INDO – US Nuclear Deal and 123 Agreements

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Abstract- The process of Indo-US nuclear deal could be said to have started on July 18, 2005 with the issue of joint statement by the India Prime Minister and the United States (US) President. Subsequently, much of debate took place both in India and the US on issues related to granting special nuclear status to India and India joining a pro US camp. This deal has been viewed as a beginning of special relationship between India and the US. However, it took five years for the official start of first Indo-US strategic dialogue which took place at Washington during June 2010. Unfortunately, for all these years the other dimensions of this strategic relationship which were clearly articulated during July 2005 did not get much of publicity. This paper attempts to analyze various non nuclear dimensions of Indo-US strategic cooperation which include Economic Growth and Trade Promotion, Energy and the Environment, Democracy and Development, Non-Proliferation and Security and High Technology and Space.

Index Terms- India, United States, Nuclear, Strategic, High Technology, Energy and the Environment

I. INTRODUCTION

The civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the United States is only one part of the wide-ranging alliance that the UPA government sought to forge with the United States. The strategic alliance with the United States as stated in the joint statement of July 2005 by the Indian Prime Minister and the US President has four aspects. The political, which involves India joining the US bandwagon of “spreading democracy” around the world; the economic, involving a strategic partnership based on a blueprint for US capital; the military, expressed through the Defense Framework Agreement; and fourthly the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Prior to the joint statement of July 2005, the UPA government signed a ten-year Defense Framework Agreement with the United States. It is evident that without the defense agreement, the Americans would not have agreed for the nuclear cooperation. This seems to be part of a quid.

II. HISTORY OF INDIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

In the 1950s, the United States helped India develop nuclear energy under the Atoms for Peace program. The United States built a nuclear reactor for India, provided nuclear fuel for a time, and allowed Indian scientists study at U.S. nuclear laboratories. In 1968, India refused to sign the NPT, claiming it was biased. In 1974, India tested its first nuclear bomb, showing it could develop nuclear weapons with technology transferred for peaceful purposes. As a result, the United States isolated India for twenty-five years, refusing nuclear cooperation and trying to convince other countries to do the same. But since 2000, the United States has moved to build a "strategic partnership" with India, increasing cooperation in fields including spaceflight, satellite technology, and missile defense.

III. STRATEGIC ALLIANCE WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Manmohan Singh government has followed on the footsteps of the BJP-led government in accepting the US rhetoric on democracy. All the India-US joint statements accord primacy to “democracy” and “freedom.” This implicitly conveys the message that India is politically and ideologically with the US in its crusade to project democracy and freedom as weapons to enforce regime change, prise open economies and establish US hegemony in countries and regions. If the BJP-led government enthusiastically joined the democracy bandwagon by co-sponsoring the Community of Democracies the UPA government embraced the Global Democracy Initiative announced in the July 2005 joint statement. The UPA government has forced out $10 million for the UN Democracy Fund, which has been set up under US urging.

Two significant steps in the economic sphere were announced in the Bush Manmohan Singh joint statement issued during the Bush visit to India in March 2006. A report of the US-India CEO Forum titled “US-India Strategic Economic Partnership,” which was released during the Bush visit, was welcomed in the joint statement “agreeing to consider its recommendations.” Secondly, a US-India Agricultural Knowledge Initiative, which was announced during Manmohan Singh’s US visit, was formally launched. The unequal nature of the strategic economic partnership between the American and Indian corporate can be gauged from the fact that 21 out of the 30 recommendations of the CEO Forum were exclusively meant for India, most of them in the form of demands for policy changes related to specific sectors of the Indian economy to the obvious benefits of the US corporate. This includes liberalization of norms for Infrastructure investments, market-driven reforms in the Power and Oil & Gas sector, further liberalization of the Telecom sector and ensuring a “level playing field” between the private and public sector telecom companies, raising the FDI cap in the Insurance sector, liberalization of norms for FDI in Banking, liberalization of FDI norms in Retail Trade, removal of FDI caps in sectors such as print media, broadcasting, cable and satellite systems and e-commerce, liberalizing restrictions on FDI in the Real Estate and initiating urban reforms like removal of urban land ceiling, reducing stamp duty etc., liberalization of Defense Procurement norms, liberalization of FDI in Higher Education and so on. The Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, who also co-chairs India US Economic Dialogue, had promptly announced the formation of 24 committees to take the recommendations of the CEO Forum forward. While such alacrity to serve the interests of the US corporate met with domestic opposition, the Report of the CEO Forum continues to be displayed in the
official website of the Planning Commission. The CEO Forum recommendations have since been earnestly pursued by the UPA government, often overriding the NCMP.

