Reflection of Value in Education Dimensions

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DOI: 10.29322/IJSRP.9.09.2019.p9351
http://dx.doi.org/10.29322/IJSRP.9.09.2019.p9351

Abstract- The education is a topic of no small controversy. The problems of education and schools are often laid at the feet of those who prepare teachers; the solutions are often claimed to be found there as well. Education is affected by the problems and concerns of the practice of teaching; there is little reason to believe that education can be made more successful if teaching itself cannot be made more attractive. The problems that face the schools and education are diverse to say the least. There are demographic issues; the number of people at the age typically associated with education is diminishing in many Western countries, including Indonesia while the demand for teachers is showing signs of increasing. There are economic issues; the changing economies in many countries are opening employment possibilities outside teaching for those who historically have been the main supply of candidates for the teaching profession. There are political issues; governments show a lack of consistency in their interest in the quality of education. Begins by presenting a basic definition demarcating the concept of ‘education’ from other processes of human learning and formation, yet in a way that allows circumventing various features that have been the source of debates. The paper then presents education’s bi-dimensional structure and connects this structure to Schwartz’s theory of universal values. To further explicate the merits of the theory, the paper presents four generic types of education and connects each of them to Schwartz’s value scale. It is argued that the conception of education offered may serve as a commonly shared framework for educational theorists and practitioners alike to think about and research education. It moves between high and low priority, leaving those involved in education confused about the importance to be assigned to their work. The world of education education finds itself caught between the expectations of the profession it serves and the institutions which house it. What the teaching profession thinks is important for education programs may not be what will gain them credibility within the universities that provide them homes. These are but some of the issues that those involved in the world of education have been called upon to consider.

Index Terms- reflection, value, dimention, education.

I. INTRODUCTION

Countless educational theories have appeared over the past few years in the educational literature, each attempting to develop the most appropriate, effective or ethically desirable conception of education. To this end, educational theories offer definitions and thought-out criteria for what constitutes a suitable or desirable educational process. But as R. S. Peters already noted a while back, it is rare to find demarcations of the concept of ‘education’ as such (Peters, 2010). Apart from a few bold attempts (e.g. Carr, 2003; Jackson, 2012), we believe the same scarcity of demarcations still persists today. This may be because the concept of ‘education’ is ‘not very close to the ground’ (Peters, 2010, p. 1) and is (by definition) intimately tied to a certain philosophical, moral or ethical outlook. What one would consider an education in a given context (and a desirable one indeed), another would deem as either plain indoctrination (or even oppression) or a strictly functional learning process. Carr (2003) addresses philosophical arguments inhibiting the ability to reach a commonly shared understanding of the meaning of ‘education’. In defence of a (liberal) conception of education that is essentially committed to objective knowledge and truth, Carr shows, quite convincingly, that even acknowledgement of the ‘social character of meaning’ or the ‘meaning as use’ thesis does not preclude giving a definite (objective) sense to the ‘meaning’ of education. Although thinkers such as Carr and Jackson present cogent arguments and provide fruitful conceptual clarifications, it would appear that their definitions (which closely follow Peters’) rely on the acceptance of several liberal presuppositions (‘extending rationality’ or ‘self-transcending virtue’ for instance) and as such are to be considered as further attempts at defending modernist-liberal education and curriculum against so-called postmodernist attacks (Carr, 2003; Englund, 2006; Harkin, 1998). Elsewhere, we have already expressed our own views on these educational debates (Sarid, 2017a). Our present aim is rather different. Our aim here is to offer a theory of education that abstains as much as feasibly possible from ‘taking sides’ in current ideological disputes. Stated otherwise, we would like to offer a generic theory of education that does not adhere to any particular ideology or philosophy–with the exception of compliance to basic presuppositions of argumentation necessary for constructing a theory as such. It should be noted that, for some postmodernist thinkers, the very talk of ‘theory’–including other all-encompassing notions, is suspect given its abstractedness from particular (social) contexts and meanings. This is perhaps another reason why a generic definition of the conception of education is intentionally averted by certain educational thinkers in today’s intellectual climate, leaving the field of demarcation largely to those upholding a modernist orientation favourable to theoretical thinking. Nevertheless, we believe the theory offered here is no more conceptually restricting, illusionary or pretentious than, say, broad conceptualisations such as postmodern curriculum or
postmodern education (Doll, 1993; Slattery, 2013; Usher & Edwards, 1994).

