Internal Uprising/Insurgency: A Theoretical Analysis of NATO Intervention and Regime Change in Africa

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Abstract - It appears that the study of insurgency and peacekeeping intervention in Africa suffers from general disregard for an examination of some covert intended outcomes by the intervening organisations— the gap which this study attempts to fill with special focus on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. Yet, it is observable that due to huge resource gaps, African Union peacekeepers depend upon external assistance, most notably from states within the EU and NATO in form of classroom education, field training exercises, the provision of equipment, and support to deploy African peacekeepers and equipment into the theater of operations. How has this form of assistance transformed from humanitarian intervention to interference? Using Libya as a case study, this paper sets to discuss this subtle metamorphosis particularly within the context of the US-led NATO operations on the Continent.

Index Terms - Insurgency, Regime Change, Uprising

I. INTRODUCTION

Conflict and insecurity rank among the worst of the disasters that have afflicted Africa and serve as major causes of poverty, hunger, and unemployment. They are also primary factors leading many Africans to emigrate and seek asylum in other parts of the world (Ngabirano 2011: iv). The end of superpower rivalry has proved empowering for insurgents in several respects and has dramatically changed the nature of African conflict. During the Cold War, foreign supporters usually linked their material support to groups exhibiting acceptable ideological or political agendas; Warsaw Pact nations often being the primary suppliers to African rebellions. Now, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demobilization or shrinking of non-African militaries, such cash-strapped nations as Bulgaria sell equipment to insurgents without political preconditions (Howe 2001:5).

The end of the superpower rivalry has, therefore, changed the nature of African conflict. The availability of weapons has escalated the number of armed participants, especially poorly trained militias and insurgent groups, and contributed to the militarization of African political discourse. The diversities of Africa’s nation-states, the fact that they are almost invariably multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multilingual, and multi-cultural in the midst of relatively high levels of material poverty and uneven spatial and social development, and have been dominated by corrupt governments, created a combustible mix that periodically erupted into open conflict and warfare. The peacekeeping efforts by different International and regional organizations on the continent, therefore, require a thorough examination particularly within the context of their overt mission and covert intended outcomes essentially as it affects regime change.

II. INTERNAL UPRISING/INSURGENCY AND CHANGING SECURITY PATTERN IN AFRICA

Conflict has engaged the interest of scholars and given peace-loving humanity cause for anxiety since the earliest times. Thus, the explosion of internal violence in contemporary times, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, has elicited a similar explosion of studies seeking to explain, and unveil the causes, dynamics and trajectories of these conflicts (Agbonifo, 2004:2). Africa is in a deep and persistent malaise. It is by far the least developed continent economically, and the most conflict-prone politically. In policy-making circles and media characterizations, it is “the hopeless continent” (The Economist May 13-19, 2000 cited in Jackson, 2002). Such pessimism is driven in part by the failure to manage — much less resolve — the destructive consequences of multiple violent conflicts.

The tumultuous post-independence years in Africa shattered any optimistic hopes that state security forces would provide stability or help to unify the new African states. Instead we have seen the decline and corruption of state security forces on the continent. Most African military are little more than show pieces for annual independence celebrations, and disintegrate quickly when required to perform even the simplest military task (Brooks, 2002:70).

As observed by Howe (2001:5), the availability of weapons has escalated the number of armed participants, especially poorly trained militias and insurgent groups, and contributed to the militarization of African political discourse. Adding to the volatile mix are skilled demobilized soldiers from South Africa and Eastern Europe. Many African states now lack the military resources to halt the shift of the coercive balance. Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were three examples during the 1990s of countries having virtually no national military to face growing armed opposition. From 1960 to 1990, insurgencies and invasions overturned only two sub-Saharan African states (Chad and Uganda); during the 1990s, however, armed force, exclusive of coups, toppled at least six governments.

Africa’s militarized conflictual behavior is at the stage where most conflicts are among proximate adversaries. This is due to a number of reasons: crises of legitimacy, ethnic rivalries, and irredentist movements, among others. The proximity factor is also consistent with Africa's low level of industrialization and its technological inability to project power across great territorial expanses as well as sustain long-range military confrontations.
domestic conflicts a primary factor is the extensiveness of interaction between actors related to their common geographic location. Interactions can have physical (localational), structural (institutionalized) and psychological (perceptions of threat) dimensions especially in relation to geographic proximity.

