Effectiveness and Challenges in Humanitarian Services through Peace Keeping Missions: An Empirical Study of IGAD in Resolution of Conflict

Mohamed Abukar Hussein[*], **Prof. Kennedy Mutundu** [**]

[*]Department of Languages and Humanities, Mount Kenya University – Nairobi
[**]Department of Social and Development Studies, Mount Kenya University – Nairobi

Abstract- Government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, and since then, several actors were engaged in providing humanitarian support, re-storing peace and stability and providing platforms for negotiation. After IGADD was transformed to IGAD in 1996, its member states solidly joined their efforts to reduce threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability. Therefore, the study focused on answering two research questions including what effect have IGADs' use of peacekeeping missions had in the resolution of conflict in Somalia? and what are the achievements and challenges associated with provision of negotiation platforms for conflicting community in Somalia? The study was based on functionalism theory, with both quantitative and qualitative research methodology. Using questionnaires, key informant interviews and focus group discussions, the target population of the study was 670 individuals where 200 were randomly sampled for the administration of the questions. The study findings showed that peacekeeping process can be expedited effectively while all the donors can unite their efforts in re-structuring and strengthening Somalia National Armed forces. Moreover, political affiliation, member states conflict of interest, financial incapability of IGAD and limited capacity for Somalia's political stakeholders are the main challenges.

Index Terms- Humanitarian Services, Peace Keeping, IGAD, Conflict resolution

I. INTRODUCTION

Government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, and since then, several actors were engaged in providing humanitarian support, re-storing peace and stability and providing platforms for negotiation. After IGADD was transformed to IGAD in 1996, its member states solidly joined their efforts to reduce threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability by establishing necessary mechanisms for consultation and co-operation in order to solve disputes and differences among member states. Therefore, three key areas of interest were identified: Humanitarian affairs and management, food security and development of infrastructure, environment, and prevention of conflicts. Additionally, the Somalia conflicts introduced a new topic and series of discussions to give IGAD the role to facilitate conflict prevention and peace initiatives in Somalia and other horn of Africa.

IGAD was involved in the condition therein due to failure of regional initiatives put by AU. Before mission of Africa in Somalia (AMISOM), several harmony conferences took place to come up with the best platform to make the different Somali faction and clan elders able to negotiate on sharing of power and government restoration. Almost three decades down the line, complete peace and stability has not been attained yet. To answer this question, several studies have been undertaken in the past surrounding the conflict in Somalia among them are: the role of regional and international organizations in resolving Somali conflict: the case of IGAD by K. Mulugeta. This study mostly emphasized on the role of IGAD in establishing TFG and did not elaborate on other roles. The role of regional organizations in peacekeeping in Africa; a case of IGAD in Somalia by Braza is another study conducted in this field which mostly focused on peacemaking process and barely touch on other roles of IGAD and finally conflict resolution in Somalia; learning from failed mediation processes by LM Makhubela is another study that focused on understanding the success and failure of previous peace process particularly the 2000 Arta process and 2004 Mbagathi process. All these studies have emphasized on one aspect or one role of IGAD without bringing in other roles that may result positive or negative implications of the researched topic. This has necessitated the need for this research to investigate the role of IGAD in Somalia Conflict by looking at three aspects; its humanitarian role, effectiveness of its peacekeeping missions and explore achievements and challenges in providing negotiation platforms.The study analyzed the role of the intergovernmental authority on development (IGAD) in the conflicts of Somalia.

Therefore, the study focused on answering two research questions including; What effect have IGADs' use of peacekeeping missions had in the resolution of conflict in Somalia? and what are the achievements and challenges associated with provision of negotiation platforms for conflicting community in Somalia? The outcome of the research may be useful to other researchers, government of Somalia, IGAD and other entities including regional and international organizations involved in conflict management.