Education today is at a critical crossroads. In the wake of profound and accelerated change processes reconfiguring the very nature of current societies (Bauman, 2005), including the prevalence of so-called ‘postmodern’ perspectives radically criticizing modern schooling (Giroux, 1988; Slattery, 2013; Usher & Edwards, 1994), educational theorists and practitioners are engaged in heated debates over which particular kind of educational theory or approach is either functionally relevant or ethically desirable for today’s sociocultural climate. Some even argue that ‘present-day challenges deliver heavy blows to the very essence of the idea of education’ (Bauman, 2010, p. 91). True, Bauman, and other like-minded thinkers, are radically critical of prevailing modernist school-based education and school culture. But, whether or not the ‘very essence of the idea of education’ has become outmoded or is incompatible with current social needs and expectations depends on how one defines ‘education’ as such.

We shall begin by offering a generic definition of education, followed by elaboration of its bi-dimensional structure. We shall then connect the conception of education presented here to Schwartz’s theory of universal values and demonstrate, by addressing four generic types of education, how the present theory may serve as a commonly shared framework for thinking generally about the meaning of education.

II. EDUCATION

This very basic formulation builds on previous articulations (including Peters’ and Carr’s) but with the important exception that it intentionally leaves out various properties which have been the source of disputes, such as on the nature of knowledge (objective vs. socially constructed), the extent of knowledge one needs to acquire in order to properly become an ‘educated person’ (broad initiation vs. motivationally driven specialisation), and the nature of educational ends (intrinsic vs. extrinsic-instrumental worth). As such, the merits and uniqueness of the above formulation, we argue, consist of the fact that, on the one hand, it clearly delimits the boundaries of ‘education’ by introducing several clear qualifications that set ‘education’ apart from other (social) processes that frequently, and we believe mistakenly, are deemed synonymous with it. On the other hand, as opposed to any formulation we have encountered, the above formulation is the least restrictive or exclusive, affording the inclusion of a wide range of possible practices that are excluded from other formulations on either ideological grounds or differences in educational outlook.

Education is a continuous practice consisting of purposively structured learning processes aimed at the realisation of ends that are consciously derived from a certain conception of the ‘good’. As the well-known debates over R. S. Peters’, tremendously influential conception of education reveal, Peters’ conception has generated a lot of criticism principally because it reflects Peters’ own worldview and thus excludes various other conceptions deemed equally worthy of the label ‘education’ (Beckett, 2011). As a result, some thinkers argue for the necessity of offering only minimalist definitions of education such as ‘upbringing’ or ‘preparation for adult life’ (Winch & Gingell, 2008). And while some argue that Peters’ conception actually offers a more comprehensive (or more inclusive) conception (Beckett, 2011; Katz, 2009), it is clear that even given more permissive readings, Peters’ conception is still overly restrictive. We argue that the merit and innovation of the conception offered here is that it is both non-minimalist and inclusive (non-restrictive). More specifically, the above formulation circumvents excluding properties appearing in formulations such as those presented by Jackson:

Education is a socially facilitated process of cultural transmission whose explicit goal is to effect an enduring change for the better in the character and the psychological well-being (the personhood) of its recipients and, by indirection, in their broader social environment, which ultimately extends to the world at large. (Jackson, 2012, p. 95)

There are a number of questionable features in this formulation. Consider only two. First, it is unclear what the term ‘socially facilitated’ means, but it appears to exclude various types of self-directed and personally driven educational processes inconsistent with common understandings of the notion of ‘cultural transmission’; some conceptions of education, for instance, seek to promote ongoing ‘cultural reproduction’ (Morrow & Torres, 1995). Second, ‘an enduring change for the better’ may be appropriate, but the proviso regarding the broader social environment and certainly the world at large overextends its definition, excluding various types of education that seek to promote sets of values, knowledge and skills that are valued by particular individuals, homogeneous groups or communities. In support of the definition we have offered here, let us briefly restate previous arguments made in favour of demarcating education from concepts commonly viewed as residing on the same conceptual-semantic level: socialisation, learning and teaching. To begin with, it would sound strange to say that ‘we was educated by our mistakes’; surely, a person learns from one’s mistakes. Similarly, a person may say that ‘we was taught to ride a bike or play the piano’, but certainly not that ‘we was educated to ride a bike or play the piano’. Furthermore, it is certainly possible for someone to say that learning from one’s own mistakes, learning to play the piano or engaging in physical activities have been a part of his or her education. The above insights seem to point to the fact that not all learning processes are educational processes per se and that education entails more than simply learning (to do) something. We are not saying that ordinary language is always useful for conceptual clarifications, but consideration of these simple examples demonstrates that education is not the same thing as learning or teaching and that different forms of learning and teaching take place in educational contexts. Both ‘learning’ and ‘teaching’ refer to various types of activities that take place within educational processes, but they are certainly not the same thing.

