Tolerationology

Rawaa Mahmoud Hussain

Prof. Dr. (Islamic Philosophy), Rochester Muslim Community Center (RMCC), Lecturer (Arabic Language), Nazareth College, Rochester, New York, USA

Abstract- The aim of this article is to launch the way for philosophy and human thought to start thinking with toleration as a science, which represents one of the basic approaches to counter extremism, intolerance, narrow-mindedness and stagnation. In this article, I want to be out with tolerance to the level at which it becomes a science. In order to achieve this transformation of toleration to be Tolerationology, I have briefed philosophy of toleration history, John Locke’s philosophy of toleration. I have submitted the proof that we are all looking for toleration, the religious toleration is possible. The article also contains a discussion of identity, difference, and responsibility.

Index Terms- Toleration, Tolerationology, Religion, Philosophy, Identity, Difference…

I. CONCEPT OF TOLERATION

There are many contexts in which we speak of a person or an institution as being tolerant: a friend tolerates the weaknesses of another, parents tolerate certain behavior of their children, a monarch tolerates dissent, a state tolerates a minority religion, a church tolerates sins, a society tolerates deviant behavior. The term “toleration”—from the Latin tolerare: to put up with, countenance or suffer—generally refers to the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but still “tolerable,” such that they should not be prohibited or constrained. ¹

The etymological root of toleration is the Latin word tolerantia. The general notion of enduring and putting with various items was what this concept denoted in its early history. There are two nouns that exist in contemporary English that derived from Latin word tolerantia: tolerance and toleration. More specifically, tolerance corresponds to a willingness or ability to tolerate: toleration corresponds to the practice of tolerating. ²

Another argument is that one particular conception of toleration is more suitable than others. This conception allows us to better understand the difficulties of toleration. Thus, this particular conception of toleration should lead us to see what is more adequate for dealing with the difficulties of toleration. Hu argues for a political conception of toleration, which different from the attitudinal conception of toleration as being indifferent, or the ethical conception of toleration as respect. It is virtuous for individual and collective agents to be tolerant. However, toleration is difficult, both in practice and in conceptualization. The alternative understanding of toleration do not provide better diagnoses of the difficulties of toleration. The political conception of toleration is intended to be grounded on some moral considerations, not pragmatic purpose. It is political in that it recognizes the fact that toleration is essentially practiced to deal with a power relationship among the parties of toleration. Where these is no such power relationship, there is no issue of toleration. Secondly, this proposed conception of toleration is political in the sense that it shall not deal with differences coming from, to use John Rawls’s phrase, the fact of pluralism by adopting any comprehensive doctrine such as an ethics of respect or recognition. ³

Toleration is deferent from another similar concepts and we realize some socials paradoxes that the tolerance brings. For that reason, the study of the concept of respect as the fundament of tolerance is the sustain in which the real solidarity and peace are establish. ⁴

Toleration is not an absolute ethical principle, but one among others in the context of a particular moral system. It should be given a proper place in the hierarchy of principles. Understanding toleration as the absolute or even overriding principle may lead in the face of obvious and directly threatening wrong to its use as an umbrella for adoptive or escapist behavior. As a moral principle toleration is universal, but only in the sense


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that potentially it is addressed to every rational and moral agent. The question is whether this principle is appropriate in all situations and what are those moral agents who recognize its practical actuality for them? The limits to toleration are given by basic and minimal ethical task to resist evil. The principle of active opposition to evil by all possible means is prior to the principle of toleration.

It, understood as moral attitudes and dispositions, helps us understand why deep reconciliation is logically coherent. Dispelling the apparent paradox lies in understanding the role of tolerance in forming what is called relationships of “acknowledgment and forbearance.” Societies emerging from tolerance in forming what is called relationships of”acknowledgment and forbearance.” Societies emerging from severe internal bloodshed along ethnic, racial or religious lines face significant problems of reconciliation. Relationships of acknowledgement and forbearance overcome elements of enmity and estrangement, and such relationships are necessary, in turn, for deep reconciliation. A particularly “deep” form of recognition between former victims and offenders is necessary to end enmity and achieve solidarity. Yet it appears that deep reconciliation is logically incoherent as it requires that forgiveness be asked and be given for acts that are inexcusable and unforgivable.

It usually means putting up with beliefs or actions with which one disagrees, and it is practiced because the beliefs or actions in question are not disagreeable enough to justify interference. It is usually taken to be a topic for moral and political philosophy. Theodicy, on the other hand, is the attempt to solve the problem of evil; that is, to explain the origin of suffering and sin in a way that does not make God a moral cause of those evils. Theodicy and Tolerance seem at first glance to be an unlikely pair of topics to treat in a single paper. While theodicy concerns the notions of good and evil, and could therefore be considered a moral topic, historical and contemporary discussions of it have been predominantly metaphysical and epistemological in scope. Tolerance and theodicy would therefore seem to belong to entirely different spheres of philosophical inquiry.

Tolerance is a philosophically elusive concept. Indeed, in the liberal ethos of the last three centuries, it has been hailed as one of the fundamental ethical and political values, and it still occupies a powerful position in contemporary legal and political rhetoric. In the theory of rights, virtue, and duty, people who radically disagree about the analysis and justification of these concepts can still appeal to a commonly shared repertory of examples. But with tolerance, it seems that we can find hardly a single concrete case that would be universally agreed to be a typical object of discussion. Courage and habeas corpus are standard cases of virtue. However, our firm belief in the value of tolerance is not matched by analogous theoretical certitude. Perhaps the best indication of the shaky grounds on which the philosophical discussion of tolerance rests is the intriguing lack of agreement on paradigm cases.

