

The Role of HMI in Socio-Political Change (A Case Study of Indonesia Under Soeharto Power, 1978-1998)

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DOI: 10.29322/IJSRP.8.5.2018.p7748

<http://dx.doi.org/10.29322/IJSRP.8.5.2018.p7748>

I. INTRODUCTION

This article guides a stepwise walkthrough by Experts for writing a successful journal or a research paper starting from inception of ideas till their publications. Research papers are highly recognized in scholar fraternity and form a core part of PhD curriculum. Research scholars publish their research work in leading journals to complete their grades. In addition, the published research work also provides a big weight-age to get admissions in reputed varsity. Now, here we enlist the proven steps to publish the research paper in a journal.

HMI is a Muslim University Students Association in Indonesia and it was founded on February 1947 in Yogyakarta town Central Java when Indonesian nation was in the midst of struggle for defence of independent proclamation from the menace of Dutch colonialism which was trying to reoccupy the country. The objective of HMI is put forward first time by Lafran Pane on the occasion of conference of Persatuan Pelajar Indonesia, PPI (Islamic Student Union) held in Ponorogo East Java from 4th to 6th November 1947.¹ In this paper I would like to describe more on the role of this muslim youth organisation in the change of Socio politics of Indonesia during the Soeharto regime from 1978 up to 1998.

In the history of Indonesian politics, Christian Snouch Hurgronje, Soekarno and Soeharto have applied Ali Abdul Raziq's notion. Even in the New Order regime, President Soeharto handled the Islamic affair in the country based on the separation between religion and politics. The main reason of the two former Indonesian Presidents taking the decision was experience of the politics apparently weakened, the role of its religious and social dimensions has developed and flourished from time to time until today.²

Like the view of former President Soekarno and secular nationalist group the HMI is of the view that Islam without political party became stronger. If the view of President Soeharto

was predicated on political reasons, the HMI's view was based on religious motivation, namely to make Islam a religion that helped to unite the entire people in order to gain the national interest, and the desire of togetherness, although the religious view was definitely quite different to those of historical Muslim thought.³

The motto of creating "*the intellectual-ulama and the ulama-intellectual*" is the other factor which indicated the strong desire of the HMI to live as devote Muslims amidst the Indonesian cultural milieu. The effort meant to prepare the leadership of the ummah to enabled them to formulate the religious and social notions needed for development. The encouragement to put broader human concern into doctrines of Islam, and interpret Qur'anic doctrine as social justice was indeed a useful contribution and appreciate to be taken up by the HMI, not only for the religious development of the Ummah, but even to meet demands for justice and prosperity of all Indonesian people.

The MHI has been adopted the concept of *amal saleh* (good deed) within the Qur'an as their notion on the development of humankind. The HMI's stand like this was inspired by Fazlur Rahman's suggestion to determine what is the best for the future of Islam and takes into consideration what is fundamental Islam, and what is historical Islam.⁴ The struggle for universal Islamic values, the HMI as an organization of young Muslim intellectuals could accept for meeting the demands of modern Indonesian people without forcibly alienating it from the basic Islamic doctrines.

That the above concept of HMI for development could be seen as relevance to the general development and has lasted in the country under the New order's sponsorship.

The Indonesian development has shown a paradoxical implementation of models of the development between liberal model of Talcott Parson and conservative model of Huntington. In the Personian

Paradigm, development means change of social and economic structure and shift from a traditional system to a

¹ Agussalim Sitompul, Sejarah Perjuangan HMI (Surabaya, Bina Ilmu, 1976), p.30

² Victor Tanja, HMI, Sejarah dan Kedudukannya, dalam Pergerakan-Pergerakan Muslim Modern, *Jakarta, Suara Harapan, 1991) p..142

³ Cragg, Kenneth, *The Call of The Minaret*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 159

⁴ Rahman, Fazlur, *Islam*, New York : Doubleday & Co., 1968, p. 310

modern one that my result in social mobilization, development, while in the Huntington paradigm, becomes a combination of modernity and tradition with an effective government.⁵

The first paradox is that national development in Indonesia, has to some extent, adopted elements of a liberal development by the creation of modern forms of social and economic structures, yet in the meantime reviving classical indigenous traditions. The second paradox lay in the fact of economic liberalisation at the cost of strong political control.

Strong evidence of that kind of development is to be found in the two different directions of structural transformation that occurred in the economic field and the political one respectively. Structural transformation in the economy already seen in a shift of the income of society from agriculture sector in the agro industry, industry in profit sectors.

The change civic polities, on the other hand, indicated structural transformation in polity, by Praetorians. According to Huntington, the civic polity is a type of politics in which one or more independent political forces dominate social forces, whereas praetorian power of a government is that which is not controlled by the political parties.⁶ The latter term might not fit in to Indonesian politics very well, but some elements of Praetorianism were discernible in the New Order government, such as the absence of and independent effective political force, the strength of the bureaucracy in decision-making, and its expansion and interference into almost all social spheres.

In relation to the “ ideology ” of development, a Praetorianistic polity has, of course, a political logic of its own, such as an argument for the necessity of national stability for the success and sustainability of development itself. The accentuation of national stability has been one of the characteristics of the New Order’s political engineering. Political institutionalization in this respect is reflected in the security and monolithic approaches exercised by the New Order government. As a consequence, the degree of political participation has been weakened, particularly because political parties, as vehicles of political expression, were not able to articulate the political interest of the people.

The political institutionalization achieved thus far has not encouraged people’s political participation, because the institutionalization process only strengthened what Professor Liddle has called the “ New Order Pyramid “. ⁷ This pyramid consist of a dominant presidency, which becomes the centre of decision-making, and pattern of state society relationship that combines co-optation and response with repression.

According to Liddle, the mechanism of the New Order political structure departs from the presidency at the top giving commands to the military which is a most important element of the bureaucracy and, which in turn, exercises power over society, The whole process of political engineering has effectively created a relatively stable condition of relationship between state and society, or between the ruler and the ruled.

⁵ See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* : New Haven and London, 1968, p. 80-83

⁶ R. William Liddle, “Soeharto ‘s Indonesia, Personal Rule and Political Institution” in *Pacific Affairs*, No. 58, 1985, pp. 68-90

⁷ Nasir Tamara, “Islam Under the New Order : A. Political History”, in *Prisma* (English Edition), No. 49, June, 1990, p. 14

It is in such a political setting that the depoliticization of Islam has been processed. The manner of the process took the form of getting rid Islamic symbols for political activities, eliminating Islamic political parties, and clearing the political arena of Muslim politicians. The depoliticization of Islam has reached its culmination in terms of political vehicle in the amalgamation of all existing Islamic political parties into PPP in 1973, and in terms of political ideology in the obligation to adopt Pancasila as the *asas tunggal* (the sole basis) by all political parties and mass organizations in 1985.

The depoliticization of Islam was part of a broader target, namely the depoliticization of the people in general. This was seen in the creation of a floating mass population. Which depoliticized people at the grass root level and alienated political leaders from their followers. The streamlining of political parties followed this in to Golkar, the PPP, and the PDI. Islamic political parties responded in a relativists “ easy “ way toward this streamlining, though the story behind the creation of the PPP is not simple, as Nasir Tamara reported.