The vision of foreign and domestic agribusiness driven agriculture underlying the Agricultural Knowledge Initiative is inappropriate for a country like India dominated by peasant agriculture. The efforts by the UPA government to allow large scale procurement of food grain by corporate, promote contract farming and futures trading in food grain and open up retail trade to FDI are influenced by such a distorted vision, which is in conflict with the commitments made in the NCMP.

IV. DEFENCE AGREEMENT

The ten-year Defense Framework Agreement was signed in June 2005. It was a precursor to the joint statement issued in July, just three weeks later. Such a wide-ranging military collaboration agreement has not been signed by India with any country since independence. The agreement provides for joint operations by the two armed forces in military operations outside the auspices of the United Nations; the agreement aims “interoperability” of the armed forces; the two sides will work for missile defense cooperation; sale of US weapons to India and co-production is another feature. Under this pact, India has agreed to work out a Logistics Support Agreement (otherwise known as the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement) with the United States and a Maritime Security Cooperation between the two navies. Regular joint exercises and military training of Indian officers in the United States are already underway. This Defense Framework Agreement alone is sufficient to change the entire security and strategic orientation of India.

Following the announcement of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in July 2007, Nicholas Burns, the Under Secretary of State, who was responsible for negotiating the bilateral agreement, in the official briefing after the 123 agreement was reached, said: “And I think now that we have consummated the civil nuclear trade between us, if we look down the road in the future, we’re going to see far greater defense cooperation between the United State and India: training; exercises; we hope, defense sales of American military technology to the Indian armed forces.”

V. NUCLEAR DEAL AND ENERGY

The major argument advanced by the UPA government is that the nuclear agreement is vital for India to end its nuclear isolation, without which it will not be possible to meet the country’s energy requirements in the future. This ignores the very limited contribution that nuclear power makes to our overall energy generation which is less than 3 per cent. It cannot exceed 7 per cent even if the ambitious plans for expansion to 20,000 MW are implemented by 2020. While talking about energy security, the cost of nuclear power has to be factored in. We should continue to develop nuclear technology based on the three-phased program me. But the expansion of nuclear power cannot become the central focus for energy security. The cost of power per unit generated for imported nuclear reactor will be twice that of a coal-based plant. The capital required to set up a plant with an imported reactor will be thrice that of a coal-based plant. So, what does it mean in terms of investment to set a target of 20,000 MW of nuclear power by 2020, or the more ambitious 40,000 MW target set out by the Prime Minister? The government has not conducted any techno-economic study on the feasibility and cost of nuclear power.

The implementation of the nuclear cooperation agreement will hamper the pursuit of a self-reliant nuclear technology policy for peaceful purposes based on the three-phase nuclear energy program me. There will be an unacceptable price to be paid. While negotiating for the nuclear deal, the United States simultaneously opposed India going ahead with the Iran pipeline project. The strategic alliance with the US will constrain India from accessing energy from Iran and working for an Asian energy security grid which will link Central Asia, West Asia and South Asia. After the Hyde Act was adopted in December 2006, the CPI(M) had stated that it contains provisions which are contrary to the assurances given by the Prime Minister to Parliament on August 17, 2006. The CPI (M) had repeatedly asked the government not to proceed with the bilateral negotiations for the 123 agreement, till this matter was cleared up. But the government did not heed this advice too. The ten-year Defense Framework Agreement was signed in June 2005. It was a precursor to the joint statement issued in July, just three weeks later. Such a wide-ranging military collaboration agreement has not been signed by India with any country since Independence. The agreement provides for joint operations by the two armed forces in military operations outside the auspices of the United Nations; the agreement aims “interoperability” of the armed forces; the two sides will work for missile defense cooperation; sale of US weapons to India and co-production is another feature. Under this pact, India has agreed to work out a Logistics Support Agreement (otherwise known as the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement) with the United States and a Maritime Security Cooperation between the two navies. Regular joint exercises and military training of Indian officers in the United States are already underway. This Defense Framework Agreement alone is sufficient to change the entire security and strategic orientation of India. Following the announcement of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in July 2007, Nicholas Burns, the Under Secretary of State, who was responsible for negotiating the bilateral agreement, in the official briefing after the 123 agreement was reached, said: “And I think now that we have consummated the civil nuclear trade between American us, if we look down the road in the future, we’re going to see far greater defense cooperation between the United State and India: training; exercises; we hope, defense sales of military technology to the Indian armed forces.”