Many of Africa’s conflict countries have histories of political and institutional turmoil, which have severely distorted the actions of national actors—opportunistic behaviour has often come to dominate longer-term considerations. This is particularly evident in state institutions where corruption, together with war-profiteering, often replaces long-term planning and considerations of the national interest. As noted by Matanga and Nzau (2013:56), throughout the post-independence period, Africa experienced many crises of governance. Today many sitting governments around Africa are highly compromised due to the low degree of legitimacy they actually enjoy among the populace. It was not surprising that due to this state of things many Presidential Elections have been highly contested but poorly conducted and ill informed, culminating in violence and mass protests, destruction and economic retrogression.

Conflicts in Africa, although usually internal in character, have important regional dimensions. In that sense Africa forms a ‘security complex’ as defined by Buzan (cited in Laakso, 2005:2), i.e. a regional group of states, whose security concerns are interlinked. Therefore it is pertinent to assume that regional level cooperation, irrespective of the policy sector where it occurs and how it occurs, affects those concerns. And indeed, even though enhancing peace is not included in the actual mandate of most African regional organizations, peace and security are often mentioned in their constitutive agreements as the indirect benefits of deepening regional cooperation. Precisely this common understanding of the benefits of regional cooperation for security is at the core of the notion of a security community.

For years Africa was a backwater for al-Qaeda-linked insurgents, but today it is a rising axis for extremism. Two African insurgencies now rank among the most dangerous internationally: Boko Haram in Nigeria and Somalia’s al-Shabab. Going by the number of fatalities per attack, Nigeria now has the world’s deadliest insurgency (killing an average 24 people per assault, versus two in Iraq), according to Maplecroft (cited in The Economist, 2014)- a risk consultancy. Violence has split into neighbouring Chad, Cameroon and Niger. In Somalia, al-Shabab has come under pressure from regional African forces, but has responded by striking beyond its borders. Kenya has been particularly hard hit. Since the bloody siege on Westgate Mall in Nairobi, the capital, in 2013, a series of coastal attacks has cost hundreds of lives and hammered the tourism industry.

Unprecedented popular protests in North Africa demanding greater political freedom, dignity, and economic opportunity have captivated the world’s attention since they burst onto the global stage in January 2011. The subsequent resignations of long-time autocrats in Egypt and Tunisia, the toppling of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, and a shift toward constitutional monarchy in Morocco have dramatically reshaped state-citizen relations in this long static region. With tentative steps toward democracy, long held assumptions of public passivity and the inviolability of stable, autocratic states in the Arab world have withered.

Despite the major social, cultural, and economic differences between North Africa and the rest of the continent, the mass protests in Tunisia and Egypt have riveted the attention of millions of Africans from all walks of life. Expressions of frustration with political exclusion, corruption, yawning inequality, and impunity seen on the streets of Cairo and Tunis resonated deeply across the continent. Indeed, protests demanding more political liberties, services, and accountability were seen in over a dozen Sub-Saharan African countries including Burkina Faso, Uganda, Senegal, Benin, Malawi, Kenya, Djibouti, Mauritania, Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, and Swaziland in the months following the launch of the Arab Spring. Africa’s democratization experience, accordingly, predates the Arab Spring. The demands of protesters in North Africa -elections, a free press, freedom of assembly - are rights most Africans ostensibly already have. Indeed, one of the remarkable aspects of the prospective democratic transitions in North Africa and the Middle East is that it has taken so long. With the exception of Central Asia, the Arab world is the last major region to start down the democratic path (ACSS, 2011).

III. NATO AND THE DYNAMICS OF PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: FOCUS ON REGIME CHANGE IN LIBYA

The nature of peace operations in Africa has changed dramatically over the past decade in the sense that such operations now involve a range of actors, ranging from the UN, the AU, and the European Union (EU) to regional organizations like ECOWAS, as well as a plethora of states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Many operations are partnerships that involve multilevel coordination among and between the actors involved. While participation in these operations has increased, the scope and aims of these operations have also widened (Okumu and Jaye, 2010:11).

The Middle East is – for geographical necessity if nothing else – an area of growing importance for NATO. Since the 1990s, NATO has had a role in the Middle East, largely conducted through the mostly dormant talk shops of the Mediterranean Partnership and the Istanbul Cooperation Council. More ambitious peacekeeping roles have been repeatedly proposed for NATO in Lebanon and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These cases aside, Libya is the first ‘proper’ operation in the Middle East – the limited NATO Training Mission in Iraq exempted.