From the beginning, NU was the largest member. Although initially not very keen on merging, NU eventually joined without internal conflict. On the other hand, there was unrest within PSII resulting in a leadership change, which was won by pro-merger people. On the other hand, Parmusi and Perti supported a quick merger from the start.⁸

This “ easy and quick response “ was due in part to the situational logic of politics at the time that led political parties to follow the current of political engineering, and in part to an “intrinsic competition” among Islamic political groups to be seen as the first supporter of the regime.

Escaping from the obligation not to include any mention of Islam in the new party’s name, Muslim leaders have chosen the term *persatuan*

(unity and *pembangunan* (development). They hoped by so doing not to delete some mention of Islam, because the term *persatuan* indicates one of the most important principles of Islam. They also hoped that the amalgamation would provide them with *Hikmah* (in Indonesia language understood, interalia, in the sense of blessing in disguise). To establish *ukhuwan Islamiah* (taken from Arabic words) namely Islamic brotherhood. The adoption of the term *pembangunan* was perceived as agreement with and support for the New Order’s policy of development. It is possible that the use of the term’s *persatuan* and *pembangunan* was meant to convey a message that the PPP, the “Islamic” party, had emerged to gain the support of the Muslim community in order to participate in the national development process.

It is notable that Muslims responses to the political change during the first ten years of the New Order (1996-1976) which, in relation to the agenda for the depoliticization of Islam, might be identified as a “period of conditioning” appeared more political in nature, although with critical accommodation. Little intellectual response was shown, such as elaboration on the relationship between Islam and the state, the Pancasila, and

⁸ Muhammad Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses ti “New Order” Modernization in Indonesia,* (Kuala Lumpur, 1980), pp. 78-116

politics with the exception of the accommodationalist responses of Mintaredja and Nurcholis Madjid.⁹

Mintaredja (then the chairman of Parmusi and later President of the PPP) in his reflection on Islam and the Pancasila considered that Islam does not aims at the creation of an Islamic state because during the time of Prophet Muhammad, the term “state” in the sense of state as we knew it today was not yet in existence.¹⁰

In the Mintaredja’s view that the major duty of Muslims is to struggle for creating a true Muslim society which, should be distinguished from an Islamic state. A Muslim society could legitimately exist in a state without undermining its integrity as the nation-state.¹¹

Concerning of relationship between Islam and politics. Mintaredja at the meantime believed in the totalistic character of Islam as a way of life, including political life. He maintains that the political issues are worldly in nature and as such an approach to political issues should be in accordance with its nature.

The slogan promoted by Nurcholish Madjid (than a national chairman of the HMI) on the eve of the 1970’s “ Islam-Yes, Islamic party-No “ is similar in nature. The idea is one of the main points of this “ his renewal project “ which as severely criticised by many Muslims.¹²

Having observed the problems of Indonesia Islam, which lay in the paradox between the defeat of politicised Islam and the rapid expansion of it, Nurcholish Madjin came to the conclusion that Islam’s quantitative growth was not encouraged by the Islamic parties or Islam organizations, for the Islamic parties had failed to build a positive and sympathetic image of Islam.¹³

According to H. Munawir Sjadzali, in certain circumstances, the absence of the Islamic political parties was better for Muslims. The experiences of national life in the past view years clearly showed that the Muslim ummah’s interests were even served at the time when there was no Muslim party in the Indonesian political sphere, he said.¹⁴

From the start of the New Order, especially in the last decade, many expectations of Muslim for the improvement and religious infrastructure and facilities have been sufficiently met. In the past, at the time when Muslim parties were presents, the

⁹ H. M. S. Mintaredja, *Renungan Pembaharuan Pemikiran : Masyarakat Islam dan Politik di Indonesia*, (Jakarta, 1971), p. 77

¹⁰ H.M.S. Mintaredja, *Renungan Pembaharuan Pemikiran: Masyarakat Islam dan Politik di Indonesia*, (Jakarta, 1971), p. 78

¹¹ For more detailed in this account, see *Nurcholish Madjid, Keharusan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah Integrasi Ummat*, (Jakarta, Islamic Reseach Centre, 1970)., pp/ 1-12

¹² *Nurcholish Madjid, Keharusan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah Integrasi Ummat*, (Jakarta, Islamic Reseach Centre, 1970).

¹³ H. Munawir Sjadzali, *Muslim ‘ sInterests are Better Served in The Absence of Muslim Parties*, (Indonesia Experience), Jakarta, m. 1992, p. 2

¹⁴ H.Munawir Sjadzali, *Muslim’ sInterestsAre Better Served in the Absence of Muslim Partie* (Jakarta, Department of Religious Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1992) p.3

same expectations had never been fulfilled. The following examples could be advanced.

In the field of law, for instance, with the passing of law No. 14 of 1970’s on judicial Authority the existence of Religious Court of Law (read: Islamic Court) is fully recognized as an independent court of law and equal to the other three Courts of law: Public Court, Administrative Court, and Military Court, This law was then followed by the enactment of law No. 7 of 1989 on Religious Court, some of which had prevailed for more than 100 years, and at the same times served as the realization of the stipulation contained in law No. 14 of 1970 on the independence of the Religious Court, to the other three law.

In this context, it should be noted that in 1948, a Muslim party brought up a proposal for the improvement of religious court status to KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, or the Indonesian National Central Committee) which, at the time, served as provisional parliament, but the proposal met with strong opposition from other parties or factions and, being a minority group at the time, that Muslim party could do nothing about it.¹⁵

Till in the development in the field of law, up to the year 1991, religious judges had no standardized books of law similar to the KUHP (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, or the Penal Code) for judges in the Public Court, in spite of the fact that the Religious Court had been established long before; the religious judges had to resort to numerous yet diverse reference *fiqh* books in dealing with the legal issues brought up by members of the community. As a result, it often happened that the two similar cases, headed by two different judges with two different books of reference, would result in two different verdicts, which meant that there was no legal.

The peculiar situation ended, once again, at the time of the New Order, in the absence of Muslim parties, with the issuance of a joint-decree of the President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of Religious Affairs on the establishment of an Islamic Law Compilation Project.

In December 1987, the project succeeded in completing three draft book of legal references to be used by the religious judges throughout Indonesia. The first book is on marriage, the second one about in Inheritance, and the third one on *waqf* (religious endowment). By the presidential instruction No. 1 of 1991, issues on June 10, 1991 just one week before the President and his family made a pilgrim to Makkah, those three books were officially sanctioned and ordered to be publicly used.

In the field of education. The Indonesian people has law No. 2 of 1989 on National Education System, in which religious education is affirmed to be a sub-system to the National Education System, and religious instruction is compulsory at all public schools and universities. The law also reaffirmed recognition to the long existing religious education institutions in conformity with the claim of the New Order that the state which, is based on Pancasila is neither a theocratic nor a secular state.

In the relation to houses of worship there has been a sharp increase in the number of *mosques* and *mushalla* including over

¹⁵ Robert W. Hefner, “*Islam, State, and Civil Society : ICMI and The Strategy for the Indonesia Middle Class*, Indonesia, October, 1993, p. 11

500 strong and beautiful mosques built by the Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila (Muslim Charity Foundation) Chaired by President Soeharto.