Andrew Jason Cohen points out that toleration is considered also as noninterference. This is the intuitive notion that most of us share when we only briefly consider the idea. Noninterference seems to be the point of toleration; that is, an act is only an act of toleration if noninterference is its intent. Importantly, though, we sometimes tolerate beings that we do not think are autonomous, deserve respect, or have rights. We tolerate nonhuman animals on occasion, for example. We believe there is value in the natural order of things. We believe, that is, that noninterference with nature is itself a value. Asking what should be tolerated without being clear about what it is to tolerate seems to put the cart before the horse. Clarity is clearly a virtue when discussing issues like this. If we are to say we should (or should not) tolerate a certain behavior, we need to know what we are prescribing. With further consideration, however, it is clear that “intentional noninterference” is not satisfactory as a definition of toleration. Cohen makes do recognizing several conditions of genuine toleration. One of these is intentional noninterference, as just discussed. But not all intentional noninterference is toleration. Perhaps the most common suggestions are the following three, related, possibilities: rights, individual autonomy, and respect. The idea for each of these is fairly simple. If we oppose someone’s action, but (a) they have a right to do the action, (b) they must be allowed to act on their autonomy, or (c) they are worthy of our respect, then we cannot interfere even though we oppose the action. These can, of course, be easily conflated: we respect them because they are autonomous or because they have rights; they have rights because they are autonomous, etc.

It also could be argued that toleration is love to human beings and other creatures. It is cooperation and a decision in co-existence with other regardless of being different. The difference is an essential part of human nature, and history shows that humanity has been different throughout its history. The solution for humanitarian difference is in tolerance. The aim of ‘Tolerationology’ is to launch the way for philosophy and human thought to start thinking with toleration as a science, which represents one of the basic approaches to counter extremism, intolerance, narrow-mindedness and stagnation. ‘Tolerationology’ means through tolerance we can find solutions

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to the severe structural imbalances in the nature of individual and
the structure of society too.

II. PHILOSOPHY OF TOLERATION HISTORY

The origin of the history of humanity, as we think, is
tolerance, peace and coexistence; regardless of the periods in
which this history has seen witnessing a struggle and a conflict
between different social groups in different times and places.

Research into the conception of toleration has demonstrated
that it did not always connote a positive appreciation and
treatment of others that could be contrasted with a position of
intolerance. Literally, toleration is about some person or group of
persons putting up with, or “suffering,” something undesirable
for the sake of something else, be it sustained peace among rival
ethnic groups in a nation, financial gain, or family unity. In fact,
etymology of the Latin tolerate and its older German
equivalents are Leiden and dulden imply that the toleration of
someone or something different is the result of circumstances
that make persecution of such difference unappealing to those in
power. Enlightenment discourses about toleration linked the
conception to political, economic, and social concerns about
equality and human rights and argued for toleration as a
fundamental good within civil society. Nevertheless, critics such
as The post-Enlightenment understanding of toleration as a
public good that is linked to a conception of individual human
rights is relatively new in the history of the West. Yet scholars
have dealt with the concept in a number of different ways and
reached conclusions that bear on questions of public policy,
human rights, and economic equity. Goethe has argued that
toleration itself is an insult to human dignity if it does not give
way to recognition of the other. Research on toleration in
German-speaking lands during the early modern period before
Enlightenment philosophers brought the issue to the fore,
however, has lagged behind, especially with respect to negative
attitudes toward religious toleration. Scholars seem to be most
interested in finding and doing research on early modern
historical figures (e.g. Erasmus of Rotterdam, Sebastian Franck,
Sebastian Castello, Hans Denck, and Valentin Weigel) who
advocated some kind of religious toleration, albeit not in the
name of enlightened concerns about human rights or individual
freedom. While John Marshall devotes attention to early modern
attitudes of intolerance, he does so with an eye toward
establishing an “early Enlightenment culture” of men of letters
who advocated forms of toleration in the 1680s and 1690s. 10
The true historian of political thought looks not for individual
originators of modern concepts such as equality, liberty, and
toleration— individuals who may turn out to be imaginary, in
any case—but rather the complex historical-intellectual processes
out of which those concepts emerged. It is rarely observed that
the traditional hall of mirrors also reflects a male image or an
exclusively male perspective on political concepts and political
issues. It has sometimes been observed that the history of
political thought is, figuratively speaking, a hall of mirrors in
which our present political concerns and preoccupations are
reflected back at us, albeit in a slightly distorted form. Several
scholars have challenged this traditional kind of history: if we
propose to understand the true origins of modern political
thought, it is argued, then it is a mistake to search for the present
in the past, or to identify purely contemporary ideas in the works
of historical figures. Yet the historian of philosophy who focuses
on male political ideas alone also makes the mistake of failing to
take into account the precise historical circumstances of pre-
modern political thought. This is because women were also
active participants in the conflict of opinions that shaped and
defined modern political philosophy as we know it. The
historical evidence suggests that the phenomenon of the female
political thinker was not an isolated one, but a recurring feature
across the centuries and in different regions of Europe. In
addition to influencing the development of ideas through their
practical support and patronage, women themselves discussed
political ideas and wrote influential political works. 11