As waves of protest spread across North Africa in early 2011, authoritarian regimes appeared more vulnerable than at any time in the contemporary history of the Middle East. Protest movements gave voice to the failure of Arab autocrats to address deeply held economic, social, and political grievances, challenging notions of authoritarian regimes as adaptive and capable of adjusting their strategies and tactics to changing conditions (Heydemann, 2013:61). The Arab Spring has certainly resulted in a change of regime in Tunisia and then Egypt. The uprisings against Gaddafi’s regime triggered a military intervention by NATO that drove the Libyan leader and his entourage from power. Ali Abdullah Saleh finally relinquished his grip on power in Yemen. However, the ramifications of regime change for state-society relations in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya are still uncertain. Mubarak may be on trial,

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Gaddafi is dead and Ben Ali is currently enjoying the dubious pleasures of exile in Saudi Arabia.

The international community did not stand idly by as Gaddafi was embarking on what was described as a warfare against his own people. The issue was brought before the Security Council, which on 17 March voted in favour of imposing a no-fly zone over Libya, restricting Gaddafi from using his air force against the Libyan population. The vote was not uncontroversial, and five countries chose to abstain; Brazil, China, Germany, India and the Russian Federation. However, resolution 1973 passed and the responsibility of enforcing the no-fly zone was distributed amongst the member states of the UN with NATO as the commanding organization.

Unlike in other cases caught up in the Arab Spring, it is only in the case of Libya that Western forces became actively involved as interventionists against the regime of Gaddafi. Can their involvement be explained by economic interests, in particular the mining of oil that had been nationalized by Gaddafi when he came to power in 1969? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then, power theory could be useful in explaining the Libyan case. Being part of the Realist approach to international relations, Power theory is guided by the tenets that states are the only actors in international relations and that they act to secure and defend their national interests (Matanga and Nzau, 2013:48).

Indeed, haphazardness, rather than deliberate strategy, was the reason why NATO became involved in the bombardment of military targets in Libya in the first place. The intervention in Libya is interesting from the perspective that it is not only rooted in international considerations, but also to a great degree in domestic factors. It was France under the leadership of Sarkozy who issued the first official recognition of the National Transitional Council and then initiated the first air bombardments against military targets in Libya. The Libya intervention started out being widely popular in France and seemed to give Sarkozy a much-needed success at a time of unfavourable opinion polls in the run-up to the presidential elections in 2012.

France felt she had failed her historical responsibility during the ‘Arab Spring’ in Tunisia, and Libya therefore became a welcome opportunity to manifest a French return to North Africa with support to revolutionary movements and willingness to back words with action (DIIS, 2011:1). In fact, from the beginning of the uprising in February 2011 to the time of Col. Muammar Gaddafi’s capture and subsequent killing in October 2011; 25,000 people had lost their lives. The Libya experience was quite controversial due to disagreement as to whether it was truly a Libyan affair or a Western-led invasion aimed at making spoils from Libyan vast oil riches; though shrouded in “helping defeat Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime” that was out to exterminate its own people (Matanga and Nzau, 2013:45).

The doctrine of protection of civilians from atrocities (‘responsibility to protect’) prescribes that the international society has a right and duty to intervene and hinder humanitarian catastrophes against civilians around the globe. This doctrine is important for understanding why NATO actually ended up intervening in Libya in the first place. When it comes to the real consequences of this doctrine, however, a whole list of other countries appear as potential targets for external intervention. Syria and Bahrain are just the latest examples of violent crackdowns on demonstrators of the ‘Arab Spring’, which could equally lead to justification for external intervention. If the intention is to enforce humanitarian principles around the globe, it would seem just as obvious to intervene in countries like Zimbabwe, North Korea or Burma. The perpetual problem with these kinds of interventions is, therefore, that they are extremely selective (DIIS, 2011:2). As stated in the Danish Institute for International Studies’ Policy Brief:

In 2010 NATO published a New Strategic Concept…for the future of the Transatlantic Alliance. The New Strategic Concept outlines the elements of a more political NATO which seeks to influence the surrounding world through strategic partnerships and political agreements. The Concept seems to attempt to redefine NATO beyond the predominantly peace-making role which the Alliance invested in during the 1990s, when the security landscape was characterised by a high degree of instability following the disintegration of Yugoslavia. With the gradual consolidation of NATO’s geopolitical presence in south-east Europe, the Alliance seems to be preparing for the encounter with a new world order with limited possibilities for further expansion. The Libya intervention, however, must be said to constitute somewhat of a paradox vis-à-vis NATO’s self-declared vision of playing a larger political role in the future. The intervention in Libya clearly represents a return to the ‘peace-making through air bombardments’ of the 1990s, only now with a new geographical focus.

