# Add-on security using Weak Magic squares in Public Key Cryptosystem, Modified with Dummy Letters

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*Abstract*- The efficiency of a cryptographic algorithm is based on the time taken for encryption/decryption and the way it produces different cipher-text from a clear-text [1]. An alternative approach was suggested for handling ASCII characters in the cryptosystem, a magic square implementation to enhance the efficiency by providing add-on security to the cryptosystem. The encryption/decryption is based on numerals generated by magic square rather than ASCII values and expected to provide another layer of security to any public key algorithms such as RSA, EL Gamal etc.

In this paper a modified cryptosystem is considered with the introduction of 5 dummy letters {Au, Ea, Ee, Oo, Ou} in the existing 26 English letters. The proposed dummy letters are used in the theoretical developments focusing on its merit and advantages of using magic squares or any type of matrices in encryption and decryption processes. In fact, the introduction of dummy letters will affect the ASCII characteristics thereby inviting troubles in other uses. The technique will provide another layer of security to the modified cryptosystem. If implemented, it will give a new direction to the information scientists, computer operators and specifically to the crypt-analyzers.

*Index Terms*- Basic Latin Square, magic Square, pivot element, add-on security, public key cryptosystem AMS classification No. A-05 and A-22

## I. INTRODUCTION

Tomba [2-6] developed simple techniques for constructing normal magic squares using basic Latin squares for any n (odd, doubly-even and singly-even). The method needs 3 steps for construction of odd order and doubly-even magic squares but 6 steps for construction of singly-even magic squares. Depending upon the choice of the central block and assignment of pairnumbers satisfying T, different weak magic squares are generated that can produce different cipher text as far as possible from plaintext.

### II. METHODOLOGY

We [13] suggested the introduction of 5 dummy letters as joint-vowel letters as AU, EA, EE, OO, OU, expressed as  $A_u$ ,  $E_a$ ,  $E_e$ ,  $O_o$ ,  $O_u$  in the existing 26 English letters. The merits and demerits of introducing the selected dummy letters were also discussed. Suppose the plaintext and cipher text of these letters are:

PT	А	В	С	D	Е	F	G	Η	Ι
СТ	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
PT	Q	R	S	Т	U	V	W	Х	Y
СТ	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24

J	K	L	Μ	Ν	0	Р
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Ζ	Au	Ea	Ee	0	Ou	
				0		
2	26	27	28	29	30	
5						

### (i) Encryption/decryption with a weak magic square

**Encryption:** Let the message to be encrypted be M comprising a block of m letters. Encryption is considered as a vector of m dimensions and multiplied by a m\*m weak magic square, mod 31. If the weak magic square, A is invertible i.e.!A!  $\neq 0$ , decryption is ensured.

Now, cipher text =  $\{(m * m) \text{ weak magic square}\}$  \* plaintext mod 31.

**Decryption:**  $M = \{(m * m) \text{ weak magic square}\}^{-1}$  Cipher text mod 31 giving the original plaintext of the message.

### (ii) Application of weak magic square as add-on security in public key cryptosystem

Consider a public-key cryptosystem, RSA is taken. The private key of a user consists of two prime p and q and an exponent (decryption key) d. The public-key consists of the modulus  $n = p^*q$ , and an exponent e such that  $d = e^{-1} \mod (p-1)$  (q-1). To encrypt a plaintext, M the user computes  $C = M^e \mod n$  and decryption is done by calculating  $M = C^d \mod n$ .

**Encryption** The encrypted cipher text using the m\*m matrix or weak magic square (i) is done by using Cipher text<sup>(i)</sup> =  $\{(m * m) \text{ weak magic square}\}* M \mod 31$ : denoted as  $CT^{(i)}$ .

The encrypted cipher text,  $CT^{(i)}$  is then applied to RSA algorithm given above  $C^{(1)} = \{CT^{(i)}\}^e \mod n$ . In fact,  $C^{(i)}$  represents the doubly encrypted cipher text (first using a weak magic square and secondly using RSA algorithm) of a message. **Decryption** To decrypt  $M^{(1)} = C^{(1) \ d} \mod n$ . The decrypted cipher text using RSA algorithm gives  $CT^{(i)} = \{C^{(i)}\}^d \mod n$ . Once again, the doubly decrypted plaintext is calculated using Cipher text<sup>(i)</sup> =  $\{(m \ *m) \ weak \ magic \ square}\}^{-1} CT^{(i)} \mod 31$ 

Example 1: For any singly-even n (6 \* 6) magic square

Step-1

34	9	22	15	27	4	111
2	29	17	14	11	32	105
36	25	13	19	12	6	111
1	7	18	24	30	31	111
5	26	20	23	8	35	117
33	10	21	16	28	3	111
111	106	111	111	116	111	111