Voltaire points out that when enlightenment spread, with the
renaissance of letters in the fifteenth century, there was a very
general complaint of abuses, and everybody agrees that the
complaint was just. It is said that, since Jesus Christ had never
exacted fees, nor sold dispensations for this world or indulgences
for the next, one might refuse to pay a foreign prince the price of
these things. One may, therefore, without blasphemy, admit that
the heretics, in proposing to abolish these singular taxes, which
will astonish a later age, did not do a very grave wrong to the
kingdom, and that they were rather good financiers than bad
subjects. Let us add that they alone knew Greek, and were
acquainted with antiquity. Let us grant that, in spite of their
errors, we owe to them the development of the human mind, so
long buried in the densest barbarism. 12

Weekend bonito articulates a critical philosophical-
methodological approach at the heart of which is Mikhail
Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy and the idea of
“vnenahkodimost” (“outsidedness”). According to Mikhail
Epstein’s concept of “transculture,” each culture is incomplete,
thus needs to transcend its borders in dialogue with other
cultures. Transculture is a path of liberation of the individual

10 Adam W. Darlage, “Mit was für Gewissen kan man sie ...?”
Conscience and Toleration in Christoph Andreas Fischer’s Vier
und funftzig erthebliche Vrsachen,” From: Seminar: A Journal of
Germanic Studies 48, Number 3 (September 2012).

11 Jacqueline Broad and Karen Green, Virtue, Liberty and
Toleration Political Ideas of European Women 1400 - 1800

12 Voltaire, Toleration and Other Essays, translated, with an
Introduction, by Joseph McCabe (New York: G.P. Putnam’s
from the symbolic dependencies of culture itself and self-imposed identities. It is a state of virtual belonging of one individual to many cultures. Edward Demenchonok analyzes the problems of cultural diversity and universality as elaborated in the concepts of “intercultural philosophy” (Fornet-Betancourt), “transculture” (Mikhail Epstein), and “discourse ethics” (Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, and Seyla Benhabib). In the postmodern theories of culture, there is an internal tension between multiculturalism and deconstruction. Edward Demenchonok focuses on Jürgen Habermas’s analysis of the problem of cultural identity and diversity in terms of the liberal conception of equality and cultural rights. Multiculturalism itself is not immune from knowledge/power relations. Its paradox is that individual basic liberties are restricted in the name of the securing collective rights of culture groups. Habermas argues that these problems can be solved only from the perspective of “the difference-sensitive egalitarian universalism of equal rights.” Multiculturalism implies an essentialist connection between cultural production and ethnic or physical origin. In contrast, there is an argument for a concept of cultural diversity free from determinism and representation. Edward Critical universality means diversity as a property of a single individual or a single culture insofar as they can include the diversity of others. It is viewed as an internal diversity of individuals, their dialogical openness to others and self-identification primarily as members of humanity. Attention is paid to David Rasmussen’s analyses of conflict and toleration within the confines of a post-secular society. Mutual recognition requires a transformation of interpersonal relations through discourse and public debates over identity politics. 13

In America, religious diversity emerged in different ways, appeared in different degrees, and had different connotations, depending on the local context. Indeed, the one vital lesson in the history may be that there are diverse sorts of diversities, each with its own peculiar causes and consequences. Pennsylvania is widely recognized as the front door through which ethnic and religious diversity entered America. New York and New Jersey made their contributions as well, but they tend to pale in comparison to what could be found in eighteenth-century Pennsylvania. It would not be terribly controversial to assert that, in the creation of early American ethnic and religious diversity, Pennsylvania made a very big difference. Perhaps Pennsylvania made the difference. To appreciate the difference that Pennsylvania made it is first essential to realize that diversity did not just happen. Diversity is a deceptively simple word. There is no single way to be diverse. Without this critical appreciation of diversity we risk taking Pennsylvania’s accomplishments for granted. Exactly why Pennsylvania happened at all, let alone how it evolved into the epicenter of early American religious pluralism, are complicated and still contentious questions. 14

Religious liberty in the new United States entailed an unprecedented commitment to the principle of religious equality, or at least substantive gestures in that direction. The American Revolution in religious liberty was also distinguished by its durability. Changed social customs and formal legal arrangements proved crucial in this regard, as did the relative absence of anticlericalism and secularism. Yet it was the ineluctable force of widely accepted principles, particularly religious liberty and nonsectarianism—the consistency they demanded, the equity they extended, and the portability they provided—that made the revolution an enduring phenomenon. The tolerance that prevailed by the 1780s made almost all previous tolerationist regimes in the Western world, as well as in North America, look halting and limited. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, European states were just getting around to making or expanding policies of toleration. Some of these same states had long traditions of inter-confessional peace, but almost always on the condition of legal inequality. Until the French Revolutionaries exclusionary establishments were universal. Toleration meant that religious minorities were "dissenters," as they had long been in much of British North America. 15

III. LOCKE STATION

The philosopher John Locke represents one of the important stations in the history of the idea of toleration in the world. His book ‘A Letter Concerning Toleration’ is considered a leading figure in the attempt to think about ‘Tolerationology.’ Therefore, it is necessary to have a brief idea about the philosophy of Locke in toleration.