On 20 October 2011, the National Transitional Council, NTC, backed by NATO did not only overthrow Gaddafi out of power but captured him and subsequently killed him gruesomely. This shows that the NATO intervention was designed to depose the Gaddafi regime and not the purported reason of protecting civilians and forestalling humanitarian crisis. In fact, even the civilians that the NATO coalition claimed to protect also suffered untold destruction in the hands of NATO forces. Evidence showed that NATO contributed significantly to the death of civilians it claimed to protect in Libya. A US-based Human Rights Watch examined in detail evidence of claims of civilian deaths from eight separate NATO strikes. In one instance, it said a first bomb killed 14 people and a second, moments later, killed 18 more who had rushed to help victims. Similarly, in March, 2010, another human rights organization, Amnesty International, said it had documented 55 cases of named civilians, including 16 children and 14 women, killed in air strikes by NATO (Chigozie C.F et al 2013:6). Little wonder, Rahnuma, has dubbed NATO’s intervention in Libya “protecting to kill, killing to protect”.

In any case, most Africans are upset about the outcome of NATO’s operations in Libya. The AU and some African heads of state, as well as the African intelligentsia and large swathes of public opinion, consider that what happened in Libya was not a revolution such as those of Egypt and Tunisia, but a coup d’état orchestrated by a heteroclite coalition of putschists helped by NATO under the pretext of its responsibility to protect (Paul-Simon handy, 2011:9). The manner American fighter-jets bombardard Libya showed that NATO had ulterior motive. The first American attacks against the Gaddafi regime occurred on 18 March, and consisted mostly of Tomahawk attacks against air defense, radar, and missile systems in an effort to set the conditions for the no-fly zone implementation (this action would allow Allied planes to operate with reduced anti-aircraft threat).
(Kirkpatrick et al., 2011). The campaign intensified over the following day, as airstrikes on 19 March focused on strategic command and control targets in Tripoli as well as Libyan mechanized and motorized forces in the vicinity of Benghazi (Kirkpatrick and Elisabeth, 2011). These strikes sent a particular signal. That is, the strikes near Benghazi demonstrated NATO’s support for the rebel fighters on the ground and a willingness to attack Libyan forces that could suppress the rebellion.

Gaddafi’s fall was made possible by the actions of powerful states in flagrant violation of the mandate initially conferred by the UN Security Council through Resolutions 1970 (26 February 2011) and 1973 (17 March 2011). While the UN did authorise an international force to ensure the ‘protection of civilians’ and initiate political dialogue, the NATO countries that decided to implement the resolutions sided with the rebels and refused to consider the option of political process unless on the condition of regime change. In retrospect, it is now clear that some of the countries engaged in the campaign never intended being bound by the UN mandate – unless they had it their way.

Former South African President Thabo Mbeki, in a lengthy address Feb. 16 in South Africa, entitled “Reflections on Peacemaking, State Sovereignty and Democratic Governance in Africa,” systematically exposed the manner in which the U.S.A., U.K., and France, with the full collaboration of the UN, intended to implement regime change in Libya from the beginning, and willfully ignored African efforts to resolve the crisis.

Mbeki asserted that the crisis in Libya could have been resolved without regime change, but the NATO powers were determined to push it through. Instead, on March 17, seven days after the AU made its Roadmap decision, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973, which provided the space for NATO political alliance, “to intervene in Libya to impose a violent resolution of this conflict, centered on regime change, which objective was completely at variance with Resolution 1973.” In so doing, Mbeki stated, NATO intervened, not to protect civilians as the UNSC resolution called for, “but to lead and empower the opposition National Transitional Council in a military campaign to overthrow the Gaddafi regime” (cited in EIR, 2012).

IV. NATO AND POST-GADDAFI GOVERNANCE CRISIS IN LIBYA

The history of NATO and the history of Libya are intertwined in many ways. It was two years after the formation of the North American Treaty Organization that Libya became independent in 1951. However, for the Europeans, the strategic importance of Libya during the Second World War and the memory of the siege of Tobruk were too fresh in their minds for NATO to give up Libya entirely. The compromise was that NATO and the US would maintain a military presence. The US established a base called Wheelus Air Base in Libya. This base was called a ‘Little America’ until the US was asked to leave after Gaddafi seized power in 1969. The US had been scheming to get back into Libya since then. For a short while Gaddafi was supported as an anti-communist stalwart, but later he became a useful nuisance shifting as friend and foe over the years. As the US fabricated the myth of al Qaeda in the Maghreb, cooperation was extended to this leader but Gaddafi was opposed to the establishment of US and French military bases in Africa (Campbell, 2011).

