apart from Lagos State, which generates over 65% of its revenue from internally-generated taxes, other States depend on the Federal government in varying degrees. At the sub - national level, poor accountability exists, complemented by a glaring absence of coherent data with which to assess, monitor and project the fiscal direction and eventual viability of Nigeria’s States. There is a need urgently for fiscal res-structuring of Nigeria with a population of 200 million States have not helped matters by becoming, and remaining bulwarks of fledgling characterised by large bureaucracies, bloated workforces, investments in unsustainable projects and a widespread appetite for highly-priced debts. These debilitating problems will only be resolved when States are incentivized towards internal fiscal restructuring; the continuous push to receive funds from the Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) is not sustainable.

http://dx.doi.org/10.29322/IJSRP.8.11.2018.p8388
States must be both assisted and coerced, as much as is legally possible, towards the path to viability through peculiar structural adjustment that reduces duplication of functions, enhancing public sector efficiency, transparency and accountability (Country Reports on Terrorism, 2016).

The current fiscal structure of Nigeria, where revenue-sharing formulas and waivers can be likened to hand-outs, will remain a boon for corrupt individuals seeking to live off politics, unless the status quo changes. Nigeria should emulate this, placing eight million hectares of land into the revenue mix, to reap significant income from the same global Oil Palm industry it once dominated pre-Independence (BudgIT, 2017).

Nigeria’s future as a viable nation-State will depend on efficient financial systems and optimal manufacturing base complemented by vibrant power supply and world-class infrastructure. Trade, monetary and fiscal policies will have to be deliberately fashioned to achieve truly inclusive socio-economic growth, which has eluded Nigeria for far too long. Only a purposeful stop to decades of Nigeria’s rigmarole in this maze of oil booms, oil price busts, recessions and loan mongering can stop the on-going mortgage of the future of generations unborn.

8.0 Nigeria Security Management

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security

The Nigerian government’s criminal justice institutions were not significantly strengthened in 2016, although several donor countries, including the United Kingdom, continued to work closely with the Ministry of Justice to assist in prioritizing how to investigate and prosecute suspected terrorism cases. While the Nigerian military had primary responsibility for combating terrorism in the northeast, several government agencies performed counterterrorism functions, including the Department of State Security (DSS), the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), and the Ministry of Justice. Counterterrorism activities of these agencies and ministry were ostensibly coordinated by the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) . The level of interagency cooperation and information sharing was limited and at times hindered overall effectiveness. The Nigerian government participated in U.S. counterterrorism capacity-building programs under the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, including the training of NPF members in explosive ordnance disposal, explosive incident countermeasures, and preventing attacks on soft targets. The NPF also stood up the Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response, which is a specialized selection and training program for local police dedicated to the security of the U.S. Embassy and other diplomatic missions throughout Abuja (Country Reports on Terrorism, 2016). The Nigerian government worked with the FBI to investigate specific terrorism matters, predominantly through the DSS, and provided improvised explosive device components to the FBI for analysis at the Terrorist Device Analysis Centre. ONSA, DSS, Nigerian Army, Nigerian Emergency Management Agency, and NPF explosive ordnance and post blast personnel worked with FBI special agents and special agent bomb-technicians in-country. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and NPF also received crime scene training relevant to counterterrorism investigations.

The role of Nigeria government

To overcome insecurity, there is need for intelligence gathering and surveillance so that law enforcement agents could become proactive and reasonably predict potential crime with near accuracy rather than being reactive. According to Achumba et al (2013), the menace of insecurity calls for a new approach founded on creditable intelligence gathering. There is the need to modernize the security agencies through capacity building in advanced training, intelligence sharing, advanced technology, logistics, motivation and change of orientation (Figure 12). This will enhance the operational capabilities of the security agencies by identifying avenues that would enable them respond appropriately to internal security challenges and other threats. There should equally be complete overhaul of the security institutions in Nigeria to reflect international standards of best practices in order to pre-empt security breaches. There is need to reorder priorities and seek better understanding of the underlying causes and dynamic of the insecurity in the country, with the aim to provide effective conflict prevention and management strategies. According to Akpabibibo (2003), the formulation and effective implementation of policies and programmes to address the root causes of insecurity in Nigeria particularly with regards to poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, injustice, corruption, porous borders and small arms proliferation have become crucial. In Nigeria, the law has ceased to act as a deterrent since corruption and insecurity have largely been compromised.