VI. SECTION (123) AGREEMENT

Under existing law (Atomic Energy Act [AEA] of 1954, as amended; P.L. 95-242; 42 U.S.C. §2153 et seq.) all significant U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries requires a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. Significant nuclear cooperation includes the transfer of U.S.-origin special nuclear material subject to licensing for commercial, medical, and industrial purposes. Such agreements, which are “congressional-executive agreements” requiring congressional approval, do not guarantee that cooperation will take place or that nuclear material will be transferred, but rather set the terms of reference and authorize cooperation. The AEA includes requirements for an agreement’s
content, conditions for the President to exempt an agreement from those requirements, presidential determinations and other supporting information to be submitted to Congress, conditions affecting the implementation of an agreement once it takes effect, and procedures for Congress to consider and approve the agreement. Section 123 of the AEA requires that any agreement for nuclear cooperation meet nine nonproliferation criteria and that the President submit any such agreement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The Department of State is required to provide the President an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS), which the President is to submit, along with the agreement, to those two committees. The State Department is also required to provide a classified annex to the NPAS, prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS is meant to explain how the agreement meets the AEA nonproliferation requirements. The President must also make a written determination “that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”

VII. FEATURE OF THE 123 AGREEMENT

• The Agreement could be a major contributor to our energy security. For India it is critical that we maintain our current economic growth rate of 8 to 10 per cent annum if we are to achieve the goal of eradicating poverty. Inadequacy of energy supply is one of the primary constraints on accelerating India’s growth rate. We are trying to expand all forms of energy production in a manner which takes care of concerns about environment. Nuclear energy is a logical choice in this context and can make a larger contribution to our overall energy mix. At present its share is only about 3%. We have an ambitious program me to increase our nuclear energy generating capacity to 20,000 MWe by 2020 and double this by 2030. While our domestic three stage programme continues, using our own uranium resources, this Agreement, by adding additional capacity quickly, would help us to reach that target soon.

• The Agreement also opens the door for cooperation in civil nuclear energy with other countries. We are already discussing with France and Russia similar bilateral cooperation agreements on civil nuclear energy. Once the NSG adopts an exemption to its Guidelines we hope to operationalise all these agreements.

• The Agreement places India in a special category as a “State possessing advanced nuclear technology”, like the United States, with both parties “having the same benefits and advantages”.

• The Agreement provides for full civil nuclear energy cooperation covering nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment and reprocessing.

• The Agreement provides for nuclear trade, transfer of nuclear material, equipment, components, and related technologies and for cooperation in nuclear fuel cycle activities.

• The Agreement contains a full reflection of the March 2, 2006 supply assurances, its linkage to safeguards in perpetuity and the provision for corrective measures in case of disruption of fuel supply.

• The Agreement provides for the development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors.

• The Agreement provides for the application of IAEA safeguards to transferred material and equipment. There is no provision that mandates scrutiny of our nuclear weapons program me or any unsafeguarded nuclear facility.

VIII. REQUIREMENT UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Section 123 of the AEA specifies the necessary steps for engaging in nuclear cooperation with another country.

Section 123(a) States that the proposed agreement is to include the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation and lists nine criteria that the agreement must meet. It also contains provisions for the President to exempt an agreement from any of several criteria described in that section and includes details on the kinds of information the executive branch must provide to Congress.

Section 123(b) specifies the process for submitting the text of the agreement to Congress.

Section 123(c) specifies how Congress approves cooperation agreements that are limited in scope (e.g., do not transfer nuclear material or cover reactors larger than 5 MWe). This report does not discuss such agreements.

Section 123(d) specifies how Congress approves agreements that do cover significant nuclear cooperation (transfer of nuclear material or reactors larger than 5 MWe), including exempted agreements.