NATO had been formed as an alliance ostensibly to defend Western Europe against the Soviet Union. Charles De Gaulle had pulled France out of this alliance in 1966 after it became clear that this military alliance was dominated by the USA and Britain (supporting their military industries). Usually, when an alliance is formed for a specific purpose such as halting the spread of communism, that alliance is folded when the mission is complete. Hence, after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was expected that the mission of NATO would be scaled down (ibid). Perhaps, Gaddafi’s greatest crime, in the eyes of NATO, was his desire to put the interests of local labour above foreign capital and his quest for a strong and truly United States of Africa. In fact, in August 2011, President Obama confiscated $30 billion from Libya’s Central Bank, which Gaddafi had earmarked for the establishment of the African IMF and African Central Bank. In 2011, the West’s objective was clearly not to help the Libyan people, who already had the highest standard of living in Africa, but to oust Gaddafi, install a puppet regime, and gain control of Libya’s natural resources.

For over 40 years, Gaddafi promoted economic democracy and used the nationalized oil wealth to sustain progressive social welfare programs for all Libyans. Under Gaddafi’s rule, Libyans enjoyed not only free health-care and free education, but also free electricity and interest-free loans. Now, the health-care sector is on the verge of collapse as thousands of Filipino health workers flee the country, institutions of higher education across the East of the country are shut down, and black outs are a common occurrence in once thriving Tripoli (Chengu, 2014).

After the assassination and humiliation of Gaddafi in October 2011, Hifter became leader of one of the 1700 militias with over 250,000 persons under arms. Abdelhakim Belhadj became the most powerful person in Tripoli after the NATO ‘victory’ when he installed himself as the head of the Tripoli Military Council. When the United States undertook its transition program for Libya, Belhadj dropped his military title and contested elections as a civilian leader. Hifter could not openly challenge the LIFG forces in Tripoli so he worked to build relations with the Zintan militias working hard to emerge as the new military强man of Libya. Since 2014, Hifter has been involved in a number of high profile military actions (first a declared military takeover in a failed coup attempt of February 2014 and later in May in a prolonged war to defeat the Misrata forces and those supported by Qatar). From the western platforms and those who have interviewed Hifter, this general claims the allegiance of over 70,000 troops along with the Zintan militia forces.

On Friday, February 14, Maj. Gen. Khalifa Hifter announced a coup in Libya. The national command of the Libyan Army is declaring a movement for a new road map’ (to rescue the country), Hifter declared through a video post. Even the New York Times ridiculed this coup attempt with the story by David Kirkpatrick who reported on the coup from Cairo (Campbell, 2014). Western and regional governments share responsibility for much that has happened in Libya, but so too should the media. The Libyan uprising was reported as a simple-minded clash between good and evil. Gaddafi and his regime were demonised and his opponents treated with a naïve lack of skepticism and enquiry. The foreign media have dealt with the subsequent...
collapse of the Libyan state since 2011 mostly by ignoring it, though politicians have stopped referring to Libya as an exemplar of unsuccessful foreign intervention (Cockburn, 2014).

Since the 2011 overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, Libya’s path has been tumultuous. Despite a number of advantages compared with other post-conflict societies, progress on political, economic, and security fronts has fallen far behind, generating frustration and threatening the recovery altogether. Libya has teetered on the brink of a relapse into civil war on more than one occasion in the past year. Libya’s most serious problem has been the lack of security. Insecurity has had negative repercussions across the spectrum. It has undermined efforts to build functioning political and administrative institutions, further constricted an already minimal international footprint, and facilitated the expansion of criminal and jihadist groups within Libya and the wider region.

Libyan political leaders have been under constant threat of attack, as displayed most dramatically in the October 2013 kidnapping of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. The lack of security stems primarily from the failure of the effort to disarm and demobilize rebel militias after the war. Both international advisors and Libya’s political leadership recognized the importance of rebel disarmament from the outset, but neither has been able to implement it. As a result, various types of armed groups control much of the country and the elected government is at their mercy (Chivvis, and Martini, 2014:ix). Libya is imploding. Its oil exports have fallen from 1.4 million barrels a day in 2011 to 235,000 barrels a day. Militias hold 8,000 people in prisons, many of whom say they have been tortured. Some 40,000 people from the town of Tawergha south of Misrata were driven from their homes which have been destroyed (Cockburn, 2014).