39 Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Constitution
Azazi (2011), in order to check the crime rate in Nigeria, the federal government has embarked on criminalization of terrorism by passing the anti-terrorism Act in 2011, installation of computer-based Closed Circuit Television cameras (CCTV) in some parts of the country, enhancement of surveillance as well as investigation of criminal related offences, heightening of physical security measures around the country aimed at determining or disrupting potential attacks, strengthening of security agencies through the provision of security facilities and the development and broadcast of security tips in mass media.

**Why Positive Peace Is Transformational**

Humanity is now facing challenges unparalleled in its history. The most urgent of these, such as climate change, decreasing biodiversity, increasing migration and over-population, are global in nature. These issues call for international cooperation on an unprecedented scale. Furthermore, the sources of these challenges are multidimensional, increasingly complex and span national borders. For these reasons, finding solutions requires fundamentally new thinking. Peace is an essential prerequisite in working to resolve these challenges. Without peace, it will not be possible to achieve the levels of trust, cooperation or inclusiveness necessary to solve these challenges, let alone empower the international institutions and organisations required to help address them. Without an understanding of the factors that support peace, it is impossible to determine the policies that work, the programmes that need to be implemented, and when, how, and where to introduce them. Practically identifying what resources are required is complex and calls for a shift towards new ways of thinking about peace. Positive Peace provides a framework to understand and then address the multiple and complex challenges the world faces. Positive Peace is transformational in that it is a cross-cutting facilitator for improving progress, making it easier for businesses to sell, entrepreneurs and scientists to innovate, individuals to produce, and governments to effectively regulate. In addition to the absence of violence, Positive Peace is also associated with many other social characteristics that are considered desirable, including better economic outcomes, measures of wellbeing, levels of gender equality and environmental performance. In this way, Positive Peace can be thought of as creating an optimal environment in which human potential can flourish (Figure 14). Understanding what creates sustainable peace cannot be found in the study of violence alone. A parallel can be drawn with medical science. The study of pathology has led to numerous breakthroughs in our understanding of how to treat and cure disease.

However, it was only when medical science turned its focus to the study of healthy human beings that we understood what we needed to do to stay healthy: the correct physical exercise, a good mental disposition and a balanced diet, are some examples. This could only be learned by studying what was working. In the same way, the study of conflict is different than the study of peace. Seen in this light, Positive Peace can be used as an overarching framework for understanding and achieving progress not only in levels of global peacefulness, but in the many other interrelated areas, such as those of economic and social advancement (Figure 14). The factors of Positive Peace are highly interconnected and interact in varied and complex ways. These pillars interact with and affect society’s attitudes, institutions and structures. High levels of Positive Peace occur where attitudes make violence less tolerated, institutions are more responsive to society’s needs and structures underpin the nonviolent resolution of grievances. Countries with high levels of Positive Peace (GPI, 2016) , for example, suffer fewer effects from natural disasters, including 13 times fewer fatalities compared to low Positive Peace countries. Furthermore, Positive Peace levels relate to a country’s reaction to different systemic shocks. Trends in the GPI also show that high Positive Peace is a significant determinant of long term improvements in peace.
9.0 Dialectic of Economy and Security Vulnerabilities in Nigeria

Nigeria is now the largest economy in Africa, having recently surpassed South Africa. Despite recent improvements in the non-oil sector, driven by agriculture and trade and services, the economy continues to be dominated by the petroleum industry, which provided 96 percent of export earnings in 2013 as well as 60 percent of fiscal revenue. Nigeria is the fifth-largest OPEC producer and a major exporter of oil to Western states, including the United States. It has also experienced higher-than-average economic growth (compared to both West Africa and sub-Saharan Africa as a whole) in recent years, with estimated growth of 7.4 percent in 2013 and 6.5 percent in 2012. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with an estimated 2012 population of 166.6 million. Nigeria continues to have a high fertility rate, and a significant “youth bulge” with nearly 71 percent of the population under the age of 30 and over 40 percent under the age of 14. Religion in Nigeria is, in general, affiliative rather than ascriptive. That is, individuals largely choose the practice of a particular religious faith. However, ethnic divisions tend to coincide somewhat with religious divisions.