II. LITERATURE

Most conflicted areas are susceptible to humanitarian crisis, and these has led to explosion of the condition and worsening the situation. Due to the deteriorating security situation in the region, the leaders of IGAD member states issued a communiqué on 31st January 2005 meeting in Abuja, Nigeria. The main agenda of this meeting was the plan to deploy a Peace Support Mission to Somalia. According to the communiqué, the Mission would "provide security support to the TFG and guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace process and assist with the reestablishment of peace and security including training of the police and the army" (IGAD communiqué). This decision from the summit was supported by the Fourth Ordinary Session of the African Union and authorized by the 24th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU that was held on 7th February, 2005.
In order to implement these decisions, the AU/ IGAD sent a Fact-Finding Mission on 14th February 2005 to determine among others the mandate, force, size, structure, and tasks of the peace support mission. IGASOM was intended to deploy up to 10,000 peacekeepers to Somalia starting from April 2005 with expected cost of around US$413 million per annum (Mays 2005; and see News from Africa 2005).

The deployment plan was adopted at the 24th IGAD Council of Ministers on 18th March, 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya and in the same meeting it was decided that only Sudan and Uganda would make the initial deployment of troops while the rest would provide logistical support and training of the Somali armed forces. The Council also decided to amend the constitution of IGAD to allow the deployment of IGASOM (IGAD Council of Ministers communiqué 2005). The UNSC had shown its support by authorizing 8,000 IGASOM troops to be deployed for six months, without including the frontline states. Furthermore, the UNSC decided to this a special and not to apply the arms embargo on Somalia for IGASOM, under resolution 1725 (2006).

However, the IGASOM was not deployed due to contrasting and conflicting minds between member states. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda stood by the idea while Djibouti, Eritrea, and Sudan showed strong reservations. Moreover, its deployment was also opposed by some opposing factions and the UIC in Somalia. Most importantly, the proposal lost financial support from the then leading powerful nations including the US (Bryden 2006). The US and its allies were reluctant to finance this idea while the front-line states were involved and instead opted to provide assistance to some warlords to hunt a handful of alleged terrorists. So, the deployment of IGASOM lacked financial and logistical support (Bryden).

When the deployment of IGASOM was delayed, Ethiopian government took an initiative of solely deploying its troops to help the TFG settle in Jowhar and then in Baidoa in 2005. To show support and solidarity to the newly formed government of Somalia, IGAD ministers organized their 26th meeting in Jowhar on 29th November 2005 (IGAD Council of Ministers 2005). The council urged the TFG to engage in dialogue but at the same time warned those who deliberately obstruct the peace building process that they will take action against them including referring to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

With the intensification of the insurgency, IGAD showed its support for the TFG as a legitimate government in Somalia that needed to be assisted by the international community. Thus, it pushed for the deployment of the African Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia. This is mission of peacekeeping carried out by IGAD with help of AU and approval by UN under Resolution 1744. In September 2006, African Union approved to send mission of keeping peace to Somalia and in February 2007 AMISOM was deployed for six months. By then they had the authoritative command to give support to the then TFIs in their endeavor to stabilizing the situation of Somalia as well as enhance process of reconciliation as well as dialogue. They were also mandated to make available the humanitarian assistance provision, bring out conditions that are co conducive for stabilization that is long term, constructing again as well as growth in Somalia. The soldiers deployed were 5250 representing 2700 from Uganda and 2550 from Burundi till 2010 when the neighboring countries like Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya joined the mission to reinforce existing forces on the ground.

John Mcdonald, former US diplomat was among the earliest people to have provided forums for conflicting communities with underlying theoretical and analytical structure. He believed that the strength of unofficial diplomacy has the ability to communicate the main conflict causes. In the forums they are able to discuss the underlying human needs that fuel antagonism and can find solution to it. He also stated that face-to-face communication helps participants stop the dehumanization process, focus relationship building, overcome psychological barriers and see the conflict as a shared problem which can be resolved collaboratively. It is perceived that IGAD are in a better position to facilitate peace processes, since, it often deals with local communication. They are in good condition to do human right monitoring and do early warning in the case where human rights are violated. They also help in establishing a well-knit local facility across the society levels that empower the infrastructure for reconciliation's sake.