IX. TERMS OF THE DEAL

The details of the deal include the following:

• India agrees to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog group, access to its civilian nuclear program. By March 2006, India promised to place fourteen of its twenty-two power reactors under IAEA safeguards permanently. Teresina Schaffer, director of the South Asia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says these will include domestically built plants, which India has not been willing to safeguard before now. India has promised that all future civilian thermal and breeder reactors shall be placed under IAEA safeguards permanently. However, the Indian prime minister says New Delhi “retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian.” According to him: “This means that India will not be constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per our national requirements.”

Military facilities-and stockpiles of nuclear fuel that India has produced up to now-will be exempt from inspections or safeguards.

• India works toward negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) with the United States banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. India agrees to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that don’t possess them and to support international nonproliferation efforts.

• U.S. companies will be allowed to build nuclear reactors in India and provide nuclear fuel for its civilian energy program. (An approval by the Nuclear Suppliers Group lifting the ban on India has also cleared the way for other countries to make nuclear fuel and technology sales to India.)

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X. OBJECTION OF THE AGREEMENT

Critics call the terms of the agreement overly beneficial for India and lacking sufficient safeguards to prevent New Delhi from continuing to produce nuclear weapons. “We are going to be sending, or allowing others to send, fresh fuel to India—including yellowcake and lightly enriched uranium—that will free up Indian domestic sources of fuel to be solely dedicated to making many more bombs than they would otherwise have been able to make,” says Henry Sokowski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a nonprofit organization dedicated to improving awareness of proliferation issues. While India has pledged that any U.S. assistance to its civilian nuclear energy program will not benefit its nuclear weapons program, experts say India could use the imported nuclear fuel to feed its civilian energy program while diverting its own nuclear fuel to weapons production. New Delhi has done similar things in the past; India claimed it was using nuclear technology for civilian purposes right up until its first nuclear weapons test in 1974. A Congressional Research Service report (PDF) on the agreement states, “There are no measures in this global partnership to restrain India’s nuclear weapons program.”

XI. WHO NEEDS TO APPROVE THE AGREEMENT

The final terms of the nuclear deal were approved by the following bodies before they could be implemented:

• (IAEA.) India signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA under which all nuclear material and equipment transferred to it by the United States as a part of this deal shall be subject to safeguards. In August 2008, the IAEA’s Board of Governors approved an India-specific safeguards agreement (PDF). The IAEA said it will begin to implement the new agreement in 2009, with the aim of bringing fourteen Indian reactors under agency safeguards by 2014. The IAEA currently applies safeguards to six of these fourteen nuclear reactors under previous agreements. IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei says the IAEA and India are in dialogue concerning an additional protocol to the draft safeguards agreement.

• (India’s Parliament.) While the deal does not require a formal vote by the parliament, the coalition government has faced a confidence vote over it. Many parliamentarians oppose the deal, arguing it will limit India’s sovereignty and hurt its security. Some Indian nuclear experts are protesting what they see as excessive U.S. participation in deciding which of India’s nuclear facilities to define as civilian, and open to international inspections under the plan.

• (Congress.) In October 2008, the U.S. Congress gave final approval to the bill. Under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which regulates the trade of nuclear material, congressional approval was needed to pass the exemptions to U.S. laws required for the nuclear deal to be implemented. Some members of Congress were resistant, and called for India to commit to strict limits on its nuclear weapons program before the deal went through. There is a potential area of dispute with India over the terms for suspending the agreement. Before clearing the bill, the U.S. Senate rejected an amendment that would require U.S. nuclear supplies to be cut off if India tests nuclear weapons. The deal does not explicitly impose that condition, though it is part of a 2006 law known as the Hyde Act, which gave the deal preliminary approval.