Muslims, who make up an estimated 50 percent of the population, are concentrated in northern zones, while Christians, with an estimated 40 percent of the population, are concentrated in the south. The approximate 10 percent of the population that practices traditional, animistic religions, is also concentrated in the south. Nigeria fell under British colonial rule in the late 19th century, with formal establishment of a British colony on Nigerian territory in 1900, under Sir Frederick Lugard as the first High
Commissioner of Northern Nigeria. While Southern and Northern Nigeria were initially governed as separate entities due to cultural differences, the British unified their governance in 1914 for economic reasons.

Security Vulnerabilities

From 1998 through 2008, societal violence was concentrated in the South-South and the Middle Belt states. Since 2009, social violence has shifted to the Northeast. In the Niger Delta, ethnic militias most recently as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) – have engaged in violence regarding the exploitation of oil resources.

Security Legal Framework

Early Nigerian laws regarding terrorism were based on Part II Section 11 of the 1999 Nigerian constitution, which stipulates that the National Assembly is responsible for public safety and order and can make laws to ensure their maintenance and security. In 2011, the National Assembly promulgated the Terrorism (Prevention) Act (TPA), which more specifically defined acts of terrorism while also providing a framework for the investigation, prosecution, and interdiction of suspects in terrorism cases. The TPA was amended several times in 2013, largely to address concerns expressed by international and domestic actors regarding human rights abused by Nigerian security forces, as well as to continue to pressure Boko Haram through legal action.
Significant aspects of these amendments include the following:

i. Delineating the boundary between terrorism and conspiracy;
   Specifying functions and responsibilities of agencies with responsibilities in counter-terrorism arena;

ii. Expanding the role of the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) as the main coordinator for all counter-terrorism enforcement activity; and

iii. Charging the Attorney General to provide oversight ensuring that all counter-terrorism activities conform to international law.60

Additionally, the death penalty was added as a legal punishment for terrorism convictions, and security forces were provided the right to confiscate vehicles, as well as to enter and bar people from their homes without a warrant.61 Despite changes, human rights watchdogs continue to express concerns regarding the TPA, especially section 9, 12, 26, and 28.62

Security Responses
In June 2009, under orders to eliminate Boko Haram, the Nigerian military destroyed multiple Boko Haram positions in and around Maiduguri with infantry and artillery, captured Mohammad Yusuf; and after a brief interrogation released him to the Nigerian police. The police subsequently executed him, his father-in-law, and Buji Foi, then State Commissioner of Religious Affairs who was funding Boko Haram.63 A video tape of these executions were reportedly released to YouTube.64 In 2011, the Nigerian military sent some 3,600 troops along with some Chadian and Nigerian troops to patrol north-east towns and prevent Boko Haram smuggling, but this failed as there were too few troops to adequately guard the large border region.65 In 2013, an additional 2,000 troops and air support were moved to the north to support the offensive. In 2014, another 3,000 troops were deployed as part of a joint task force of international military cooperation between Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon.66

Security Evaluation
Military build-up in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa since May 2013 has had uncertain results, dislodging Boko Haram from some positions but failing to address their strength in inhospitable and large regions that include porous borders with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.67 Reportedly, Nigerian security forces have been infiltrated by Boko Haram, particularly in the north, and accusations of corruption and collusion between it and state forces are rampant among local citizens.68