Additionally, education, as both Peters and Carr fittingly observe, should be distinguished from ‘other processes of human learning or formation’ (Carr, 2003, p. 197), primarily wider socialisation, therapy and training. According to Carr, education can be seen as a particular case of socialisation and not vice versa. But, if education is to be properly distinguished from socialisation, some clear qualifications must be made yet without an appeal to philosophically contestable features, as Peters and Carr make. We propose that the demarcation rest on the condition that learning processes are in some sense purposively structured and are
consciously grounded on a certain conception of the ‘good’. Thus perceived, both Dewey’s notion of an ‘unconscious education’ (Dewey, 2004) and Rousseau’s notion of education ‘from circumstances’ (Rousseau, 1889) are conceptually incoherent as they blur the distinction between socialisation and education. ‘Socialisation’, viewed as spontaneous or unconscious learning processes through social interactions, should not be confused with education (Jackson, 2012).

To further clarify this claim, consider what is usually regarded the most basic and significant source of socialisation, namely, parenting. Evidently, not every parenting act can be considered as falling within the realm of education, regardless of whether the specific lessons learnt in each case may seem morally deplorable or not (i.e. a judgment of what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘bad’ behaviour). A child may learn many things from his or her parents either explicitly or implicitly; parents may teach their children many things either by saying things to them, by remaining silent or by their own actions. But it would be undeniably excessive to call all such interactions educational acts. Parenting-acts qualify as educational acts when such acts are purposive and are directed towards a certain vision of what is ‘good’. Just as schooling differs from education (Carr, 2003), the entire spectrum of parenting activities may comprise educational acts but the latter are only possible particular cases of the former.

To avert confusions with regard to the notion of ‘conscious’ or ‘purposively structured’ learning processes consider a passage taken from a review of Jackson’s book (2012):

Jackson seems … to emphasize that ‘education does not just happen. It has to be planned’ … we are not sure who needs to be reminded of this; surely not today’s teachers who concentrate ever more intensively on raising their students’ test scores or helicopter parents who plan every moment of their children’s days. Most commentators wish children had more unstructured time. Perhaps there are still a few progressive educators who think letting kids loose in a rich environment is sufficient to induce worthwhile learning, but they are few and far between. (Schrag, 2014, p. 536.)

In response, it is important to clearly distinguish between the desire to promote more open-ended or unstructured learning processes and the educational vision for which implementing open-ended or unstructured learning processes is deemed worthy or as having value. Otherwise, why should anyone, including Schrag, be critical that ‘they are few and far between’? One may be critical of the fact that very little unstructured learning takes place in schools, but this has no import whatsoever on the qualification that teachers, or any other individual for that matter, purposively plan and implement such processes on the grounds that they are conducive for satisfying a certain conception of the ‘good’. The main point is that education requires mindfulness of the reasons (value) for employing certain learning processes, including those that are unstructured or open-ended.

To conclude the clarification of the above generic definition, it is important to make two additional points that necessarily follow from what has been claimed thus far. First, once ‘education’ presupposes purposively structured learning processes, it requires human involvement—as opposed to non-human entities such as, following Rousseau, ‘nature’ or ‘things’. The point is that education is a continuous practical activity that takes place when it is either directed by a person for his or her own sake or by a group of individuals for the sake of other individuals; it is certainly plausible that a person may educate him or herself. Second, and consequently, education does not necessarily require institutionalised procedures and is open to informal varieties, although given the complexity of sustaining educational processes in the long run this makes the institutionalisation of learning processes (including informal) a realistic requirement. While it is reasonable to suppose that education would most likely be manifested as a social institution having a formal structure administered by some form of governing body, this certainly does mean that formal varieties alone exhaust the definition of education. Thus, following the above requirements the basic definition can be revised as follows:

Education is a continuous practice consisting of purposively structured learning processes, which are either individually or socially directed, formally or informally governed, aimed at the realisation of ends that are consciously derived from a certain conception of the ‘good’.

III. A BI-DIMENSIONAL CONCEPTION OF EDUCATION

The above generic or basic definition provides some criteria for demarcating the concept of education, but it is far too narrow to serve as a theory of education as such. What is missing from the above definition is an account of how education ‘works’, or in other words, an account of the operative dimensions composing the concept of education. In line with Peters’ normative conception of education (Katz, 2009), we have argued that any educational process is derived from a ‘certain conception of the good’, and since any such conception reflects adherence to a certain set of values, we claim that ‘education’ must be thought of in terms of programmatic commitments to certain sets of values. Peters claims that the norms built into education, which ‘generate the aims … educators strive to develop or attain’, are highly indeterminate. For this reason, the aims of education must also be continuously reconsidered and re-evaluated through critical dialogue (Katz, 2009, p. 106).