XII. ADVANTAGE OF THE NUCLEAR DEAL TO INDIA AND THE U.S.A

Under the new civil nuclear agreement, India has agreed to separate its civilian and military programs and to put two-thirds of its existing reactors, and 65 percent of its generating power, under permanent safeguards with international verification, and in return the United States would be under commitment to supply nuclear fuel and technology to India. This is very vital for India, because one of the biggest constraints for the continuing success of its fast-growing economy is the electricity shortage. Nuclear energy, which at present accounts for only about 3 percent of India’s total electricity generation, is an attractive alternative to coal and expensive imported oil and gas. The fourteen nuclear power plants India has agreed to put under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards exemplify approximately 3,000megawatts or 3 gig watts of generating capacity. By 2020, India plans to add another 12-16 gig watts of nuclear generating capacity to increase its current capacity. , World Energy Outlook (2004,) As presently nuclear power plays a very marginal role in India’s growth, therefore in some quarters it is also being felt that even by 2020, nuclear power will contribute only about seven percent of India’s total generating capacity and thus would make only a very marginal difference in India’s electricity scene. It is also being argued that though the nuclear power could help India in addressing its energy problems to some extent, but it would not make a major difference in the energy sector and also contribute a little to satisfy the needs of its transportation sector. But on the other hand it is being believed by the supporters of nuclear energy that in the future, nuclear power might play an even bigger role. In view of the various problems associated with the other sources of energy and to satisfy India’s huge population’s growing energy needs, projected to increase four-fold within 25 years, this group believes that without aggravating its dependence on oil from the Middle East or excessively contributing to pollution and global warming, the growing energy needs could be fulfilled by using the nuclear energy. Ashton B. Carter,(2005)

Unfortunately, though, 17 percent of the world’s population resides in India but it has a very trivial portion of the world’s oil and gas reserves. Therefore in the absence of a reliable source of electricity, industries and households mostly are dependent on scarce and costly energy sources like petroleum, natural gas and coal to produce electricity to meet its requirements. Rahul Tongia (2006) in view of India’s dependence on imported oil, gas and coal to produce electricity which is not a very practical alternative for meeting India’s rapidly increasing electricity and energy needs, it is being opined that these limited sources, besides hampering India’s growth and development, would also add to India’s mounting pollution problems. They also argue that though coal would continue to be a major source of fuel for generating electricity, that the increasing prices of petroleum and natural gas and the need to control and manage the problem of pollution would push India like other countries to adopt cleaner means of generating electricity. In fact the worries about growing pollution levels have also forced as many as thirty countries in the world to restart their nuclear power plants. Presently the
United States is the biggest producer of nuclear energy, with 103 nuclear power plants and 27 percent of the global nuclear generating capacity, and rising natural gas prices have contributed to extensions of nuclear plant licenses in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. China, with just nine nuclear power plants also intends to build thirty new nuclear plants by 2020. (Mark Bucknam, 2007)

In view of the scarcity of alternative sources of electricity generation and India’s mounting energy needs to match its economic progress, India has perceived this agreement as a means of fulfilling its energy needs. The United States, on the other hand, has been viewing it as a tool to bring India under the control and obligations of the nuclear regimes. In view of India’s energy-related problems, this agreement appears to have transformed their relationship by fulfilling the objectives of both the countries. As on the one hand, it would end India’s isolation, help it acquire high-technology, and reduce its dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf; and on the other, it would bring India under the IAEA inspection and control system, and prove economically beneficial for the United States, too. Due to this fact, the deal was welcomed by Mohamed E Baradei, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In his opinion “the nuclear deal would bring India closer as an important partner in the non-proliferation regime and which would be a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety.” Mohamed El Baradei,(2006) The forty-five nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), such as France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, also did not take much time in expressing their support for the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal but on the other hand Canada and China, both NSG members, expressed their reservations about this deal.

The U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (Condoleezza Rice, “March 13, 2006, A15) While arguing in favor of the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership and the civil nuclear deal, stressed that India has a record of thirty years of responsible behavior on proliferation matters, and the agreement would make the world, and the future of India and the United States, safe. While naming the agreement as unique, Rice also emphasized that India’s uniqueness as a country, as a democracy with an accountable and transparent government, encouraged the United States to move forward for this agreement. In her view point other countries like North Korea and Iran that had also been seeking to develop their programs on the basis of this agreement do not fall in this category, because Iran is a state that promotes terrorism, and North Korea is the least transparent state, threatens its neighbors, and proliferates weapons. She also felt that by satisfying India’s energy needs, it would end its dependence on fossil fuels and ease the environmental impact of India’s vibrant economic growth; and, on the other hand, it would also help the U.S. economy and enhance the employment and job prospects for the American people also. The nuclear deal grants India the facility of reprocessing the nuclear fuel acquired from the external sources, a concession the United States has presently given only to Japan and European countries. In accordance to the deal the United States would also help India to find fuel if the United States cuts off the supply for any reason particularly if India tests a nuclear weapon. In the viewpoint of several scholars, the reason for the U.S. willingness to take these steps lies in the fact that lately it has started to recognize India as an important strategic bulwark and an answer against a growing Chinese power and highly unstable and unpredictable Pakistan. India’s billion-man army, the world’s fourth largest, and its blue-water navy makes it a natural buffer as well as a sentinel on the trade route between East Asia and the Middle East. The United States believes that a demographically and economically vibrant India could serve as a counterweight to expanding Chinese influence in Southeast Asia as well as Beijing’s great-power ambitions around the globe. Sadanand Dhume, (2006) U.S. Ambassador to India David Mumford has also accepted that the United States by adopting such policy moves towards India has succeeded to a large extent in de-hyphenating its relationship with India and Pakistan. Amit Baruah, (2009)