60  “Nigerian senate passes new anti-terrorism act with death penalty for offenders.” Nigerian Watch, February 21, 2013
64 Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency.” International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 216, April 3,
Intelligence practices suffer from inter-agency competition and mistrust, as well as under reporting, poor information sharing, and bad recruitment policies. In early 2014, Jonathan fired all of his military chiefs of staffs to replace them with new leadership. Although it was never clearly stated, this move was likely due to the poor handling of combating Boko Haram in the past, particularly the inability of the military branches to cooperate and work together effectively (or simply a political move to shore up support for the 2015 elections). Despite changes in leadership and changes in the configuration of military forces deployed, Boko Haram continued to launch successful attacks, including gaining control of towns and villages in 2014. Most informants in Nigeria critiqued the government’s over-reliance on military and security responses. In particular, many informants identified the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf as a key trigger to Boko Haram’s embrace of violence. Other common critiques included:

i. Prevalence of human rights abuses, high levels of corruption within the military, and police are not violating rights. The more some violate rights, the more we create space for young people to become militant.

ii. The state is the enemy of communities in the northeast. The military is killing out of frustration, in response to killing of soldiers. This has never worked;

iii. “The military understands and perception of locals makes them attack communities indiscriminately.”

iv. “The high-handedness of the counter-insurgency campaign has fuelled grievances against the state.

v. “They [Boko Haram] have supporters among the people that are supposed to fight them, that is, the military and other security forces. And that is the biggest problem.”

Comments regarding the military’s approach to communities and human rights included:

i. “The army understands and perception of locals makes them attack communities indiscriminately.”

ii. “The state is the enemy of communities in the northeast.”

iii. “The military is killing out of frustration, in response to killing of soldiers. This has never worked;

iv. “I think we need to continue with the military effort, but that is not the ultimate solution. We need to ensure that military and police are not violating rights. The more some violate rights, the more we create space for young people to become militant.”

v. “You do not use bullets or deaths to intimidate terrorists because they have already embraced death. So the repressive strategy is wrong.”

vi. “They [the military] should also put their house in order as there are elements within the groups that compromise them through giving out of intelligence to the insurgents.”

vii. “They [Boko Haram] have supporters among the people that are supposed to fight them, that is, the military and other security forces. And that is the biggest problem.”


72 Civil society representative engaged in democracy and development. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adeléhin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 14, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria


74 Civil society representative engaged in development and conflict resolution. Interviewed by Kop’ep Dabugat. August 19, 2014. Kano, Nigeria


76 Civil society representative and researcher. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adeléhin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 14, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
Representative comments regarding the lack of equipment included:

i. "The firepower of Boko Haram seems to be overwhelming the federal government."  
ii. "It has been a long time since the government has been budgeting for the upgrading of ammunitions for the Nigerian Army, so how can there be complaints that the army does not have weapons to engage the insurgents?"  
iii. "[W] hen the average soldier in the battle front is saying he doesn’t even have ammunition to fight, that means there is a problem and we have been having billions of naira been given for security. What is happening to this money?"

**Counter-radicalization and De-radicalization**

Under the leadership of Dasuki, the ONSA has taken the lead in developing counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programming in Nigeria. The 2014 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program headquartered in Abuja has a national coordinator, state coordinators, and local coordinators. It seeks to counter Boko Haram by implementing multiple government-sponsored initiatives that address terrorist motivations, grievances, and behaviours on the local, state and federal levels. The ONSA’s CVE program also has developed and is implementing a de-radicalization program for prisoners. Finally, some aspects of the CVE program focus on improving governance in affected areas. One program seeks to work with law enforcement to create new means of community policing and citizen/law-enforcement cooperation. Another endeavour is to improve engagement with communities and government-local interactions.

"The NSA policy of de-radicalization is sound. It took two years to develop, but isn’t yet implemented. That is the only policy that has been well-conceived." The soft approach is “dealing with root causes/driver of the entire issue: what turns youth to violence extremism; what causes radicalization; how to deal with recruitment base.