While we concur that the operational aims of education as well as its contents must be continuously reconsidered so that education corresponds to the timely needs and values of individuals in a given socio-cultural context, we argue that educational forms operate (and are set apart from each other) by differing levels of commitments to two central dimensions of values, regardless of the specific sociocultural context.

The first dimension of education concerns the analytic division between the two ultimate ends of education: preparing individuals for life in a given social context and re-shaping reality according to a certain ideological or philosophical stance. Stated otherwise, any form of education is either more inclined towards mirroring (or functionally transmitting) the needs, knowledge and normative expectations legitimised or commonly accepted in a given social context or is more inclined towards reshaping individuals and society according to a certain conception of the ‘good’ person or society. Ever since Socrates, the polar division between the two orientations (conservation of social values vs. changing-reshaping of individuals or society) has divided adversarial educational outlooks. A different way of looking at the above dimension is through the division between education’s role as an agent of socialisation and its role as a proactive change agent.
To further illustrate this point, consider the following statement by Bauman: ‘Without much ado we would, we guess, all agree that the mission of education, since articulated by the Ancients under the name of paideia, was, remains and probably will remain preparing the young to life’ (Bauman, 2011, p. 10). Here Bauman, whose notion of liquid education will be discussed later, reduces education merely to the notion of paideia, commonly understood as the rearing or socialisation of individuals to become ideal members of the community. This, of course, stands in contradiction to conceptions of education grounded on, say, the acquisition of objective knowledge or Truth, or the self-realisation of individuals (which, contra common belief, was not born as a concurrent product of postmodernist thinking). The point is that any kind of education is configured according to its ‘position’ upon the conservation-change dimension. To be sure, extreme cases are not often found in either theory or practice; forms of education will lean more or less to either side of the polar division. Some further clarification of the notion of change is in order. It is certainly the case that in any educational process a person must change to some extent. Change is of course a necessary presupposition of any learning process. Thus, even the most strict or rigid forms of education, in which individuals are either indoctrinated into a particular worldview or are given specific skills to perform very specific tasks, presuppose change and development. But since ‘change’ is necessarily a defining feature of any learning process, it would be unproductive to argue that change constitutes a dimension of education. Rather, ‘change’ in this context refers to the extent to which an educational approach or process deems ‘change’ as an inherent motivational value. The ‘change dimension’ reflects a range of possible commitments towards the changing of attitudes and dispositions (cognitive and emotive), acquired knowledge, or even value-orientations.

At one extreme (‘conservation’) we may position educational views that promote types of personal development that unwaveringly value the preservation of socially accepted knowledge, traditional views and heritage. Examples can range from strict religious educational approaches to various forms of technical education. At the other extreme, we may find educational views which regard the willingness and the capacity to change as an ultimate end of the educational process. Here we can speak of radically critical educational views entiticing radical scepticism and ongoing critical attitudes towards socially accepted knowledge and value-commitments or entiticing ongoing exploratory modes of existence in which individuals consciously seek to revise their own views and mind-sets. Thus, a defining feature of any educational process is the manner in which the value of change is conceived and practised within it.

The second dimension of education concerns the division between forms of education geared towards the successful achievements of specific individuals or societies and those aimed at promoting universal values. Needless to say, the two extremes are not logically inconsistent. We might assume the existence of forms of education for which the internalisation and application of universal values are consistent with the achievements and success of individuals. One might conceive Aristotle’s views of education precisely in that manner (Brumbaugh & Laurence, 1959). Nevertheless, we claim this second dimension harbours a highly oppositional relation between two different focal points of the educational process: that between promoting the success, achievements and self-flourishing of specific individuals or societies in a given social context, on the one hand, and the spiritual, material and physical well-being and sustainability of humanity (including the planet), on the other. It is these two focal points that usually come into conflict in different forms of education.

Here, too, differences between educational forms usually do not manifest themselves as either or oppositions but rather as varying levels of commitments across a continuum composed by personal success, achievement or self-enhancement at one pole and universal other-regarding values at the other pole.