Traditionally historians of early modern religious toleration have focused on British intellectual history and connected freedom of conscience to sweeping accounts of liberalization and modernization, often at the expense of acknowledging the limitations of this tolerance. However, revisionist historiography, has approached toleration as a matter of social, rather than intellectual, history and has shifted our focus from Britain to all of Europe and her Atlantic colonies. Moreover, revisionist historians of English religion have usefully questioned whether seventeenth century calls for toleration really advocated either liberty in the modern sense of the word or pluralism. These innovations have revealed a broad range of tolerant practices in ordinary life, and they have shown that toleration was often due more to a “particular concatenation of circumstances” than “an


evolutionary process.” Religious liberty in this period should not be confused with a straightforward embrace of equality or multiculturalism: while a measure of error or “tolerable Differences” might be allowed, heresy was still to be condemned, and unity—with Christ, with other believers, with the state—was held as the ultimate religious goal. John Coffey, who has tried to renew the connection between civil war–era Puritanism and modern liberalism, has conceded the evidence of many tolerationist pamphlets to his opponents because of these texts’ “very limited” calls for religious freedom. Blair Worden has noted that Puritans sometimes found “toleration” to be “a dirty word … an expedient concession to wickedness,” and both he and J. C. Davis have emphasized the special meaning of liberty in early modern toleration tracts: liberty of conscience concerned not “a claim to direct or manage ourselves,” but “a claim to be free to submit to the governance of God rather than to any other authority”.16

16 Ben LaBreche, “Areopagitica and the Limits of Pluralism,” in: Milton Studies 54 (2013), p. 139 | 10.1353/mlt.2013.0006. Colin Jagere indicates that the advent of religious toleration in England at the end of the seventeenth century has long interested political theorists as well as intellectual and literary historians. Many have argued that toleration is a movement from below, born of the desire to be free. Toleration is among other things a linguistic program, and it turns out that the discourse of toleration mistrusts the ambiguities of literary language. A careful reading of John Locke and the latitudinarian tradition indicates that toleration originates in raison d’état arguments, and that the question of state power can be neither historically nor analytically detached from it. Two poems by John Dryden, Religio Laici and “To the Pious Memory of the Accomplished Young Lady Mrs Anne Killigrew,” push against the limits of toleration discourse; the first, written while Dryden was still an Anglican, limns the emptiness of a formal commitment to “common quiet”; the riotous figuration of the second, written the year of his conversion to Catholicism, points to what Charles Taylor has called the “awkwardness” of a multicultural polity trying to balance its commitments to majority and minority identities. See: Colin Jagere, “Common Quiet: Tolerance Around 1688,”

In this context, the philosophy of John Locke appeared to the public to be one of the main stations of tolerance. His “Letter Concerning Toleration,” represented the new trend of tolerance which has been growing in Modern European Philosophy.

Petar Cholakov analyzes the problem of the development of John Locke’s ideas on toleration, in particular the grounds of separation of church and state. The relation between Locke’s views on toleration and political practice explains the shift between the three stages. The first part examines Locke’s arguments regarding the prerogatives of the magistrate towards ‘indifferent things’ and the religious sphere. Cholakov outlines two fundamental sets of interdependent arguments that Locke uses for the separation of church and state. The third part is dedicated to the sphere of the church and the dimensions of the duty of toleration. Cholakov distinguishes between three stages in the development of Locke’s view on toleration: a suspicion toward the plea for it (the Two Tracts); an implicit non-verbalized distinction between church and state, and support for toleration (An Essay on Toleration); and toleration as a political right (A Letter Concerning Toleration, the Two Treatises and the later letters). The second part focuses on the definition of ‘commonwealth’ in A Letter Concerning Toleration. 17

17 Petar Cholakov, “The Development of John Locke’s Ideas on Toleration,” in: Balkan Journal of Philosophy 7, Issue 2 (2015), p.187. DOI: 10.5840/bjp20157223. Micah Schwartzman points out that John Locke’s theory of toleration has been criticized as having little relevance for politics today because it rests on controversial theological foundations. Although there have been some recent attempts to develop secular; or publicly accessible, arguments out of Locke’s writings, these tend to obscure and distort the religious arguments that Locke used to defend toleration. Bracketing the search for publicly accessible justifications makes it possible to appreciate the continued relevance of Locke’s religious arguments for toleration. These efforts ignore the role that religious arguments may play in supporting the development of a normative consensus on the legitimacy of liberal political principles. See: Micah Schwartzman, “The Relevance of Locke’s Religious Arguments for Toleration,” in: Political Theory 33, No. 5 (Oct., 2005), p. 678. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30038449.
John Locke inquiry what are his thoughts about the mutual Toleration of Christians in their different Professions of Religion, he must needs answer you freely, That he esteems that Toleration to be the chief Characteristical Mark of the True Church. For whatsoever some People boast of the Antiquity of Places and Names, or of the Pomp of their Outward Worship; Others, of the Reformation of their Discipline; All, of the Orthodoxy of their Faith; (for every one is Orthodox to himself): these things, and all others of this nature, are much rather Marks of Men striving for Power and Empire over one another, than of the Church of Christ. Whosoever will list himself under the Banner of Christ, must in the first place, and above all things, make War upon his own Lusts and Vices. It is in vain for any Man to usurp the Name of Christian, without Holiness of Life, Purity of Manners, and Benignity and Meekness of Spirit. Let any one have never so true a Claim to all these things, yet if he be destitute of Charity, Meekness, and Good-will in general towards all Mankind; even to those that are not Christians, he is certainly yet short of being a true Christian himself. The Kings of the Gentiles exercise Lordship over them, said the Savior to his Disciples, but ye shall not be so. Luke 22:25. The Business of True Religion is quite another thing. It is not instituted in order to the erecting of an external Pomp, nor to the obtaining of Ecclesiastical Dominion, nor to the exercising of Compulsive Force; but to the regulating of Men’s Lives according to the Rules of Virtue and Piety. 18