IGAD's active involvement in Somalia peace building processes and negotiation plat forms started in 1998. IGAD was disillusioned with the lack of development in peace and reconciliation in Somalia which was attributed to the multiplicity of warring factions and warlords not interested in peace and the fact that warlords benefit from the multiple peace initiatives' (Francis, 2005: 230). As a result, 'IGAD convene a summit in March 1998 and called for an end to 'the proliferation of competing initiatives' (a reference to Egypt's activities) that served to undermine the peace process in Somalia' (Healy, 2009: 9). However, the call did not materialize due to the outbreak of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998 which hugely affected the conflict situation in Somalia. Eritrea was found to be arming the Aided faction while Ethiopia stepped up assistance to its own allies in Somalia. The Ethiopia-Eritrea war thus resulted to worsening conflict within Somalia, as the two sides sought out proxy partners' (ibid.). The mediation initiatives led by IGAD produced the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia in 2004 (Francis, 2005: 231).

A major challenge for IGAD in peace making is how to achieve and maintain balance, avoid siding with one party in a conflict, dealing with intolerance, conflict of interest from within IGAD member states, commotion and intense emotions of people engaged in conflict. McDonald (1996) pointed out unethical issues that intervene in conflict including distinctive moral concerns about power, ethnocentricity and personal agendas of mediators.

Economically IGAD members are poor nations that are not financially capable of facilitation negotiation platforms for conflicting member states on their own. Therefore, there is need to depend on financial support from outside IGAD either AU, UN or EU. So, this has handicapped their ability to achieve the maximum target from these negotiations.

Development of effective mechanism to mitigate conflict in Somali should in the first place find a way to understand the main reason of conflict. (Richmond 2001). Enactment of Security Council generally is an approach of conflict management and resolution through consultative meeting. Boulder (2003) explains the failure of UN in Somali and Liberia forging a way out through in Djibouti for peace in 2000. Initially, action was authorized through the United Nation Security Council which was not consultative and yielded dismally, but later through Agenda for peace forum, there have been substantial results since it is participatory through regional organization to support UN harmony efforts by diplomacy that is preventive to after conflict harmony building. From 1992 when nation of Somali fell apart, there were conflict resolution efforts that were about fifteen arranged by organizations regionally and internationally and other nation's allies.

Among the achievements of IGAD in the negotiation platform was the facilitation of the following conferences that are supported by states regionally and the international community: Conference of Djibouti in 1991; Conference of Addis Ababa in 1993; Conference of Cairo in 1997; Conference at Djibouti in 2000; Eldoret procedure in 2002, which brought about the initial Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004; and Djibouti procedure of peace in 2008, that resulted the TFG II establishment by putting together the TFG I with ARS-D (union for Re-liberation of Somalia-Djibouti) (ICG 2004; and see Dagne 2009, 19).

In every conference there was a development that opened a new page and raise hope for the people of Somalia. It went on and several other forums were held in Mogadishu Somalia's Capital city which resulted the first internationally recognized federal state which with the help of international community took the responsibility of establishing federal states and now there are five federal states that are well established in Somalia that forms the federal government.

III.   MATERIALS AND METHODS

The study was based on functionalism theory, which states global peace can be attained via cooperation that is functional by the international organizations work (like IGAD) and other actors. This study applied both quantitative and qualitative research methodology and used both secondary information gathered from existing literature and primary information from the field using questionnaires, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. The target population of the study was 670 individuals representing government of Somalia, representative from IGAD office in Mogadishu, other diplomats particularly embassy staff from IGAD member states, civil societies and the public. Out of this, 200 hundred individuals were randomly sampled for the administration of the questions. A total of 130 questionnaires, 6 focus group discussions and 40 interviews were administered throughout the four administrative cities in the

southern Somalia. Out of the 200 individuals sampled, 181 responded and participated in the research.