The above-mentioned bi-dimensional conception of education finds support in other thinkers’ work but with some important reservations. Jackson (2012), for example, views education as a dialectic between the paired notions of essence and existence, lofty and mundane, practical and contemplative (p. 49). For Jackson, education, properly conceived, consists of an ongoing movement between the paired notions (let us call them dimensions) such that, for example, the learning process involves the acquisition and discussion of ideal essences or values that should be espoused or acted upon and, at the same time (at least conceptually), an understanding of the ‘here and now’ of current social and individual reality. The same back-and-forth dialectical movement between poles occurs with regard to the other two dimensions. While we argue that the first dimension (essence-existence) should be placed on a different conceptual level than Jackson’s two other paired notions—since the first involves ends and the two others involve procedure—this does not concern me here. Our point, at least with regard to Jackson’s first dimension, is that while in practice curricula and educational processes might involve a combination of ‘essence’ and ‘existence’, the idea that education involves a dual commitment to both essence and existence is a feature of a particular type of (liberal) education. Theoretically speaking, the two notions of essence and existence reflect polarities that, while they might be commonly practised in tandem, are still opposing features and nearly all educational forms lean to either one or the other. Jackson justifiably presents the notions of essence and existence as inherent features of education, but unjustifiably regards the dialectical movement between the two as features of any kind of education. By doing so, we believe Jackson exhibits a liberal bias towards other possible forms of education.

To conclude the above discussion, we claim that all educational forms have a bi-dimensional structure according to which educational aims are generated as well as the modes of operation deriving from these aims. Educational forms can be defined and set apart from each other according to the degree to which they value either conservation or change, and the degree to which each is committed to functional success-achievement or other-regarding values.

Let us return to the definition of education presented at the outset of this present discussion and modify it accordingly: Education is a continuous practice consisting of purposively structured learning processes, which are either individually or socially directed, formally or informally governed, aimed at the realisation of ends that are consciously derived from a certain conception of the ‘good’ along two central dimensions: (1) conservation vs. change and (2) self-flourishing or self-actualisation vs. universal well-being.
IV. THEORY OF VALUES

As the bi-dimensional view of education presented here is grounded, first and foremost, on levels of commitments to sets of values, it is useful to connect the present view of education to Schwartz’s theory of universal values (1992). This will afford the possibility to gain a better understanding of the contents of the two dimensions and to offer a research tool for examining commitment levels to sets of values along a bi-dimensional continuum. We shall first briefly present Schwartz’s theory and then apply his theory to the conception of education presented here.

In his seminal work on universal values, Shalom Schwartz (1992, 2012) specified 10 distinct types of universal motivational values and placed them on a single (circular) continuum. In more recent work, Schwartz et al. (2012) refined the theory, expanding it to include 19 values. The closer these values are situated on the circular motivational continuum (in either direction), the more similar their underlying motivation.

Schwartz’s theory of universal values is particularly advantageous since, as opposed to construing values as isolated (semantic) entities, it acknowledges the relations of values to one another. According to the theory, some values are more closely related to other values and, in certain cases, adherence or commitment to one value or set of values is seen to exclude or seriously diminish the commitment to others. For instance, on Schwartz’s scale, the motivational values of ‘stimulation’ and ‘hedonism’ are perceived as conflicting with the values of ‘conformity’ or ‘tradition’; ‘benevolence’ or ‘universalism’ are seen to conflict with (personal) ‘power’ and ‘achievement’. Second, as opposed to binary either or conceptions of values (one either values ‘self-direction’ or not), the theory captures the dynamism involved in value-commitments and the varying levels to which real people may uphold certain values. Similarly to Aristotle’s notion of the ‘golden mean’ - but stripped from its metaphysics, Schwartz’s theory accounts for the implications of adherence to a certain value (along a range between complete rejection and extreme adherence) on the commitment to other values. In Schwartz’s theory, for instance, the more committed a person is to the value of ‘self-direction’, the less he or she will be committed to values such as ‘conformity’ or ‘security’.

Schwartz claims that his theory competently addresses value-behaviour relations because it incorporates motivational conflicts along the circular continuum and so it partly explains some of the incongruities between value commitments and behaviour. While gaps between values and behaviours are sometimes explained by a tension between values and norms (those that are espoused in a specific social or organisational context) it has been shown that values-regardless of the specific normative reality-do in fact motivate behaviour (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). Since education involves, by definition, the translation of values into praxis (structured learning processes), the fact that Schwartz’s theory accounts for the connection between values and behaviour makes it all the more applicable to educational contexts.

More pertinent to the present discussion, the theory further arranges the 10 (or 19) values according to two dimensions, one dimension contrasts ‘self-enhancement’ with ‘self-transcendence’, the second dimension contrasts ‘conservation’ with ‘openness to change’. The first dimension ‘self-enhancement’-‘self-transcendence’ organises sets of proximal values along a spectrum ranging from valuing personal achievements and success (or generally, personal or social self-actualisation) to other-regarding or universalised commitments such as benevolence, equality and tolerance. The second dimension ‘conservation’-‘openness to change’-arranges values ranging from commitments to the preservation of tradition, conformity and security to those expressing a commitment to ongoing risk-taking, novelty and self-directedness.