In the realm of *daawah* (Islamic propagation), it is well know that the major weakness of socio-Islamic organizations is a serious lack of financial back up. An international Islamic organization once promised to help the financing of 1000 preachers for the whole country. However, the realization was only for 300 preachers, far below the target, and later the number went down to just a little more than 100. To cope with that unfavourable situation and being fully aware of the urgency for religious guidance in the remote and isolated areas especially in the transmigration locations President Soeharto urged the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, or The Indonesian Council of Ulama) to prepare 1000 da'I (preachers) for religious duties in transmigration sites. They would receive Rp. 100.000 per month for the period of three years as financial support from the Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila. The same foundation has also donated financial support for other 1000 imams for transmigration sites channelled through the MDI (Majelis Dakwah Islamiah, or The Council for Islamic Preaching).

During the old order regime under President Soekarno and still more so under the New Order regime of his successor Soeharto, the Indonesian government was directly or indirectly involved in the construction of many mosques and the development of public institutions of Islamic religious education, from the primary school to the IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, or The State Islamic Institute for Islamic Studies).¹⁶

The new order regime, on order hand, has started for the depoliticization of Islam which, was primarily materialized by a ban on political parties based exclusively on Islam or its particularities; it favoured the development of Islamic values in the social, cultural and intellectual spheres of life, in order to create the so-called "ethical" basis of national development.

Up to present time, Islam often functions as a source of motivation for demands of adjustment of different aspects of government policy. In the demands, the Islamic motive is generally combined with other reasons and motives, of a cultural, social, economic or political nature. An example is the movement for the democratization of the political system which has been growing for some years now. Its background is partly based on Islamic values, legal notions and organization.

The Islamic element was still more prominent in the recent campaign for the abolition of the SDSB (Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah, or social philanthropically Contribution with Prizes) lottery, In which formal arguments about Islamic law were combined with the denunciation of growing social and economic disparities. The latter campaign finally attained its goal on November 25, 1993, when minister of social Affairs announced the discontinuation of the lottery. However, at present Islam is seldom a source of criticism of the political system or the public authorities as a whole in the country.

The HMI observed that the view of Munawir sadzali is true in certain aspects of development; but in the other it was insufficient, particularly, in order to develop a democratic

political system. The HMI is of the view that the time has come when the need of political reform has become urgent.

It is an interpretation of commitment and responsibility of the HMI as child of the nation as well as an intellectual community.

According to Anas Urbaningrum,¹⁷ the national chairman of the HMI in 1995-1997, the reform concerning the main bases of having a society, nation and state should be radical, fundamental and systematic. The main agenda of the Indonesian nation in the years to come is to develop steady and matured social system and structure based on appropriate foundations. The strong and matured system able to anticipate needs in each sphere and demands of smooth social change without much turbulence.

The HMI is of view that the promise of the New Order government to broaden the Pancasila democracy in practical politics is only lip service. The organization considered that political democracy could not be built by political slogan only; it is possible only by way of creating healthy and qualified interaction among all political forces. This need a strong state with an effective government and a strong society with autonomy of people whit character. The effective administration could safeguard the social order and run the public service, while the antonymous people who have character would guarantee the growth of critical participants and emancipators of culture.¹⁸

The democratic Tradition that can accord respect to diversity should be tough at practical level. The politics of concentration of power and the policy of incorporation in operation since long should be reviewed. Indeed, the politics of concentration is not only not relevant to the democratic tradition, but is also contrary to the heterogeneous social nature of the Indonesian people. The motto *Bhinekka Tunggal Ika* or Unity In Diversity, is a cultural treasure of the Indonesian people which quite relevance to be practiced in real practical life. The selection of public service officials should represent and respect this pluralistic society.

The strong demand for democracy and healthy political activity have forced the government to review political life, together with the legislative institutions to review the rules of political game. From time to time the people awareness towards their rights as citizens has increased, including right to politics and implementation of the clean government by the New Order administration.

While speaking in the student study Forum of the HMI in September, 1993, chief of socio-political staff of the ABRI, Lt. General Hariyoto P.S remarked that the ABRI's interest in the established political system in Indonesia is for the cause of national stability. In stable political system, all kinds of people's demand could be accommodated properly.¹⁹

According to him, stability is always to be associated with public pressure and demand should be implemented with security approach. He recognized the worried of many if the demands are not accommodated properly it would invite mass frustration In

¹⁷ *Graha Insan Cita, Pidato Ketua Umum PB HMI pada Dies Natalis ke 51, February, 5 di Depok, 1992, , p. 8*

¹⁸ *Republika, September, 1993*

¹⁹ *Graha Insan Cita, Pidato Ketua Umum PB HMI pada Dies Natalis ke 51 Fwbruary 5, 1992 di Depok Jawa Barat.*

¹⁶ *Graha Insan Cita, Pidato Ketua Umum PB HMI pada Dies Natalis ke 51, February 5, 1998, Depok, p. 7*

people, and aggressive action by authority,²⁰ an it turn, would lead to socio-political unrest.

In the last years of Soeharto administration, the political dynamism

In the country has increased. After short period of decline following the repression of the Megawati²¹ supporter on 27 July 1996, a surge of democratic waves appeared throughout the archipelago. Reminiscent of the last days of Soekarno, the current democracy movements has been championed by the university student who launched their protest in response to the government which is seen as being incapable of controlling the crisis and its negative impacts on the life of the people.

The politics off de-politicization of Soeharto consists of two strategies; the direct and indirect one. The first has been target to the rural masses, which constitute bulk of In Indonesian population (approximately 70 percent). It has taken the form of the so-called “floating mass” policy, the purpose of which is to limit the activities of political parties as far as the district level. The underlying assumption of the particular policy is to protect people from political manipulation by competing parties, which had occurred in the past and engendered political instability and promoted social disturbance.

The second strategy, namely the indirect strategy of de-politicization has been implemented through various mechanisms, most important of which have been the state's corporatization, co-optation, and ideological hegemony. Through the corporatist mechanism, the state is able to exert systematic control and surveillance over the existing interest groups in society through direct intervention in their existing organizations.

According to the Lt. General (ret.) Rudini,²² the rise of the people political awareness should be accompanied also with the rise of the government's role and socio-political structure. It was quite important in order to meet the development demands, their aspirations and aggregation of people's political interest could be developed to become “affirmation potential” for sustained national development, not just “trouble-maker potential” which hampers national integration.

Accordingly, the role of the ABRI, the political parties, the Golkar and all the existing mass organization, including youth organizations, should be enhanced maximally so that they could participate to increase the national awareness and to boost national unity in order to realize the national ideals based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

As custodians of people's aspirations all political parties and Golkar were expected to participate actively in enhancing of the quality of development and democracy. In this connection, the role of political institutions should be maximized.

All socio-political forces in the country should work to prepare the people qualified for development and capable of channelling the socio-political aspirations of the grass-root

people; they are expected to serve the interest of the society, the nation and the state properly and consistently. Unfortunately, these political parties, particularly the Golkar as ruling party was regarded as a political vehicle by its leaders for their self-interest, their families and their cronies.