It is intelligence and research driven. Lots of research has been commissioned to understand what the issues are and properly apply solutions. Some of that work NSRP [Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme] is working on with ONSA. A key aspect deals with de-radicalization - ONSA has commissioned quite a number of studies. Also, there is a unit that deals with strategic communication and Boko Haram have stolen the narrative. There was no counter-radivative, much less positive messaging. They’re [ONSA] working with religious clerics so you can deal with that aspect of Boko Haram, because wrong interpretation of religion has been core of the recruitment base. The Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE) incorporates the Victims Support Fund. Launched in 2014, the fund provides economic assistance to families who have lost members to Boko Haram attacks. After an 18-month development process, the ONSA is also starting to implement programming to provide psychosocial support for victims of violence, focusing on the diagnosis and treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

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78 Government actor engaged in conflict management. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola - Adelehi n. August 18, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria


82 Civil society representative engaged in human rights and development. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola - Adelehin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 15, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria


84 The office has established an institute on PTSD, which serves as the umbrella for the three-tier program. The institute is now included in the Nigerian mental health program, meaning providers are required to have training in PTSD. The office is involved in training frontline health workers in every Nigerian state, as well as developing a referral system. A PTSD clinic was set up in Kano in 2014, one of several planned. The ONSA is also establishing centres of excellence in six geopolitical zones.
monitored. The British government’s chief scientist, Sir David King, suggested that ‘climate change is a far greater threat to the world’s stability than international terrorism’. Margaret Beckett, the British Foreign Secretary between May 2006 and June 2007, consciously made ‘climate security’ a central plank of British foreign policy during her short stint at the Foreign Office. A group of eleven high-ranking, retired American admirals and generals released a report in April 2007 arguing that climate change will act as a ‘threat multiplier’ that makes existing concerns, such as water scarcity and food insecurity, more complex and intractable and presents a tangible threat to American national security interests. A couple of months later, Kaire Mbuende, the Namibian representative to the United Nations, called the developed countries’ emissions of greenhouses tantamount to ‘low intensity biological or chemical warfare’. In its 2007 assessment, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stated that ‘Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability, a situation aggravated by the interaction of “multiple stresses”, occurring at various levels, and low adaptive capacity’. The expected manifestations of climate change will have a range of consequences for social and economic well-being in many parts of Africa.

In the Nigeria scenario, Fulani herdsmen are nomad livestock breeders and in pre-colonial times their place of origin was the Sahel and semi-arid areas of Futa-Jalon Mountains in West Africa. But a result of threat from climatic changes and population growth, made herdsmen to move to the savannah and tropical forest regions of Southern West Africa and far northern Nigeria. There migration into far Northern Nigeria dates back to the 13th and 14th centuries. Some State Governments made specific policies which include intergroup committees and or after due process of law making in a democratic society, presented open grazing prohibition and establishment of ranches laws to guide behaviours and the resolution of future conflicts that may arise between farmers and herdsmen in their respective States. Yet pocket of threats to life and property continued in some parts of the country to ensure the laws are not enforced and “cattle colonies” were established instead. The call for a State and Local Government Police should by synergize to make it work after fine-tuning areas of fear and abuse of the policy.

10.0 Conclusions

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and largest economy. Nigeria continues to have a high fertility rate with a population of 195 million. In Nigeria, the law has ceased to act as a deterrent since corruption and insecurity have largely been compromised. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 framework for security matters with the integral function of the military and national security agencies are:

i. Part II (Section 14 (2) (b) ; Section 20; Section 16 (1) (a) Sections 11,18,19 and 20;
ii. Chapter VI B Sections 153, 154 and Part III Supplemental C Sections 217, 218,219 and 220;

In Nigeria, the constitution unequivocally spelt out as a fundamental objective and directive principle of state policies (i, ii and iii above). Nigeria does not rely on itself for military protection. This is because Nigeria does not produce arms and ammunition, and depends on other countries for that. Nigeria has high probability of damage to their acquired values; therefore, Nigeria is not secured and there is an urgent need to establish Nigeria industrial complex for security re-enforcement of our infrastructure for sustain in internal conflicts and regional obligation of the UN Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter “provides the constitutional basis for the involvement of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security for which the Security Council is primarily responsible”. Further, since it is not every environmental issue that will qualify to be identified as threatening to national security, there is a need to identify the parameters that will be used to set clear measurable threshold beyond which an environmental problem will constitute a threat to national security and warrant intervention. Environmental degradation without doubt is an underlying cause of many human population stressors, conflicts and regional instability. The regional conflicts databases are premised to qualifies environmental security as a major re-definition of our national security strategy. “The environmental problems of the poor will affect the rich as well in the not too distant future, transmitted through political instability and turmoil”. The menace of insecurity calls for a new approach.
founded on creditable intelligence gathering. There is the need to modernize the security agencies through capacity building in advanced training, intelligence sharing, advanced technology, logistics, motivation and change of orientation.