Step-2

31	25	19	13	7	1
32	26	20	14	8	2
33	27	21	15	9	3
34	28	22	16	10	4
35	29	23	17	11	5
36	30	24	18	12	6

Step 3 and step-4: not shown

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Step-5

6	12	13	24	30	1
5	11	14	23	8	35
34	28	16	15	10	4
3	9	22	21	27	33
2	29	17	20	26	32
36	7	18	19	25	31

32 3 34 35 1 111

Step-6

111	111	111	111	111	111	111
36	5	33	4	2	31	111
25	29	10	9	26	12	111
18	20	22	21	17	13	111
19	14	16	15	23	24	111
7	11	27	28	8	30	111
-	-				-	

Note: In the construction of singly-even magic squares using basic Latin squares, selecting a suitable central block, assigning the pair-numbers satisfying T in selective positions is normally complicated. In many cases, it will generate weak magic squares

**Example 2**: For singly-even, n = 6, and n=10, pair numbers satisfying T are 18:and24 respectively. For n = 6, different weak magic squares can be constructed. Assuming central block comprise of the pair-numbers [13, 24] and [18, 19], then six types of weak magic squares can be generated as follows:

34	9	16	21	27	4	111
2	29	17	14	11	32	105
31	30	24	18	7	1	111
6	12	19	13	25	36	111
5	26	20	23	8	35	117
33	10	15	22	28	3	111
111	116	111	111	106	111	111

WMS-1

1	2	3	4	5	6
8	9	10	11	12	7
15	16	17	18	13	14
22	23	24	19	20	21
29	30	25	26	27	28
36	31	32	33	34	35

WMS-2

34	9	16	21	27	4	111
2	29	17	20	11	32	111
31	30	18	13	12	1	105
6	7	24	19	25	36	117
5	26	14	23	8	35	111
33	10	22	15	28	3	111
111	111	111	111	111	111	111

WMS-3	<u>, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </u>

34	9	16	21	27	4	111
2	29	17	20	11	32	111
31	30	18	13	12	7	111
6	1	24	19	25	36	111
5	26	14	23	8	35	111
33	10	22	15	28	3	111
111	117	111	111	111	105	111

WMS-4

34	9	16	31	37	4	111
2	29	23	14	11	32	111
31	30	24	18	7	1	111
6	12	19	13	25	36	111
5	26	20	17	8	35	105
33	10	15	22	28	3	111
111	116	117	105	106	111	111

WMS-5

34	9	22	15	27	4	111
2	29	23	14	11	32	111
36	25	13	19	12	6	111
1	7	18	24	30	31	111
5	26	20	17	8	35	111
33	10	21	16	28	3	111
111	106	117	105	116	111	111

WMS-6

The above illustrations (6\*6) shows that six different forms of weak magic squares can be generated, depending upon the choice of two pair-numbers [13, 24] and [18, 19] satisfying T,

Altogether  ${}^{18}C_2.6 = {}_{918}$  weak magic squares can be generated taking the central block and assignment of pair-numbers satisfying T in different positions.

#### 8. Illustrations

**Illustration 1**: Using 5 selected dummy letters, the message SEA  $\Rightarrow$  SE<sub>a</sub> corresponds to the plaintext, [18 27]

Let 
$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 7 \\ 5 & 12 \end{bmatrix}$$
  
Encryption  $\begin{bmatrix} 3 & 7 \\ 5 & 12 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 18 \\ 27 \end{bmatrix}_{\text{mod } 31} \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 243 \\ 414 \end{bmatrix}_{\text{mod} 31} \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 26 \\ 11 \end{bmatrix}$   
cipher text  $[A_0 L]$   
Decryption:  $\begin{bmatrix} 12 & -7 \\ -5 & 3 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 26 \\ 11 \end{bmatrix}_{\text{mod } 31}$   
 $\begin{bmatrix} 235 \end{bmatrix}$   $\begin{bmatrix} 18 \end{bmatrix}$ 

$$\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 235 \\ -97 \end{bmatrix}_{\text{mod } 31} \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 18 \\ 27 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow_{\text{SE}_a \text{ or SEA}}$$

**Illustration 2**: Consider a message HOUR represented as  $HO_u R \Longrightarrow$  corresponds to [7 30 17]

Let 
$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 2 & 5 & 7 \\ -2 & -4 & -5 \end{bmatrix}$$
  
Encryption  $\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 2 & 5 & 7 \\ -2 & -4 & -5 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 7 \\ 30 \\ 17 \end{bmatrix} \mod 31$   
 $\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 118 \\ 283 \\ -219 \end{bmatrix}_{\text{mod } 31} \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 25 \\ 4 \\ 29 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow [Z \in O_o]$   
Decryption:  $\begin{bmatrix} 3 & -2 & -1 \\ -4 & 1 & -1 \\ 2 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 25 \\ 4 \\ 29 \end{bmatrix}_{\text{mod } 31} \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 2 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 3 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 2 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 3 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 2 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 2 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 2 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 2 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 2 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 3 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 3 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 2 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 3 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 2 = 0 \\ 2 = 0 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 3 = 0 \\ 2 = 0$ 