For the present purposes, we shall focus here on Schwartz’s two dimensions rather than on the individual values comprising them. Consequently, given the focus here on Schwartz’s two dimensions, the present discussion employs Schwartz’s scale of 10 values rather than the refined 19-value scale, adding further values partitioning the original 10-value scale, leaving intact the original bi-dimensional structure. Which motivational values are to be included in the theory as well as the depiction of the kinds of relations that exist between values is open to further discussion. To be sure, these are serious considerations that demand continuous refinement and investigation. However, we believe there is something basically right about how Schwartz scrutinises the nature of values and the relations between them, especially the manner in which he sets up a bi-dimensional organisation of sets of value commitments.

V. CONNECTING THE CONCEPT OF ‘EDUCATION’ TO THEORY OF VALUES

Schwartz’s theory and scales have been empirically validated in many studies and in many different sociocultural contexts (Schwartz et al., 2012) and applied to different fields of research including, among many others, leadership (Sarid, 2016; Sarros & Santura, 2001), work settings (Ros, Schwartz, & Surkiss, 1999), and psychological and subjective well-being (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). On rare occasions, Schwartz’s theory and scales have been applied in educational contexts; for example, to examine the connection between a teacher’s values and goals (Pudelko & Boon, 2014) and students’ values and learning approaches (Matthews, Lietz, & Darmawan, 2007). However, no study we know of has yet made the explicit connection between Schwartz’s values and the investigation of the conception of education as such.

In light of what has been claimed thus far, we argue that Schwartz’s theory is tightly connected to the bi-dimensional view of education presented here, particularly in the manner in which it organises motivational values along the two dimensions of self-enhancement-self-transcendence, and conservation-openness to change. As stated above, at the most elementary level, any form of education is intimately tied to a certain conception of the ‘good’ (or sets of values) from which all educational aims and pedagogical processes are consistently derived at least in principle. Such that, for example, a person or a group of people may regard either ‘pluralistic individual emancipation’ or ‘traditional cultural preservation’ as the raison d’être for all pedagogical processes. In the first case, it is possible to assume that a major part of the curriculum will consist of experiential constructivist-like methods of learning and increased student...
choice. In the second case, transmission of canonised forms of cultural knowledge will most likely constitute a better part of the curriculum. Theoretically speaking, the extent of the commitment to a specific set of values constitutes the underlying motivation for all educational processes. Connecting the conception of education offered here to Schwartz’s bi-dimensional organisation of values offers a reliable and empirically sound platform to examine and determine the extent of commitments to sets of values, and therefore a proper method for determining and classifying different forms of education.

To further demonstrate how the conception of education offered here connects to Schwartz’s theory of values, we shall briefly consider four basic types of education: religious education, technical education, liquid education and critical-transformative education, each representing a cluster of educational perspectives sharing similar characteristics. It should be noted that there is a certain crudeness to the way the four educational clusters have been fashioned here. One should keep in mind that any generalisation of such sorts may misrepresent or omit particular cases or manifestations. But, as in most (effective) theories, what is lost in terms of particular representation is gained by increased theoretical explanation. We believe it is possible to connect any particular educational perspective or approach to the theoretical framework presented here.

VI. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Religious education is depicted within a range positioned in the conceptual area intersecting ‘conservation’ with ‘self-transcendence’. This affords accounting for various forms of religious education that might be considerably different from one another. Nevertheless, it is possible to claim that nearly all forms of religious education share some basic common features. First, with regard to the ‘change dimension’, religious education typically centres on the cultural transmission of sacred texts, incorporating within them the essential knowledge and values that are supposed to be passed down to learners. In this sense, religious and spiritual forms of education are founded on the enduring commitment to and conservation of (more or less) unchanging beliefs, knowledge and values. However, varying degrees of ‘conservation’ can be attributed to different religious educational approaches and paradigms (e.g. Buchanan, 2005). For instance, whereas strict orthodox religious views enforce extreme conservation (radical preservation of religious forms of life), various religious educational approaches may ‘drift’ more towards the ‘openness to change’ pole since an essential feature of such approaches is the ongoing and innovative interpretation of and personal connection to sacred texts and beliefs. While innovative interpretations are espoused in the latter types of religious views, traditional sacred texts continue to serve as the foundation for all learning processes. Another possibility concerns exclusive orthodox educational institutions promoting the development of religious prodigies, who are able to introduce fresh new insights into traditional questions and problems. In such cases we might witness a movement towards the ‘openness to change’ pole. But in most particular manifestations of religious education we must assume a certain threshold beyond which commitments to ‘openness to change’ are excluded, certainly the belief in an other-worldly deity.