The respondents represent 90.5% of the sample which the researcher deemed adequate and sufficient for purpose of data analysis. The majority (76%) of respondents were male while 24% were female. Only 10% of the respondents were in the bracket 21-30 years of age with 35% of respondents being between 31-40 years while 30% were 41-50 and the remaining 25% were above 51 years. The middle 2 brackets 31-50 combined contributed the largest percentage 65%. Only 15% of the respondents were untrained (acquired only secondary education). About 28% of the respondents had diploma, 36% were university graduate which is the highest percentage of the respondents while 21% of the respondents attained post graduate level of education.

The data collected were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) and the result tabulated, presented in graphs and percentage charts. Qualitative data were analyzed using descriptive summary report citing the proportion of respondents alongside their responses.

IV.   RESULTS

The Effectiveness of IGAD's Peace Keeping Missions

The findings on the measure of the effectiveness of the IGAD's peace keeping missions is presented using Table 1.

Table 1 The Effectiveness of IGAD's Peace Keeping Missions

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Very effective	29	16
Effective	50	28
Less effective	69	38
Not effective	33	18
Total	181	100

The table shows that 16% of the respondents said the peace keeping missions are very effective, 28% said it is effective, 38% said it is less effective while 18% marked it as not effective.
On the other hand, the FGD results are presented using table 2.

Table 2 The Effectiveness of IGAD's Peacekeeping Missions-FGD Result.

Focus group number	Member 1	Member 2	Member 3	Member 4	Member 5
1	NE	VE*	VE	LE*	LE
2	E*	E*	E	VE	NE*
3	LE	LE*	LE	E	LE
4	NE*	E	E	LE	LE*
5	E	NE	NE*	E	E
6	VE*	E	E	LE*	VE*

The focus group discussions through table 4 shows that 17% of the members said peacekeeping missions are very effective, 37% said are effective, 30% said less effective and 17% not

effective. About 12 members of the FGD groups explained their argument. The variations in these is presented in Table 2.

Table 3 Whether the Somali Conflict Can be Managed Better Without the Involvement of Peacekeeping Missions

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	51	28
No	130	72
Total	181	100

The researcher also asked the respondents whether this conflict can be managed better without the involvement of IGAD. About 72% of the respondents said no while 28% said yes as shown in table 3 above.


Figure 1 whether the conflict can be managed better without peace keeping missions

Figure 1 above on whether the conflict can be managed without the peace keeping missions, 67% of FGD members said no while 33% said yes. A bout 13 members have given significant explanation and is captured in the summary part.

Challenges and achievements of IGAD in providing negotiation platforms for conflicting community in Somalia

The questionnaire participants were asked their feelings on the extent of the influence of political affiliation on the negotiation platforms. The results are presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2 The influence of political affiliation on the negotiation platforms

The figure presents the challenges and achievements of IGAD in providing negotiation platforms. The findings show the influence of political affiliation to the negotiation platforms. As indicated above, 28% of the respondents said political affiliation has very large extent, 39% said large extent, 25% moderate extent while 8% said little extent.

Using FGDs, the study investigated the same item (influence of politics affiliations on negotiation platforms). The findings are presented using Table 4.

Table 4 The Influence of Political Affiliation-FGD Result

Focus group number	Member 1	Member 2	Member 3	Member 4	Member 5
1	VLE	LE*	ME	lE*	LE
2	ME *	VLE	ME	VLE	lE
3	LE	LE*	LE	LE	LE
4	ME*	LE	lE	LE	LE*
5	LE	ME	VLE	ME	VLE
6	VLE*	ME	lE	LE*	VLE*

Key: VLE-Very large extent, LE-Large extent, ME-Moderate extent & lE- little extent.

The FGD result of the influence of political affiliation on the negotiation platforms indicated that 23% of the FGD members mentioned political affiliation has very large impact on the negotiation platforms, 40% of the members said it has large extent, another 23% said moderate extent while 14% said little extent.

The stuyd also investigated on the level of effectiveness of negotiation platforms in conflict resolution. The results are presented using Table 5.