Toleration is a pragmatic response to the practical need to coexist with others who have different conceptions of the good. Toleration develops out of the recognition that in practice diversity cannot be eradicated by either philosophical argument or political force. Locke’s approach became more clearly defined in the nineteenth century with Mill’s account of the practical need to tolerate dissenting opinions. Both Locke and Mill base their argument for toleration upon an account of human psychology and epistemology. Locke argued, for example, that since it was not practically possible to produce orthodoxy by way of coercion, the state should tolerate dissent. While Locke rejects coercion in belief formation, Mill emphasizes that belief in the truth will be stronger if the truth has been tempered by argument and dissent. Although Mill’s psychology of belief is similar to Locke’s, his tolerant attitude goes beyond Locke. Mill thus foreshadows the way in which toleration would develop in the twentieth century. Mill celebrates diversity as such. Today we encounter radical diversity with tolerant eyes opened by the horrors of those “final solutions” that have sought to eliminate it. We no longer believe that it is practically possible to unify human life under one concept or idea. 19

John Locke points out that if the Gospel and the Apostles may be credited, no Man can be a Christian without Charity, and without that Faith which works, not by Force, but by Love, then it would indeed be very hard for one that appears careless about his own Salvation, to persuade me that he was extremely concerned for mine. For it is impossible that those should heartily and sincerely apply themselves to make other People Christians, who have not really embraced the Christian Religion in their own Hearts. Locke appeals to the Consciences of those that persecute, destroy, torment, and kill other Men upon pretense of Religion, whether they do it out of Kindness and Friendship and towards them, or no: And he shall then indeed, and not till then, believe they do so, when he shall see those fiery Zealots correcting, in the same manner, their Friends and familiar Acquaintance, for the manifest Sins they commit against the Precepts of the Gospel; when he shall see them thus express their Love and Desire of the Salvation of their Souls, by the infliction of Torments, and exercise of all manner of Cruelties; and when he shall see them prosecute with Fire and Sword the Members of their own Communion that are tainted with enormous Vices, and without Amendment are in danger of eternal Perdition. For if it be out of a Principle of Charity, as they pretend, and Love to Men’s Souls, that they deprive them of their Estates, maim them with corporal Punishments, starve and torment them in noisome Prisons, and in the end even take away their Lives; I say, if all this be done merely to make Men Christians, and procure their Salvation, Why then do they suffer Whore-doom, Fraud, Malice, and such like enormities, Romans 1; which (according to the Apostle) manifestly relish of Heathenish Corruption, to predominate so much and abound amongst their Flocks and People; These, and such like things, are certainly more contrary to the Purity of the Church, to the Glory of God, and to the Salvation of Souls, than any conscientious Dissent from Ecclesiastical Decisions, or Separation from Public Worship, whilst accompanied with Innocence of Life. 20

John Locke argues that the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things; when considering any thing as existing at any determined time and place, we compare it with itself existing at another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and diversity. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no; it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with itself, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning; it being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place, or one and the same thing in different places. That therefore that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse. When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it

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is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable sever it may be in all other respects: and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present. For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exists any where at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there itself alone.  

Aaron Lercher indicates that our concern for nonhuman nature can be justified in terms of a human right to liberty of ecological conscience. This right is analogous to the right to religious liberty, and is equally worthy of recognition as that fundamental liberty. The liberty of ecological conscience, like religious liberty, is a negative right against interference. Each ecological conscience supports a claim to protection of the parts of nonhuman nature that are current or potential sites of its active pursuit of natural value. Destruction of an object of current or potential natural value is like destroying a church, mosque, temple, or other holy place. This justification for environmental conservation is analogous to the standard justification for individual negative rights, as upheld by the liberal tradition of Locke, Mill, and Rawls.  

IV. WE ARE ALL LOOKING FOR TOLERANCE  

Michael Walzer believes that the idea that our choice are not determined by a single universalism or universal principal and that the right choice might not be similarly right there is, strictly speaking, a relative to the history and culture of the people whose lives it will arrange. This seems an obvious point. However, he is advocating an unconstrained relativism, for an arrangement, and no feature of an arrangement, is a moral option unless it provides for some version of peaceful coexistence. We choose within limits, but the real disagreement is whether such limit exist, no one seriously believes that they don’t, but how wide they are. The best way to estimate that the width is to describe a range of options and to make the case for plausibility and limitations of each within its historical context.  

David M. Rasmussen clarifies the kind of context, which requires toleration. His point of departure is a characterization of modernity that both departs from the classical modern theory of secularization and draws from the current research on multiple modernities. This will lead to the definition of conflict and tolerance within the confines of a post-secular society. The philosophical component of the concept of toleration will be taken from both Aristotle and Kant in the sense that toleration is not only a necessary virtue in modern society, it is also a normative notion based on respect for the law. We can no longer characterize toleration on the basis of a theory of secularization because of the more or less recent resurgence of religion. Rasmussen concludes that toleration must be conceived of as a principle of justice in a society that requires respect not only for the rights of others but for their cultures as well.  

Catriona McKinnon points out that by countering the claim that vertical toleration is redundant given a commitment to the Rawlsian version of the liberal democratic ideal, and by articulating a version of that ideal that shows this claim to be false; the reaffirmation is that the centrality of vertical toleration in the Rawlsian liberal account of state-citizen relations. The direct, vertical toleration of certain types of citizen by the Rawlsian liberal state is appropriate and required in circumstances in which these types of citizen pose a threat to the stability of the state.  