With regard to the second dimension, religious education (certainly monotheistic religions) uphold universal self-transcendent values as opposed to values denoting particular interests such as economic success or enhancing personal achievements. There is nothing of particular functional value to religious forms of education although perhaps some practical aims may be promoted as secondary. One such example is the functional rehabilitation of underprivileged at-risk youth. It is also possible that some types of religious education are more concerned with self-preservation and the successful propagation of a certain religious creed. However, even in these cases, greater commitment to other-regarding (self-transcendent) values than personal (instrumental) values is to be expected.

VII. TECHNICAL EDUCATION

By ‘technical education’ we refer to types of learning processes that while are specifically aimed at professional development are purposively and explicitly geared towards a certain perception of the ‘good’, such as the development of a work ethic, excellence in a specific vocation and (rational) goal-oriented behaviour. Now there may be a thin line demarcating vocational training and vocational education, but it is certainly possible to consider types of vocational education such as those implemented in the Finnish educational system as being consistent with the above definition.

In the educational literature there are competing views regarding the question of whether vocational or technical forms of learning can be classified as ‘educational’ as such. Winch (2002), for example, disputes the liberal discrimination of various forms of vocational-instrumental learning processes and proposes the notion of ‘vocational education’ as distinct from both functional training, on the one hand, and liberal education, on the other. Carr (2003) defends Peters’ liberal qualification of intrinsic worth (i.e. that what is learned is not a means towards instrumental ends but an end in itself) by claiming that either Winch’s notion of vocational education is redundant, since what ultimately distinguishes ‘vocational education’ from crude vocational training is precisely the liberal qualification of intrinsic worth, or that Winch confuses schooling with education. Schooling, says Carr, is a social institution that promotes instrumental ends, but the fact that it does, does not mean that all learning taking place within it is, in fact, educational. Without directly participating in the debate regarding intrinsic and extrinsic worth, we claim that in the name of conceptual vigilance (and tolerance) towards different and at times opposing views of education, the present theory must account for educational views that are, at least, consistent with the above-mentioned definition of education.

Technical education is thus depicted within a range covering the conceptual area intersecting ‘conservation’ with ‘self-enhancement’. This depiction delineates technical education, on the one hand, as reflecting greater motivation to uncritically acquire more or less conventional bodies of knowledge in a given vocational or disciplinary field (and therefore the conservation of such bodies of knowledge), and, on the other hand, as intensified commitment to the values of (functional) personal achievement and success in the various social spheres.
VIII. LIQUID EDUCATION

The terms ‘liquid education’ and ‘liquid pedagogy’ (Oxenham, 2013; Green & Gary, 2016) are derived from Bauman’s notion of ‘liquid modernity’ (2000). Bauman himself also explicitly discusses the application of liquid modernity to educational contexts (Bauman, 2005, 2010). Savin-Baden (2007), for example, appeals to Bauman’s notion of liquid modernity to develop a view of ‘liquid learning’ which is defined as follows: ‘Liquid learning … is characterized by emancipation, reflexivity and flexibility so that knowledge and knowledge boundaries are contestable and always on the move’ (Savin-Baden, 2007, p. 8). Several key characteristics of liquid education unfold in this short definition of liquid learning. First, while mention of ‘emancipation’ here might suggest that liquid forms of education are geared towards other-regarding universal values (such as social justice or benevolence), a closer examination of Bauman’s work reveals that ‘emancipation’ is consistently viewed by Bauman and commentators as the chameleon-like capacity of each unique individual to continuously transform and change according to changing social circumstances (Sarid, 2017b). The essence of liquid education is to enhance individuals’ freedom and the reflexive capacity to continuously transform themselves. Like all views of modernism (at least in its non-liquid or classical form), liquid education too is suspicious of all-encompassing and perpetual visions of the individual and society, and therefore calls for continuous re-examination of knowledge and the pursuit of contingent meanings. As such, the term ‘liquid education’ can serve as an umbrella term under which can reside educational perspectives and pedagogical approaches such as ‘border pedagogy’ (Giroux, 1988) and deconstruction-inspired views of education (Biesta & Egéa-Kuehne, 2001), as well as various other types of so-called postmodern educational perspectives. What all these approaches share in common is a radically critical view of foundations (in terms of ethics and knowledge), stable meanings and universalised thought in general. Such approaches are all about being open to change. This is why ‘liquid modernity’ is depicted as leaning towards the ‘openness of change’ dimension. Two brief points should be addressed with regard to the manner in which liquid types of education are depicted here. First, there is the question of whether or not the philosophy instructing liquid educational approaches promotes or reinforces conservative (neocapitalist) values and social constellations (thus favouring a depiction leaning more towards the ‘conservation’ pole). While an adequate response to this question lies well beyond the boundaries of this present discussion, what is undeniable, regardless of the possible socio-political repercussions of the philosophy underlying liquid approaches, is their underlying commitment to the continuous reconfiguration of meanings and knowledge as well as continuous personal transformation. A second consideration is the issue of whether liquid education leans more towards self-enhancement. For Bauman, the mission of education is ‘preparing the young to life’ (Bauman, 2011, p. 10), and this means successful conduct in the social and economic spheres. At least in Bauman’s case, the functional-instrumental empowerment of individuals is certainly emphasised. However, various other educational approaches inspired by a postmodern ethics can be seen to be more committed to ‘other-regarding’ values; thus, a ‘movement’ towards self-transcendence is advisable in such cases. Nevertheless, ‘self-transcendence’, certainly in Schwartz’s model, concerns universal value-orientations that are conceptually incompatible with liquid educational sensibilities. Thus, while liquid education consists of different approaches reflecting a range of value commitments along the self-enhancement-self-transcendence dimension, they are still to be demarcated from approaches committed to universalistic types of change-oriented visions of the ‘good’, such as transformative-critical educational approaches.