The role of mass organizations as medium to articulate the people's interest should be advocated and supported continuously. The rise of all social institutions, including youth organizations is quite helpful to enhance the quality of political awareness in support of national unity and integration for better civilized Indonesian people in the future.²³

There are three Islamic university student organizations, namely the HMI (Islamic University Student Association), the PMII (Islamic University Student Movement), and the IMM (The Muhammadiyah University Student Union), and each of them has had a form of Cadre

Programme through training, usually it was range of training since primary level, mediums and advanced. Only HMI declared itself an independent organization. The other two; PMII and the IMM have been affiliated to the large Islamic religious organizations namely the NU and the Muhammadiyah.

The basis of membership of the HMI is quite unique. The largest section of the HMI membership is in the secular universities and colleges. On the contrary, most of the PMII membership is from Islamic religious colleges, particularly from the IAINs (the State Institutes for Islamic Studies) through the country and higher education institutions run by the private foundations, While those of IMM originated from Muhammadiyah higher education institutions, for instance, the Muhammadiyah universities and the IKIP (the Institute For Teacher and educators) Muhammadiyah.

As most of its members are from general universities; so in cadre formation, the HMI would try to provide sufficient Islamic knowledge for them. While those of them studying in the IAINs has been provided a general knowledge in order to bring them at par with their counterpart in the secular colleges and universities. This programme has been formulated on the beautiful motto i.e to create “the intellectual-ulama and the ulama-intellectual”.

The above motto has been programmed since the birth of HMI in 1947. Its main objective is to fill the vacuum of Muslim young intellectual circle, as ever has been done by the Jong Islamiten Bond (JIB) in Dutch colonial era. The JIB born on January 1, 1925 was dissolved as Japan came and annexed Indonesia.

Therefore, in those circumstances, the establishment of the HMI was in-spired by notion of the JIB with its “Islamic study club.” Hence, in

Several things, the HMI focused its concern on long-term purpose of the JIB, namely it would like to convince the Muslim young intellectual to complete their academic education, they should also understand Islam.

The formulation was a response to the prevailing challenge faced by Muslim university students in the secular universities and colleges. Deliar Noer, ex-national chairman of HMI, observed that the Muslim young intellectuals were keep away the Islamic doctrine by the secular educational system. According to

²⁰ Megawati Soekarno Putri is daughter of former Indonesia first President, Soekarno. She is also national chairwomen of the PDI Perjuangan, and known as a prominent opposition leader of the country along with Amin Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid.

²¹ HM Yusuf (ed), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, (Jakarta, LSAP, 1977), p. 132

²² HM Yusuf (ed), *51 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, (Jakarta, LSAP, 1977), p. 132-133

²³ HM Yusuf (ed), *HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman*, (Jakarta, LSAP, 1977), p. 136

him, such a problem had been faced by the JIB and still remained before the HMI.²⁴

Because secular education which was neutral towards the religious notion, they became alienated spaced from Islam. They tended to ignore the Islamic doctrine and the Shari'ah (Islamic Law). More than that the secular educational system created friction among the Muslim youth between those who ignored and those who obeyed the Islamic doctrine. Above all , because in Java island could be found the tendency of religious assimilation , their presence in the secular education affected to deeper friction between intermingle Muslim group and those who desired to purify the Shari'ah (Islamic Law) from all kind of derivations.

In order to ever come the above problems, Deliar Noer has given inspiration to develop nationalism based of the deepest religious heritage.

Deliar Noer believes that a nation which has identification with the religion of its majority population is a basic key for national unity and integration. Therefore , the Indonesian strength lay in its identification with Islam, and only Muslim which hardly endeavoured to develop the Islamic basis of nation potential become “ the ulama-intellectual and the intellectual-ulama “. ²⁵

The noble desire, which likely underlined the HMI programmes and activities. Which implemented through series of leadership training, has been going on until today. In each period of chairmanship, such activities tended to become conventional. The platform of the organization almost never changed from year to year, particularly in branch levels, which later occurred routinely and even obstinately.

According to Sudirman Tebba,²⁶ ex-activist of Ciputat branch of HMI, the programme of HMI is to achieve the objective of ideal man as stated by the government through the improvement measure of religious education in secular universities and syllabus of the IAINs throughout the country. IAlthough its formulation was different from the HMI's platform, yet as stipulated by the 1983 GBHN (the Guidelines of State Policy) that the objective of national education is the enhancement of faith and devotion to the One and Only God, of intelligence and skill, of character, and of personality and spirit of nationhood and love of homeland.

The above formulation placed the enhancement of faith and devotion to the one only God as the top priority in the national education objective. It was indicated that religious education in secular higher education should get the man concern. One fact of the seriousness is the ongoing perfection of the Islamic religious subjects in the secular higher education.

After long time the religious subject was given in the conventional way, and today in the secular universities, the Islamic concept of any discipline (IDI) was already taught. This indication is one step ahead with relating the process of science and technology to Islamisation. Besides, it has developed many

ways to delve deep into Islamic doctrine in various fields like in economics, politics, culture etc.

One the other side, the New Order administration policies generally weakened all Islamic university student organizations. Since its established, the New Order government engaged in bringing about economic development and repressing all political opponents and mass and religious organizations. This phenomenon is peculiar of neo-fascists, not only in Indonesia, but it was also common to several third world countries like Brazil, Argentina and Iran under Syah Riza Pahlavi.²⁷

Although the real political condition was non-conductive for all-political parties and mass organization activists, the HMI remained to serve for the benefits of ummah. Under the real and reasonable approach, according to Adi Sasono,²⁸ the cadres of HMI whether in infra or in suprastructure have made an endless contribution, throughout in the time when the Indonesian people were struggling to defend the State against the colonial effort to reoccupy, or in the period of national character building, and at the time of consolidating the freedom. Because the HMI and the KAMI activist were also thinkers in the development sectors, the contribution is quite valuable. And up to today, the HMI is the largest organization in the campuses of the country.

Each cadre of HMI is expected to be doing something of or the ummah wherever they lived and worked. The cadre outside government structure became writer, columnist, analyst and critic. Their actions are as pure activists functional outside the system, and have a function to remember and put forwarded a healthy norm for national life. This group is usually called ‘ pressure group “. ²⁹

Meanwhile, there is also a group who entered the system. This group called institutionalist, which struggled from within the structure. Some of Them succeeded in supporting the processes of change from within the structure. However there was a group disinclined to motivating the change process from within. Beside that, there was professionalist group which was neutral towards power system. They tended to work related to the justice aspect, even distribution and freedom. They have given contribution, but their activities have not influenced to the wider social issues. They worked sectorally in their own field.

Therefore, a novel idea was needed to resume their activities and responsibilities based on professionalism. They did not need to do dichotomy between those worked in the state institutions and outside of it. But, they should develop togetherness in order to realize the sovereignty of the nation effectively.

As the ideal cadres of HMI, they did not get trapped in seminar activity and regarded at as escape from problems faced by the Indonesian society. Also if they worked in government offices, not automatically the ideal job as HMI's cadre will be over? They needed to be aware that the social change process toward the right direction is quite complicated process requiring

²⁴ HM Yusuf (ed), *HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman*,(Jakarta, LSAP, 1977), p. 137

²⁵ HM Yusuf (ed), *HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman*,(Jakarta, LSAP, 1977) p.139

²⁶ HM Yusuf (ed), *HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman*,(Jakarta, LSAP, 1977) , p. 147

²⁷ Adi Sasono is ex-activist of Bandung branch HMI. Since May 1998 President B. J. Habibie appointed him as minister economic, co-operative and weak entrepreneurship development.

