Abstract: This article provides a comparative analysis on the post-1974 crisis leadership of Ethiopia. For this purpose, the 1989 coup d'état and the post-2015/16 protracted instability were selected. Methodologically, descriptive analysis has been employed based on the data gained from an array of secondary and primary sources of data. The 1989 coup was plotted by the military chiefs of the armed forces against Mengistu Hailemariam`s regime. The regime had considered this crisis as a threat. As a result, the crisis decisions had emphasized on defusing blames, and defending the status quo. Negotiations and power sharing scheme were discredited. The systemic problem had denied both in problem analysis and crisis responses. On the other hand, in post-1991, ethno-nationalism has been recognized to be the vortex of the political norms. The extreme politicization of ethnicity constrained the shared vision of the people. The spaces for democratic struggles have banned which resulted in the formation of nominal opposition groups. Generally, the problems were both systemic and implementation though the government did not recognize the prevalence of a systemic problem. In its decisions, the regime has considered the crisis as a threat—not as an opportunity—though it has certain deviances from the former in its attempt to use legal and political measures. Therefore, it is recommended that the incumbent government need to consider the crises as an opportunity to adopt systemic reforms.