IX. TRANSFORMATIVE-CRITICAL EDUCATION

By transformative-critical education, we mean types of education that are, on the one hand, ideologically committed to the ongoing critical re-examination of (neo-liberal) social structures (knowledge and social practices) and thus are essentially change-oriented. Yet, on the other hand, these change processes are grounded on universal values such as equality, social justice and tolerance. Another way of demarcating liquid from critical-transformative education is distinguishing between deconstructive and reconstructive forms of thinking (Sarid, 2017b). Transformative-critical educational approaches encompass a range of educational views applying the critical theories of thinkers such as Friere and Habermas. Consider how Mezirow, a representative example, defines transformative learning:

… is learning that transforms problematic frames of reference-sets of fixed assumptions and expectations (habits of mind, meaning perspectives, mindsets) to make them more inclusive, discriminating, open, reflective, and emotionally able to change. Such frames of reference are better than others because they are more likely to generate beliefs and opinions that will prove more true or justified to guide action. (Mezirow, 2003, pp. 58-59)

All the central characteristics of a critical-transformative approach unfold in the above definition. Most visible here is the dual commitment to change and universalised notions of truth and justification. While some educational approaches within this group will lean more towards critique and change, others may be more committed to the development of a democratic will-formation entailing a universal morality.

X. CONCLUSION

The present classification or grouping of the four generic types of education can be regarded as theoretically self-serving in the sense that each of them can be more or less conveniently connected to Schwartz’s scale. As generic types, each represents a range of mostly homogeneous approaches and therefore excludes conceptual complexity or intricacy. To be sure, some educational theories and models in the educational literature might be characterised as intersecting or overlapping the four generic types; admittedly, the above classification is certainly not exhaustive. Perhaps the most prominent type of education omitted from the above classification is the liberal-modernist educational model, which, to my mind, reflects varying intermediate degrees of each dimension, depending on the particular liberal view one upholds. This might partly explain the broad acceptance of the liberal (modernist) model and its enduring prevalence in most educational systems despite profound social changes (Sarid, 2017a). Consider
the representation of liberal education when connected to Schwartz’s scale. The dotted lines indicate possible movements along both dimensions, each movement representing increasing commitments to either pole of the bi-dimensional model. However, we claim that in prevailing modernist-liberal educational models, the relations or proportions between the two dimensions will remain more or less balanced. For instance, while liberal models are principally committed to the values of attaining objective truth and knowledge, they are nonetheless committed to promoting the individual’s capacity to develop his or her own understandings within more open-ended learning processes, and growing educational space to express uniqueness and creativity. Now, the meeting of these two commitments (objective Truth and personal expression), as the Schwartz scale underscores, does not entail a logical contradiction; the two commitments may certainly reside within a particular model or approach. However, there will certainly be some tensions or at time collisions between them in practice. This is why we claim that an ‘authentic’ modernist orientation contains within it an in-built conflict between two different educational impulses (Sarid, 2017a; Habermas, 1997). Regardless of whether one accepts how the four generic types have been depicted here and the specific manner in which each has been connected to Schwartz’s value scale, we believe the theory of education offered here contributes to the understanding of what education is and specifies the operational dimensions responsible for defining the nature and meaning of each different type of educational perspective or approach. While the merits of this theory are open to future discussion, we argue that what is gained is not only conceptual clarity but also a sound methodological basis for further research.

REFERENCES


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