The formulation and effective implementation of policies and programmes to address the root causes of insecurity in Nigeria particularly with regards to poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, injustice, corruption, porous borders and small arms proliferation have become crucial like application of the Pillars of Positive Peace (Figures 13 and 14). Positive Peace can be thought of as creating an optimal environment in which human potential can flourish. Countries with high levels of Positive Peace (GPI, 2016), for example, suffer fewer effects from natural disasters, including 13 times fewer fatalities compared to low Positive Peace countries as related The 2017 Global Terrorism Index, GTI ranks Nigeria 3rd most terrorised country globally (2017).100

Impacts of internal conflicts on Nigeria Economy

The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) released its 2016 annual Gross Domestic Product, (GDP) is N67.9 trillion showing contraction of about negative (-) 1.51% for the year ended December 2016. This is Nigeria’s first negative GDP growth rate since 1991, ending a 25 year run of modest GDP Growth rate. Nigeria’s highest GDP growth rate remains 14.6%, recorded in 2006. This reflects a difficult year for Nigeria, which included weaker inflation induced consumption demand, an increase in pipeline vandalism of oil production was estimated to be 1.833mb/day, compared to 2.13mb/day in 2015 largely been attributed contraction of about negative (-) 1.51% for the year ended December 2016. This is Nigeria’s first negative GDP growth rate since 1991, ending a 25 year run of modest GDP Growth rate. Nigeria’s highest GDP growth rate remains 14.6%, recorded in 2006. This reflects a difficult year for Nigeria, which included weaker inflation induced consumption demand, an increase in pipeline vandalism of oil production was estimated to be 1.833mb/day, compared to 2.13mb/day in 2015 largely been attributed to vandalism in the Niger delta region. This reduced the oil sectors share of real GDP to 8.42% in 2016, compared to 9.61% in 2015.102

Boko Haram and U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance to Nigeria

The U.S. government designated Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 on November 14, 2013. BH commander Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi, and Abubakar Adam Kambar were designated on June 21, 2012, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists under section 1(b) of E.O. 13224. A fact sheet about FTO and E.O. designations can be found Since June 2013, the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program has advertised a reward offer of up to US $7 million for information leading to the location of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau. The group espouses a violent extremist ideology and at times has received some limited assistance, including funds and training, from al Qu’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).102

Climate links to conflict and implication for Africa

The four main climate links to conflict in Africa may emerge. First, reduced water supply and growing demand will, in some places, lead to increasing competition between different sectors of society, different communities and different countries. Under certain conditions, such as poor governance and existing ethnic division, these stresses may turn violent. Second, reductions in crop yields and increasingly unpredictable weather patterns around the world may lead to higher prices for food and greater food insecurity, and increase the stakes for control over productive agricultural land. Third, changes in sea level, increased natural disasters and the reduced viability of agricultural land may cause large-scale and destabilizing population movements. Finally, the cumulative impact of all these challenges on the prevalence of poverty and the ability of governments to provide services to their citizens could be a factor that tips fragile states towards socioeconomic and political collapse. Climate change is, in effect, a ‘threat multiplier’ that makes existing concerns, such as water scarcity and food insecurity, more complex and intractable. However, it is non-climate factors (such as poverty, governance, conflict management, regional diplomacy and so on) that will largely determine whether and how climate change moves from being a development challenge to presenting a security threat (Oli Brown and Alec Crawford, 2009). Africa has the highest proportion of undernourished people, about 35 percent of the total population compared to about 14 percent of the total population of the rest of the developing world. For Africa a further increase in the number of people at risk of hunger is projected, resulting for 2020 in 35 percent of the total number of people at risk of hunger to originate from Africa, and 40 percent in 2030 104.
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