²⁸ HM Yusuf (ed), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*,(Jakarta, LSAP, 1977),. p. 155

²⁹ HM Yusuf (ed), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*,(Jakarta, LSAP, 1977) ., p. 156

collaboration with the other side or institutions, which existed in the government institution as well as outside of it.

They needed to focus on the mass approach and practical action and more attention to the professionalism in their own field. It was a development of political education agenda.³⁰

Democracy is a social process and also a learning one. The social control towards the decision-making which quite often not inclined to justice was also time-consuming. To implement democracy shortcuts and romantic measures are not enough.

The idea of revolution which is quite often talked in certain circle, particularly the radical young generation, did not offer the way-out of the ummah problems, because the problems were very complicated and needed to discern the importance off all socials forces to operationalise collective awareness.

In this connection, could be seen the role off intellectual organizations like the KAHMI, ICMI or the other, to develop a positive interaction. In order to struggle for justice and even distribution which did not end with lip-service. Slogan and philanthropy programmes inclined to defend status-quo. Theoretically, there is no difference between philanthropy programmes and even distribution one. The gift of philanthropy programmes is to provide a social agenda, but it did not have impact of concrete economic structure. What has been expected by the society is even distribution programmes and has the impact on the productive asset of entrepreneurship.³¹

It is hard to imagine that without support of the KAHMI, the ICMI could play a significant role and become the prestigious organization that it is today. Vast majority of ICMI is also members of the KAHMI. The main job of HMI's alumnus is to become catalyst of the development for empowerment of the people. This job covered agendas of rapid reform in social, economic and political renewal in the society. The economic and political democracy is a necessity, and the KAHMI has a role to guide and push up the political process within the framework of Pancasila democracy.³² It is no exaggeration to say that the success of all programmes of ICMI in economic and socio-political fields in the country is caused by the KAHMI's support as one of the factors, "because both in the centre (Jakarta), and in the districts, the majority members of ICMI are members of KAHMI too."³³

While receiving PB HMI on August 13, 1993, vice President Try Sutrisno said that the globalization era demanded the quite tight competition, more advanced society and openness of action. As the natural resource decreased from time and all sectors needed better management.³⁴

In order to response the suggestions, the national chairman of HMI, Yahya Zaini agreed to the call of vice President, and stressed the importance of better political education. According to him, in the frame of political education, the HMI wanted that

³⁰ HM Yusuf (ed), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, (Jakarta, LSAP, 1977), p. 154

³¹ HM Yusuf (ed), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik* (Jakarta, LSAP, 1977), p. 157

³² HM Yusuf (ed), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, (Jakarta, LSAP, 1977) p.157

³³ *Pidato Ketua Umum PB HMI pada Dies Natalis ke 51*, op. cit., p. 15

³⁴ *Kompas*, August 14, 1993

the following issues must be included namely Pancasila as an ideological foundation, nationhood outlook and religious outlook.

Yayha Zaini remarked that essence of nationalist outlook is the unity and the integration as a motivator, mover and cement in every struggle of the Indonesian people.³⁵

Regarding the economic crisis, the HMI through its national chairman, Anas Urbaingrum³⁶ has expressed its apprehension. According to him, the monetary crisis of the country has given us the most important lessons and it has a bitter impact on the grass-root level people.

The lessons were: First that the innate strength of economic globalization. The foreign debt should be utilized for the maximum benefit of people and their prosperity. Second that a tiny group of society could not develop the strength of economic foundation. Strength of the tiny group caused the collapse of national economy and disrupt distribution.

At the practical level, the above constructive suggestions were not implemented by the government so that the apprehensions appeared and raised a huge social unrest and deep economic crisis in the country.

The deepening economic crisis was being matched by a growing political crisis Soeharto was facing a people who had slowly and painfully begun to recover from the terrible defeat of 1965. The first major sign of the revival of resistance came in 1974 when a million people spilled onto the streets during widespread student protests. Yet they were also brought together as workers, and as "the 1980s progressed they began to use their collective strength to strike for better wages and working conditions with some success."³⁷

By 1996 the dissatisfaction against the Soeharto regime was spreading up to sections of the ruling and middle classes, who were being excluded from the profit and corruption bonanza by Soeharto's cronies. Protests at various levels were mounting throughout th to come. The idea behind creating of the ICMI is not revealed instantly, but it has historically a deep root in the last 30 years.

In the beginning of 1960's, some of Santri alumnus entered the Universities and Collages. Seven years later, the boom of educated scholars from the Santri cultural background occurred. After graduation, they became bureaucrats. During developing their career, for few years, they hid their Islamhood and after they occupied an important position, they begun to act foe "Islamisation" of offices, departments, or campuses. The managers and the leaders of the office held *pengajian* or teaching of Islamic doctrines and performed congregation prayers in the place where they worked. And lecturers revived the religious activities in the campus.³⁸

The former HMI activists occupied the important positions in the governance, for example, Arifin Siregar, Hasyirul Harahap, Abdul Ghofur, Azwar Anas, Akbare Tanjung, Mari'e

³⁵ *Kompas*, August 14, 1993

³⁶ International Socialism, *A Quarterly Journal of Socialist Theory*, Autumn 1998, p. 11

³⁷ HM Yusuf (ed), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, (Jakarta, LASPI, 1977), p.132

³⁸ Jalaluddin Rakhmat, *Islam Aktual, Refleksi-Sosial Seorang Cendekiawan Muslim*, cet. IX, (Bandung, Mizan, 1996, p. 101

Muhammad and so on. The number of educated Muslims has increased. They needed a container to channel their aspiration. They have an intention to play wider role in contributing to the development process. The role could be effective if they joined hand with the bureaucrats in decision-making. In the bureaucrats should be attracted to join the intellectuals outside bureaucracy, or non-bureaucrat-intellectuals should be called for merging with the bureaucracy.³⁹

The birth of ICMI was expected to determine Indonesian Muslim history in the year to come. Gradually, to fulfil the aspiration of ummah to colour the decision-making, the ICMI would like to become a platform to collect the ideas of Muslim intellectuals. The ICMI is a non-political movement, although it was bound to Islamic commitment, the ICMI was not intended to revive primordialism, because it thought in terms of entire Indonesian people. In Azyumardi Azra's words, the ICMI will become "brain-trust" of the New Order government in the years to come.⁴⁰

According to Ridwan Saidi, ex-national chairman of HMI in 1974-1976 the birth of ICMI was an inseparable part of the will Muslim scholars for vertical mobility. Because in the early of 1960s, there were thousands of Muslim scholars and they did not enter party was not likely to recruit a Muslim intellectual in top position. Second, the intellectuals felt that their views were not at home with the existing Islamic parties, because their social origin did not have roots in prevailing Islamic parties.⁴¹

In order to resolve the deadlock, they constituted the Persami (The Indonesian Muslim Scholar Union) in 1964. While the New Order came into being, some of Muslim scholars headed by Subchan, Z.E, from NU element withdraw from the Persami, and established ISII (Ikatan Sarjana Islam Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslim Scholar association) affiliated to the NU party. Unfortunately the two Muslim scholars associations never displayed their activities so that even many Muslim scholars did not know them.