**Illustration 3**: Let the message be HOUR  $\Rightarrow$  HO<sub>u</sub>R  $\Rightarrow$  the plaintext: [7 30 17]

Let 
$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 8 & 1 & 6 \\ 3 & 5 & 7 \\ 4 & 9 & 2 \end{bmatrix}$$
  
Encryption  $\begin{bmatrix} 8 & 1 & 6 \\ 3 & 5 & 7 \\ 4 & 9 & 2 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 7 \\ 30 \\ 17 \end{bmatrix} \mod 31$ 

$$\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 188\\290\\332 \end{bmatrix}_{\text{mod } 31} \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 2\\11\\22 \end{bmatrix}_{: [C L W]}$$
  
Decryption: 
$$\begin{bmatrix} 24 & 25 & 11\\7 & 20 & 2\\29 & 15 & 16 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 2\\11\\22 \end{bmatrix}_{\text{mod } 31}$$
$$\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 565\\278\\575 \end{bmatrix}_{\text{mod } 31} \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 7\\30\\17 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow$$

$$HO_uR$$
 or  $HOUR$ 

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Illustration 4: Consider the message COE that corresponds to the plaintext: [2 14 4]

Let 
$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 13 & 14 \\ 19 & 6 & 4 \\ 12 & 1 & 25 \end{bmatrix}$$
  
Encryption:  $\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 13 & 14 \\ 19 & 6 & 4 \\ 12 & 1 & 25 \end{bmatrix} * \begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ 14 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix} \mod 31$   
 $\Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 238 \\ 138 \\ 148 \end{bmatrix} \mod 31$   
 $31 \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 21 \\ 14 \\ 24 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow [V O Y]$   
Decryption, Here,  $A^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{6453} \begin{bmatrix} -146 & 311 & 32 \\ 407 & 238 & -266 \\ 83 & -221 & 247 \end{bmatrix}$ 

Using the multiplicative inverse  $\Rightarrow$  5 mod 31 as 25 mod 31, A<sup>-1</sup>

$$\begin{bmatrix} 8 & 25 & 25 \\ 7 & 29 & 15 \\ 29 & 24 & 6 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$Now, \begin{bmatrix} 8 & 25 & 25 \\ 7 & 29 & 15 \\ 29 & 24 & 6 \end{bmatrix}_{*} \begin{bmatrix} 21 \\ 14 \\ 24 \end{bmatrix}_{mod 31}$$

$$\implies \begin{bmatrix} 1118 \\ 913 \\ 1089 \end{bmatrix}_{mod 31} \implies \begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ 14 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix} \implies Corresponds to$$

COE

The involvement of the factors of 2 or 13 in any matrix is not affecting the encryption and decryption process if the matrix or magic square is non singular.

Illustration 5: (Encryption and decryption based on weak magic squares)

Taking A= 0, B =1, C = 2 ...Z=25, A<sub>u</sub>=26, E<sub>a</sub>=27, E<sub>e</sub>=28,  $O_0=29$ ,  $O_u=30$ , the message **FLOWER** gives the plaintext [05] 11 14 22 04 17]

We may consider two weak magic squares generated for n = 6(singly-even) as:

34	9	22	15	27	4
2	29	23	14	11	32
36	25	13	19	12	6
1	7	18	24	30	31
5	26	20	17	8	35
33	10	21	16	28	3

WMS-A

34	9	16	31	37	4
2	29	17	14	11	32
31	30	24	18	7	1
6	12	19	13	25	36
5	26	20	23	8	35
33	10	15	22	28	3

WMS-B

**FLOWER**  $\Rightarrow$  plaintext [05 11 14 22 04 17]

**Encryption:** Cipher text =  $[{(6*6) weak magic square}^* plaintext] mod 31.$ 

Let CT = Encrypted cipher text of the message, using 6\*6 weak magic squares given above.

 $CT^{(1)} = [WMS-A] * [05 \ 11 \ 14 \ 22 \ 04 \ 17] \mod 31 \Longrightarrow [15 \ 06 \ 22 \ 0 \ 19 \ 16] \Longrightarrow PGWATQ$ 

 $CT^{(2)} = [WMS-B] * [05 \ 11 \ 14 \ 22 \ 04 \ 17] \ mod \ 31 \Longrightarrow [29 \ 28 \ 27 \ 21 \ 11 \ 30] \Longrightarrow O_0 \ E_E \ E_a V \ L \ O_U$ 

Here, |WMS, Fig A| = 2308920, using the multiplicative inverse of  $2308920 \mod 31 \Longrightarrow 9 \mod 31$  as 7 mod 31, {Inverse of WMS-A} mod 31 =