Table 5 The Effectiveness of Negotiation Platforms

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Very effective	45	25
Effective	72	40
Less effective	46	25
Not effective	18	10
Total	181	100

The table shows that 25% of the respondents mentioned its very effective, 40% effective, 25% less effective and 10% not effective.

The FGD results were also analysed and presented using table 6.

Table 6 The Effectiveness of Negotiation Platforms-FGD Result

Focus group number	Member 1	Member 2	Member 3	Member 4	Member 5
1	VE	NE*	LE	LE*	E
2	E*	E*	VE	VE	NE*
3	E	LE*	LE	E	LE
4	LE*	E	VE	LE	LE*
5	E	NE	NE*	E	LE
6	VE*	E	NE	E*	VE*

The FGD groups discussed the effectiveness of negotiation platforms and the result as illustrated above showed 20% of all the members in the FGD groups mentioned its very effective, 33% argued its effective while 30% said its less effective and 17% said not effective. As illustrated in the table 6 above denoted by star, 12 of the members gave significant explanation to support their arguments.

Key informant interview:

The researcher conducted 40 key informant interviews in the process and the result was similar to that of the other two research tools (FGD & Questionnaires). For instance, when asked about the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, 40% of the KIs said the mission is effective and 75% said the conflict cannot be managed without these peacekeeping missions but there is need to improve the mission. 23 individuals representing 58% said negotiation platforms spearheaded by IGAD are effective and this can be improved if the political affiliation which hugely impacted (70%) the negotiation platforms are wisely managed

V. DISCUSSIONS

The effectiveness of IGAD's peacekeeping mission

Lessons learnt from the lack armed forces to defend the TNG from the warlords and opposing factions which ultimately resulted its failure and the then existing threats, has necessitated the need to have peacekeeping missions to protect the TFG. This has resulted IGAD head of states to issue a communiqué on 31st January 2005 meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on their plan to deploy a Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGAD communiqué 2005) and later in 2005, the IGAD Foreign Ministry who came together in Nairobi confirmed the plan of deployment for IGASOM (IGAD Council of Ministers 2005) (Healy, 2005). However, the idea faced a lot of challenges before its implemented delaying the deployment of IGASOM troops. Due to this delay, Ethiopia took the initiative of deploying its own troops and helped TFG to settle in Jowhar. Ethiopia stated that, besides the intention of saving TFG, its national interest and security was at risk after the ICU threatened to invade her territory and had to take this step. Hans Morgenthau noted that interventions occur when national interest is at risk (Morgenthau, H. 1950). In September 2006, African Union approved to send mission of keeping peace to Somalia and in February 2007 AMISOM was deployed for six months to give support to the then TFIs in their endeavor to stabilizing the situation of Somalia as well as enhance process of reconciliation and dialogue. However, 14 years down the line, although the situation has improved, the threat still exist and Al-Shabab controls large part of South-central Somalia (Menkhaus 2009). Despite killing several of the Al-Shabaab leaders, did not weaken the strength of the insurgents (Kidist 2009) and Somalia armed forces are weak to defend the federal government from the existing

threats. Consequently, and in line with this point, most of the participants (72%) of this research still believes that Somalia conflict cannot be managed without the involvement of IGAD lead peacekeeping missions. They have particularly mentioned that there is need to protect government bases, liberate new areas and help stabilize the newly liberated areas which Somalia armed forces alone cannot do. However, looking at the number of years AMISOM stayed and the amount of money spent on them, the effectiveness of this mission was questioned. 56% of the participants have said that the mission is either less effective or not effective at all pointing out the following: majority of the peacekeeping missions are from frontline IGAD member states where some have/had bad historic relationship with Somalia, each of IGAD member states has its own agenda behind sending peacekeeping forces, financial incapability of IGAD to run this mission on their own. The later has invited other powerful nations like USA, UK, EU who are interested in the horn of Africa and handicapped the mission to some extent and finally some nations supported the opposition fraction to undermine the mission. These challenges were anticipated for example IGAD Council of Ministers held a meeting in Nairobi on 18th March, 2005 and proposed that Sudan and Uganda make the initial deployment. The rest of IGAD member states to perform logistics support and train Somalia armed forces (Kidist, M. 2009). The UNSC pledged its support by authorizing 8,000 IGASOM force to be deployed for six months, without including the frontline states from contributing troops but this was not materialized. Most significantly, the proposal did not get the required financial support from the leading powers including the US (Bryden 2006). The US was said to be reluctant to see the involvement of frontline states and was at that time providing assistance to some warlords to hunt a handful of alleged terrorists. Thus, IGASOM lacked financial and logistical support (Bryden).