When the Parmusi emerged on surface, a lot at Muslim scholars put their hope on it. Some of them joined the Sekber Golkar. Through the Golkar and Parmusi, Muslim intellectuals channelled their vertical mobility. In the 1970 the government restructured political parties and organizations on a large scale. The Islamic political parties were merged in one party. Islamic mass organizations were separated from political organization, and engaged in social activities. In the year 1985, the political renewal and consolidation reached its culmination with the enforcement of *asas tunggal* Pancasila. Since then, legally there was not any other Islamic party. And then the years after in 1990 established the ICMI that was supported by the New Order government as a viable alternative to channel their socio-political activities. The vast majority of ummah initially welcomed it with respect.

In general, there were different approaches the Muslim leaders to the modern-challenges: legal, cultural, and social transformation. Legalistic approach aimed at revamping the existing order and society under the blur-print of Islamic legal,

³⁹ Jalaluddin Rahmat, *Islam Aktual, Refleksi Sosial Seorang Cendekiawan Muslim, cet.IX (Bandung, Mizan, 1996) p.101*

⁴⁰ *Berita Buana*, December 7, 1990

⁴¹ *Kompas*, December 8, 1990

ritual and formalistic precept. Islamic doctrine and laws to became the sole arbiter and standard of reference in all practices and affairs in the society.

The cultural approach is aimed at distilling methods from Islamic teachings, which are capable of integrating non-religious sphere (secularist part) into a new totality of Islamic framework of development.⁴² The idea of ICMI that efforts for modernity are efforts to develop parallel institutions (banking, scientific enterprises, economic, politics, etc.) under Islamic teaching.

The transformation approach aimed at seeking solutions to the problems of modernity by avoiding exclusivist attitude both towards neo-orthodox and non-Islamic aspirations. It advocated accommodative attitude and introduced disturbing questions related to the central doctrine of orthodoxy. Therefore the leading advocates of ICMI like H.M Soerhato and Prof. Dr. B.J Habibie would like to mould ICMI on the ideology of Pancasila, close to Indonesian culture, "Modern-Muslim", and high quality Muslim.

The leading Indonesian Muslim intellectuals like Prof. Dr. B.J

Habibie,⁴³ Dr. Nurcholish Madjid, Dr. Amin Rais, Prof. Dr. Quraish Shihab, Prof. Dr. Imaduddin, Prof. K.H. Ali Yafie, Abdurrahman Wahid and others have pursued this transformative strategy, advocating non-confrontational understanding of Islam and modernity, seeking open dialogue with other groups for reaching mutual understanding of problems faced by society in general, and encouraging the ummah to work together with others in resolving such pressing questions as massive poverty, abuses of human rights,⁴⁴ the stagnation of democratization, etc.

There are several reasons for the HMI and KAHMI to support the birth of ICMI; in various point they have same platforms and purpose to uplift of the ummah's fate toward better life educationally, culturally, economically, socially and politically. More important than these that one of the basic purposes of the ICMI is to call Indonesian people, particularly the ummah for the de-militarization of Indonesian politic; to seek democratization; and to create a system of "proportionalization" in which Muslim are represented in the Cabinet, the MPR and the DPR, and so on in accordance with their percentage of the general populations.

Although the ICMI is not a political organization, its basic purpose and objective has political impact. Prof. Dr. B.J Habibie, the general chairman of ICMI, firmly rejected the notion that ICMI is a political organization, and insisted it did not belong to any political group. It was established only to fight ignorance and poverty among Muslims.⁴⁵

In line with the B.J Habibie's statement, Soetjipto Wirosardjono and Nurcholish Madjid rejected the thinking of those activists of ICMI whom employed Islamic symbols for

⁴² Naisbitt John, *Megatrends Asia : The Eight Asia Megtrends that are Changing the World*, London, 1996, pp. 103-240

⁴³ See, *Otokritik Tahun Keempat, Silaturrahmi ICMI*, Gatra, No. 9 Tahun I, Jakarta, January 14, 1995, p. 36

⁴⁴ E. Ramage Douglas, *Politics in Indonesian, Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance*, London, 1995, p. 36

⁴⁵ *Merdeka*, December 8, 1992 and *Merdeka*, November 30, 1992

political purpose; including democratization and demilitarization, especially when they did not understand the meaning of religious symbol they manipulated.⁴⁶ On the other side, Aswab Mahasin as a “ non-active “ member of ICMI has expressed his worry that

the ICMI has become a “ pseudo-political party “ and behaves “ like a political machine “. ⁴⁷ For the same reason Nurcholish Madjid and Amin Rais had withdrawn their support from the organization in the years after its establishment, because they observed that the ICMI was too political.

Many in ICMI seek “ proportionalisation “ or the distribution of appointments to the senior bureaucracy or in the DPR/MPR in proportion to the religious makeup of the population at large. That is, Muslims should hold nearly 90 percent of seats in Parliament and Cabinet positions. Apparently after information of the ICMI, the ummah has been represented in the Cabinet and Parliament. Even 200 members of HMI alumnus became MPs and 9 of them became minister.⁴⁸

Adi Sasono argued that they “ key issues “ for ICMI are democratization and an eventual reduction in the military’s political role. The problem with ABRI, he noted, is that it was worried about any challenge to its position.⁴⁹ Hence, it was understandable that the ABRI expressed its displeasure over the birth of ICMI. Democratization is not the primary goal of many in ICMI, because the main objective of its activities is to “ empower the state in order to Islamize society and enact Islamic value based on law and regulations. “ Mohtar Mas’oed political scientist at Gajah Mada University argues that Abdulrahman and the NU on the other hand. “ seek to empower the people “ and in so doing both Muslim, and non Muslim Indonesian will be empowered.⁵⁰

How have the ummah and Indonesian people responded to the HMI? Of course it could not be ignored since the organization has from its inception expressed its basic commitment toward the ummah and the nation. The formulation of objectives the HMI at the time of its establishment was obviously revealed in its commitment towards the nation and the Islamic religion, namely :

1. Defending the Indonesia Republic, State and enhanced the dignity of Indonesian people.
2. Enforcing and spreading Islamic religious doctrine.