Maria Rosa Aantognazza argues that neither toleration ad intra nor toleration ad extra is grounded for Leibniz in indifference toward the content of revealed religion. On the contrary, Leibniz remained convinced of the objective truth of the Christian religion as it is handed down by the millennia-old tradition of the truly universal church. In his view, reasons internal to the very nature of salvation and to the conception of God and man explicitly contained in or, at least, in accord with this tradition present religious toleration as the only justifiable answer to the differences among religions. Maria Rosa Aantognazza as one might expect, throughout his life Leibniz assumed an attitude of religious toleration both ad intra (that is, toward Christians of other confessions) and ad extra (that is, toward non-Christians, notably Muslims). Maria Rosa Aantognazza aims to uncover the philosophical and theological foundations of Leibniz’s views on this subject. Focusing in


particular on his epistolary exchange with the French Catholic convert Paul Pellisson-Fontanier. 26

Trudy D. Conway considers the relation between tolerance and hospitality. Conway situates this discussion in the history of philosophy with reference to a range of thinkers from Homer and Aristotle to Levinas, Derrida, and Walzer. Hospitality responds to the challenge of what is most needed for re-conceiving how one might remain committed to the values of one’s own community while also remaining open to those who do not share these same commitments. Conway argues that the virtue of hospitality is important for negotiating the complexities of our contemporary world. 27

Edwin Curley points out that Spinoza’s argument is not limited to religious toleration, but is an argument for freedom of philosophizing generally. Nevertheless, freedom of philosophizing in religion is the central case. Curley wants to know whether any of the arguments philosophers made in favor of religious toleration deserved to be effective in bringing about this transformation. The central thesis of Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise is that the state not only can permit freedom of philosophizing without endangering piety or the public peace, but that it must do so if it is not to destroy piety and the public peace. In making such an argument, he contributed greatly toward the transformation of Western culture with respect to toleration and religious liberty. Curley wants to understand how this transformation came about and what role Spinoza played in it.28

Andrew Fiala discusses one source of toleration: a modest recognition of the limits of our ability to imagine the situation of the other. Fiala further connects this with both respect for the autonomy of the other and the moral need to engage the other in dialogue. The conclusion is that toleration is important in light of the ubiquity of failures of the moral imagination. Fiala considers several examples of the failure of the moral imagination, including a discussion of the Hindu practice of sati or widow burning. 29

Toleration means to keep self and other; it is to keep the other by giving him the right to exist first, then the consequence of this freedom of choice guaranteed by the right to exist. I exist; therefore I am free. Toleration also keeps other, because he will do the same role toward self on the basis of action and re-action, and although it is a natural base, but, at the same time, a role of human relations. Toleration is a human virtue, this virtue that without it human beings will be courtyard and commodificated, i.e., making them goods in one system, contrary to what is in natural order. The system of nature is based on several elements, such as: diversity, contrast, different in human and natural assets. And without toleration; diversity would be destroyed and moving people to be engaged in one box, a locked cage or a dark prison.30

So, it can be said that the attempts to deepen human understanding on toleration have not been interrupted since Locke until today. On the contrary, we find that the work is continuing in this context, and, therefore, it is very possible and important to get benefit from all attempts to formulate the general laws of ‘Tolerationology.’

V. THE POSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION

Voltaire believes what seems to reason impossible—in other words, he believe what he do not believe—and therefore he must hate those who boast that they believe an absurdity opposed to mine. Such is the logic—such, rather, is the madness—of the superstitious. To worship, love, and serve the Supreme Being, and to be of use to men, is nothing; it is indeed, according to some, a false virtue, a “splendid sin,” as they call it. Ever since men made it a sacred duty to dispute about what they cannot understand, and made virtue consist in the pronunciation of certain unintelligible words, which every one attempted to explain, Christian countries have been a theatre of discord and carnage. Voltaire also believes that God has given you understanding; he cannot wish that you should pervert it. It is a fact of daily experience that God, who gives everything, has given one man more light and more talent than another. No one can deny that it is possible for God to shower his finest gifts on one of his works. It does not offend our good sense that he has chosen to link one man more closely to himself than others; that he has made him a model of reason or virtue. We may, therefore,
believe in Jesus as one who taught and practised virtue; but let us take care that in wishing to go too far beyond that, we do not overturn the whole structure.

Catholic Encyclopedia defines toleration as “Toleration in general signifies patient forbearance in the presence of an evil which one is unable or unwilling to prevent. By religious toleration is understood the magnanimous indulgence which one shows towards religion other than his own, accompanied by the moral determination to leave it and its adherents unmolested in private and public, although internally one views it with complete disapproval as a “false faith.”

“Evangelical toleration” is recovered as a neglected tradition in early modern political thought with important consequences for contemporary political theory and practice. Not only were evangelical considerations essential in shaping the particular institutions associated with toleration in England and America, the varieties of evangelical toleration represented by Williams and Locke shed significant light on the very different institutions—and intuitions—governing the expression of religious difference in liberal democracies today. Many political theorists dismiss the prudential arguments made by “proto-liberal” thinkers like Roger Williams or John Locke in favor of toleration as a necessary precondition for evangelism and conversion as intolerant, unacceptably instrumental, and inessential to their deeper theories. By contrast, critics of liberalism treat them as smoking gun evidence for an imperial and civilizing mission underlying liberal toleration. Both sides underestimate evangelical toleration’s genealogical and theoretical importance.