31

Here, |WMS - B| = 66600, using the multiplicative inverse of 66600 mod  $31 \Rightarrow 12 \mod 31$  as 13 mod 31: {Inverse of **WMS-B**} mod 31 =

28	27	6	8	6	6 ]	
16	9	1	3	13	8	
15	26	4	0	30	6	
30	0	4	0	25	22	
14	0	26	28	28	16	
18	18	2	23	9	2 ]	mod31

 $M^{(1)} = (WMS-A)^{-1} * CT^{(1)} \mod 31 \implies [05 \ 11 \ 14 \ 22 \ 04 \ 17]$ ⇒ Original plaintext **FLOWER** 

 $M_{(2)} = (WMS-B)^{-1} * CT^{(2)} \mod 31 \Longrightarrow [05 \ 11 \ 14 \ 22 \ 04 \ 17] \Longrightarrow Original plaintext FLOWER$ 

**Illustration 6**: (Encryption and decryption based on weak magic squares)

Suppose the message be: A PROVERB IS THE CHILD OF EXPERIENCE

Arranging in blocks of 6: APROVE RBISTH ECHILD OFEXPE RIENCE

On decryption using multiplicative inverse of the WMS-A and WMS-B give: A PROVERB IS THE CHILD OF EXPERIENCE

**Illustration 7**: (Encryption and decryption based on weak magic squares)

Suppose the message be: BEAUTY IS ONLY SKIN  $DEEP \Longrightarrow BE_3UTYI$  SONLYS KINDEP

# Encryption (WMS-A):IQZVLS SO<sub>u</sub>FBSS JRDDQK Encryption (WMS-B):CUKQBM GOAXWG LBLIDM

On decryption using multiplicative inverse of the WMS-A and WMS-B give: BEAUTY IS ONLY SKIN DEEP

**Illustration 8:** Add-on security in the cryptosystem using weak magic square implementation

To show the relevance of this work to the security of public-key encryption schemes, a public-key cryptosystem RSA is taken. For convenience, let us consider a RSA cryptosystem,

Let p = 11, q = 17 and e = 7, then n = 11(17) = 187, (p-1)(q-1) = 10(16) = 160. Now d = 23. To encrypt,  $C = M^7 \mod 187$  and to decrypt,  $M = C^{23} \mod 187$ .

**Encryption:** First the message FLOWER, encrypted using two different weak magic squares : WMS-Fig-A and WMS-Fig-B using the plaintext represents [05 11 14 22 04 17] The encrypted cipher text using WMS-Fig-A and WMS-Fig-B are:

 $CT^{(1)} = [15 \ 06 \ 22 \ 0 \ 19 \ 16]$  $CT^{(2)} = [29 \ 28 \ 27 \ 21 \ 11 \ 30]$ 

The encrypted cipher text using  $C = M^7 \mod 187$  are:  $C^{(1)} = \{CT^{(1)}\}^7 \mod 187 \implies [93\ 184\ 44\ 0\ 145\ 135]$  $C^{(2)} = \{CT^{(2)}\}^7 \mod 187 \implies [\ 160\ 173\ 124\ 98\ 88\ 123]$ 

**Decryption**:  $M = C^{23} \mod 187$  for the two Cipher text C <sup>(1)</sup> and C<sup>(2)</sup>. It gives the decrypted cipher text CT <sup>(1)</sup> and CT<sup>(2)</sup>

$$CT^{(1)} = [C_{(1)}]^{23} \mod 187 \implies [15 \ 06 \ 22 \ 0 \ 19 \ 16]$$
$$CT^{(2)} = [C_{(2)}]^{23} \mod 187 \implies [29 \ 28 \ 27 \ 21 \ 11 \ 30]$$

These decrypted cipher text in two forms are again decrypted to get the original message.

 $(WMS-A)^{-1} * CT^{(1)} \mod 31 \Longrightarrow [05 \ 11 \ 14 \ 22 \ 04 \ 17] \Longrightarrow \text{original}$ plaintext, **FLOWER** 

 $(WMS-B)^{-1} * CT^{(2)} \mod 31 \Longrightarrow [05 \ 11 \ 14 \ 22 \ 04 \ 17] \Longrightarrow \text{original}$ plaintext, **FLOWER** 

### III. CONCLUSION

It indicates that any non singular matrix or magic square or weak magic squares can be comfortably used as add-on device to this modified cryptosystem. The technique will provide another layer of security to the cryptosystem. The proposed dummy letters are the theoretical developments focusing on its merit and advantages in using magic squares or any type of matrices in encryption and decryption processes. In facts, the introduction of 5 dummy letters will affect the ASCII structure thereby inviting troubles in other uses. If implemented, it will give a new direction to the Computer operators and specifically a new direction to the crypt analyzers.

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