In the congress of HMI held on 1947, the above two objectives were spelt-out in the platform as below :

⁴⁶ E. Ramage Douglas, “ *Politics in Indonesia Democracy: Islam and Ideology of Tolerance* (London, New York, Routledge, 1995), p. 95

⁴⁷ E. Ramage, Douglas, “ *Politics in Indonesia Democracy: Islam and Ideology of Tolerance*, (London, New York, Routledge, 1995) p. 94

⁴⁸ *Republika*, February 5, 1998

⁴⁹ E. Ramage Douglas, “ *Politics in Indonesia Democracy: Islam and Ideology of Tolerance*, (London, New York, Routledge,, 1995),, p. 96-97

⁵⁰ E. Ramage Douglas, “ *Politics in Indonesia Democracy: Islam and Ideology of Tolerance*, (London, New York, Routledge, 1995), , p. 110-111

1. Collaboration with Indonesian people in general and the armed forces in particular in defending the Indonesia Republic and State.
2. Collaboration with organizations and Islamic political parties particularly, and those of other parties in general in order to improve political and economic life of Indonesian people in general and of the ummah in particular.⁵¹

As a logical consequence of the HMI commitment toward the nationhood, the organization was expected to work together hand with the other organizations and institutions. The Islamic youth organization should have a cooperative attitude, toward the fellow Islamic organization like the PMII and the IMM, as well as the non Islamic ones like Catholic Students Organization, Protestant-Christian Organization and from other religious backgrounds. The HMI collaboration with other such organizations could be seen in the Kelompok Cipayung (Cipayung Group). It consists of the PMII, GMNI, GMKI, PMKRI and Indonesian people in various aspects. They used the medium to strengthen articulation of strategic issue of whole life which arose amidst the society. Beside that the motivation of unity in the Kelompok Cipayung is based on the awareness of better future for Indonesia appropriate to the noble aspiration of Independence. Initially the Kelompok Cipayung has played the role of challenging that, aspiration, social controller and agent of development. Unfortunately, in the years following its formation, the role has been decreasing following the internal and external problems. One of the external problems came from the government which controlled strictly all activities of the organizations and thereby emasculated all political parties. In other words an account of internal and external conditions, Kelompok Cipayung creativity could not develop.

The HMI could play its role maximally as agent of the ummah aspirations if it had at least three things: firstly, independent position and attitude so that there is no over-intervention from outside to curb its freedom and creativity. To attain this was easy because a lot of its alumnus occupied strategic positions, particularly in governance, and influenced NGOs Secondly, it should have qualified human resource in various skills. The quality of the HMI’s personnel is quite decisive in this regard. Thirdly, the external conditions was favourable. It meant that all programmes of HMI could not work properly unless the external condition is good.⁵²

In the years after Soeharto came to power, the ummah felt many obstacles in political field. Moh. Kamal Hassan in his treatise on Muslim intellectual response toward modernization of the New Order in Indonesia, pointed out in 1968 that Muslims and Islamic political party leaders realized the government considered that politically strong Islam will threaten the Pancasila Democracy New Political System of New Order, although the regime did need legitimization from Islam in order

⁵¹ HM Yusuf (ed), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, Jakarta, LASPI, 1977),, p. 215

⁵² HM Yusuf (ed), *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, (Jakarta, LASPI, 1977),, p. 215

to make success of the pelita.⁵³ even according to Deliar noer, ex-national chairman of HMI (1953-1955 period), the New Order government not merely opposed the Islamic political organizations, but also curbed their efforts which were related directly to the religious issues. For instance, the

government ever prohibited the ummah to hold a congress in 1968, and monopolized the management of pilgrims to Mecca in the same year, eliminated school holidays in the month of fasting (Ramzan) and reduced all facilities needed by the ummah in commerce. And then the government introduced a draft marriage bill, which was regarded offensive to Islam.⁵⁴

In other word, it was obvious that the government needed Islam when it supported the government and gave it legitimacy. Once the government supported establishment of Parmusi, for instance, aimed at countering the force of PNI. On the contrary, the government hampered all activity regarded as competitor with the government power; for instance, the proposal of Mohammad Hatta, former vice President, to establish PDII (Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia) was not okayed by the government. Even the creation Parmusi, according to Samson, did not benefit even the Muslim modern group in Indonesia. One of the weakness of the party was its failure to get recognition as a legal and influential political forces, namely possess political power in proportion to the number of its followers.⁵⁵ The several repressive policies had negative impact for future of Islam, it was more obvious in 1980's. According to Vatikiotis,⁵⁶ the government succeed in destroying Islamic parties, with the religious politics of the New Order which emphasized harmony, Muslim community felt it was political chaos. The Islamic political forces had indeed declined.

In the period between 1970-1986, which, in terms of the process of the depolitization of Islam might be called the "period of exorcising", the regime began to exercise a formal way to the depoliticize Islam by activating national laws obligating all political parties and mass organization to subscribe to the Pancasila as the sole foundation. While the NIJ decided to replace its Islamic foundation with the Pancasila at its congress in 1984 when the draft law was under discussion in the DPR, Muhammadiyah and HMI chose to wait until the draft was legislated.

The Consequence of Politicization of Islam by Soeharto Regime

Many Muslim leaders were concerned that the process of Pancasilaization would mean deislamization. For them, Muslim

⁵³ M. K. Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "new order" Modernization in Indonesian*, Kuala Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1980, p. 44

⁵⁴ D. Noer, "Islam a Political Force in Indonesian," in J. J. Fox et al, (ed), *Indonesia : Australia Perspectives*, Canberra; Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, 1980, p. 642-3

⁵⁵ A. A. Samson, "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic Modernism," in R. W. Liddle (ed), *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*, Monograph series No. 19, Yale University Southeast Asia studies, p. 116

⁵⁶ M. R. J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto : Order, Development and Pressure for Change*, London : Routledge, 1993, p. 120

acceptance of the Pancasila as a national consensus should not be understood as a theological statement, but only as a political one. They referred to President Soeharto's statement of 1982 that the Pancasila would not become a religion and the religion would not be "Pancasilaified".

There is a group within the Muslim community responded to the political process in a more reactionary way. The emergence of this group, which might be labelled fundamentalist, was a result of an internal dynamic within the Muslim community aimed at protecting Islam and Muslims from the impact of the ongoing political process. The majority of Indonesian Muslims did not support this group. Because, the nature of Indonesian Islam which, following the line of Indonesian culture, is devoted to moderation, tolerance and harmony, Beside this the situational logic of politics, which has created fear and to some extent apathy, within the society would scarce encourage Muslim cadres to initiate political change by attempting to seek justification for Islam.

The Indonesian Muslim intellectual has tried to give answers to the social problems faced by the Muslim community. The answers resulted from two coincidental factors; the real condition of the Muslim community stemming from its struggle in seeking the adequate relationship between Islam and Indonesian culture, and the emergence of a new educated Muslim generation, including the HMI alumnus. Majority of leaders of the new generation are dissatisfied with the ways of old generation who had been attempting to sidetrack the problems and the condition of the Muslim community.

The launching of *asas tunggal* Pancasila by the government initially got strong reaction from Muslim community of the country. The culmination of the reaction was in a riot in Tanjung Priok, the Jakarta Harbo; area in August 1984, in which hundreds of Muslim died at the hands of the Indonesian army and several prominent figures were arrested, including two members of the petition 50 group; A.M Fatwa and (Lt.Gen.Ret.) H.R. Darsono. The former was a famous Muslim preacher and the latter a famous former commander in Chief the west Java based Siliwangi Division of the Armed Forces. This incident was followed by a series of incidents during the year 1984-1985 that threatened the stability of the governance, such as the explosion at Bank Central Asia (BCA) in Jakarta, the Borobudur Buddhist Temple in Yogyakarta, and the Marine Base in Cilindak, Jakarta. A Muslim group was accused of responsibility for the first two explosions. For many, these incidents were not unconnected, and were reactions to the regime's political engineering programmes, which showed the tendency to centralize and accumulate power.