In a deliberative democracy, accommodations to religious minorities must be based on transformations in the current reflective equilibrium among the norms that make up the complex democratic ideal. This is not merely a conceptual enterprise of commensuration, since the need for any such transformation in standards of justification is due to changes in the nature of the polity itself, changes that in turn modify its regime of toleration. Recent debates about the public or nonpublic character of religious reasons provide a good test case and show why liberal deliberative theories are intolerant and fail to live up to democratic obligations to provide justifications to all members of the deliberative community. Political liberals now defend what Rawls calls the “inclusive view” of public reason with the appropriate ideal of reasonable pluralism. Against the application of such a liberal conception of toleration to deliberative democracy "the open view of toleration is with no constraints" is the only regime of toleration that can be democratically justified.

Religious toleration has long been the paradigm of the liberal ideal of toleration of group differences, as reflected in both the constitutions of the major Western democracies and in the theoretical literature explaining and justifying these practices. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares, everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. The American Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The first of the four “Fundamental Freedoms” in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is held to be “freedom of con-science and religion.” As the German Constitution (or “Basic Law”) provides in Article 4, “Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed, shall be inviolable,” adding, in a separate clause, “The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed.”

Catholic Encyclopedia indicates that nowhere is dogmatic intolerance so necessary a rule of life as in the domain of religious belief, since for each individual his eternal salvation is at stake. While abstract truth, both profane and religious, asserts itself victoriously through its impersonal evidence against all opposition, its human advocate, engaging in personal contest with adversaries of flesh and blood like himself, must have recourse to words and writing. Just as there can be no alternative multiplication tables, so there can be but a single true religion, which, by the very fact of its existence, protests against all other religions as false. But the love of truth requires each man to stand forth as the incorruptible advocate of truth and of truth alone. Conscious that the truth for which he fights or in good faith believes he fights, is, by reason of its innate nobility, incompatible with any blemish or stain, he will never claim license to abuse. Such an ideal champion of truth is fittingly designated by the English word “gentleman.” Hence the sharp, yet almost impersonal clash between opposing views of life, each of which contends for the palm, because each is thoroughly convinced that it alone is right. But the very devotion to truth which supports these convictions determines the kind of polemics which each believes himself called on to conduct. He whose sole concern is for truth itself, will never besmirch his escutcheon by lying or calumny and will refrain from all personal invective. He may, however, by a fair counter-stroke parry an unjust, malicious, and insulting attack, since his adversary has no right to employ invective, to falsify history, to practice sordid proselytism, etc., and may, therefore, be driven without pity from

31 Voltaire, Toleration and Other Essays, p. 92 – 96.
his false position. These principles obtain universally and for all men -- for scholars and statesmen, for Catholics and Protestants.

36 Voltaire says 'On Superstitition,' "My Brethren:

You are aware that all prominent nations have set up a public cult. Men have at all times assembled to deal with their interests and communicate their needs, and it was quite natural that they should open these meetings with some expression of the respect and love which they owe to the author of their lives. This homage has been compared to the respect which children pay to their father, and subjects to their sovereign. These are but feeble images of the worship of God. The relations of man to man have no proportion to the relation of the creature to the Supreme Being; there is no affinity between them. It would even be blasphemy to render homage to God in the form of a monarch. A ruler of the whole earth—if there could be such a person, and all men were so unhappy as to be subject to one man—would be but a worm of the earth, commanding other worms of the earth; he would still be infinitely lower than the Deity. In republics, moreover, which are unquestionably earlier than any monarchy, how could God be conceived in the shape of a king? If it be necessary to represent God in any sensible form, the idea of a father, defective as it is, would seem to be the best fitted to our weakness." 37

Yes, the religious tolerance is possible, but very possible; it is an inevitable reality. Religion, in its own nature, and according to what it is, cannot be an extremist or fanatic or convulsive. Indeed, the religious teachings require tolerance according to their special nature in order to accommodate different people intellectually, culturally and socially.

But where intolerance comes from? The main source of fanaticism and intolerance and exclusion of the other comes, not from religion itself, but from people who hold in themselves exclusionary, intolerant and convulsive interpretations of religion.

VI. IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND RESPONSIBILITY

There is widespread agreement that tolerance is a mainstay of modern liberalism, Michael Rosenthal argues. There is less agreement about what justifies it. It captures the central tension between disapproving some conduct and yet allowing it to continue that we find in the etymology of the word itself, which comes from the Latin tolerare, which means to bear or endure. As a starting point Rosenthal wants to offer the definition of toleration as "the refusal, where one has the power to do so, to prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct that one finds objectionable."

There are a variety of problems with this view but one bears directly on toleration itself. If we transform disapproval of others into indifference then toleration seems to have lost its meaning. Another set of problems arises if we accept some concept of the good as the basis for disapproval. One central problem of this kind, the so-called “paradox of toleration,” can be stated as follows: "Normally we count toleration as a virtue in individuals and a duty in societies. However, where toleration is based on moral disapproval it implies that the thing tolerated is wrong and ought not to exist. The question which then arises is why... it should be thought good to tolerate." If we include the expression of ideas through speech or other media as part of "conduct" then this will serve us adequately. This tension, however, produces a variety of conceptual puzzles and difficulties that bear on the justification and maintenance of the practice itself. Some of the problems are meta-ethical and arise from questions about the status of normativity itself. For example, one common justification of tolerance is based on skepticism about the good. If there is no objective idea of the good then enforcement of some subjective concept of it would be unjustified. 38