The problem of the lack of security in Libya negatively impacts on the path to democracy and seriously hinders the establishment of political and administrative institutions and also contributes to the increase in crime and activities of radical groups (Middle East Monitor, 2014). The political turmoil and military clashes in the country have also provided a hotbed for religious extremism and terrorism such as the Islamic State militant group. In fact, the Libya crisis is closely related to the indifferent attitude of the Western powers, which have not adopted practical measures to help the country set up a powerful central government capable of stabilizing the situation and reestablishing the normal public order. Similar situations have occurred in some other Middle East countries such as Iraq and Syria after the Western powers, especially the United States, adopted wrong policies there (Shilei, 2014).

Western governments believed that their approach would facilitate a smooth transition to democracy in which the opposition and the revolutionary leaders would be able to govern on the basis of joint governance of the state and its institutions after the liberation phase was over. Contrary to this, Libya witnessed a dangerous security deterioration that resulted in much desperation and pessimism towards the future of political stability in the country, especially since the scenario of overthrowing the regime was accomplished with the help of NATO forces based on a mandate from the UN Security Council. The deterioration of the situation in Libya gives the impression that the events of the past three years explain the failure of the West’s approach to achieving stability. Instead, the country has been plunged into a civil war due to the lack of an effective central authority that was able to protect Libya from falling into chaos.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

External intervention is not a primary cause of Africa’s conflicts, but more an exacerbating factor. It is directly related to the failure of the African state. In other words, because African political systems “are internally incoherent and because aspects of their internal form are projections of the external environment, they are easily manipulated from the outside” (Mujaju 1989:260). Numerous African states exist on the verge of internal conflict, and they must be monitored and assisted before large scale violence erupts or war economies become entrenched. When a state has been identified as being at risk, there are numerous preventive measures which can be applied: diplomacy and mediation, fact-finding missions, arms embargoes, the creation of demilitarised zones, disarmament and decommissioning of weapons, the preventive deployment of military or civilian peacekeepers, and programmes to deal with economic and humanitarian crises, to name a few (Jackson, 2002:18).

The situation in Africa is frightening because the region is the most backward in term of development and most vulnerable as far as peace, security and stability are concerned (Ngunun, 2013:128). The sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest part of the world and as a consequence is devastated in many ways (N’waorgu, 2013:147). At the less extreme end of the scale, internal conflict is the inadvertent result of nonetheless risky strategies by African elites to hold onto power — particularly in times of crisis — establish hegemony, or manage political demands. Pursuing exclusionary politics, the indiscriminate use of state coercion on civilian populations, unleashing ethnic chauvinism, or manipulating multiparty elections are all high-risk strategies that can lead directly to war. Similarly, the failure to deal appropriately with spill-over or contagion effects, internal or external shocks, or eroding state autonomy (state collapse), can also result in internal conflict.

Over the past ten years, the AU’s Peace and Security department developed a substantial capacity that saw the young organization taking the lead in many conflict situations in Africa. Even more than the noticeable increase in the number and quality of its military interventions (such as in Somalia, Darfur and Burundi), the AU’s biggest achievement so far appears to be its role in promoting norms and implementing security regimes throughout the continent. The prohibition of unconstitutional changes of government, and the more-or-less systematic enforcement of this norm throughout the continent, have been seen by many as important milestones insofar as they have transformed multilateral relations within the continent as well as Africa’s relations with the international system (Handy, 2011:9).

NATO’s operation in Libya elicits many reflections and has several implications for the current and future security situation in the Mediterranean. One reflection regards the future role of Europe in Mediterranean security in light of the general impression that European powers took the lead in NATO’s operation. A second reflection regards the implications of what
Undeniably, as noted by Shah (2013), the Arab Spring has more sabotaged peace and common man’s life than proved constructive. Just regime changes for never ending instability and chaos cannot be a revolution. The most crucial and important was to stabilize the uprising states in the post uprising era, which proved a brutal failure. Arab spring’s hallow success is quite manifested in Egypt’s continuing bloodshed, saga ofstrives and civil wars, the formation of new incapable and west’s puppet establishments, exclusion of women and minority voices, emergence of vulgar militias with territory politics and proliferation of terror through widespread weapons with arms smuggling, etc., Thus everything is being witnessed as worst than the pre-spring scenario. Libya today is far weaker and insecure even than the Gaddafi era, where actualizing a centralized control mechanism and curbing arrogant tribal militias seems a project of decades and formation of a powerful national army a very difficult challenge.

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