The crisis in the HMI over opposition to the Pancasila as *asas tunggal* would not only result in a split but eventually lead to the disintegration of the organization. The vast majority of HMI branches throughout the country eventually accepted the government policy over the *asas tunggal*, because since its creation, the HMI had accepted the Pancasila as the basis of Indonesian state. Even according to Abdurrahman Wahid, President of PBNU for 1980 up to today, the HMI was an University students organization which " more Pancasilaist " among Islamic movement in Indonesia.⁵⁷ However, viewed from

⁵⁷ A. R. Wahid, "HMI, Islam dan Pancasila" in *Kompas*, June 27, 1983

the cultural aspects, Islam got support of the government except in political sphere.

In fact, the critical wrestling over *asas tunggal* within the HMI body was temporary, not quite substantial. Because the *asas tunggal* was accepted by the HMI after long deliberation at its congress in Padang, north Sumatera. Until today, the HMI-MPO leaders feel that there is no debate on Islam and ideology of Pancasila as an important issue. Most of them joined the society, worked and communicated with those who accepted the *asas tunggal*. therefore, The ideological issue is not relevant to debate while observed that Islam eventually has been accommodated within the state. Fachry Ali, ex-HMI activist of Ciputat branch, said there is no difference as while HMI has its basis of Islam and those who accept Pancasila. The leaders are the same, and ideas are similar.⁵⁸

The above issues presented a negative image of Islam before the young generation during the New Order era, and also forced their alienation from the government. At this stage, the ummah faced a dilemma. If they were close to the government, it was contrary to the real condition. If they remained away from the government, it would benefit the anti-Islam groups, particularly Christians. M. Amin Rais saw the former indication. According to that Indonesia is a centre of Christians activities for “Christianization” of the ummah through five strategic steps, namely education; mass media, economic assistance, marriage relationship and political power.⁵⁹ The crucial condition, ideally, demanded the unity and integration of the ummah to counter any obstacles either from within or outside of the ummah. The expected condition did not develop, and the fragmentation of the ummah occurred, including within the HMI after the launching of *asas tunggal*.

At the same time, the HMI support to the government policy brought benefits to Indonesian people at large, and the Muslim community in particular. If the policy deviated from the goal, the HMI criticized the government, and gave the necessary suggestion for seeking the way-out, or urged it to review the policy. Although the HMI has been close the government, this extra-Islamic university student Association did not lose sight of the fact that many deviations led to deep crisis. For instance, it was proved while the New Order government was facing a deep economic crisis. At that time, the HMI through its national chairman, Anas Urbaningrum, expressed its apprehension due to the ongoing economic crisis of the country on the occasion of its 51st Anniversary celebration on 22nd February 1998 in Depok. Unfortunately, the government did not respond to the criticism and suggestion. The economic condition was worse due to the attitude of the World Bank and the country plunged into deeper crisis. The World Bank admitted that it turned a blind eye to corruption, social unrest and a collapsing financial system during the last years of former President Soeharto’s rule. An internal report said that the Bank staff and managers were aware of the problems but continued to praise the country’s economic

performance.⁶⁰ Some media persons and public figures like Amin Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid has articulated the same views as those the HMI, but the Soeharto and his close aides apparently ruled out the constructive critics and suggestions. The rampant Indonesian malaise illustrate the high political cost excessive authoritarianism imposes upon economic development. The Soeharto regime plainly had overstayed its welcome and built up the people’s frustrations with its failure.

The condition was worse as the growth of corruption in the country under Soeharto regime had become so rampant, that it seems almost old fashioned to mention it. But it can hardly be avoided in a discussion of national level openly and transparently. While for long time, corruption was the whip with which neo-liberals would beat opponents of liberalization, now it is becoming increasingly obvious that there is a close correspondence between liberalization and the scale of corruption. This indeed is now recognized as a global problem.⁶¹ The corruption adds to the myopia of private investment decisions, since the commitments and contracts won through corruption are even more vulnerable to political instability. While the number of unemployed is more increasing and dismissal of workers in big factories occurred almost every day and it was quite vulnerable to the social unrest on large scale.

The people’s frustrations reached culmination as the university students throughout the country voiced their suffering via a huge demonstration demanding of President Soeharto to step down immediately. It was on 21 May 1998. The downfall of Soeharto paved the way to Prof. B.J. Habibie as Vice President to become the third Indonesian President. Unfortunately, the downfall of Soeharto did not mark a complete break with the past. President Habibie has performed better than feared as he has tried to institute changes (such as the election), but remains a Soeharto appointee in his policies. The corruption of the Soeharto years has been white-washed rather than investigated.⁶²

While politicians and academics in Jakarta are preoccupied with political and economic reform, the concern in rural areas is much more down to earth. In the last few weeks, demonstrations have broken out in at least 50 districts (called regencies in Indonesia) from Sumatera to Nusa Tenggara. Many of the protests are related to disputed land ownership. All fall into the category of what Indonesians call KKN,⁶³ which is fuelling public demands for a full investigation of the Soeharto family’s wealth. One Habibie aide noted “ they are like people who have not had oxygen for 32 years “. ⁶⁴

Many sides regarded the Presidential post of Prof. B.J. Habibie as unconstitutional, and hence invited the controversial

⁵⁸ Lembaga Studi Pembangunan Indonesia, *50 Tahun HMI Mengabdikan Republik*, op. cit. p. 166

⁵⁹ M. Amien Rais, “*Gerakan Kristian di Asia Tenggara : Kasus Indonesia*”, kertas kerja dalam seminar Isu-isu Dakwah Kontemporer dan Cabaran Abad ke 21”, di Marang, Trengganu, September 1994

⁶⁰ “What’s Ahead For Asia”, *For Eastern Economic Review*, Februari 25, 1999, p. 59

⁶¹ See The Symposium on Corruption : Constraints” in *Annual World Bank Conference on Economic Development 1997*, edited by B. Pleskovic and JE. Stiglitz, The World Bank 1998. See in particular the article by Susan-Acherman

⁶² *The Times of India*, May 10, 1999

⁶³ KKN is the local abbreviation for corruption, collusion and nepotism

⁶⁴ “Politics & Policy”, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 25, 1998, p. 21

debate. On the other side, the vast majority of HMI and KAHMI members considered it as legal and constitutional. Therefore, they preferred to let him complete his tenure as transitional President until the new President was selected in the month of September 1999 following the result of the 7 June 1999 general election. Each result, usually, has an advantage and disadvantage, including the policies adopted by the President Habibie. The HMI and KAHMI apparently observed that a number of reform agenda in one of the advantages of B.J. Habibie cabinet. The agenda aimed, among other things, to promote decentralization and reform, guard the country's interests in era of globalization, and improve links between small enterprises run by indigenous businessmen and large ones, which are usually Chinese-owned.⁶⁵ Therefore, the HMI and the KAHMI supported the reform agenda of President B.J. Habibie, and they remained of the view that the socio-political change was need of the time, and it should go on gradually, first evolutionary and eventually total.

In brief it can be said that the collapse of Soeharto regime is the logical consequences of his politicization of that non sided to Islam in the real meanings and not for the prosperity of Indonesian people.

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