Interestingly, now the United States has also tacitly acknowledged India as a responsible state with advanced nuclear know-how, but it has very diplomatically avoided accepting India as the sixth nuclear weapons state. The U.S. stand also makes the nuclear deal noteworthy. It clearly shows that America has agreed to help India acquire the same benefits and advantages as other states with nuclear weapons. India would also be granted full civil nuclear energy co-operation, fuel supplies and the transfer of technology, etc., but the United States would not like to undermine the conditions of the NPT by recognizing India as a sixth nuclear state. In some quarters it is believed that the present U.S. policy, like the NPT which created two classes of states, the nuclear haves and the have-nots, would once again create two classes of the non-NPT signatories, “responsible” non-nuclear states such as Japan and the EU countries which are allowed to conduct plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment for their civilian programs, and other countries like Iran which are denied this right because of the feeling that they may use their potential to acquire nuclear weapons. T.V. Paul,(2006) In view of this duplicity, it can be said that a country cannot be assured of obtaining full fuel cycle facilities by just signing the NPT or the IAEA safeguards system but its political system and proximity to the western countries would also matter in deciding its suitability for access to the dual use potential sensitive technologies.

However some other scholars have opined that the July 18, 2005 agreement for a civil nuclear deal with the United States has heralded India’s strategic liberalization, and has also ensured substantial gains such as the import of nuclear fuel, etc. They feel that an enabled India, free of technology denial restraints and of the category of the strategic outcast, would not only emerge as an important state in the twenty-first century but also help multipolarity to become a reality at the global view. Paul,(2008)

XIII. Conclusion

Though there is no denying the fact that there are various complications which have made the task of the Congress-led UPA government of India very tough, but in view of the limited alternatives the dilemma seems real. On the one hand, the option of generating clean energy through nuclear fuel due to its inherent cost would not only be very expensive, but it would also very difficult to sustain it for a long time due to the cost factor. But on the other hand in view of the limited options for other sources of energy and pressures of the international community for using clean energy sources on account of the threat of global
warming there is little choice left for India. Since India has also willingly imposed a moratorium on further nuclear tests after the 1998 nuclear test, therefore the acceptance of the civil nuclear deal would only assist India in its economic pursuits and open the door for other international cooperation. If India has to sustain its economic growth and use its full economic potential, India would have to move forward and clutch the deal. But as India has always maintained its freedom of action and independent foreign policy, therefore any pressure on India would be seen as a compromise in its long-held stand by the concerned people. In fact it is a catch-22 situation for India, because if the Congress-led UPA government decides to proceed further with the deal, the coalition partners (left parties) would withdraw their support from the government and push the country towards political instability, and if India fails to complete the process of the nuclear deal in time, the future of the deal would be in jeopardy. Actually, in recent weeks, a dramatic situation was witnessed in the Indian political scene with the political parties of India being divided into two clear camps the supporters and non-supporters of the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal. This scene emerged with the Manmohan Singh-led UPA government’s decision to go to the IAEA and the NSG to fulfill the requirements of the deal, and the left parties withdrawing their support from the government. This situation left the political ground open to all sorts of pulls, pressures, horse-trading and manipulations. The country observed an ugly political scene where not only the Congress-led UPA government received support from unexpected quarters, but allegations were also made in the parliament about how money changed hands to sustain and save the government. The doubts on the stability of such a government which has survived by using every possible tactic are still being raised. However it is also being assumed that with the government passing the hurdle of sustaining the confidence motion, it would be able to move forward in time to finalize the deal before the United States goes to the election mode, and ensure the economic growth of the country through nuclear energy.

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