VI. CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF IGAD IN PROVIDING NEGOTIATION PLATFORMS FOR CONFLICTING COMMUNITY

Similar to the peacekeeping mission, negotiation platforms faced challenges like foreign interference, lack of willingness from the warrying fractions, lack of financial support and the impact of conflict of interest among IGAD member states. Political affiliation which is closely associated to the intension of IGAD member states and other non IGAD states to have influence on the administration formed from these negotiation and quest to put their allies in to power had the largest percentage. 67% of the participants said this has large to very large impact on negotiation platforms. In connection to this, IGAD was disillusioned with the lack of development in peace and reconciliation in Somalia which was attributed to the multiplicity of warring factions and warlords not interested in peace and the fact that warlords benefit from the multiple peace initiatives' (Francis, 2005: 230). As a result, 'IGAD convene a summit in March 1998 and called for an end to 'the proliferation of competing initiatives' (a reference to Egypt's activities) that served to undermine the peace process in Somalia' (Healy, 2009: 9). However, the call did not materialize due to the outbreak of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998 which hugely affected the conflict situation in Somalia. Eritrea was found to be arming the Aided faction while Ethiopia stepped

up assistance to its own allies in Somalia. The Ethiopia-Eritrea war thus resulted to worsening conflict within Somalia, as the two sides sought out proxy partners' (ibid.). A major challenge for IGAD in peace making is how to achieve and maintain balance, avoid siding with one party in a conflict, dealing with intolerance, conflict of interest from within IGAD member states, commotion and intense emotions of people engaged in conflict.

Among the achievements of IGAD in the negotiation platform was the facilitation of the following conferences that are supported by states regionally and the international community. This conferences were either facilitated by a member state with the other members backing or IGAD as an organization and they include: Conference of Djibouti in 1991; Conference of Addis Ababa in 1993; Conference of Cairo in 1997; Conference at Djibouti in 2000; Eldoret procedure in 2002, which brought about the initial Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and TFIs in 2004 (Menkhaus, 2009); and Djibouti procedure of peace in 2008, that resulted the TFG II establishment by putting together the TFG I with ARS-D (union for Re-liberation of Somalia-Djibouti) (ICG 2004; and see Dagne 2009, 19). In every conference there was a development that opened a new page and raise hope for the people of Somalia. In connection to this point, Majority of the participants acknowledged these processes as an achievement without which they said Somali could not have come this far.

However, on the other hand close to 40% of the participants have doubted the effectiveness of this negotiation platforms citing conflicting mines of IGAD member states and other involved nations and lack of continuity or interconnection between the processes. This has resulted the outcome of several platforms not to succeed up to date. For example, the TNG formed in Djibouti was formally recognized by IGAD, African Union and United Nations as a legitimate government of Somalia. TNG was strongly opposed by Ethiopian-backed hostile warlords in Mogadishu and beyond, Puntland and Somaliland who had close relationship with Ethiopia did not also welcome the TNG. Ethiopia publicly accepted the Arta initiative, but undermined it covertly through the use of its proxy warlord network simply because it was wholly unsatisfied with the results of the Arta peace process and organized a conference of its own in March 2001 in Ethiopia. Despite commitments of Intergovernmental Authority and Developments, TNG, faced serious problems of legitimateness (ICG, 2008). Without the support of the warlords, regional governments, the U.S., or the UN, the TNG was unable to assert its power throughout the country (Kinfe 2006, 215). The Arta peace process was as a result not successful and violent clan conflict continued in Somalia (IGAD 2002, 59). TFG, the outcome of Eldoret-Mbagathi reconciliation process which was regarded as Ethiopian led process where the western countries had also influence through Ethiopia, similarly faced challenges. They faced opposition from the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) which had emerged and taken control of Mogadishu and the volatility of the security situation inside Somalia, so it was reluctant to move to Somalia at first. The TFG lacked a strong military to march that of the UIC which was supported by Hawiye, a dominant clan in Mogadishu. Delayed deployment of IGASOM due to conflicting interest between IGAD member states with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda supporting the move but Djibouti, Eritrea, and Sudan disowning this agreement and lack of financial support resulted the failure of TFG. The initial TFG lost popularity among the