Tolerance requires us to accept people and permit their practices even when we strongly disapprove of them. There are limits to what we are able to do to prevent these things from happening, but we need not restrain ourselves out of tolerance for these actions as expressions of the perpetrators' values. Tolerance thus involves an attitude that is intermediate between wholehearted acceptance and unrestrained opposition. This intermediate status makes tolerance a puzzling attitude. There are certain things, such as murder, that ought not be tolerated. 39

Conceptions of equal citizenship or of universal human rights can be seen to have protected deep-reaching structures of inequality and domination that are damaging to women and other subordinate groups. It is now widely acknowledged that social pluralism—the presence in a society of distinct traditions and ways of life—vastly complicates the project of liberal political thought. The permanent presence of different and often competing systems of value challenges the ideal of civic culture on which liberal principle depends. 40

Forgiveness benefits wrongdoers, as well, by releasing them from the blame and hard feelings often directed toward them by those they wrong, or helping them transcend the guilt or remorse


they suffer from having done wrong, thereby allowing them to move forward in their lives. There is a strong relationship between toleration and forgiveness. Maintaining or perpetuating personal relationships is one of the clearest and most important ends of forgiveness, though not the only important one. Forgiving those who wrong us often helps us move beyond strong negative emotions which, if allowed to fester, could harm us psychologically and physically. These ends of forgiveness may be regarded as in general enabling in the sense that they show how forgiveness sometimes helps people move beyond the wrongs they endure or cause and the sometimes debilitating effects those wrongs have on wrongdoers and victims alike. For some, forgiveness has these forward-looking benefits because of the way it transfigures the past. 41

Tolerance is a defining value of liberalism, but it is also a nagging an embarrassment and vulnerability, as critics and defenders of liberalism both recognize. Liberals call tolerance “elusive,” “difficult,” “unstable,” “contradictory,” and even “impossible,” but they nevertheless regard toleration as an indispensable practice not only for believers in the values of self-creation and pluralism but also for citizens of whatever persuasion in a world of cultural, moral, and ideological variety. Many of its advocates acknowledge its flaws—for example, that tolerance can be condescending, hypocritical, and insufficiently ambitious in pursuit of justice and equality—but the only thing worse, they agree, is intolerance. Tolerance involves acceptance, sometimes grudging, of beliefs, values, and practices with which one disagrees or of which one disapproves, and that may understandably be felt as something less than the full recognition and equal treatment that dignity and respect require. 42

The full freedom of expression of individual and group differences in terms of culture, morality, religion, and lifestyle would be granted, and people would be freed from the burden of their differences and from the disadvantages suffered as members of certain groups. Equating contemporary question of toleration with issues of distribution, dealt with by the appropriate extension of the distributive paradigm, would love liberal toleration intact as the solution to moral, religious, and metaphysical pluralism. Moreover, it would avoid questioning the principal of state neutrality, and it would neutralize the risk that particular memberships and collective identities might trespass into the public domain of citizenship, the ground, indeed, of democratic legitimacy, of the overlapping consensus and of public reasons for the liberal democratic order to be preserved. And if the distributive paradigm could be stretched far enough to compensate for asymmetries in public respect, social, and opportunities linked to membership of disadvantaged groups, then the liberal ideal of toleration would be properly fulfilled. 43

Therefore, tolerationology is a way of thinking in the individual and collective responsibility about the importance of tolerance and its extreme necessity for the sustainability of human life and the continuity of co-existence. It’s a responsibility to maintain self-identity on the one hand and to deal with the different identity of other in a very sophisticated way so as to promote the values of peace in every place and time.

VII. CONCLUSION

1- The aim of ‘Tolerationology’ is to launch the way for philosophy and human thought to start thinking with toleration as a science, which represents one of the basic approaches to counter extremism, intolerance, narrow-mindedness and stagnation.

2- We consider toleration as love to human beings and other creatures. It is cooperation and a decision in co-existence with other regardless of being different.

3- ‘Tolerationology’ means through toleration we can find solutions to the severe structural imbalances in the nature of individual and the structure of society too.

4- The difference is an essential part of human nature, and history shows that humanity has been different throughout its history. The solution for humanitarian difference is in toleration.

5- The origin of the history of humanity is tolerance, peace and coexistence; regardless of the periods in which this history has seen witnessing a struggle and a conflict between different social groups in different times and places.

6- John Locke represents one of the important stations in the history of toleration in the world. His book ‘A Letter Concerning Toleration’ is considered a leading figure in the attempt to think about ‘Tolerationology.’

7- The attempts to deepen human understanding on toleration have not been interrupted since Locke until today. On the contrary, we find that the work is continuing in this context, and, therefore, it is very possible and important to get benefit from all attempts to formulate the general laws of ‘Tolerationology.’

8- The religious tolerance is possible. It is an inevitable reality. Religion cannot be an extremist or fanatic or convulsive. Indeed, the religious teachings require tolerance according to their special nature in order to accommodate different people intellectually, culturally and socially.

9- The main source of fanaticism and intolerance and exclusion of the other comes, not from religion itself, but from people who hold in themselves exclusionary, intolerant and convulsive interpretations of religion.

10- Toleranology is a way of thinking in the individual and collective responsibility about the importance of tolerance and its extreme necessity for the sustainability of human life and the continuity of co-existence.

11- It is a responsibility to maintain self-identity on the one hand and to deal with the different identity of other in a very sophisticated way so as to promote the values of peace in every place and time.

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First Author – Rawaa Mahmoud Hussain,
Prof. Dr. (Islamic Philosophy), Rochester Muslim Community Center (RMCC), Lecturer (Arabic Language), Nazareth College, Rochester, New York, USA, Rawaahussain1@gmail.com