major clans because its leader heavily engaged in supremacy battles instead of its core objective of peace and security. In general, disagreements between the government and militants caused deteriorated security across the country leading to TFG changes in Djibouti in 2008 at a peace agreement (Medhane, 2009). The situation paved way for a birth of TFG II in a bid to avert humanitarian crisis in Somalia and on 19th August 2008, the UN intervened as third party and requested IGAD to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement that had been signed between old TFG and the Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) (Keck, 2009). Apparently, the UIC members had dominated the ARS. It was a conference of peace that intended to give life to the old TFG primarily.

This was to bring on board to the so called the moderate ARS, and isolate those who were perceived as radical groups. This saw Djibouti play host to yet another peace conference for Somalia on 9th May 2008.There was division within the ARS however, between those allied to Djibouti and those aligned to Asmara. ARS –Asmara as they were referred to reject any move to dialogue with the TFG until the foreign troops on Somalia soil had been withdrawn. TFGII was formed which was the combination of TFGI and ARS-Djibouti. Both the ARS and the TFG requested for forceful exit of the Ethiopian soldiers out of Somalia and AMISOM involvement immediately. The Government and the Heads of States of IGAD concurred to facilitate a mechanism to watch over the assembly decision implementation. Following the resignation of President Abdullahi Yussuf, the parliament appointed a Islamic leader who was considered moderate, Sheik Sharif Ahmed, as new TFG II President on 30th January 2009. 13 days later he chose Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as his new leader of the majority party to win support of Puntland where Abdullahi Yussuf hails (Medhane, 2009). IGAD back up and other partners from different nations has helped Somalia to establish representatives and lawful government chosen by the participants of the people of Somali in the conference.

From the look of the way the conferences were organized, facilitated and the outcome was managed, it is clearly visible that IGAD member states' conflicting interests and the desire of western countries to have influence in the outcome had negative impacts to the success of these processes and its outcome. Although after TFG II all the succeeding government were elected with in the country, foreign influences were still and is still a real. There is need for IGAD member states to define its objective and strategy, unite and show commitment on every activity they are assigned to and put their differences aside. There is also a need for IGAD to work independent organization & be free from the influence of its member states. This way they can collectively achieve the goal of every mission and that of their member states without anybody doubting its dignity and gratitude of the victim nations. There is also need to engage negotiation with the insurgents since they are the main threat and cannot be easily defeated.

VII. CONCLUSION

The study concluded that the peacekeeping process can be expedited effectively while all the donors can unite their efforts in re-structuring and strengthening Somalia National Armed forces and include capacity building programs for Somalia armed forces so that they can ultimately take over the task. The study also found out that IGAD member states need to put their personal interests and conflicting ideas aside and focus on stabilizing Somalia.

The study concluded that political affiliation, member states conflict of interest, financial incapability of IGAD and limited capacity for Somalia's political stakeholders are the main challenges. All the fractions struggling for a leadership in Somalia are attached and looking up to the support of IGAD member states.

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AUTHORS

First Author – Mohamed Abukar Hussein, Department of Languages and Humanities, Mount Kenya University – Nairobi, abukar6666@hotmail.com

Second Author – Prof. Kennedy Mutundu, Department of Social and Development Studies, Mount Kenya University – Nairobi